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This thesis introduces and examines the work of French philosopher Michel Henry 
with particular focus on his phenomenological-theological analyses of the self. Given 
its thematic emphasis, the thesis incorporates several interlocutors in addition to 
Henry: primarily Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and St. Augustine but also 
Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Yves Lacoste and Dominique Janicaud. Revolving around the 
question of the self, the thesis maintains that Henry elucidates a peculiar and 
ultimately problematic theory of the self—a duplicitous self bifurcated between 
interior and exterior fields of display. While appreciating Henry’s attempt to 
reconstitute the interior self in relation to God, we argue he ultimately disqualifies 
the utility of the exterior body in the world; to overcome this imbalance we employ 
key insights from St. Augustine’s “phenomenology of the self,” drawing especially 
on his more mature works, De Trinitate, City of God and the Confessions. 
 The first chapter offers broad context to the thesis as a whole by specifying 
what constitutes phenomenology as a line of inquiry, the debate surrounding the 
“theological turn” introduced by Dominique Janicaud in the 1990s and a constructive 
proposal for a rapprochement between phenomenology and theology. Chapter two 
determines Henry’s place in the phenomenological tradition, bringing to light his 
critical departure from both Heidegger and Husserl. Heidegger’s analytic of being-in-
the-world discloses how human existence is co-emergent with the exterior (i.e. 
ecstatic) field of the world. Husserl’s focus on the intentional life of the ego suggests 
that consciousness is like a “lighthouse” that illuminates objects before its gaze. 
From Henry’s perspective, both Heidegger and Husserl advance a self shaped 
entirely by the exterior world and its temporal horizon. To counter the singular focus 
on exteriority, Henry does not deny exteriority but attends to the possibility of a site 
of pure interiority, secure and complete in its transcendental self-presence and thus 
disengaged from the exterior horizon of the world.  
 Chapters three and four critically elaborate Henry’s duplicitous self from a 
theological point of view. Interrogating Henry’s triptych on Christianity (C’est moi 
la vérité, 1996; Incarnation, une philosophie de la chair, 2000; and Paroles du 
Christ, 2002), we see that the self is structured a duplicity or two-sidedness. Chapter 
three’s main premise is that the interior ego is manifest internal to itself apart from 
exterior horizon of temporality. Prior to the temporal opening of the world, Henry 
articulates a self who appears in non-temporal or “acosmic” union with divine life. 
Joined together in perfect unity by a subjective structure called “auto-affection,” the 
interior self and God form a fully-realized “monism,” a parousaic presence that both 
eliminates the Creator-creature distinction and promotes escapism from the world. 
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Chapter four confirms this thesis with regard to Henry’s richly textured 
considerations of the body. 
 Chapters five and six proceed to show a constructive way beyond Henry’s 
duplicitous self. Over against Henry, the thesis elaborates an eschatological 
conception of the self we call the “porous self.” Ordered by the eschatological 
structure of “seeking,” the porous self takes as its principal interlocutor St. 
Augustine, however, insights from Marion, Lacoste, Husserl and Heidegger are 
employed. This thesis figures a self that does not split, but integrates, the interior and 
exterior fields of display within the absolute horizon of the parousia or eternal 
Sabbath to come. Chapter five discusses the temporal nature of faith nurtured by the 
eucharist and the chapter six highlights the importance of the body in view of the 
ecclesial, sacramental and resurrection bodies. An exercise in constructive 
philosophical theology, this thesis figures the self over against Henry’s duplicitous 
self, and in so doing, integrates interiority more deeply with exteriority in a manner 
that accounts for (1) the temporal nature of the body in the world and (2) the 
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 Michel Henry (1922-2002) is perhaps one of the most eclectic and prolific 
philosophers to appear in France following the cultural and social upheaval of World 
War II. Publishing a two volume tome exceeding 1,000 pages entitled simply the 
L’essence de la manifestation in 1963, and following it up with several significant 
cross-disciplinary studies in the course of a long career, his current popularity in 
France shows no signs of waning and the reception of his work in the English-
speaking world is steadily advancing among theologians and philosophers. 
Throughout his career he declined several invitations to take up prestigious posts at 
the Sorbonne, opting instead to spend his entire career working quietly, and often in 
isolation, at the University of Montpellier in the south of France. It is no surprise, 
then, that his philosophical style mounts a meticulous critique of standard habits of 
thinking, typically forsaking the trends of the day in a bid to reach an original and 
formidable moment in not only the phenomenological tradition but also in the history 
of Western philosophical discourse and philosophy of religion, making his work a 
major force to reckon with both in philosophy and theology.   
 Henry was principally a philosopher in the phenomenological tradition, but 
he also incorporated important theological motifs within his work. The trajectory of 
Henry’s thought originates with a unique and radical phenomenological articulation 
of transcendental life and culminates with an explicitly theological thematization of 
the “arch-transcendental” truth manifest in the New Testament that builds on and 
advances from his earlier work. Endeavouring to set phenomenology on new footing 
in his widely-read L’essence de la manifestation, and exhibiting already in that text a 
markedly theological sensibility, Henry consistently engaged throughout his career 
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with the intellectual tradition Husserl inaugurated. Not so much a phenomenologist 
under the spell of Husserl or Heidegger but an imaginative philosopher who 
privileges the conceptual organon of phenomenology, Henry treated multiple topics 
of study on the basis of phenomenological inquiry from the 1970s up through the 
1990s. Even while penning four novels, Henry critically engaged with, and advanced 
debate in, topics in political theory, cultural critique, art, psychoanalysis and 
provided original readings of figures such as Marx, Main de Biran, Spinoza, Hegel 
and Husserl himself. At every stage Henry reaffirmed his commitment to ordering all 
intellectual inquiry by the philosophical techniques born from his critical 
rearticulation of the Husserlian subject, and this is dramatically punctuated in his 
phenomenological treatment of Christianity developed in a final trilogy from 1996 to 
2002.  
 Adopting the code name “Kant” during the French Resistance in WW II,
1
 he 
devoted those precarious years to understanding Kant’s powerful transcendental 
architectonic only to replace it with a more refined phenomenological alternative 
years later. Not satisfied with Kant early on, then, it was after the war he discovered 
the philosopher’s harvest to be had in the confrontation with Husserl’s Cartesian 
Meditations. This book provoked in him grande emotion
2
 and opened his eyes to the 
rich possibilities for renewing transcendental philosophy that lay dormant in Husserl. 
Recognizing that the transcendental tradition constituted a key breakthrough in the 
history of philosophy, Henry advanced a thesis holding within it what he thought was 
a much needed corrective to that tradition: the secret of pure immanence given to a 
subject that is “not of this world.” There is no question here that Henry’s work gave 
                                                 
1
 Michel Henry, Auto-donation: entretiens et conférences (Paris: Beauchesne, 2004), 247-48. 
2
 Michel Henry, Entretiens (Paris: Editions Sulliver, 2007), 16. 
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philosophical expression to a concrete, historical situation in which a young man’s 
life was consecrated, for a short time, to secretive reconnaissance missions 
undertaken during the underground La Résistance Française: the secret of life itself 
is manifest, not as a political and social force witnessed to in and ordered by the 
world, but as a living underground current within my soul. And such an underground 
current reveals itself as a living feeling of myself that can never become thematized 
as a visible object in the world. Once I institute a withdrawal from the world, 
interiority appears as a living auto-affection, a secretive and nocturnal (i.e. 
“underground”) source in which there is no exteriority, no outside and no world 
involved, a pure subjective life that brings to light the transcendental root at the base 
of all experience. 
 Henry advances into explicitly theological terrain in his final works, where a 
theological distinction between the interior and exterior domains of selfhood is 
magnificently detailed. The structure of the transcendental self is originally 
theological in substance inasmuch as the integrity of interior self-awareness suffuse 
with itself holds another secret: that it is held together by God, and once revealed, 
opens up an interior self-awareness pervaded by the essence of divine life—a 
transcendental subject reflecting what Rudolf Bernet describes as a thickly “baroque” 
expression of Christian philosophical theology.
3
 Henry insists that the inner content 
of Christianity expressed in a New Testament idiom, one Christological in aesthetic 
and deeply Johannine in sensibility, is able to illuminate with overwhelming power 
the secret and invisible joy of sharing in an eternal Sonship through which God 
enables me to undergo myself as myself. It is this theological turn that figures the 
                                                 
3
 Rudolf Bernet, “Christianity and Philosophy,” Continental Philosophy Review 32 (1999): 325-42, 
reference on 339. 
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invisible manifestation of God inside me, and the conceptual difficulties to which it 
gives rise, that consist of the principal content to which we shall attend throughout 
this dissertation, albeit never in isolation from the larger context of Henry’s eclectic 
work. We sketch, in what follows, the contextual and constructive aspects of the 
dissertation and then outline the prospective chapters. 
 Why is Henry significant for theological reflection on the self? To begin, 
Henry works between phenomenology and theology in such a way that they mutually 
engage by exchanging resources and intertwining vocabulary. To arrange philosophy 
and theology within a single transcendental style of reflection, as Henry does, is to 
unify them around thematic of the self. This is, of course, an intellectually dubious 
strategy. To figure the self after Henry is to situate the self within a space between 
philosophy and theology, and yet, this becomes space seems to move in and out of 
the long shadow of modernity stretching back principally to post-Kantian reflections 
on the transcendental “I” and secondarily to the post-Cartesian cogito.  
 Evident most emphatically in the valorisation of the subject, the philosophical 
tradition of modernity casts the dark cloud of egoism or solipsism over any thinker 
who might be seduced by its intellectual and spiritual pathos. Henry elucidates the 
subject’s direct relation with itself, an interior experience that opens up an apodictic 
self-revelation of life manifest as a subjective unity at the ground of all experience. 
Some have accused Henry to have alighted upon, with unprecedented rigor, a 
sovereign, self-legislating subject, one that dictates in advance how and when the 
world may appear and on what conditions the other subject shall become a 
meaningful experience for me, not least how God may appear. This is why Michel 
Haar has recently compared Henry’s transcendental self to a metaphysical subject 
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explicitly inscribed within the onto-theological trajectory originating with Descartes 
and proceeding up through Kant and reinforced in great detail by Husserl.
4
 There is 
no question Henry figures the self explicitly within a post-Kantian context, however, 
Henry also incorporates theological resources that prioritize the spirituality of a 
contemplative self before God (coram Deo), a Western theological concept of the 
self stretching back at least to St. Augustine’s conspicuous turn inward in the 
Confessions. Henry is thus important for theological reflection on the self because he 
discusses the contemporary philosophical problem of the self in tandem with a strong 
theological critique of the self-subsisting, sovereign “I.” 
 While intending to challenge a hasty condemnation of the valorisation of the 
sovereign subject that befalls Henry’s transcendental self, this dissertation explores 
constructive directions the self can take after Henry. To count as a “self” in the first 
place, Henry insists, God must be there as that ineliminable primitive power that 
gives rise to “me” in my self-presence: continually born of God, I am joined to 
myself in and through my abiding and indestructible unity with God. This 
dissertation engages such key theological breakthroughs that Henry orchestrates with 
great imaginative force and philosophical depth—only to construct, over against 
Henry a self who comes to himself in a pilgrimage through the world undertaken in 
faith; this, too, a theological self but one thematized explicitly from an eschatological 
point of view. A charitable and sympathetic reading of Henry appreciates the creative 
manner by which a phenomenological description of the self in unity with God is 
given expression in his last works on Christianity. To break from Henry is not 
abandon the basic Christian theological economy in which he situates the self. 
                                                 
4
 Michel Haar, La philosophie française entre phénoménologie et metaphysique (Paris: PUF, 1999), 




Rather, it is to challenge the narrow scope of such an economy and reaffirm in fresh 
and subtle ways the eschatological directionality of the self. 
 Henry is important for reflection on the self for another reason. He challenges 
and provokes his readers into rethinking the self apart from the visible disclosure of 
the world: I am, according to Henry, a living soul the world can neither accept nor 
recognize, for my display is immeasurable by the standard of the world. 
Consequently, the course his work proceeds down gives to theology motivation and 
skills for understanding more fully how God’s self-revelation engenders a mystical 
subjective ground that is juxtaposed with the world’s light, and this for Christological 
reasons: “Having come among his own, they did not recognize him” (John 1.11). As 
a strategy for thinking about the absolute, Henry’s work provides an opportunity both 
for phenomenology and theology together to explore the interior space of the soul as 
it lay bare under the gaze of God as well as the “subjective feel” of the body and 
importance of affection and feeling as theological attunements nourished by the soul 
in faith.  
 While the literature on Henry continues apace in French-speaking literature, 
there is an opportunity here to bring to light resources in Henry that may contribute 
to the ongoing conversation taking place between phenomenology and theology and 
continental philosophy of religion broadly conceived as it continues to gain traction 
in the English-speaking world. Along with figures like Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Yves 
Lacoste and Jean-Louis Chrétien, Henry is a thinker whose ascension in the literature 
proves that he as struck a chord, that he has evoked and continues to evoke creative 
debate that can engender fresh thinking on traditional theological discourse. 
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 Henry’s position is not without problems, as noted above. Intended as a 
constructive study that does not merely conduct a survey of, or serve as commentary 
upon Henry, this dissertation carefully brings to light and then attempts to surpass 
two problems that bedevil Henry’s project at its most basic level: the inability to 
account for the ineluctably temporal and bodily states of the self. This dissertation 
intends to show that his narrative of the self remains shut up inside itself and 
enunciates a interior disposition that is (1) self-present and without relation to the 
temporal streaming of the world and (2) a purely interior subjective body and without 
relation to the exterior objective body in the world. Hence this dissertation takes 
temporality and the body as entry points into the lived-structure of the eschatological 
self. In critical dialogue Henry this dissertation therefore attempts to explicate a 
theological self that does not split, but integrates, the interior and exterior domains 
(as spatial metaphors) from an eschatological point of view, and this to overcome an 
escapist mood or “non-temporal” other-worldliness to which Henry’s bifurcated self 
is liable. The eschatological self so understood, in contrast to Henry, does not 
abandon the body in the temporal world but is catalyzed by, and realized in, bodily 
manifestations tied to a world given at creation. As placed in a world whose cosmic 
drama entails a temporal telos, a theological destiny to be fulfilled beyond itself, I am 
drawn by grace in my pilgrimage through such a world without terminating here and 
now in a religious experience in which God becomes a phenomenon present to me. 
The eschatological self inhabits thereupon a temporal horizon in view of the eternal, 
which, to situate the argument in view of the wider contemporary theological turn, 
lies between those projects that render God a phenomenon (Henry, Marion, etc.) and 
those that treat God as wholly other (Derrida, religion without religion, etc.). Such a 
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contribution seeks to articulate a self who seeks a God always intimate and yet 
elusive, neither present as a phenomenon nor distant and without relation. 
 Theological reflection is not carried out in a vacuum. As such, we appeal to 
the phenomenological depiction of the self made explicit in so many exemplary 
passages from the canonical mind of St. Augustine. The dissertation therefore offers 
a constructive phenomenological theology that at once draws on contemporary 
theological resources and creatively retrieves aspects of St. Augustine’s inventory of 
the self.  
 As both a critical study of Henry’s theological turn and a constructive 
exercise in philosophical theology, the dissertation is ordered thematically around the 
two poles that figure the self: temporality and the body. A prospective division of the 
book as a whole consists of three parts with two chapters each: (1) part one proceeds 
with contextual themes, (2) part two is exegetical in nature, spanning the entire scope 
of Henry’s work while singling out his theological turn and (3) part three proposes a 
constructive way forward beyond what we perceive to be decisive conceptual 
problems in Henry. 
 
Chapter outline 
 Chapter one begins from a purposely broad vantage point by asking: what is 
phenomenology? Setting up important contextual boundaries for the dissertation as a 
whole, this chapter characterizes phenomenology as a “style of thinking” (rather than 
a strict method) as well as discusses strategies for how phenomenology and theology 
can positively relate; which, of course, enables us to approach with greater care and 
depth Henry’s understanding of the self. Chapter two’s intent is narrower in that it 
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elucidates the specific phenomenological context out of which Henry’s unique 
contribution emerges. Focusing especially on Husserl, and tangentially on 
Heidegger, chapter two shows just how Henry broadens the “theatre of appearing” 
originally assembled by those two German phenomenologists.  
 Part two consists of chapters three and four, both of which explicate how 
Henry figures the theological self in view of temporality and the body. Chapter three 
highlights how Henry critically attends to the temporal field of the self while chapter 
four spells out Henry’s critique of the exterior body in the world. Both of these 
chapters maintain that Henry’s theological turn amounts to a turn toward a qualified 
monism inasmuch as an interior, non-temporal self is privileged over against an 
“irreal” temporal and bodily self in the world; we name Henry’s monistic self the 
“duplicitous self” because it splits the self irreparably between interior and exterior 
sites.  
 And, finally, part three consists of a phenomenological-theological sketch of 
a constructive way forward beyond Henry’s duplicitous self, again taking temporality 
and the body as entry points into the self. To this end, we reoccupy St. Augustine’s 
brilliant explication of time and his theological interpretation of the sacramental, 
ecclesial and resurrection bodies, forming single self comprised of integrated fields 
of expereince—we name this the porous self. This is, in brief, the overarching 
structure of the dissertation. 
 
Two caveats 
 (1) Many of our creative rearticulations of St. Augustine’s insights about the 
self are taken up with Henry and the contemporary theological turn explicitly in 
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mind. While the reader can refer to footnotes to investigate further the works from 
which we draw in Augustine, three in particular stand out: the Confessions, the City 
of God, and De Trinitate. While some secondary sources on Augustine are engaged 
in the footnotes too, our main task is to profit from Augustine’s own intellectual 
inventory on the structure of the self, thereby mining him as a resource for figuring 
the self after Henry. That is, our project is not a comparison between Michel Henry 
and St. Augustine, outlining Henry and St. Augustine’s respective positions only to 
suggest that latter triumphs. The “porous self” is elaborated in an Augustinian 
complexion, but it is intended primarily as rebuttal to problems we raise in Henry, 
and thus, as a contribution to the discussion of the self transpiring between 
phenomenology and theology. 
 (2) The second caveat invokes the issue of theological method. Throughout 
we shall appropriate aspects of important and frequently debated theological loci in 
dogmatics, such as the doctrines of creation, eschatology, God and the imago Dei. 
Our constructive application of these issues (typically discussed and debated in 
Christian dogmatics such as Barth’s Church Dogmatics) shall not enter into the 
important and vastly complex history of Christian doctrine and the various 
contemporary modifications of creation, eschatology, etc. As traditional loci within 
Christian dogmatics, we are not intending that our affirmation of creation or 
eschatology necessarily provide a new angle on their contemporary use. We are 
principally interested in figuring the lived dynamics of the porous self between 
traditional Christian theology and the contemporary philosophical interest in 
overcoming the post-Cartesian, modern subject. Beginning with Descartes and 
developed over the course of the Enlightenment up through German and French 
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phenomenology in the twentieth-century, the “subject” is normally understood as 
sovereign and self-positing, and furthermore, typically avoids theological grammar to 
articulate its basic structure. The great merit of Henry’s work is that he recasts the 
“subject” from a theological point of view without abandoning philosophical rigour. 
The porous self as we elucidate it after Henry is therefore intrinsically theological 
and thus draws on Christian theology to sharpen its complex philosophical 
configuration. While the self is truly accomplished within a theological space, it is 
also brought to light by phenomenological inquiry, and so figuring the self from the 
point of view of phenomenological theology treads carefully among contemporary 
debates about the theological doctrines themselves. We devote, for example, a 
portion of chapter five both to reinforcing the doctrine of creation and the imago Dei, 
and yet, we are not advancing a thesis about creation that we perceive to be novel. 
And, while we affirm that God is both timeless and dynamically involved in the 
temporal streaming of the world-horizon, and while that may be a fruitful insight 
about the doctrine of God for a systematic theologian, we are not offering what we 
perceive to be a novel thesis about the doctrine of God. The principal focus of this 
thesis is to examine Michel Henry’s philosophical thematization of the self from a 
theological point of view, which in turn, blends aspects of dogmatic theology with 
























































The unfinished nature of phenomenology and the inchoative atmosphere 
which has surrounded it are not to be taken as a sign of failure, they were 
inevitable because phenomenology’s task was to reveal the mystery the 











 §1. WHAT IS PHENOMENOLOGY? 
 We commence with three aims: (1) to highlight key features of what 
constitutes phenomenology as a line of inquiry, (2) to deliberate critically upon the 
debate about the “theological turn” in phenomenology typically associated with 
Dominique Janicaud and (3) to develop a constructive, if only a rather skeletal 
defence of the possibility of a rapprochement between phenomenology and theology. 
While this chapter sets the intellectual context in which Henry thought maneuvers, it 
also advances what can only be portrayed as preliminary moves toward a basic 
harmony between philosophical and theological intuitions—which shall count as an 
important foundational principle for later chapters that operate on the assumption that 
phenomenology and theology intertwine. For most of this chapter, Henry recedes to 
the margins, occasionally surfacing to prompt a sign that shall guide us along the 
path of brief but necessary condideration of the broad patterns of inquiry that give to 
                                                 
5
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1965) xix. 
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phenomenology its coherence as a specific conceptual vernacular or tradition of 
philosophical discourse. We reconstruct the details of the Husserlian profile of 
Henry’s own interest in phenomenological method (and he devoted several texts to 
it) in chapter two. In the present chapter, however, we aim solely at the historical and 
intellectual movement of phenomenology, how it could be defined as a particular 
style of thinking with a form of discourse distinct from its predecessors without at 
the same time committing it to a strict scientific regiment (§1). We then examine the 
theological turn in contemporary phenomenology (§§2-3), after which we shall offer 
a précis of the overall argument of the dissertation (§4).  
 Is phenomenology the “rigorous science” inaugurated by Edmund Husserl at 
the dawn of the twentieth-century, a science that returns to “the things themselves” 
and the vast network of lived experiences to which that return gives rise?
6
 Or, is 
phenomenology a disconnected sequence of philosophical breakthroughs that follow 
upon, but diverge radically from, what counts as the return to “the things 
themselves”? Husserl correlates the return to the “things themselves” to acts of 
consciousness, Heidegger structures it around existential being-in-the-world, Levinas 
links such a return to ethical existence and Henry and Marion mark out their 
respective trajectories. If phenomenology, as an intellectual tradition, is pulled in 
several directions at once, is it nothing more than a fragmented set of philosophical 
trends that originate in Germany and then blossom in France? Is phenomenology 
nothing more than a diffuse mosaic of singular styles of philosophy that rarely 
                                                 
6
 Husserl calls his readers to return straight to the things themselves when he writes, “but to judge 
rationally or scientifically about things signifies to conform to the things themselves or to go from 
words and opinions back to the things themselves, to consult them in their self-givenness and to set 
aside all prejudices alien to them.” See Husserl, Ideas I, 35. Claude Romano makes explicit the 
connection between returning to the things themselves and the affirmation of concrete, subjective 
experience in Husserl. See Romano, Au coeur de la raison: la phénoménologie (Paris: Gallimard, 
2010), chapter one, “le retour à l’expérience.”  
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 While phenomenology, as an intellectual tradition, is certainly diverse, this 
need not be a sign of failure, as the well-known Mearleau-Ponty epigraph highlights 
(in 1945) with a poetic prescience. If we do not constrain phenomenology within 
rigid categories such as “strict method” or “rigorous science” then we ought not 
assume the presumptive opposite end of the spectrum either, i.e., that 
phenomenology is shapeless, a shattered montage of philosophical trends without 
purpose. In what follows, this section intends to show that phenomenology, as a 
generative intellectual tradition originating with Husserl and winding its way through 
a tortuous path up to the present French scene, examines the appearing of 
phenomena in relation to a self (however “self” is conceived) and the ensemble of 
lived experiences to which that relation gives rise.   
 Phenomenology, as that philosophical tradition that makes appearing the key 
to interpreting the self and its place in the world, is as vibrant a style of thinking 
today as any other contemporary philosophical tradition. Given its proliferation over 
the last few decades not only in continental Europe but in America as well, its 
fecundity as a movement lies not in a particular thinker but rather in a group of 
diverse thinkers unified around a single mode of inquiry—which we shall sketch in a 
bit more detail below. Michel Henry may overstate the extent to which 
phenomenology has become an intellectual force in twentieth-century philosophical 
discourse, but nevertheless, he highlights well the decisive place phenomenology 
currently occupies among other intellectual traditions born in the West. 
                                                 
7
 See his brief, but provocative, book: Dominique Janicaud, Phenomenology “Wide Open:” After the 
French Debate, trans. Charles N. Cabral (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). 
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Phenomenology, he insists, will be to the twentieth-century what German Idealism 
was to the nineteenth, what empiricism was to the eighteenth, what Cartesianism was 
to the seventeenth, what Thomas and Scotus were to Scholasticism and what Plato 
and Aristotle were to antiquity.
8
 Doubtless, phenomenological inquiry was 
undertaken by some of the best philosophical minds of the twentieth-century, from 
its founder in Husserl and his protégé in Heidegger, to Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, and 
Henry, to name but a few. Yet, precisely because, as we shall show, it is a “style of 
thinking” (rather than a strict scientific procedure), phenomenology often proves 
difficult to define; to secure it once and for all and to domesticate it a single concept 
should appear as an impossible consideration. While it is no surprise that some 
phenomenologists such as Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion,
9
 not least the founder 
himself, endeavour to fix its boundaries with an unwavering finality and establish its 
methodological protocol with an unpalatable triumphalism, phenomenology’s 
“inchoative atmosphere” has resisted such rigid territorialism. In fact, attempts 
severally made at defining phenomenology have given way to internal strife, 
generating considerable controversy over what constitutes its basic ground rules. If it 
is situated as one among other great intellectual traditions of the West, and it displays 
enough of a unified character to be identified as a “style of thinking” (not a strict 
method), then it follows that phenomenology must be describable as a theoretical 
enterprise without at the same time assuming a territorial perspective.   
                                                 
8
 See Henry, Material Phenomenology, trans. Scott Davidson (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2008), 1. 
9
 For their respective claims about founding phenomenology on a final principle, whether it is pure 
immanence (Henry) or givenness (Marion), see Henry, Material Phenomenology, chapter 1; and 
Marion, “Phenomenology of Givenness and First Philosophy,” in In Excess: Studies in Saturated 




 Over the course of this chapter it shall become clear that we think 
phenomenology is the study of how phenomena “appear” (i.e., manifest, reveal, 
show, disclose, display, phenomenalize, etc.) to a perceiving subject. It is a 
philosophical strategy that, while simple on the surface, takes on highly complex 
questions about the nature of “phenomena” as well as the structures of perception 
that allow phenomena to appear. Studying how a phenomenon is given to a 
perceiving subject necessarily touches off fascinating inquiries into the nature the 
world, consciousness, temporality and the body, among other things. So whether one 
is investigating how an object appears or how another human appears or even how 
the world-horizon itself appears, phenomenology, in principle, analyzes and gives 
expression to how anything whatsoever may appear and thus be experienced. As 
Husserl maintains, anything experienceable is by right expressible.
10
 It is therefore 
our view that because phenomenological inquiry is unified as an intellectual 
movement around “the appearing of phenomena to a perceiving subject,” it brings to 
light both the genitive and dative poles of appearing: a phenomenon is always an 
appearing of something for someone.
11
 This is not a gratuitous definition. To 
consider it a more persuasive, and perhaps less gratuitous, definition we shall 
therefore seek to situate it within the breadth of the phenomenological tradition itself. 
 Placing the correlation between the genitive and dative poles of appearing at 
the centre of phenomenology brings to light the basic correlation between the object 
pole (genitive) and the “me” pole (dative). Using categories drawn from grammar, 
                                                 
10
 Husserl writes, “Anything ‘meant as meant,’ anything meant in the noematic sense (and, more 
particularly, as the noematic core,) pertaining to any act, no matter which, is expressible by means of 
‘significations.’” See Edmund Husserl, Ideas I, §124, 295. 
11
 I borrow the heuristic expression “genitive and dative of appearing” from two Husserl scholars even 
though I do not necessarily owe how I build upon it to their overtly Husserlian orientations. See Dan 
Zahavi, Self-awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1999), 50 ff; and James G. Hart, The Person and the Common Life: 
Studies in a Husserlian Social Ethics (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), 9 ff.  
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the classification of genitive and dative poles of appearing is not intended to be 
understood literally. Even if a little awkward, the grammatical formula of “genitive 
and dative” illustrates a helpful metaphor or convention that clarifies the basic 
perimeter around which phenomenological inquiry circulates. The nominative is 
excluded, not because it is nonexistent, but rather because it is such a contested and 
problematic philosophical declension. The nominative “I” or “transcendental ego” is 
what contemporary philosophers usually associate with the Cartesian “I think” (Ego 
cogito) or Kant’s transcendental aesthetic. The strategy of placing the genitive and 
dative poles at the centre of phenomenology is motivated by a desire to move from 
the valorisation of the nominative “I” to the relation between a phenomenon and the 
lived-experience it evokes in “me.” Studying how something is given to me displaces 
the “I,” therefore, from the centre of reference and brings to light rich resources 
phenomenological inquiry after Husserl may hold for figuring the self outside of the 
post-Cartesian tendency to reify the self as a sovereign “I” that dictates “everything 
else.”  
 It is also worth noting that the emphasis on the genitive and dative poles of 
appearing represents a heuristic device employed over against other methodological 
procedures also capable of bringing to light characteristic features of phenomenology 
as a style of thinking. Certainly the various interpretations of the phenomenological 
reduction (epoché) initiated by Husserl and developed in various directions by, for 
example, Henry and Marion, could disclose fundamental structures of appearing, and 
thus, help one find what phenomenology as an intellectual tradition “is all about” 
(Eugen Fink remarks that all phenomenology must pass through the reduction).
12
 The 
                                                 
12
 See Eugen Fink, The Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of a Method, 
trans. Ronald Bruzina (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), 10.  
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notion of “intentionality,” too, is perhaps adequate to such a task. Even the weighty 
question of “Being” and “Existence” broached by post-Heideggerian and post-
Sartrean phenomenology may suffice to account for important boundaries of 
phenomenology and, again, help one get to the heart of what constitutes it as a line of 
inquiry. While discussing all of these classifications (reduction, intentionality and 
Being) shall take us too far afield, the “genitive and dative poles of appearing” 
represents a preferable strategy in that it can aid the reader to gain a sense of what 
phenomenology, broadly conceived, may mean at its base. This is so because these 
procedures (reduction, intentionality and Being) are constantly modified, and 
perhaps, too elusive to be able to grant unity to what is already a radically diverse 
movement. Take “intentionality,” for example. Is there constitutive intentionality 
(Husserl) or counter-intentionality (Levinas and Marion) or non-intentionality 
(Henry), or all three? The category itself is highly contested. The same could be 
shown with regard to the reduction and to Being. Appearing can be unveiled with a 
range of particular procedural considerations, and yet, these considerations are 
normally pressed into service to unveil how something can become a “phenomenon” 
in view of the perceiving subject (however the phenomenologist describes the 
subject). It is perhaps most fruitful, and simple, then, to define phenomenology as a 
style of thinking that examines how phenomena come into view by passing between 
the two poles, how something appears (genitive pole) to “me” (dative pole).  
 Now, it is crucial to acknowledge that what is indicated by the term 
“appearing” is elusive. Phenomenological inquiry does not give only illuminations of 
how something appears on its own, as if an object could appear without also already 
appearing to someone. “Appearing” necessarily implicates both genitive and dative 
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poles. Appearing is a lived experience of a phenomenon. If the chair in the corner of 
the room is to appear to me, then it must be given to me, in the flesh, and become a 
lived experience for me. Never independent of the perceiving subject, something 
cannot appear without a subjective pole already there to receive and live through the 
appearance. So even though phenomenology brings to light how objects appear or 
even how the world-horizon appears, by virtue of the primal correlation between the 
genitive and dative poles, appearing cannot appear as a presentation of a 
phenomenon independent of a subject. Phenomenology is pre-eminently concerned 
with what makes the object’s appearing possible in the first place, namely, the 
subject who receives the object, typically understood as the “self.” In the 
phenomenological tradition, Husserl may call this subjective site of manifestation the 
“Ich-pol,” Heidegger may call it “Dasein,” Merleau-Ponty may call it the “le corps 
vécu” and Marion may call it “l’adonné.” Phenomenology must elucidate the precise 
structure of the “self” involved in the correlation between the genitive and dative 
poles. 
 So far we have characterized phenomenology as that diverse intellectual 
tradition that focuses, at its base, on the genitive and dative poles of appearing. 
Despite the variations of vocabulary deployed and elaborate philosophical 
constructions worked out by the great thinkers of the tradition, our classification (i.e., 
genitive and dative) reveals the distinctive movement of the tradition from a broad 
point of view. And yet a more precise characterization of it is required all the while 
maintaining the “inchoative atmosphere” that inevitably surrounds it. While one may 
find the double focus on genitive and dative poles a point of unity, as a thread that 
ties together the phenomenological movement, it is necessary to emphasize that 
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phenomenology, as “a style of thinking” (not a strict method), reflects a dynamic 
openness. Its boundaries are in a fluctuating dialectic of expansion and contraction 
accompanied by frequent interruption. Phenomenology is not a closed system; quite 
the contrary, it reflects a living oscillation of tributaries, channels and alleyways 
splintering in conflicting, as well as overlapping, directions. It thus reflects a shifting 
intellectual movement interested in elucidating multiple phenomena rather than in 
limiting itself to a specialized programme or ossified routine. Phenomenology 
unfolds itself in a process, as an unfinished movement, as Merleau-Ponty famously 
contended in his preface to the Phenomenology of Perception (see the epigraph 
above). It never completes or exhausts itself in its ambition for finality. Indeed, 
phenomenological inquiry introduces a dynamic and supple mode of thinking—not a 
school of philosophy propped up by the self-defeating stasis of territorialism. 
Because it is style of thinking, it resembles what Levinas calls a “technique”
13
 or a 
finely-tuned conceptual skill learned in a tradition and put into play to unveil and 
then articulate how something might become a phenomenon (genitive) for me 
(dative).   
 In the name of such dynamism, the emphasis on genitive and dative poles of 
appearing disallows the subject-object opposition to be the point of departure. 
Phenomenology’s attentive sketches of the structure of appearing surmount the facile 
notion that my ego is like an inner sphere, a cabinet or a box, for “the perceiving of 
what is known is not a process of returning with one’s booty to the ‘cabinet’ of 
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 Emmanuel Levinas, Discovering Existence with Husserl, trans. Richard Cohen and Michael B. 




consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it.”
14
 While Husserl may highlight 
the “purified ego” up against the bracketed “world,” he does not sever the relation 
between the intentional life of the ego and its ongoing immersion in the exterior 
world-horizon of temporal objects. Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas (and others) 
also refuse pitting the ego over against the world. For them, the “self” is ineluctably 
tied to, and implied within, the structural opening of the world. The self, in our view, 
therefore, is linked to the sphere of appearing opened up by the lived experience of 
worldly phenomena that make their impact on “me” as a dative pole in the world; 
and so, the dative pole is the centre around which phenomena gather like iron fillings 
gather around a magnet’s pole. The deep integration of “exterior” phenomena in the 
world and “interior” subjective experience shall be taken up later and become an 
explicit theme at important points in various chapters. For now it is crucial to 
recognize that their interrelation engenders the correlation between genitive and 
dative poles of appearing that overcomes the subject-object opposition.  
 If phenomenology is to remain truly a dynamic “technique” or “style of 
thinking” ordered by the lived experiences resulting from the correlation between the 
genitive and dative poles of appearing, then one of its principal virtues lies in its 
remaining flexible enough to accommodate the ambiguity and mystery intrinsic to 
those lived experiences. The self is lived in its radical singularity as this “me,” and 
yet, this me that I am is not entirely translucent to my philosophical gaze. I am never 
fully at my disposal, as if I were an object to be instrumentalized or a thinking thing 
(res cogitans) to be reduced to a concept. Phenomenology distinguishes, in principle, 
between the appearing of a simple object, say a cup on a table and the living capacity 
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to receive that cup. There is, thus, on the one hand, the appearing of objects in the 
world (genitive), and, on the other, the appearing of the self (dative), both joined 
together in a primal unity. A central task of phenomenology is to unveil the unique 
character of the self that is irreducible to empirical deduction or mere reflective 
categories of the third-person (“it”). As a lived-pole of concrete experience, I am this 
“me” who suffers, enjoys, and feels the burden of being this particular me as an 
absolute zero point of orientation. On such a view, there are no floating or abstract 
pains or floating hungers, nor are there floating states of love. When I fall in love, it 
is me who is in love and no one else. When I experience the traumas of the loss of 
love and the impact of intense pain, how am I to deny that it is “me” who undergoes 
those trials? Perhaps I may claim there are floating pains or loves until I am the one 
who undergoes them. To put it another way, I am never a grammatically neutered 
“it” as if I were a cup on a table to be duplicated by any other cup. This leads 
straightaway to a question: just as the cup cannot appear independently of the self 
who lives through it, can a self appear to itself without reference to the world of 
objects and other subjects “out there”?  
 Henry addresses this question affirmatively, arguing with all vigour that the 
self appears to itself in a sphere all its own, experiencing itself in its pure self-
embrace before it goes out into the world. For now, we simply acknowledge that 
such an understanding of the self is too dualistic, bifurcating the self between interior 
and exterior fields of display. In contrast to Henry, this dissertation shall articulate 
the dative pole, this “me” that I am, as a self that exists independently of the world in 
a qualified sense—I am not simply given to myself as an empirical entity. In other 
words, we reject that I am a mosaic of impressions or sensations, and in this sense, 
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we can agree with Henry. I am not merely a receptacle of sense impressions, 
gathering myself together as “bundle” of streaming impressions as they continually 
arrive and trigger brain synapses.
15
 Rather, I am this “me” who experiences myself 
intimately as a singular living me. And yet, we can depart from Henry here by 
maintaining that such a self is not isolated from the empirical, temporal and spatial 
display of the world. I am ensconced, as a living me, in the temporal flow and spatial 
dimensions of the world (and its streaming sense impressions). The world’s visible 
and luminous field of display is inescapable. As mentioned above, phenomenology 
repudiates a kind of subject-object dualism between inner and outer (to use spatial 
metaphors), or the interior self over against the exterior body in the world, as if the 
fields were irreparably split. And while Henry’s splitting of the self between interior 
and exterior is no mere subject-object opposition, it nevertheless leads to a situation 
in which genitive and dative poles are bifurcated. It is the therefore a principal goal 
of this dissertation to overcome that bifurcation without at the same time rejecting 
Henry’s excavation of the interior self and the explicit theological thematization 
Henry gives to that sphere. Figuring the self after Henry is to participate in the rich 
phenomenological discussion of the self’s lived relation to itself and to the world 
from a theological point of view. 
 I am truly “myself” when I embrace myself in the world as an image of the 
living God who transcends the world. But is such theological claim illicit from an 
explicitly phenomenological perspective? Since the widely-read publication of 
Dominique Janicaud’s 1991 essay, “Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie 
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 James G. Hart puts it well: “The perennial temptation to think of consciousness as the brain or as a 
self-contained repository of mental events that projects schemas of meaning subsequent to getting 
stimulated from outside is rejected by phenomenology.” James G. Hart, Who One Is: A 
Transcendental Phenomenology, vol. 1 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 102. 
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française,” phenomenology has been embroiled in a conflict over whether it can 
fruitfully engage with theological discourse and address theological questions. We 
shall now turn to this debate prompted by Janicaud’s sweeping and dogmatic 
condemnation of the theological turn.  
 
 §2. PHENOMENOLOGY AND THEOLOGY  
 Phenomenology, as an intellectual tradition unified around the correlation 
between the genitive and dative poles of appearing, is not a protective strategy 
designed to shelter lived-experience from theological reflection. There is no need to 
say with Heidegger that the expression “phenomenological theology” is a 
contradiction in terms (square-circle)
16
 or an incoherent expression without a referent 
(protestant mathematics).
17
 The question of phenomenology’s relation to theology 
originates, indeed, with phenomenology’s founders. Husserl addresses the question 
of God’s appearing directly not only by bracketing or parenthesizing God from all 
scientific investigation of pure consciousness
18
 but also by considering the possibility 
of religious experience in many of his unpublished manuscripts.
19
 Heidegger devotes 
not only an essay to the issue (entitled “Phenomenology and Theology”) but also 
utilizes religious figures such as St. Paul, St. Augustine and Kierkegaard in Being 
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 Heidegger, Pathmarks, trans. William McNeil (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
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 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Presss, 1988), 20.  
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 Husserl, Ideas I, §58, “The Transcendency, God, Excluded.”  
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 For more on the idea of God in Husserl, if even adduced from a wide range of manuscripts not 
easily available, see Emmanuel Housset, Husserl et l’idée de Dieu (Paris: Les éditions du cerf, 
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and Time and other works.
20
 His later work is characterized by a turn (Kehre) toward 
the sacred (i.e., the “fourfold”), and as Dominique Janicaud writes, “Without 
Heidegger’s Kehre, there would be no theological turn.”
21
 
 The “theological turn” in French phenomenology taken in the 1960s and 
persisting down to the present day perhaps reflects one logical end to which Husserl 
and Heidegger’s peripheral interests in theology led. The theological turn has 
certainly proved a fertile ground upon which both disciplines have flourished in 
exciting ways together, generating a burgeoning canon of secondary literature in the 
English-speaking world, Germany, the Nordic countries, and of course, France.
22
 But 
there has been no lack of controversy surrounding the fellowship of phenomenology 
and theology. Janicaud’s well-known diagnosis and critique of whether a 
“phenomenological theology” counts as phenomenology at all is of paramount 
importance for us here. It constitutes nothing less than a major challenge which we 
must surmount if we want to pursue the kind of open and dynamic phenomenology 
we introduced above.  
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 The great virtue of Janicaud’s 1991 essay, “Le tournant théologique de la 
phénoménologie française” and his 1998 follow-up, “La phénoménologie eclatée,”
23
 
is that they take an unequivocal stand. There is no doubt that in these essays he 
detracts from such a theological turn. He undermines the very idea of founding a 
partnership or reciprocal alliance between phenomenology and theology. By 
invoking what he perceives to be phenomenology’s strict naturalism as a “rigorous 
science,” he finds the swerve toward and/or wholesale adoption of transcendence in 
thinkers like Levinas, Marion, Henry and Chrétien to have violated the basic ground 
rules of orthodox phenomenology, practitioners of which must necessarily commit to 
“protecting its neutrality” as a scientific discipline.
24
  
 Janicaud delimits the boundary of phenomenology by giving such a boundary 
the rigid name of “method” He calls his own method a “minimalist 
phenomenology.”
25
 Welcoming of the ways in which phenomenology can be 
enriched and expanded (and not merely reduced to a duplication of Husserl), 
Janicaud recognizes that the current state of phenomenology is fragmented. He sees 
it as a living tradition in an ever-expanding intellectual universe, so that “the 
minimalist orientation claims to be nothing more than one furrow in this still open 
field.”
26
 And yet, he nevertheless insists that its “method” must be observed if a path 
of thinking is to be identified properly as phenomenological.
27
 Not everything, 
according to Janicaud, is phenomenology, especially not theology. That is, the price 
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to be paid for introducing a theological turn is the denial of the phenomenological 
method altogether, “a farewell to the Husserlian ambition for rigor”
28
 in that 
“phenomenological neutrality has been abandoned.”
29
 For Janicaud, it is precisely 
this methodological rigor and the spirit of neutrality that characterizes the chief gain 
of Husserlian phenomenology. The phenomenological method, as such, must obey 
the constraints put in place by the relation between the world and the intentional ego. 
Remaining within the province of this finite relationship, in his estimation, is what 
gives phenomenology its coherence as a rigorous method whose purpose is neutral 
description of lived-experience.
30
 Neither theism nor atheism shall reign in a 
minimalist phenomenology, for it suffices to be simply “non-theological.”
31
 
Unsurprisingly, Janicaud completes his 1991 study with the following shibboleth. 
We quote it in full to absorb its impact: 
 
We have not had any other design than to draw out these several 
traits and to recall an insurmountable difference: phenomenology 
and theology make two. To see as much and to understand it better, 
certainly it is not out of place here to draw attention, finally, to two 
thoughts equally worthy of being meditated upon in their very 
divergence. On the theological side, Luther: “Faith consists in 
giving oneself over to the hold of things we do not see.” On the 
phenomenological side, Goethe: “There is nothing to look for 




 Phenomenology and theology make two, so he argues. We appreciate 
Janicaud’s admission that phenomenology has become an open frontier of 
intellectual inquiry; we also acknowledge his desire articulated here to disclose firm 
methodological procedures in which respectable and authentically philosophical 
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phenomenology can emerge within that frontier. But the either/or terms in which he 
pits phenomenology against theology tends to dramatize what is and has continued to 
be a fruitful relationship. The temptation to take a theological turn should not be 
conjured away as audacious as Janicaud claims.
33
 For phenomenological 
investigation makes manifest the concrete modalities of life, and as such, its duty is 
to attend to the possibility of any experience, religious or otherwise. Phenomenology 
is to ask about the conditions for the possibility of what may appear in the sphere of 
experience as it is lived. For the Christian in particular, lived experience is shaped by 
the life of pilgrimage and participation in the body of Christ. Being Christian is not 
merely an ancillary group of experiences or momentary suspension in what is 
otherwise a fundamentally neutral structure of “non-theological” living. Rather, the 
Christian lives on the basis of faith in an embodied community of believers, and that 
concrete set of experiences constitutes the core of living, the source from which the 
Christian dwells in the horizon of the world and its visible disclosures. As such, 
phenomenology is not taken hostage when it veers toward theological discourse. 
Rather it remains true to its commitment to study human life in its lived acts in the 
world, whether lived by faith in the mystery of God (and incorporate theological 
resources) or faith in science (and incorporate natural sciences)—for no 
phenomenology is “faithless” and can presume to reduce life to a set of experiences 
laid bare by neutral, scientific observation.  
 To be fair, Janicaud does indicate that phenomenology is made the richer 
when it goes beyond Husserl, for he states, “the philosophical fecundity of a mode of 
thought is not, moreover, measured by the strict respect accorded its orthodoxy—
                                                 
33





 But Janicaud goes on to claim that phenomenology must 
observe a specific kind of rigor, one closely aligned with modern natural science and 
its “minimalist” spirit, a set of assumptions not interested in the “mirage of the 
absolute,”
35
 but in the rational structures of universal knowledge and the self-evident 
field of human experience.
36
 This is why it is not rash to conclude that his critique of 
the theological turn succumbs to a protective strategy that views phenomenology and 
theology as discrete, tightly bound disciplines—and this despite the fact that his 1998 
study admits the vast array of possibilities within the “wide open” field of 
phenomenology. The upshot of Janicaud’s protective strategy is not simply that it 
discounts a whole swathe of profound studies that work between phenomenology and 
theology enriching our knowledge of both, but that it also harbours a faulty 
assumption about the very nature of both intellectual traditions. Certainly, as we 
noted above, we may approach phenomenology as a “style of thinking” rather than as 
a strict methodological protocol to be observed under the tutelage of natural science. 
For if it can, in Janicaud’s mind, join the spirit of natural science, then 
phenomenology as a style of thinking is not as neutral as he insists. What is here not 
a question of neutrality but of remaining engaged with rational structures of 
knowledge, Janicaud’s thesis fails to acknowledge the richly rational character of 
Christian theology because theological discourse is always realized in a complex 
process of faith seeking rationality.  
 While we cannot go into the niceties of the theologian’s craft here (that would 
be a valuable task that would take at least a book length study), we can say that the 
dialogue between theology and philosophy has been licit for centuries. Theology has 
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been involved in an ongoing conversation with philosophy, evidenced in ancient 
figures such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas as well as in contemporary theologians 
such as Rahner, Tillich, etc. Christian theology does not maintain as a rule that God 
“genuinely transcends human experience,” to quote George Pattison’s protective 
strategy outlined for theologians suspicious of phenomenology’s intruding 
presence.
37
 It is not our purpose here to come from the other direction and belabour 
the point that theology is open to phenomenological description. It does not seem 
that God genuinely transcends human experience in the sense that God appears 
unreachable and wholly other. God appeared in intimate covenantal relation with 
Israel in the Hebrew Bible and considered himself nothing in the form of a man, and 
in that perfect self-humiliation, appeared among us as a servant on the Cross in the 
New Testament. God’s transcendence properly conceived (and God is transcendent) 
lies therefore not in God’s transcending human experience altogether (and thus the 
field of phenomenological investigation) but in exceeding the facile dichotomy of 
immanence vs. transcendence.  
 So how do phenomenology and theology relate? If the relation obtains at all it 
is in a manner in which the technique of phenomenology can be applied to the life of 
faith in order to explore both how God is “more intimate to me than I am to myself” 
and how I am an “enormous question to myself,” to borrow well-known lyricisms 
from St. Augustine. We agree with Robert Sokolowski when he remarks that 
phenomenology “is not meant to establish Christian belief but to be involved in its 
understanding.”
38
 We agree, similarly, with Etienne Gilson that Christian philosophy 
is an active searching for the living God and that “our task is not so much to prove 
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Him as to find Him.”
39
 Phenomenology, to express it another way, aids the 
theologian, not in the verification of the belief in the existence of God but in the 
articulation of the pilgrim’s concrete life of faith in and through the world, as it is 
lived in its concrete temporal and bodily manifestations.   
 There are two principal views that shed light on how phenomenology and 
theology relate, both of which have their merits but swing to either one of two 
extremes: phenomenology and theology coincide on the one hand, or they are 
entirely distinct but collaborative on the other. (1) Michel Henry, to whom we are 
most indebted, views phenomenology and theology as inextricably bound, as do we. 
But he declares that they operate by the exact same intelligibility, conflating the two, 
as if philosophy were another name for God-talk on the basis of God’s self-revelation 
in Christ.
40
 We shall offer a fuller reading of Henry’s theological turn in chapter 
three (§20). (2) Jean-Luc Marion suggests that phenomenology can provide a service 
for theology: namely, that phenomenology could, if thoughtfully applied, function as 
a “relief” from what is fundamentally a metaphysically hampered theology prone to 
reducing God to Being (i.e., the “God of the philosophers and scholars”). Relating 
phenomenology and theology in this way, Marion indicates that theology can make 
use of phenomenological discourse to expunge theology of metaphysical trappings. 
But phenomenology can go no further, for it fails in the face of divine revelation 
based on faith, the ground upon which theologians only tread. All that 
phenomenology can do, from Marion’s point of view, is show theology the path free 
of metaphysics, offering the theologian resources to read revelation just as it is given 
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(and thus without circumscribing God within philosophical concepts outlined in 
advance). But Marion presumes here, like Janicaud above, that phenomenology is 
without faith, and as a discipline devoted to neutral description, phenomenology 
cannot enter into actual explication of the life of faith, for the “God of Abraham, of 
Isaac and of Jacob” is the sole property of theology, or so is the implication of 
Marion’s thinking. In contrast to Marion and Janicaud, our proposal of a 
phenomenological theology defends against this kind of strict separatism.
41
  
 Over against these two positions, Marion’s and Henry’s, we do not purport to 
have a finely-ground formula within which to fit phenomenology and theology, 
neatly dividing and ordering their relationship.
42
 We do, however, find that the 
mystery of life lends itself to being explored by techniques of thinking that draw on a 
“faith seeking understanding” paradigm, a rationality filled with wisdom and 
revelation. Any kind of separatism between philosophy (wisdom) and theology 
(revelation) that splits their unity will eventually lead to the modern phenomenon of 
an “autonomous philosophy,” a philosophy entirely extricated from Christian faith. 
According to many modern philosophy departments, philosophy as a discipline 
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exercises autonomy, but only to the degree that, in reality, it amounts to a 
conversation partner for natural science. Our account avoids the modern design of 
autonomy, and so, phenomenology and theology do not “make two,” if we mean that 
they constitute two autonomous disciplines. We view them as styles of thinking or 
conceptual discourses unable to separate and yet unable to dissolve into a single 
discourse. As techniques with unique sets of skills and traditions, they both offer 
incentives for contemplating the elemental features of life, as it is lived. And for us, 
to contemplate life is not to draw protective lines between philosophy and theology, 
the two styles of thinking most associated with contemplating life. A 
phenomenological theology joins them together, bringing their lexicons and other 
conceptual resources into contact, affirming their mutuality without always giving 
due recognition to their respective intellectual properties. This “iron sharpening iron” 
(Proverbs 27.17) enables the life of faith to be clarified by the light reason before a 
God who recedes before every intellectual grasp. God is a God before whom we can 
worship and dance and to whom we can pray and offer praise and love with the mind 
(i.e., the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob) not a God who can be grasped 
within a concept or made present as a phenomenon.   
 
 §3. THE PROBLEM OF GOD AS PHENOMENON: A TYPOLOGY 
  A phenomenological theology so understood does not promote that God is a 
phenomenon. God is not a phenomenon even in a peculiar sense as Husserl thinks the 
world is.
43
 But if God is not a phenomenon, then how can God be an object of 
                                                 
43
 Husserl writes, “I stand above the world which has now become for me, in a quite peculiar sense, a 
phenomenon.” See Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An 
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1970), 152. 
43 
 
inquiry at all? Put another way: because God is not a phenomenon, does God 
transcend the field of phenomenology altogether? We are suggesting, in this section, 
that phenomenology, as it engages with theology, interrogates a self who lives 
toward God’s eschatological proximity through faith and participation in the body of 
Christ—all this while never grasping God as a concept or rendering God a 
phenomenon present to me. God is not rendered as a phenomenon present to 
consciousness, as if God were lived through and thereby endowed with objective 
meaning. And yet God does not elude experience altogether. To say that God is not a 
phenomenon is not to prevent me from living in the presence of God; being present 
to God, we presume, is part and parcel of what faith is about. God is mysteriously 
present to all things while also transcending them. To make God present to me, on 
the other hand, as if God were a genitive pole able to appear, and correlate, to a 
dative pole, is to come close to idolatry. We recall that phenomenology must open up 
a space wherein God remains God, wherein God is “I am who I am” (Exodus 3.14).
44
 
We shall articulate in later chapters how I can be present to God and how I can live 
toward God with making God present to me.  
 It shall serve us here to note that our position, “God is not a phenomenon,” 
stands in contrast with current literature. To clarify the problem of God as 
phenomenon, we briefly outline three positions that have gained some currency in 
the literature. Here the problem of God as phenomenon is addressed by reactions 
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proceeding in contrasting directions: God is either an absolute phenomenon, 
disclosed with a revelatory power that overwhelms the subject or is internal to the 
subject on the one hand, or, on the other, God is no phenomenon at all, not even an 
eschatological proximity. To throw into relief our own position of living toward the 
eschatological proximity of God (which implies that I can be present to God even if 
God is not a phenomenon), we outline a heuristic typology of the contemporary 
literature.  
 Even though secondary sources on this issue are disparate, there are three 
main “types” that dominate and are cashed out in light of Husserl’s theory of 
intentionality. We take John Caputo’s helpful essay “Two Husserlian Revolutions”
45
 
as a guide to elucidate two types, one that emphasizes an empty intentional gaze 
(God is no phenomenon), and the other that compares God to a saturated 
phenomenon that floods the intentional gaze (God is an absolute phenomenon). The 
third type, and the one we find most fruitful, is Henry’s theory of non-intentional life, 
a domain in which God appears as a phenomenon beneath the bipolarity of empty 
and full intentions. We are certainly critical of Henry’s type but we nevertheless 
show the way forward must pass through him, more on this in §4 below. 
 As will become clearer in chapter two, Husserlian intentionality is a structure 
of appearing that seeks a match between the ego’s gaze and an object to fulfil that 
gaze. Husserl’s concept of intentionality clarifies the subjective activity of the mind 
as “consciousness of” or “about-ness” and purposely makes the decision to exclude 
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God as a phenomenon present in consciousness. This is to say that Husserl charges 
the ego with the task of fixing the conditions for the possibility of experience 
inasmuch as it decides the conditions for an adequate correlation between the ego 
and object, and to maintain all scientific rigour, God is excluded. With regard to the 
problem of the phenomenon of God, the intentional structure so conceived is 
incapable of illuminating how God is manifest. This means that intentionality has not 
been done away with in recent literature but has been theologically modified in three 
distinct ways, what can be described as three “Husserlian revolutions:” Marion, 
Derrida and Henry. We take each in turn. 
 
Intentionality and Excess in Jean-Luc Marion  
 Marion’s “Husserlian revolution” lies in expanding the conceptual boundaries 
of a “phenomenon” to account for those phenomena whose givenness is excessive or 
saturating over against the ego’s intentional power.
46
 Saturation achieves, according 
to Marion, certainly its most dramatic form in the phenomenon of God. An exemplar 
of this kind of encounter is perhaps when Job undergoes the terrifying presence of 
God (Job 38) or when Isaiah is stunned by the impact of God’s holiness as it filled 
the Temple (Isaiah 6). In order to identify God with a saturated phenomenon present 
to me, Marion appeals to the excessive givenness of God displayed in these 
encounters. God modifies intentionality, opening the enclosure of the intentional 
subject to accommodate that which exceeds the mundane correlation between the ego 
and its object. God arrives unexpectedly, overwhelmingly and with too much 
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intuition to be enclosed within ego’s intentional aim. This excessive gift, given with 
a saturating impact, stuns, even dazes the ego’s intentional aim, disorienting it.
47
  
 A central insight of Husserlian phenomenology is that the ego constitutes 
phenomena. The ego’s aim toward objects is an aim that constitutes them, securing 
them as objects and determining them according to their given objectivities. To 
account for divine revelation, Marion radically modifies the relationship between the 
intentional gaze and the intuition. The impact of the phenomenon of God is like an 
earthquake that reverses the flow of a river thereby reversing the direction of 
Husserlian intentionality. The ego does constitute the divine intuition but rather is 
constituted by the phenomenon of God, in its excessive presence. For Marion, 
intentionality defined by Husserl can no longer ensure the horizon of experience by 
which all phenomena appear, especially the horizon by which the phenomenon of 
God may make an appearance, however dramatic or excessive. The intentional aim 
of the Husserlian ego is blunted, folding back upon itself in the face of the immense 
pressure of the God’s surplus. By way of counter-intentionality, the I is “given over 
to” (l’adonné) or submitted to the power of God’s revelation.
48
 God’s saturating 
phenomenality intends me and thereby constitutes me, transforming the “I” into the 
gifted, the “me”, the witness or the l’adonné: the one who receives himself from 
what gives itself, even if the saturated phenomenon that makes its landing accedes to 
experiential moments of “stupor,” “amazement” and “terror.”
49
 In this manner, 
Marion reconfigures intentionality to account for the phenomenon of God as excess, 
saturation and plenitude—as intuition exceeds intention, reversing the ego’s aim and 
giving way to counter-intentionality. 
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Intentionality and Poverty in Jacques Derrida 
 Caputo helpfully observes that Derrida’s “Husserlian revolution” proceeds in 
the opposite direction of Marion’s and is therefore illustrative of an empty/absent 
intentional act.
50
 According to Derrida, Husserl’s “metaphysics of presence” is 
complicit with a theory of speech made possible by a particular understanding of 
intentional constitution. In consequence of its metaphysics of presence, the 
Husserlian intentional act set into operation by speech renders the ego fully present 
to itself. All speech is like a soliloquy, or a talking to oneself with the immediacy of 
self-presence that accompanies such a speech act. That is, speech animates the sign 
with its inner Geistigkeit, i.e., “spiritual” or mental presence, rendering the ego 
immediately self-present: “The signifier, animated by my breath and by the meaning-
intention, is in absolute proximity to me. The living act, the life-giving act, the 
Lebendigkeit, which animates the body of the signifier and transforms it into a 
meaningful expression, the soul of language, seems not to separate itself from itself, 
from its own self-presence.”
51
 Derrida insists that, because Husserl privileges speech, 
Husserlian intentionality necessarily prioritizes the ideal over the sensible, the 
immaterial over the material and pure identity over difference. In other words, 
Husserl’s theory of intentionality does not participate in the economy of signs 
because it fails to account for the structural différance of signs and the specific 
absence of self-presence they explicitly underwrite.  
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 Husserl’s disavowal of signs, for Derrida, forecloses the possibility of an 
empty intention. A sign always points to that which is other than itself and functions 
to make approximate what is not fully present. Signifying what is to come, the sign 
never attains “presence.” The empty intention whereby the ego’s streaming 
consciousness goes unfilled is the structure peculiar to writing/signs, and Derrida’s 
privileging of writing over speech reverses the Husserlian hierarchy of intentional 
presence over empty intentional acts. 
 An empty intention is consistent with a theory of signs because an empty 
intention does not accommodate immediacy. Like a sign, an empty intention is a 
mediator, a pointer and thus signifies phenomena. An empty intention, to be clear, is 
ordered by the surrogate signifier, which thereby functions as a replacement or trace 
of what would otherwise be completely present. Derrida describes the discourse of 
signification with reference to a well-known neologism he coined, différance. In the 
self-entitled essay, différance establishes how I experience phenomena through the 
grid of distinctions shaped by signs. Signs necessarily communicate an object by 
demonstrating its difference from every other object as well as showing that this 
difference “defers” throughout time by way of a chain of signifiers.
52
 Deconstructing 
presence from within Husserl’s own intentional complex, Derrida institutes an 
inescapable structural difference and temporal deferral at the base of all human 
experience.
53
    
 How might Derrida situate the problem of God as phenomenon within this 
intentional framework? Rather than accommodating saturated phenomena, différance 
reduces the phenomenon of God to an empty intention. Founded on the 
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differing/deferring structure of différance, God cannot be made present and thus 
subject to the model of what counts as a phenomenon that either Husserl or Marion 
advances. Derrida’s “Husserlian Revolution” lies in the prioritization up front of an 
empty intentional act, and so, without fulfilment or verification, the intentional life of 
the ego gropes toward every phenomenon, but all the more so with regard to God.   
 Derrida therefore maintains that the very idea of God as phenomenon is 
“pseudo-problem” because there is no God at all (he appears to accept atheism even 
if the violence of atheism may come under the aspect of logocentrism). There is no 
such thing as presence, not least divine presence; God as phenomenon “promises 
presence given to intuition or vision…,” which is the “immediacy of presence.”
54
 
Différance, on the other hand, blocks the possibility of God as phenomenon—the 
satisfaction of intentional verification with regard to divine presence remains forever 
differed/deferred in a radical kind of way over against mundane intentional objects. 
While God is not a phenomenon, and perhaps God is nothing, perhaps just a fiction, 
the idea of God as deferred presence nevertheless leads the empty intentional act 
forward in an ethical manner. We could perhaps categorize Derrida as an atheist 
interested in the positive, ethical structure of religion. The eschatological structure of 
religion he picks out is therefore not an appropriation of the promise St. Paul makes 
to Christians that God will consummate history in a final historical parousia to come. 
Commending a “religion without religion,”
55
 Derrida instead advances a structure of 
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religion that hangs entirely on a deferred temporal horizon, indefinitely deferred. All 
presence is postponed, infinitely postponed. The structure of hope and expectation 
preserved by Derrida’s “religion without religion” is without reference to dogmatic 
content of the Christian faith or institutional creedal system (religion without the 
religious content).  
 
Non-Intentionality and Pure Interiority in Henry 
 So far we have seen that Marion conceives of God as an absolute 
phenomenon that overflows the prefixed and stable boundaries of Husserlian 
intentionality. Whereas if Derrida eliminates the possibility of presence, then a 
fortiori the problem of God as a phenomenon is undercut: two Husserlian revolutions 
proceeding in opposite directions. A third “Husserlian Revolution” is undertaken by 
Henry: a non-intentional field of manifestation in which God appears as an absolute 
“subjective” phenomenon. 
 Rather than orchestrate the theological possibility of an intentional act 
saturated with presence (Marion) or undercut intentional presence and fulfilment by 
showing the poverty of all intentional objects, not least God (Derrida), Henry 
outlines a non-intentional or pre-intentional field of interiority. As a concrete sub-
layer or primal “underground” of self-experience, Henry highlights the possibility of 
immediate contact with the divine without at the same time commiting himself to fit 
that experience within the intentional field of streaming noematic correlates. The 
problem of God as phenomenon is resolved for Henry in that God appears as an 
absolute living phenomenon constitutive of that very field of non-intentional 
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subjectivity prior to intentional display where the ego is stratified with layers of 
fulfilment, some acts empty and some saturated. Internal to the ego’s self-presence, 
in that “interior space” underneath empty and full intentional acts, God appears as a 
phenomenon, the full glory of which Henry compares to the parousia.
56
 Henry 
therefore insists that God as phenomenon appears as a phenomenon present to me 
prior to intentional visibility. The non-intentional field of display so understood gives 
rise to a purely interior field of manifestation, prior to language, the physical body, 
the world-horizon and the intentional life of the subject.  
 Our threefold typology has clarified three divergent “Husserlian Revolutions” 
that adopt creative modifications of intentionality in an attempt to address what 
appears to be a chief phenomenological problem: if God is not an object, then how 
may God appear as phenomenon at all? God is an absolute phenomenon that defies 
objecthood so far as he saturates my gaze (Marion), God is no phenomenon at all, 
and thus no object, which breaks over me as an utter absence that leads me through a 
series of empty intentions toward a life made less ego-centric and more hospital to 
that which is wholly other (Derrida) and, finally, God is an absolute phenomenon 
whose glory appears as an interior self-experience prior to intentional display of 
objects (Henry). Marion’s theory puts into play resources to think through dramatic 
encounters, whether it is Paul’s Damascus Road experience or the types of 
experience Rudolf Otto characterizes as examples of an event that evokes a 
mysterium tremendum et fascinans. Yet the problem with Marion’s theory of 
saturation is that it cannot show how the life of faith is ordered in an enduring or 
abiding manner. The life of faith is frequently without verification and fulfilment, 
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and is, especially, without “mountaintop experiences” of excess. Our contention 
throughout this dissertation is that faith is a living toward the eschatological 
proximity of God whose grace is near but whose presence does not appear as a 
phenomenon for me. We may all be present to God, laid bare and seen exactly as we 
are by the divine creator and his all-seeing eye. But this hardly necessitates a 
mutuality of contact between Creator and creation. Without claiming the right to 
presume a logic of presence, as if God were present to me however dramatic or 
interior that presence may appear to be, this dissertation shall open out onto a living 
faith described as “pilgrimage in the world” until God is present to me in the 
parousia—not a blithely unreflective recapitulation of Derridean “religion without 
religion.” 
 Derrida’s phenomenological narrative, born from his early confrontation with 
Husserl, yields emptiness, absence and deferment, and is, admittedly, a formidable 
critique of “presence” similar to my own Augustinian proposal. Derrida adamantly 
counters the conceptual violence of those who claim God as phenomenon. More 
radically, he contradicts any basis for a primal pre-intentional field of presence: 
perhaps Derrida and Henry are antithetical at every level of their departure from 
Husserl. Yet Derrida’s proposal of an empty intention, and the “religion without 
religion” to which it gives rise, is “atheistic” in that its eschatological structure is 
finally bereft of any positive content; despite his protests, Derrida’s elusive 
“agnosticism” and his economy of différance simply fails on every account to aid the 
theologian in interpreting the life of faith (though John Caputo and his heirs may 
disagree). Henry, in utter contrast, avoids either intentional feature (empty or 
saturated) and opts for an “metaphyscis of presence” of the most radical kind: an 
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interior space prior to intentionality wherein the feeling of myself in a primal self-
presence apart from the world designates the absolute and abiding unity between my 
soul and God. The principal problem with Henry’s economy of presence, for all of its 
brilliance, is not that it presumes the existence of God but that it eliminates the 
distinction between creature and Creator (or it is at least greatly blurred: we shall 
highlight this point in chapter three). Moreover, for Henry, the presence of God to 
me in the fully glory of the eternal parousia also leads, without delay, to an 
overrealized eschatology, a kind of Gnostic protology. Even though Henry elucidates 
how I am in intimate and abiding unity with God an the basis of the arch-presence of 
auto-affection, Henry’s narrative of the subjective origin of divine presence does not 
permit space for the eschatological temporality of faith. Nor does it allow for the 
bodily participation in the ecclesial body of Christ so crucial to the everyday life of 
faith for the Christian of antiquity and of today. For Henry, participation in the 
ecclesial life is an unnecessary burden, for I am already in an acosmic, non-temporal 
unity with the Trinitarian glory of God—I enjoy in Christ the eternal sonship of 
heaven.
57
 Henry’s God is a God who is already fully present, shinning in the majestic 
lustre of the parousia. Divine self-revelation, Henry insists, abides as always already 
there, inside me, in that invisible site where my life and God’s life co-emerge. 
 Against Marion, Derrida and Henry, our discourse of a eschatological self 
argues that the phenomenological figure of “God” is simultaneously a living God and 
not a phenomenon. A phenomenological theology advance in what follows requires a 
visible word of faith professed in the body of Christ as a means of drawing near, 
inwardly, to God. Faith orders life as a “seeking,” a pilgrimage toward God who is 
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never a phenomenon for me but whose eschatological proximity is revealed to me at 
a distance, as a promise to be unveiled at the dawn of the last day, the parousia to 
come.  
 Yet what does the order of seeking presuppose about the structure of the self? 
As the dative pole, I am given to myself as an imago Dei by my Creator, and by 
virtue of creation, I am drawn into intimacy with God precisely because I image 
God. As such, I do not first achieve myself as a nominative “I.” I am originally given 
to myself through the work of creation. Creation narrates how God created heaven 
and earth, and it is this horizon into which I am thrown through creation. Only God (I 
am who I am) posits himself and the world and can achieve a pure “I.” And so we 
turn to the figure of the “porous self” and the larger eschatological argument of the 
dissertation as a whole. 
 
  §4. A PRÉCIS OF THE ARGUMENT   
 We have been arguing that, as a style of thinking focused on describing 
phenomena in accord with their distinctive properties and movements, 
phenomenological inquiry scrutinizes appearance’s various manners of givenness, 
appearing appears (genitive) to me (dative) (§1). We have also elucidated the 
sometimes contentious, but fruitful, exchange between phenomenology and theology, 
and that their reciprocity determines how the self can be figured over against 
modernity’s tendency to reduce the self to a set neutral, finite experiences (§2). And 
finally, we discussed that, if we grant the theological turn within phenomenology a 
legitimate place in contemporary thought, we find various compelling formulations 
of it in current literature. Focusing on the problem of God as a phenomenon, we 
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showed that Marion, Derrida and Henry address the manifestation of God in 
interesting, but ultimately, in unsatisfying ways (§4).  
 Making a shift, then, from God as a phenomenon to a life of seeking a living 
God who is no phenomenon (pilgrimage), our proposal is in accord with the 
Christian theological drama that unfolds cosmically with creation, moving properly 
only toward its Christological fulfilment in the eschaton. In view of the problem of 
God as a phenomenon the structure of the self requires recourse to theology in order 
to clarify how I am an imago Dei created to seek its Creator. The thesis we are 
urging is that the self bears witness to the structure we shall describe in later chapters 
as an eschatological “porosity.” But why is the porous, eschatological self important, 
not least, interesting at all? To defend the claim that the logic of porosity furnishes 
the coordinates of the self, we counter particular interpretations of the self that 
advance one of two claims: one the one hand, the self is to be dissociated from God 
and reduced it to its appearing in the world (Heidegger and his heirs such as Derrida, 
Janicaud, etc.), and, on the other, the self is to be dissociated from the world and 
situated within a site outside of the world in communion with God (Henry, and the 
argument could be made in another context, Marion and Lacoste). Though we do not 
accept Henry’s thesis that I appear to myself and achieve myself as an interior “me” 
in unity with God, we nevertheless appreciate the originating proximity of God to me 
that can be ascribed to Henry’s position and what we shall ascribe to the doctrine of 
creation. I am necessarily intimate to, and open to communion with, God because 
God created me. Our thesis that the self is porous configures a self that is more than 




 God is not a phenomenon, but that does not prevent us from analyzing in this 
dissertation how God is given to me while on pilgrimage in the world. I image God 
thanks to creation and God is an eschatological proximity to me thanks to the coming 
renewal of creation. The structure of the self that this theological perspective brings 
to light is a porous self, who is created in the world and who cannot escape the 
world, and yet, who is porous to that which transcends the world. If the structure of 
the porous self can be maintained, then it follows that possibilities for a nuanced 
contemporary approach to explicating the life of faith can be opened up without 
making God a phenomenon present to me in a religious experience. Additionally, 
figuring the self in this way also overcomes two extremes: to reduce the self to the 
world and its physical body or to reduce the self to an interior union with God that 
seeks to escape the world. The porous self so understood is not escapist but nor can it 
simply realize its full identity in the present world.  
 The two principal features upon which the porous structure of the 
eschatological self trades are (1) the temporal nature of confessing faith and 
contemplating in hope within the world before a God who transcends the world, and 
(2) the bodily nature of participating in the body of Christ in the world with a view to 
the resurrection body to come.
58
 We enrich our approach to each of these topics by 
incorporating theological resources drawn principally from St. Augustine.    
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 Our argument so far, furthermore, has insisted that phenomenology privileges 
a structure of appearing whereby things are given to a dative pole, to “me.” 
Appearing is explainable by appearings of something (genitive) to someone (dative). 
Yet we have also claimed that God is not a phenomenon and therefore resists the 
genitive category. Yet if God is manifest within the horizon of human experience, 
and thus is given to the dative pole, then how do we square this with the fact that 
God is not a phenomenon? 
  Our proposal of a porous self contends that I am created by God and thus 
made in the image of God. We appreciate here what the Fourth Lateran Council has 
declared about the theological truth of creation: “Between the Creator and the 
creature there cannot be a similarity so great that the dissimilarity is not greater.”
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Understood as given to itself by creation, the porous self is in possession of the 
capacity to draw near to and enjoy intimacy with God without making God a 
phenomenon idolatrously present to me, giving way to a monism in which we merge 
together. As a unique self dissimilar to my Creator, I cannot merge with my Creator 
nor can I partake of the same essence. Because of this dissimilarity, or gap, between 
the self and God, the life of faith is simply that: a life of “seeking” for its Creator 
until that final presence is disclosed in the eschaton where all the saints shall see God 
face to face, unveiled in full glory. However great a similarity to God we display in 
being an imago Dei, there is a greater dissimilarity, at least while on pilgrimage here 
and now. So while I may be in the presence of God, the opposite eludes me, that is, 
God does not become present to me as a phenomenon that I live through or that 
saturates me.  
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 The “porous self” is also created in the temporal streaming of the world (God 
created heaven and earth) and embodied locally as particular spatio-temporal body-
pole geometrically situated amid other objects and body-poles; and yet, I am also 
inwardly porous to that which transcends the world. This means two things: (1) that 
my display in the temporality of the world-horizon does not constitute me in my 
entirety and (2) that my display as a body-object in the world-horizon is not all that 
my body is. There is a double-sided structure by which I am manifest, such that my 
exterior display is available to all as a common object of inquiry but my inner life is 
spiritual and porous to the eternal. And it is the eschatological seeking put into play 
by pilgirimage that nourishes this inner life.
60
 This is a very brief précis of the 
argument that shall be worked out over against Henry’s proposal of the duplicitous 
self, which maintains that the parousia already appears inside me, in my non-
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Things stand out, are visible and manifest, because they are lustrous, 
luminous. But without the sun or some artificial light, things would not have 











§ 5. WHAT IS VISIBLE DISPLAY? 
 
 In this chapter we continue to contextualize the universe of ideas that were 
formative for Henry not only for his inaugural publication, but also up through his 
theological trilogy, which served as a concluding epilogue, a final theological turn 
that upon completion in 2002 bequeathed to posterity a narrative of the “interior self” 
in its totality. Whereas in the preceding chapter we discussed the nature of 
phenomenology, its relation to theology and Henry’s place in that landscape, this 
chapter situates Henry in view of the specific phenomenological principles under 
whose provenance he enunciated his own peculiar notion of self-presence: Husserl’s 
category of intentionality and Heidegger’s analytic of being-in-the-world. The 
propeadeutic importance of this chapter cannot be overemphasized given that Henry 
prioritizes reflection on phenomenological method, especially in view of Husserl.
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As Henry’s primary interlocutor, Husserl occupies a central role in this chapter. Yet 
Henry departs sharply from such a “teutonic” philosophical discourse, in both its 
Husserlian and Heideggerian forms. He does on the basis of the key issue of the 
interior self’s structural relation to the exteriority of the world-horizon, and thus, 
reference to both figures (in this and subsequent chapters) shall help clarify Henry’s 
own position. Moreover, because Husserl and Heidegger represent a single, unified 
position in Henry’s estimation about the nature of appearing, they are together 
complicit in the systematic reduction of the self to the visible display of the exterior 
world. In contradistinction, Henry proposes a purely interior self, a non-reflective, 
non-intentional self riveted to itself in pure self-presence independent from the 
economy of mediation, distance, separation, transcendence and exteriority of any 
sort. Henry’s theory of the self is without light and thus occupies a nocturnal sphere 
of experience unique to itself, appearing to nothing other than itself, without 
interpolation of the visible display of the world—Henry’s self is manifest as a sphere 
of invisible display, which contradicts Husserl’s and Heidegger’s preoccupation with 
visible display. Hence, the title of this chapter indicates that, for Henry, visible 
display is the basic problem of phenomenology. 
 Yet when one thinks of “invisible display” one is confronted with an 
oxymoron, at least seemingly so (Henry himself asks rhetorically: “Is not a 
phenomenology of the invisible a contradiction in terms?”).
63
 According to all post-
Husserlian phenomenology, in order for a phenomenon to come into display it must 
appear, become visible and be seen. To display is to come into the light of the 
horizon of the world. In fact, whereas “invisible display” is ostensibly an oxymoron, 
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“visible display” is a tautological expression; to display is to become visible and to 
become visible is to display. So phenomenology in its Husserlian and Heideggerian 
variants declares it impossible for an invisible phenomenon to display itself without 
also at the same time bursting forth into the field of visibility, which both Husserl 
and Heidegger name simply the “world.” Yet it is precisely this mode of visible 
display that Henry thinks bedevils phenomenology as its basic problem. Henry seeks 
to overcome it by broadening the concept of “display” to include not just visible but 
also invisible modalities. 
 Before we outline the particular contours of Husserlian intentionality and 
Heideggerian being-in-the-world that touch off articulations of visible display, 
contours against which Henry rearticulates display to account for the invisible, we 
ask an obvious question: why is visible display a basic problem at all for Henry?  
 The field of visible display consisting of the horizon of the world itself is 
linked by Henry to the reductive philosophical principle he calls “ontological 
monism.”
64
 Visible display, i.e., the “world,” is by nature monistic because its power 
is reductive, stripping display of its richly duplicitous structure, and in this stripping, 
designates the complete and utter exhaustion of appearing within a single field of 
appearance: the visible disclosure of the world. Henry contends that, for Husserl and 
Heidegger and their heirs, only things which appear in the exteriority of the world, in 
other words, can legitimately “appear” as phenomena. Precisely because it is 
monistic, the field of visible display conceals the invisible presence of interior life, 
disallowing the interior self to appear as a phenomenon.  Intentionality and being-
in-the-world so conceived by Henry are not neutral fields of appearing. Indeed, 
                                                 
64




together they constitute the mode of givenness of the “world” itself, a sphere of 
appearing that suppresses the interior core of display, covering over the invisible 
self-revelation of myself to myself given inside me. Accordingly, Henry argues that 
intentionality and being-in-the-world reflect the destructive power of the “world” 
because, as a mode of display, the world brings to light its exterior horizon at the 
expense of the invisible display of interiority. While we shall explore Husserl in 
greater detail below, we take the Husserlian ego for a moment here to clarify just 
how Henry’s notion of invisible display is interior and thus structurally closed to, 
and forever blocked from, the visible display of the “world”—and hence, why visible 
display disallows invisible display to count as a field of display.
65
  
 As the agent of manifestation itself, the Husserlian ego “lights up” or 
illuminates objects by representing them. To represent, in German, is vorstellen or an 
act of “placing-before.” Similarly, the word object, in German, is Gegenstand or an 
act of “standing-against.” Hence the “ob-ject” is nothing other than this appearing 
before, or the showing of the object “standing against” a conscious ego. The state of 
being-there-before-me in the stream of consciousness highlights the Husserlian ego’s 
structural opening to the exterior, visible world. For Husserl, the intentional aim of 
the ego-pole looks outward, toward that which is “transcendent” to itself, what we 
have been calling the genitive pole; and it is this gap between the genitive and ego 
poles that is the luminous space of visible display.  
 Husserl therefore compares the power of ego’s aim to a spot-light, and it is 
here that the ego is not just a dative “me” but also an agent of manifestation that 
brings to light the world itself, a nominative “I,” an Ichpol. Husserl writes, “The 
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object of attention, in this specific sense, lies in the cone of more or less a bright 
light; but it can also move into the penumbra and into the completely dark region. 
Though the metaphor is far from adequate to differentiate all the modes which can be 
fixed phenomenologically, it is still designative in so far as it indicates alterations in 
what appears, as what appears.”
66
 Michael Purcell rightly describes the nominative-
dative aspects of the Husserlian ego-pole as “somewhat like a lighthouse,” in which 
“consciousness would illumine the area within which objects may make their 
appearance….”
67
 Because consciousness functions to make visible objects before its 
gaze, the conscious ego, structurally speaking, inclines forward as if in an ongoing 
state of “outside-ness” or “transcendence” beyond itself. Here the Husserlian ego, as 
a nominative agent of display, is alienated from itself, cast outside of itself into the 
interplay between the genitive and dative poles of appearing. By virtue of its function 
as a light-ray or spot-light, the Husserlian ego is focused on the “outside,” casting its 
luminous gaze outward upon the horizon of objects and other subjects.  Once seen, 
objects are bathed in the luminosity opened up by a “distance” (or gap, mediation, 
separation, etc.) between the nominative Ichpol and its receiving (dative) that which 
is given to it (genitive). This gap is the field of visible display itself, the gap is the 
world. Without this distance there is no visibility and, without the visibility, there is 
no world.  
 Henry contends that once we isolate the structural distance between the 
genitive and dative, we at the same time lay bare the basic phenomenological 
presupposition driving Husserl’s thinking.
68
 Husserlian visible display requires the 
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mediation of the “world” or the luminous sphere of display outside the interior self. It 
is therefore no surprise that the Husserlian “spot-light” solidifies a structural distance 
or gap between the ego and the world, a distance or gap that allows the horizon of the 
world to be illuminated by the ego. Correlatively, there is no pure ego, nor pure 
nominative “I” in Husserl. “Consciousness of…” forms the basis of the play between 
the ego and the non-ego, or the ego and that which it constitutes before its gaze: the 
world.  
 The opposite situation is just as true for the Husserlian ego: if there is no gap, 
then there is no spot-light, and thus, no visible display of the world—no appearing 
whatsoever. Without distance there can be no “seeing” or luminous appearing of 
phenomena in the field of visible display. If the ego’s aim reflects itself in a mirror, 
for example, it can only see its reflection by the light that shines in the gap between 
the ego and the image received back via the mirror’s reflection. I see myself in the 
mirror because my vision is mediated by a reflection, a reflection made possible by 
the distance between the reflection and that which is being reflected. Distance, 
presupposed by the ego’s aim itself, carves out a site that constitutes the space 
wherein the ego’s “seeing” can bring to light anything that may appear. To pursue 
the “mirror” metaphor further, when my eye draws closer and closer to its reflection 
in the mirror until finally it coincides perfectly with its reflection, then, and only 
then, do the genitive and dative collapse into one another and does my vision 
terminate. Without distance between my ego’s gaze and the mirror I cannot see my 
reflection: as I pull away from the mirror, my field of vision is opened up allowing 
my ego once again to “see” and illuminate objects before its gaze.  
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 For Henry, the lighting of the world is the result of such a distance, i.e., 
mediation, outsideness, gap, transcendence, horizon, exteriority, separation, 
alienation. Because the Husserlian ego dwells in the crevice interposed between itself 
(dative) and the object (genitive), it is enabled to act as a spot-light. Understood on 
the basis of the distance between the genitive and dative poles of appearing, the 
Husserlian Ichpol is unquestionably of a piece with visibility, always bound up with 
the world. Henry describes Husserlian consciousness as the very opening-up or 
bringing to light of the world as such: “The ‘world’s truth’ is nothing other than this: 
a self-production of ‘outsideness’ as the horizon of visibility in and through which 
everything can become visible and thus become a ‘phenomenon’ for us.”
69
 Henry 
names this reductive field of appearing “visible display” because it displays la venue 
hors de soi. 
 For Henry, the problem, then, with reducing appearing to visible display 
alone, to the world alone, as Husserl does, is that it unduly limits appearing. Henry’s 
solution to the problem of visible display is to work out in great detail a field of 
invisible display purely interior to the self, a nocturnal self-presence isolated from 
the visible display of the world. In so doing, he articulates the lineaments of an 
interior sphere of invisible display that challenges, and even inverts, those 
phenomenological articulations whose typical focus is visible display, whether it is in 
the form of Husserlian intentionality or Heideggerian being-in-the-world.
70
 Henry’s 
innovation of invisible display is innovative precisely because it counters the 
valorisation of intentionality and being-in-the-world. Invisible display is thus “non-
intentional” and “non-worldly.” By Henry’s lights, this is a fundamental expansion 
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of the meaning of “appearing” or “displaying.” He broadens the field of appearing to 
account for that which is invisible, or that which has no distance, gap, alienation or 
mediation and therefore no luminosity or visibility—the invisible is without world. 
Perhaps it is an oxymoron to claim that a phenomenon can appear within a field of 
“invisible display,” but for Henry, whose work is characterized by a monumental 
effort to redraw the bounds of “display” itself, Heidegger and Husserl do not have 
the final say on the limits of those bounds.
71
  
 In what follows we highlight the phenomenological setting in which Henry’s 
nocturnal self-present subject takes shape. To do so, we outline the visible character 
of Husserlian intentionality in greater detail (§6) and of Heideggerian being-in-the-
world (§7). We then introduce the duplicity of display whereby it is shown that 
Henry divides all appearing into two fields: exterior visibility and interior invisibility 
(§8). We then examine more closely Henry’s relationship to Husserl’s notion of the 
consciousness of internal time (§9). This is a critical section because it shows not 
only how indebted Henry is to Husserl’s notion of the “living present” but also just 
how radically interior Henry’s notion of invisible display is with respect to the 
Husserlian ego (and thus to what extent Henry departs from Husserl). We then offer 
more general observations about the interior self inasmuch as Henry emphasizes its 
purity as living (§10). Each of these sections shall lay the proper phenomenological 
groundwork to enable us to explore in greater depth Henry’s “theological turn” in 
chapters three and four. 
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 §6. HUSSERL AND INTENTIONALITY 
 It is widely agreed upon that intentionality forms the very foundation of 
Husserlian phenomenology. Husserl himself calls it the “principle theme of 
phenomenology”
72
 and the “wholly indispensable fundamental concept which is the 
starting point at the beginning of phenomenology.”
73
 Derived from the Latin 
intendere, which means “to stretch out”, “to aim at” or “to direct to,” Husserl 
borrows the term intentionality from his mentor, Franz Brentano.
74
 In fact, Brentano 
retrieved the term from the medieval Scholastics to explain mental phenomena as 
unique with respect to physical phenomena.
75
 Husserl grants Brentano’s basic thesis 
as a legitimate starting point for thinking through the philosophical structures of 
consciousness. How does the mind become aware of phenomena that appear to it? 
Husserl writes, “Franz Brentano’s significant discovery that ‘intentionality’ is the 
fundamental characteristic of ‘psychic phenomena’—opened the method for a 
descriptive transcendental-philosophical theory of consciousness.”
76
 Yet Husserl 
surmises that intentionality entails complex moments of mental, subjective activity 
for which Brentano never accounted. This is to say that he goes beyond Brentano 
insofar as Husserl developed how consciousness worked in its pure, transcendental 
state—as a complex meaning-scheme that endows objects with “sense” or 
“meaning.” This desire to elucidate the essential structures of the ego led Husserl to 
discover the rich and complex inner-life of transcendental intentionality. It took 
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many years for Husserl to elaborate and refine his theory of intentionality, and so, we 
bring to light here only its most important features with an eye to clarifying the field 
of visible display. In doing so, many of the most important technical terms in the 
Husserlian lexicon will be clarified. Terms such as Erlebnis, the intentional object, 
meaning-intention, intuition, retention and protention, and the impression—all 
important concepts, as we shall see in this chapter and subsequent chapters, for the 
inception of Henry’s phenomenology of invisible display. 
 
Intentionality 
We begin with Husserl’s initial breakthrough. Upon its release it, Husserl 
garneed critical acclaim and was viewed as a serious and thorough continental 
philosopher. Published in successive years, the two-volume Logical Investigations 
(1900-01) commenced with a sustained and exhaustive study of the problematic of 
intentionality and the relation between the ego and the world to which it gave 
concrete expression. It motivated phenomenology from its inception as a universal 
apriori, and he paid exacting attention to its structure from Logical Investigations up 
through his final publications; he writes, “The first breakthrough of this universal 
apriori of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness (which 
occurred during work on my Logical Investigations around 1898) affected me so 
deeply that my whole subsequent life-work has been dominated by the task of 
systematically elaborating on this apriori of correlation.”
77
 Particularly in 
Investigation V he sketches the two principal components of this universal apriori, 
what in the vernacular of the Investigations we depict as an “intentional act.”  
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Such “intentional acts” are conscious experiences of things. It must perforce 
apply to experiences that are dispositional or prejudicial. When I think about a castle, 
I always perceive it in the mode of “wished for,” “delighted in,” “judged about,” 
“pictorially represented,” “imagined,” etc.  Every object immanent within 
consciousness is an intentional object, or an object on which I have a certain mental 
stance. Each and every intentional object thus represents a mental object that evokes 
in me an “act,” or a determinant descriptive experience of the object in question. In 
the second place, because I am always “directed toward” or “about” a phenomenon, 
all intentional experiences contain only intentional objects, that is, contents 
experienced by the mind’s dispositional character. All intentional objects are simply 
that, objects intended by the mind’s intentional powers. By the same token, I enjoy, 
in some cases, the experience of something totally imaginary as an object present in 
consciousness (i.e. round square, the god Jupiter, a mermaid, etc.), and so, all 
intentional objects are immanent to consciousness but are not necessarily “real” or 
really “in” consciousness (reell Bewusst), a crucial distinction Husserl takes pains to 
sharpen throughout his career. 
To distinguish intentional objects from “real” objects in space and time, 
Husserl delineates the two primary layers of an intentional act: the intentional object 
and the intentional content. The intentional object is simply the castle as it is 
presented and experienced by the ego via intentionality (as we made clear above) 
whereas the intentional content is the actual castle, the one that is really (reellen) 
existent in space and time perceived in and through sensation, for Husserl states, “the 
experienced content, generally speaking, is not the perceived object.”
78
 Or similarly, 
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“we must distinguish, in relation to the intentional content taken as object of the act, 
between the object as it is intended, and the object which is intended.”
79
 Thus there 
are two types of material in a conscious act: intentional objects and real (reellen) 
spatiotemporal content. But how do the spatiotemporal contents relate to the mental 
sphere of intentionality?  In other words: how does the interior mind gain access to 
the transcendent, exterior object? How do the genitive and dative poles unite? 
That which is really within consciousness, as a real (reellen) spatiotemporal 
object, is a non-intentional sense experience. Husserl declares as much when he says, 
“truly immanent contents, which belong to the real make-up [reellen Bestande] of the 
intentional experiences, are not intentional: they constitute the act, provide necessary 
points d’appui which render possible an intention, but are not themselves intended, 
not the objects present in the act. I do not see colour sensations but coloured things, I 
do not hear tone sensations but the singer’s song, etc., etc.”
80
 The “real content” is 
thus a non-intentional empirical substance that really exists and is present within 
consciousness but (and this may sound counter-intuitive) remains at the same time 
something never “experienced” by the intentional ego. To this dilemma we now turn. 
 
Erlebnis 
For Husserl, the term “experience” reflects a technical or phenomenological 
meaning, one expressed by the German word Erlebnis, in English, “lived-
experience” and in French “la vécu.”
81
 To experience, or live through anything is to 
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encounter that thing as an intentional object, within the matrix of meanings the mind 
may bestow on the thing. Thus the non-intentional “stuff” (Stoff), in principle, cannot 
be experienced (this point is made much of by Henry as we shall see). We must 
continue to bear in mind that, for Husserl, the experienced castle remains embedded 
in the temporal streaming of intentional acts so that the same real (reellen) castle is 
subject to a multiplicity of perspectives. The one and same castle is experienced from 
several different angles, as I move around it, looking at it from the front, the back, 
the side, etc. Each new angle yields a new “experience” (Erlebnis) within the 
wakeful ego and its consciousness of…. The castle itself is rarely, if ever 
experienced, for the Husserlian ego experiences each new perspective of the castle as 
it appears by way of the ego’s “lighthouse.” Husserl writes of this distinction 
between the castle as it is and the castle as it is perceived by the ego: “The appearing 
of the thing (the experience) is not the thing which appears (that seems to stand 
before us in propria persona.)”
82
 Husserl therefore distinguishes the intentional 
object from the non-intentional content insofar as only the intentional object is 
experienced (Erlebnis) within, and constituted by, the intentional life of the ego. We 
are now in a position to move to a brief engagement with the concepts of intention 
and intuition, or form and content, the twin structures of Husserlian Erlebnis.  
Husserl states that there must remain an “absolute distinction between form 
and matter of presentation…”
83
 Herein lies the basic dualistic structure of Husserlian 
intentionality: form vs. matter, or ego and genitive poles of appearing respectively. It 
is important to maintain the strict division between thought (i.e. form) and intuition 
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(i.e. sensible or non-sensible matter), because even though they form a unity of 
experience, each component retains its distinct role in the intentional act. If distinct, 
how do these two components come together and form this unity? Husserl’s 
transcendental subject is synthetic, but how? 
At the basis of this dualism, intuition is that which provides the fulfilling 
material for consciousness. Intuition represents something like the raw material from 
which the intentional aim synthesizes objects into units of knowledge. The 
intentional act of the mind “lives through” (Erlebnis) or “experiences” this raw Stoff, 
endowing it with shape and meaning. Appropriately, then, the intentional aim is 
called the “meaning-intention,” whereby the mind bestows meaning onto the object 
in question, which is called the “fulfilling intuition.” The meaning-intention or sense-
bestowal (Sinngebung where Sinn literally means “sense” or “meaning”) sets into 
operation the process of constitution, the movement by which consciousness gives 
meaning to and synthesizes the intuition into an intelligible lived-experience, an 
Erlebnis.  
We can say that intentional acts are fulfilled on two levels for Husserl: first, 
some intuition is always necessary, a synthesis must occur between intention (i.e. 
thought) and intuition (i.e. raw data) and thus genitive and dative poles are unified by 
the nominative agent of manifestation, the ego; and second, the intentional aim sets 
out the limits of what can be given in intuition; only that which matches the ego’s 
look as it searches for content can actually be constituted by the ego. It is at this 
juncture that we encounter a deepening of the cognitive power of intentionality and a 
sharper turn towards the interiority of the nominative Ichpol. We witness the 
emergence of a constitutive phenomenology with all of its attendant conceptual 
73 
 
devices, the most well-known of which is the phenomenological reduction—the 
philosophical tool which Husserl thinks enables the philosopher to discover the 
sphere of pure immanence (Eigenheitsphäre), the pure Ichpol as it subsists within its 
own world.   
 
Interiority 
Does the visible display of the world, as an exterior horizon of objects, really 
stand outside of the Husserlian ego, as if the world were merely an appendage to the 
ego? While we shall describe it more detail in chapters three and four, we invoke the 
Husserlian transcendental reduction here briefly to show that, despite Husserl’s 
claims to the opposite, the ego cannot escape the interplay between genitive and 
dative in the exterior world, i.e., the Husserlian Ichpol is never pure and worldless 
but always wrapped in world-engagements—a position against which Henry 
articulates a theory of a world-less interior self. 
 The Husserlian phenomenological reduction brackets or suspends the natural 
attitude. This entails bracketing the naïve assumption that the world exists as it is, for 
“in the theoretical attitude which we call the ‘natural attitude’ the collective horizon 
of possible investigations is therefore designated with one word: It is the world.” 
84
 
The crude realism of belief in the existence of the world apart from consciousness 
must be eschewed according to Husserl.
85
 All disciplines other than phenomenology 
subscribe to the naiveté of the natural attitude: all natural and cultural sciences must 
undergo the reduction in order to make the transition from the natural attitude to the 
phenomenological attitude. Even God is subject to the blow of the reduction. Both 
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the natural world and God are methodologically excluded: “We extend the 
phenomenological reduction to include this ‘absolute’ and ‘transcendent’ being 
[God]. It shall remain excluded from the new field of research which is to be 
provided, since this shall be a field of pure consciousness.”
86
 The phenomenological 
attitude, in contrast to the naïve or natural attitude, stipulates that the philosopher 
figure consciousness as the single target of research. Husserl urges that all 
philosophical research, if it remain rigorous, must avail itself, “of nothing but what 
we can make essentially evident by observing consciousness itself in its pure 
immanence.”
87
 Left over like residue, then, the pure ego is the only substance able to 
subsist after the performance of the reduction. 
Consequently, the transcendental reduction returns to intentionality as its 
principal theme. By bracketing or parenthesizing the existence of all transcendent 
fields of research (especially the world), Husserl seeks to arrive at the absolute 
interior space of the ego’s intentional life. Because intentionality perfectly governs 
the transcendental subject, the intentional structure remains the, “comprehensive 
name for all-inclusive phenomenological structures.”
88
 As the transcendental 
reduction opens up the field of pure consciousness, Husserl orders intentionality in a 
synthetic duality. Using the Aristotelian Greek appellations of morphé and hyle, he 
labels the intentional sense-bestowing activity (i.e. Sinngebung) of the mind as the 
“form” or morphé and describes the intuitional data as the “material” or hyle. They 
are entitled accordingly as “stuffless forms” (morphé) and “formless stuffs” (hyle).
89
 
He explicitly calls the hyletic material non-intentional data. All hyletic data reaches 
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the mind via sense impressions. But this impression must conform to and receive its 
meaning from the intentional regard of the ego in order for the ego to “live-through” 
(Erlebnis) the data.
90
 The hyletic dimension (“formless stuffs”) of Husserlian 
intentionality will prove crucial to Henry’s own proposal of a pure hyletic 
phenomenology with no morphé—a connection we shall make explicit momentarily 
(§9).    
 For now it is suffices to point out that Husserl makes the “interior” synthetic 
life of the ego the key to interpreting the world: “Every grounding, every showing of 
truth and being, goes on wholly within myself.”
91
 Idealism reaches its ultimate status 
in the swerve toward “solipsism” present in his later 1929 work Cartesian 
Meditations: “If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an 
outside is precisely—nonsense.”
92
 Husserlian idealism is an idealism that makes use 
of the phenomenological reduction, and here, the reduction is concerned with 
highlighting how the ego constitutes all exterior entities within itself, within its 
morphé-hyle synthetic unity.
93
 But, is transcendental constitution truly interior? And 
is the world “out there” really an appendage relative to the inner space of the ego?  
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We shall return to this question when we confront Husserl’s careful 
explication of the consciousness of internal time, which is the “universal peculiarity 
of all mental processes.”
94
 The nominative “I” or achievement of the Ichpol is 
wrapped up in the interplay between the genitive and dative poles of appearing in the 
temporal streaming of the world. The Husserlaian ego so understood is pervaded by 
the transcendent directionality of intentionality, for consciousness always proceeds to 
constitute that which is other than, different from and outside of consciousness, 
namely the “world.” The reduction so conceived is therefore nothing more than a 
momentary suspension that clarifies how the ego is, not entirely separate from, but 
constitutive of the world (more on the reduction in chapters three and four). We now 
proceed to Heidegger and his absolute valorisation of the exterior sphere of the world 
as the basic structure of Dasein.  
 
§7. HEIDEGGER AND BEING-IN-THE-WORLD 
 
 Visible  display is certainly a decisive theme underwriting Heidegger’s notion 
of Existenz in Being and Time. It is important to pass through the Heideggerian 
schematic of visible display in this chapter because, in so many ways, Henry’s 
phenomenology of invisible display owes a large debt to Heideggerian 
phenomenology if only because the former seeks to invert the latter. By 
understanding with greater precision what Heidegger means by “being-in-the-world” 
and the field of visible display it opens up, we are at the same time gaining a more 
thoroughgoing picture of Henry’s phenomenology. So, for example, when Henry 
critiques the “truth of the world” he has in mind Heidegger. When Henry 
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denominates the world an illusion or compares its mode of appearing to an artificial 
“thin film” that “de-realizes” the invisible manifestation of interiority, he has in mind 
Heidegger as the target of critique. In fact, he is so critical of Heidegger’s analytic of 
being-in-the-world that Henry compares it to a discourse on death, one that “murders 
life” (because it covers over the interior life).
95
 Something of an “arch-nemesis” for 
Henry, the totality of Heidegger’s analytic of being-in-the-world is everything that 
Henry’s notion of life is not. We highlight here two philosophical features 
determinate of Dasein (i.e., being-in-the-world and temporality) that both clarify 
Heidegger’s notion of visible display and bring out particular advancements against 
which Henry develops the phenomenological possibility of invisible display. 
 
Being-in-the-world 
 In Being and Time, the “world” corresponds to that visible field upon which 
Dasein comes to light in its possibility to-be as it engages other Daseins together 
with things “present at hand” and “ready to hand” (Vorhanden and Zuhanden).
96
 As 
is well known, Heidegger gives the name “being-in-the-world” to the basic 
ontological structure of human existence (Dasein). Against Husserl, Heidegger is not 
concerned with analyses of the transcendental life of consciousness or of the 
intention–intuition unity. Heidegger suggested that the central task of 
phenomenology is to clarify how we exist always already in the world:  
 
                                                 
95
 Henry writes, “It is from the radical negation of such a mode of revelation that Heideggerian 
thought proceeds. If such a mode of revelation, as a self-revelation foreign to the ‘outside’ of the 
world, constitutes the essence of life, then its negation signifies nothing less than the impossibility of 
any form of life, and thus amounts to the murder of life—not accidentally but rather in principle.” 
Henry, I am the Truth, 46. 
96
 Heidegger, Being and Time, §16. 
78 
 
Of course, we are sometimes assured that we are certainly no to 
think of the subject’s ‘inside’ [Innene] and its ‘inner sphere’ as a 
sort of ‘box’ or ‘cabinet.’ But when one asks for the positive 
signification of this ‘inside’ of immanence in which knowing is 
proximally enclosed, or when one inquires how this ‘Being inside’ 
[Innenseins] which knowing possesses has its own character o 
Being grounded in the kind of Being which belongs to the subject, 
then silence reigns. And no matter how this inner sphere may get 
interpreted, if one does no more than ask how knowing makes its 
way ‘out of’ it and achieves ‘transcendence,’ it becomes evident 
that the knowing which presents such enigmas will remain 






Dasein’s knowing evokes straightaway the problem of having an “interior” nature up 
against an “exterior” horizon. Heidegger resolves this problem by insisting that there 
is no problem at all, that it is, in fact, a pseudo-problem. The world has already taken 
possession of Dasein prior to any intentional relation to an exterior object. By 
seeking to offer what he calls a “disclosure” (Erschlossenheit) of human existence 
that is “equi-primordial” (gleichursprünglich) with the world, Heidegger overcomes 
Husserl’s preoccupation with the interior transcendental ego and the reduction that 
leads to pure consciousness, as if consciousness inhabits an inner spatial sphere 
configured like a “cabinet” or “box” (of course we have shown that Husserl does not 
posit an absolute interior sphere and thus Heidegger’s portrayal of Husserl is not 
without problems, but this interpretative issue is deferred for another time). By 
dissolving the rigid distinction between the interior and the exterior, Heidegger 
privileges everyday existence in which Dasein exists concretely in the “there-ness” 
(Da) of the world.  
 While departing from Husserl’s categories of intentionality and 
transcendental consciousness, Heidegger nevertheless affirms the fundamental notion 
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of ek-stasis or “distance” that we already suggested animates Husserl’s conception of 
the ego. Dasein, by its very structure as being-in-the-world, negates more radically 
than does Husserlian intentional life the possibility of invisible display as a modality 
of appearing. As a result of its absolute and ineluctable “there-ness,” Dasein is 
structurally open to, and attached to, the visible world. Always open to the world, 
Dasein necessarily displays worldhood as an inherent property, and thus its selfhood 
is grounded in its visible worldhood. Dasein is indeed fundamentally topological, for, 
“Dasein is its world, existingly.”
98
  
 Yet Heidegger never claims that the world’s horizon in which Dasein finds 
itself thrown must necessarily give way to a purely passive description. Dasein also 
opens up the world through its temporal and affective movements. As an agent of 
manifestation, Dasein’s existential power to question its own existence (Dasein is a 
being “for whom being is a question”) designates Dasein’s capacity to open up the 
world as such: “If no Dasein exists, no world is ‘there’ either.”
99
  
 Further, Heidegger distinguishes human existence from animal existence and 
inanimate “things” precisely on this score. He declares the stone to be “worldless,” 
the animal to be “poor in world” and Dasein to be “world-forming,” theses which 
qualify Dasein as particularly aware of objects and other humans in the world such 
that it relates to them in a way to bring to light the world.
100
 Dasein occupies 
relationships whereby particular affections/moods and temporal powers (angst, 
boredom, being-toward-death, etc.) impinge on its existence. Temporality and 
affection/mood lead Dasein to question its place in the world, to the “question 
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concerning how things stand with us” inasmuch as they open up the world where 
possibilities are realized in a way that an animal or a stone cannot realize.
101
 The 




 Dasein is topological and thereby both constitutive of and constituted by the 
structures of the world. But what is not always discussed is the fact that the “there-
ness” of the world is made possible by the primal movement of temporality. 
Heidegger assigns to temporality the power of exteriorization, the power to open up 
the horizonal field of manifestation where topology is possible. Time deploys itself 
with an original movement such that spatiality is always a temporal spatiality. 
 Temporality designates Dasein’s transitive posture, which highlights Dasein 
as an agent of manifestation who is capable of actively opening up the horizon-like 
character of the world. Thanks to temporality, Dasein distanciates itself from itself 
through ecstasis, an outward movement. And it is through this movement that Dasein 
can create a horizon; this is perhaps why Heidegger says that time resembles 
something like a “horizon,”
102
 and the world-horizon is horizonal precisely because 
of its temporality. Heidegger observes: “On the basis of the horizonal constitution of 
the ecstatical unity of temporality there belongs to that entity which is in each case its 
own ‘there,’ something like a world that has been disclosed.” Or, “In temporalizing 
itself with regard to its Being as temporality, Dasein is essentially ‘in a world’ by 
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reason of the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of that of temporality.”
103
 Heidegger 
gives ultimate priority to temporality (over and above spatiality) with respect to the 
structure of being-in-the-world: “Only on the basis of its ecstatic-horizonal 
temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into space.”
104
 Heidegger’s thesis, in 
other words, is that temporality reflects a “movement,” a “going” or an “ek-static 
becoming” that creates a horizon-like spatiality.  
 It is crucial to emphasize that this movement is a temporal movement. 
Consider the opposite for a moment: if Dasein were purely static and immobile, that 
is non-temporal, then it could not move or displace itself from “here” to “there.” 
Without temporality, Dasein would have no sense of its own volume, directionality 
or the ability to discriminate among differences within its own localized continuum 
of sensory data. Thus, for Heidegger, temporality opens up a whole continuum in 
which Dasein distends itself, moves itself and opens up spatiality itself.
105
 In this 
respect, Dasein is truly “world-forming.” 
 Moreover, the worldly nature of being-in-the-world is due to the exterior 
displacement of Dasein’s temporal streaming, its movement from here to there by 
virtue of temporal movement. Heidegger emphasizes that, “In so far as Dasein 
temporalizes itself, a world is too. In temporalizing itself with regard to its Being as 
temporality, Dasein is essentially ‘in a world,’ by reason of the ecstatic-horizonal 
constitution of that temporality. The world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-
hand, but temporalizes itself in temporality.”
106
 On the one hand, Heidegger is 
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certainly maintaining that temporality is there in advance along with the world, and 
yet, on the other, he is claiming that temporality originally endows the world with its 
horizon-like structure, for “temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a 
horizon.”
107
 There can be no world without a temporal horizon. The Heideggerian 
world of visible display is therefore co-emergent with the original movement of 
temporality. Several years after Being and Time, in his “Letter on Humanism” 
(1944), Heidegger denominates Dasein as the “ekstatikon par excellence,” forcefully 




 As we shall see in chapter three, Henry’s phenomenology of interiority 
broadens the “theatre of appearing” to account for invisible display, a non-temporal 
mode of appearing whose chief feature is that of “en-stasis,” an appearance 
fundamentally at odds with the Heidegger’s temporal “ek-stasis.” It is to be recalled 
that Henry does not discount the utility of visible display of the world in either of its 
Husserlian or Heideggerian inflections insofar as he is concerned with broadening 
display itself so that both visible and invisible fields can count as fields of display. 
How does he describe this dual aspect of display? 
 
§8. THE DUPLICITY OF DISPLAY 
After furnishing the coordinates of visible display in Husserlian intentionality 
and Heideggerian being-in-the-world we are in a position to introduce Henry’s 
critical broadening of the concept of display itself. He combines Husserl and 
Heidegger together as proponents of one side of display: the visible disclosure of the 
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primal “outside” of the world. To stretch the bounds of appearing beyond its 
visibility, Henry proposes an adjoining field of invisible display, another side. This 
purely interior side of display is separate from, but complementary to, the world. 
Because appearing reflects a double-sidedness, Henry argues that a characteristic 
feature of appearing is its duplicity (la duplicité de l’apparaître)—here meaning 
“two-sided.” A reflection on the body affords us some clarifying precision on such 
duplicitous structure. Henry writes: 
 
Our singular body appears to us in two different ways: on the one 
hand as this living body whose life is my own life, inside of which 
I am placed, with which I coincide at the same time as I coincide 
with each of its powers—to see, take, move, and so on—such that 
they are mine and the “I Can” puts them into operation. On the 
other hand, it appears as body-object that the “I-Can” sees, 
touches feels—the same as any other object…. Everything is 
double, but if what is double, what is offered to us in a double 
aspect, is in itself one and the same reality, then one of its aspects 
must be merely an appearance, an image, a copy of reality, but not 





 The visible world-horizon is brought to light for Henry as a field of temporal 
objects exterior to the ego’s self-presence. This kind of visible phenomenology is 
concerned with the appearing of phenomena—objects made manifest through 
intentionality, being-in-the-world and the temporal horizon. Visible display is 
“visible” because it illuminates those phenomena that are outside of, and thus 
transcendent to, the ego in and through the interplay of the genitive and dative poles 
of appearing. The visible phenomena of which Husserl and Heidegger bespeak in 
their various phenomenological analyses are cast against the background of the 
temporal streaming of the world. Henry condemns this side of display as a lie (here 
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duplicitous as deceptive) because it conceals what is truly living about display, its 
interior side. The body, for example, displays a subjective power, an invisible mode 
of interiority.  
 Let us return to the exterior world for a moment. Henry insists that the visible 
display of the world-horizon literally displays an illusion, a “lie” about display. The 
body on visible display, to return to our example above, is not the real living interior 
body but rather an image or copy of that interior body. The exterior “body-object” is 
manifest only as a “double” or a doppelganger of the ego’s real, interior body. Visible 
display, as a vast world-horizon spread out before the ego, perpetuates the 
doppelganger effect. What I see in the world is nothing other than the other’s double, 
not the thing itself. When I look at Peter I only see Peter’s appearance in the world 
not Peter himself. To express it another way, visible display is inferior because it does 
not, and is incapable of, attending to the thing itself, i.e., the invisible essence of the 
ego in its self-embrace, a homeland untouched by the alienating power of the world. 
For Henry, the world as a stage of manifestation never gives access to the ego’s living 
subjectivity in its purity. Henry’s schematic of the duplicity of display maintains 
unequivocally that the visible world is not where thing itself resides. 
  Henry does not deny or negate the world, however. Henry writes, “the 
world’s light is not inherently shadow: it makes things manifest in its way, exhibiting 
stones, water, trees, and even people as they, too, appear lit by it, as being in this 
world….[but] its power of making manifest is changed into an utter powerlessness to 
do so with respect to the Essential.”
110
 Now, Henry does not deny the objective 
reality of the world apart from the interior ego. His critical judgment about the world 
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as a horizon of display incapable of giving access to the essential is not, in fact, the 
same as denying the objective reality of the world. The world, as the stage that 
displays visible objects and objective bodies, does not disclose the essential precisely 
because it masks the essential—the world must exist in order to cover over the 
invisible. And in its veiling of the interior self, the world shows falsehood, literally 
acting deceitful about what is really the thing itself. This prompts questions: how does 
visible display occupy a land of deception and betrayal? Why exactly does the visible 
structure display, if only as a foil, counter the truth of invisible display? 
 The world, as Henry frames it, is a façade. Its surface bears within it no depth 
and moreover it puts into play the order of appearing which approaches nothing but 
its own pure expansion as a horizon of exteriority. Similar to the absence of living 
depth so obviously manifest in a cadaver, the horizon of the world spreads itself out 
within its externality. Henry, prone to carrying out his thesis in a polemical tone, 
writes that: “a cadaver is just that, a body reduced to its pure externality. When we 
are no longer anything but something of the world, something in the world, that is 
indeed what we will be before being buried or cremated there.”
111
 The world-horizon 
limits phenomenological inquiry to exterior-bodily presences in which all properties 
ascribed to the ego are visible features. Even the mind becomes identical to the brain 
and the emotions to the facial expressions and felt bodily movements. To leave 
unexamined the very foundations of these appearings in the world necessarily leads, 
Henry so insists, to the tragedy of ontological monism: the temporal streaming of the 
world-horizon and nothing else—exteriority and nothing else. The privileging of 
visible display at the expense of the invisible is the crucial reason why Henry rejects 
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Heidegger’s emphasis on being-in-the-world as the fundamental constitution of 
existence. For Henry, the analytic of being-in-the-world is reductive inasmuch as it 
reduces existence to the world alone.  
 Phenomenological inquiry that cannot look beyond the visible world-horizon 
is a negation of the truth of duplicity, namely, that there is also an interior domain of 
self-experience prior to the world. Ek-static phenomenology, highlighted in Husserl 
and Heidegger, entails an outward thrust, a movement like emptying a box full of its 
content, in which the only thing that counts as a phenomenon is the box itself, the 
shell with no filling. Heideggerian Dasein or the Husserlian ego, are razor thin in 
their depth, visible displayings with a smooth surface, tightly pulled across the 
interior ego. Without peeling back the layer of visible display, a phenomenological 
move Henry says Husserl and Heidegger fail to initiate (let alone accomplish), the 
self in its living essence eludes phenomenological inquiry. Henry’s principal 
achievement lies in the unveiling of this primal sublayer or “underground” of 
invisible display. Internal to the ego, the invisible self lives underneath every 
appearance of the self in the world.  
 Yet Henry does not simply situate the two fields of display side by side as if 
they proceed collaterally without conflict, as if one consists of the “outside” shell 
while the other consists of the “interior” filling. The duplicity of display should not 
give the impression that the first field of display is visible and exterior while the 
other is invisible and interior, a unit lived together, each other in relative harmony. 
We must resist the temptation to think that Henry believes the exterior field is merely 
a species in kind of the interior disposition of the ego. For Henry, this picture of how 
the two relate is simply impossible, for such a harmonious picture undercuts the 
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absolute incompatibility, the radical dichotomy of the two fields. By pitting the 
invisible against the visible, or “interior life” against “exterior world,” the duplicity 
of display shapes the field of appearing by driving an impenetrable wedge between 
the invisible and the visible. Henry understands life’s reality to reveal itself within 
itself, a pure self-display within its own structure distinct from everything foreign. So 
what is “real” is pure in that it feels itself and nothing but itself thereby fulfilling 
itself. What is “irreal” or “an image” of the real appears in that field of display that 
illuminates that which is foreign to itself in its distance from itself, what Henry 
denominates as the world but shall also describe as hetero-affection (being affected 
by that which is different). Henry applies this logic of the duplicity of display in all 
rigour. The fields of auto-affection (being affected by myself with no gap between 
me and myself) and hetero-affection cannot intertwine or integrate since they are 
heterogeneous to each other. If the invisible depths of auto-affection were to become 
visible, even through the slightes fissure or fracture, interiority would no longer be 
invisible. In order to remain invisible, the modality of invisible display must 
maintain a strict relationship to itself apart from the visible display of the world.  
 The duplicity of display must, therefore, maintain itself by bifurcating itself. 
Cleaving me in two, the two sides of my phenomenological structure never 
intertwine like a double helix. Interiority is displayed prior to, and without 
integration with, the exterior world: “Life designates pure manifestation, always 
irreducible to that of the world, an original revelation that is not the revelation of 
another thing and does not depend on anything other, but is rather a revelation of 
self, that absolute self-revelation that is Life itself.”
112
 Because the interior side of the 
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self reveals itself and nothing else, it subsists without relation to the world, and 
therefore, is invisible, enstatic and non-temporal. And yet this is precisely the 
moment when Henry not only inverts the phenomenological tradition but also where 
his “theological turn” comes into full view, a turn which we shall explicate in great 
detail in chapters three and four.  
 For now it is important to note that, from the point of view of Henry’s 
scheme of the duplicity of display, God embodies each of these negatives that 
characterize invisible display (invisible, enstatic and non-temporal). Henry declares 
that in God’s self-revelation, “there is no separation between the seeing and what is 
seen, between the light and what it illuminates.”
113
 Christianity divine self-revelation 
remains the unique mould of this type of auto-affection in that there is no horizon, no 
temporal movement of the world’s kind and no distance between God and God’s 
self-revelation. It is a frequent refrain in Henry that “God is that pure Revelation that 
reveals nothing other than itself. God reveals Himself.”
114
  Henry articulates this 
theological self-revelation in phenomenological terms:  
 
The phenomenalization of phenomenality itself is a pure 
phenomenological matter, a substance whose whole essence is to 
appear—phenomenality in its actualization and in its pure 
phenomenological effectivity. What manifests itself is 
manifestation itself. What reveals itself is revelation itself; it is a 
revelation of revelation, a self-revelation in its original and 
immediate effulgence…We are in the presence of the essence that 
Christianity posits as the principle of everything. God is that pure 





Thus God’s self-revelation counters the manners of givenness of the things in the 
field of visible display, things in the world. In order to understand how invisible 
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display is structured as pure interiority, we return once again to Husserl, and in 
particular, to his study of temporality. 
 
§9. THE LIVING PRESENT 
We have come to a final, but important, engagement between Henry and 
Husserl. We have highlighted that visible display is not neutral because it conceals 
invisible display (§5), that Husserl’s conception of intentionality is an important and 
sophisticated articulation of exterior, visible display (despite its concern for interior 
consciousness) (§6), that Heidegger’s analytic of being-in-the-world represents a 
radical form of visible display, an uninhibited celebration of the temporal structure of 
being-in-the-world (§7), and that Henry orders the field of appearing in terms of an 
unwavering duplicity whereby invisible display appears in its pure self-revelation in 
the depths of the ego in contradistinction to the body in the world, which is manifest 
as an “irreal” exterior object (§8). We have already penetrated Husserlian 
intentionality by laying bare its complicity in the work of visible display or the 
“outside of the world.” But, does not Husserl’s notion of pure consciousness and his 
explicit turn toward interiority present an exception to Henry’s claim that Husserlian 
phenomenology designates a form of ontological monism? Does not the Husserlian 
ego seek to establish, as its fundamental reality, the pure immanence of the ego 
analogous to, if even identical to, Henry’s proposal of interiority? Husserl’s 
reflections on the consciousness of internal time afford the occasion to emphasize 
that only Henry’s transcendental subject inhabits the field of invisible display. 
Henry insists that the Husserlian reduction does not go far enough in its 
attempt to bracket the visible display of the world. This is to say that Henry critiques 
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Husserl’s view of intentionality for giving the impression that it adopts a purely 
interior framework. Upon closer inspection, the reduction does nothing more than 
uncover the field of temporal consciousness and the “Hericlitean” flux
116
 of the 
world-horizon situated at the base of the ego. Henry draws the conclusion that the 
Husserlian ego is manifest not inside itself but exterior to itself, in a foreign land 
alienated from its self-embrace. Henry’s penetrating critique (that Husserl’s ego is 
not interior enough) may go against traditional readings of Husserl. Dan Zahavi aptly 
observes, “Whereas post-Husserlian phenomenology has generally tried to rectify 
what was believed to be an imbalance in Husserl’s account of the relation between 
immanence and transcendence, namely his disregard of exteriority, Henry has 
accused Husserl of never having managed to disclose the true interiority of 
subjectivity in a sufficiently radical and pure manner.”
117
 The radicality of Henry’s 
theory of invisible display enables him to single out the fact that the Husserlian ego’s 
exterior link trades on its temporal constitution, a connection typically overlooked in 
post-Husserl scholarship. Henry offers a close reading of Husserl’s Lectures on the 
Consciousness of Internal Time, unearthing at the base of Husserlian intentionality 
the field visible display, i.e., the temporal horizonality of the world to which the ego 
is ineluctably attached. So even though the Husserlian ego may reflect upon itself as 
a spectator looking inward at its interior life, its “interior” streaming is not 
sufficiently pure in its interior displaying—it is always pervaded by the temporal 
horizon of the world.  
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Henry’s argument proceeds in the following manner: Husserlian 
intentionality is immersed in the temporal streaming of intentional correlates arriving 
from the world-horizon, and therefore, the Husserlian ego is incapable of 
withdrawing to a place self-presence, what Henry describes as interior auto-affection. 
Auto-affection is the immediate yet ongoing feeling of being-overwhelmed by 
myself as the feeling of myself crushing up against myself without recourse to 
anything outside myself, including the temporal horizon of the world. According to 
Henry, the structure of Husserlian intentionality resists the self-disclosure of auto-
affection because Husserlian intentionality is intrinsically conditioned by the 
ceaseless flow of temporality. The Husserlian ego is endlessly moving but moving in 
the wrong direction while placed on conveyor belt that steadily marches from future 
to past in a backward motion. As always oriented, or about something, intentional 
consciousness is ineluctably attached to the temporal flow of passing and ever-new 
sensuous impressions. Husserl names this ongoing temporal flow relentlessly 
occurring within the ego’s intentional life the “consciousness of internal time.”
118
  
To maintain its identity as this particular ego whose gaze constitutes all 
objects, it is well-known that the Husserlian ego is ordered by a two-fold temporal 
configuration of retention (reaching into the past) and protention (anticipating the 
future).
119
 Phenomena appear to the Husserlian ego by way of a flow, a streaming 
procession from the future (protention) to the present and backward therein slipping 
further into the depths of retentional consciousness. The retentional act of 
consciousness represents the holding-onto of impressions as they move backwards 
from the present. Holding onto the past impressions, the ego nevertheless looks 
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forward to the present as it expects what is to arrive from the future. The retentional 
acts therefore illustrate a backward streaming against which the ego pushes forward, 
groping ahead, “like a “drunken man or like a person on a conveyor belt or an 
escalator in the wrong direction.”
120
 In this way, Henry characterizes the continuum 
of retentional acts as a type of longitudinal intentionality because the ego deploys 
retention as a horizontal stretching that spans the entire flow of hyletic data from 
future to present to past.
121
 Like a comet’s tail, the future passes to the present which 
is displaced by a retention of the present, and so on, eventually sinking deeper into 
the past and further from the wakeful ego’s mental life.
122
  
Henry also notes that the consciousness of internal time ceaselessly shuttles 
between protention and retention in their temporal play, which prevents the 
conscious ego from achieving the presence of the present, or the living impression 
that Husserl says initiates the entire motion of temporality itself. The “living present” 
(Leibhaftig Gegenwärtig) is a primordial impression that “spontaneously emerges” 
over and again, offering one temporal object after another as they sink into the past. 
The “primal impression is the absolute beginning of this production, the primal 
source, that from which everything else is continuously produced. It does not arise as 
something produced but through genesis spontanea.”
123
 The living present is 
therefore that which alone makes possible temporal objects, the stable origin from 
which the horizon of time emerges and through which the ego situates itself in the 
flow of time as it moves backward. But no matter how completely at home the ego is 
                                                 
120
 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 30. 
121
 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 28. 
122
 Husserl writes, for example, that the “now-apprehension is, as it were, the head attached to the 
comet’s tail of retentions relation to the earlier now-points of the motion.” See Husserl, On the 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, 32. 
123
 Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, 106. 
93 
 
within the temporal flow that originates from the living present, the ego itself cannot 
claim the living present for itself. The living present for the Husserlian ego is present 
as absent. The living present channels temporal objects into a prefixed flow of time, 
but never comes into possession of the ego.  
The living present does not present itself as an object before the ego. Rather 
the living present consists of what Husserl describes as a limit point (Und Gegenwart 
ist ein Grenzpunkt), or the head at which the comet’s tail terminates but which can 
never be grasped in itself. Each time I reach for the head of the comet another piece 
breaks off, taking me with it as it flows backward within the streaming continuum of 
the tail.
124
 For Husserl, the ego flows along with the streaming impressions, as they 
recede like a “comet’s tail” into the past relating to the earlier now-points of the 
motion.
125
 Husserlian consciousness of internal time is therefore a product of the 
flow of time, and given that time opens up the horizon of the world, it is a product 
also of the exterior world-horizon itself. Henry congratulates Husserl’s disclosure of 
the living present as a genuine philosophical breakthrough; however, he sharply 
criticizes Husserl for not providing the space in which the self can inhabit the living 
present. Henry argues that auto-affection, the pure feeling of myself present to 
myself is such a living present. From this original source point is born the non-
temporal welling up of the primal impression—the living interiority of the self.  
 But is Henry’s interpretation of Husserl fair (not to say accurate)? Dan 
Zahavi defends Husserl against Henry, showing that the difference between Henry 
and Husserl is minimal at best. Zahavi thinks that, for Henry, the field of invisible 
display inside the ego provides its own affective temporalization that resembles the 
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temporal dynamic of Husserlian consciousness of internal time.
126
 In other words, 
Zahavi argues that Henry does not possess the phenomenological resources to 
critique Husserl given their basic affinity with respect to temporality. Zahavi could 
have been more measured, however, in his critique of Henry. A more attentive 
interpretation of Henry’s reading of Husserl must acknowledge that the field of 
invisible display is non-temporal, self-impressional and self-present (beneath the 
streaming of temporality of the comet’s tail). Henry writes that the living present or 
the impression as he conceives it is non-temporal and “this is because the impression, 
taken as the now, the just passed or the coming to be, does not have its place in the 
flow. Its original subjectivity has never belonged there; instead, it belongs entirely 
outside of the ek-static dimension, in the radical Elsewhere that I am.”
127
 This radical 
elsewhere is what Henry calls the living present, or that “Ur-impression” which is 
entirely outside the flow of temporality and thus outside the world-horizon itself. The 
primordial suffering-and-enjoying of myself, for Henry, that constitutes the core of 
the self-impression of the living present is manifest as the invisible essence of the 
ego.
128
 The fundamental difference henceforth between Henry and Husserl becomes 
clear when it is acknowledged that Henry refigures the ego from a non-intentional 
point of view that owes its presencing to the pure impressional “now” of auto-
affection while Husserl continually returns to the temporal structure of intentionality. 
And so while Husserl may have glimpsed the living present, he nevertheless failed to 
elucidate how it may bring to light the transcendental ego in its subjectivity apart 
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from the temporal flux of the world-horizon.
129
 Henry’s interpretation of Husserl 
may be suspect and open to contestation, however, what is important for us in this 
section is to establish how Henry articulates the living present over against Husserl 
(not necessarily to defend Henry’s interpretation of Husserl). We turn now to a more 
refined description of Henry’s conception of this living present that abides in each of 
us a pure living ego. 
 
§10: THE PURE LIVING EGO 
 This section intends to discuss briefly how Henry’s quest for the essence of 
life coincides with his desire to recover a thick description of subjectivity, and more 
precisely, subjectivity as an affective (rather than cognitive) event. To bring to light 
the “heart” (la coeur) as the seat of ipseity is by Henry’s estimation to find life itself. 
My living present is not a thinking-thing or brain-synapse. Rather I am “me” by 
virtue of the trial of my existence, my self-anguishing, self-suffering and self-
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enjoying—my pathos of myself lived in immediacy with itself. This pathos flashes 
forth interior to the lived-experience of my own subjectivity in such a way to be 
invulnerable to the model of cognitive “seeing” of intentionality, and by extension, to 
the model of scientific study. It is a fact, Henry admits, that in the manifold of 
appearings that appear in the world “we see living beings.” But in this seeing we 
never observe or intend “their life.”
130
 Life only appears internal to itself because it 
deploys itself by feeling itself. Its relation to itself is a self-relation without distance 
between its feeling and that which it feels. In life there is not streaming correlates of 
genitives given to a dative pole that presupposes a facture between the genitive and 
dative. Instead, as living I am affected by myself in a pure self-impression, given to 
myself in a pure dative, as this “me” who is me by self-affection or auto-affection. 
The “auto-structure” of interiority is the living present.  
 In terse epigrammatic form, Henry insists that, above all, “subjectivity is life, 
this is the seriousness of existence.”
131
 Given that life makes itself felt in the 
subjective space given interior to itself, it remains difficult to know exactly how life 
is manifest in the horizon of objectivity situated in the surrounding world. Henry’s 
analyses of life move away from a biological thesis tied to the world and toward a 
theological articulation of the practical and lived dimension of the self that 
approaches just how “subjectivity is life.” Given Henry’s systemic critique of the 
visible display of the world and scientific discourse complicit in that visible display, 
interior life is not a metabolic or existential impulse that reacts to exterior stimuli.
132
 
Nor is it a continual temporal impulse propelling the ego outside itself on the basis of 
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a desire to move into the surrounding world.
133
 Henry ascribes to “living” a unique 
property that is without properties in the sense that life is pure, without difference 
from itself—untainted by the temporal streaming of the world-horizon that fragments 
the self. Interiority, as a living present invincible in its power (it cannot be split or 
fractured), appears as a primal or underground “me,” a pure living ego who subsists 
and endures apart from the temporal streaming of the Husserlian ego or Heidegger’s 
ecstatic Dasein. But we must resist the temptation to claim Henry regards life as an 
immovable thing, stationed like a rock at the bottom of a fast-flowing river. Henry’s 
conception of life is manifest as a self-feeling in which I take hold of myself by 
imploding within myself, arriving at myself in and through myself as an absolute 
“me.” Never able to escape myself, and thereby riveted to myself in a living present, 
interiority occupies within itself nevertheless a movement, a growth that does not 
exceed itself but continually collapsing upon itself—that is the seriousness of 
existence.
134
   
 After the streaming impressions recede, according to Henry, what is left over 
is life, the essence of subjectivity, this living present that is never past or future. 
What makes me “living” is that I am a “me” identical to myself and what makes me a 
“me” identical to myself is that I am “living.” My being present to myself gives way 
to a pure self-feeling, which in turn, gives way to a ceaseless generation of my life; 
the living present is pure in that it crushes against itself, feels itself and pulses in and 
through that pathos. By virtue of its experiential pull, a living pathos arises that can 
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never recede into the just-past as it sinks into the forgotten past of the temporal 
streaming of the world-horizon.  
 If we think of an inanimate object, it may shine in the daylight, contain 
moving parts and, in fact, may even process data or light up a dark room. What an 
inanimate thing cannot do, however, is experience itself as existing. It cannot contain 
an invisible living present. For Henry, a thing is a “thing” in that it is incapable of 
experiencing itself as particular living “me” whose vital force of existence is at stake 
in its very feeling of itself as living. Henry (borrowing from Heidegger) observes the 
deeply existential or incarnate character of the living present born within the interior 
self by contrasting it to a table. A table, once pushed up against a wall, even to the 
point of eliminating the distance between the two objects, does not “touch” or “feel” 




Henry also gives to the living present a theological articulation. If the pure 
living present appears as the “Absolute” whose eternal arrival gives me to myself (as 
a dative “me”), then Henry’s interior self is struck in an unequivocal theological key. 
For Henry, “Life,” with a capital “L,” signifies the invisible essence of God, the 
living source of all that lives. Drawing heavily from the prologue of the gospel of 
John in which the word “Life” denotes the sphere of divine revelation, Henry 
deploys what he calls an “Arch-Christology,”
136
 a theological affirmation of the 
Johannine articulation of the “Word made flesh,” in whom is the life and light of 
humanity (John 1.4). Henry frequently describes the living present as a pure ego, 
untainted by anything outside itself, and correlatively, describes divine Life as a 
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(hyper) power, force, strength or energy that flows within the interior reciprocity of 
Father and Son through the Spirit.
137
 Most importantly, because it is pure too, divine 
Life can appear or reveal itself only within itself, and thus, cannot appear in anything 
foreign to itself, especially the world. Divine Life appears, as the “Word made flesh,” 
as a divine self-revelation identical to itself and thus inside God—without reference 
to visible display of the world or to a particular historical personage. Yet, this does 
not preclude Absolute Life from appearing within the sphere of human experience. 
Henry contends that it is possible for Life to appear within pure ego because both are 
manifest in the living present, a pure now without reference to past or future.     
Life with a lower case “l” constitutes my essence as this particular “me” 
whose living present is carried along by Absolute Life. The living present is the pure 
living ego, the site wherein I experience myself feeling myself without gap or 
separation—with no visibility. This nocturnal living experience of myself is manifest 
deep within the structure of interior feeling itself. As my invisible essence, it cannot 
appear within the exteriority of the physical body or the temporal horizon of the 
world. Henry also qualifies the distinction between the two inflections of life, noting 
that since both “Life” and “life” share the same living present, one must not hazard a 
hardened distinction between them.
138
  
Henry quite literally adopts, moreover, the Cartesian notion of the “soul” as a 
philosophical antecedent to his own conception of the living present.
139
 Henry’s 
interest in the phenomenon of life reflects, we submit, an attempt to restore the 
interior “soul” or spiritual dimension within a post-Galileo, post-Newtonian world 
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that gave rise to a mechanistic, scientized Aufklärung. Philosophical discourse 
gradually became parasitic on and complicit with modern science-and-technology. 
Henry’s own critique of modern techno-scientific culture in his La barbarie (1987) 
highlights what he perceives to be the bankrupt, i.e., “barbarous,” character of 
modern technology, natural and physical science and modern medicine. He argues 
here that modernity, exemplified in contemporary scientific discourse, seeks, 
unwittingly or not, to displace the living, interior “soul” of the human self with an 
empty exterior, physical body animated by nothing more than brain synapses and 
physiological processes.
140
 To counter the scientific distortion of life, Henry 
rehabilitates a sphere of experience that is identical to itself, and therefore, a 
subjective living present outside the bounds of empirical verification and scientific 
discourse. Henry carves out a site of invisibility that can appear on its own terms, and 
only on its own terms—thereby impervious to the reductive methods of modern 
scientific discourse.  
The essence of the living present inside each ego is, above all, a primal self-
feeling. Moreover it is a feeling un-representable and incommunicable to anything 
outside of this self-experience of being “me.” Language, consciousness, and 
temporality fail to display the life of my lived-experience because they throw “me” 
outside myself as a representation or image of myself in the world. Henry’s 
phenomenological understanding of interiority is that it has a mode of givenness and 
a form of evidence all its own. For the pure living ego incarnates itself within itself 
and furnishes its own structure of manifestation apart from the luminosity of the 
world, temporality and intentionality. To return once again to Henry’s thesis about 
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the “impression,” I am a living ego who is pure in that the living present dwells fully 
within itself, beneath the temporal horizon of the world. Henry writes:  
 
In the impression, it is that by which there is an impression, the 
silent embrace in which it experiences and senses itself at each 
moment of its being, without ever getting rid of itself and without 
the gap of any distance that would ever separate itself. But does 
not the impression constantly change? Indeed, it does. Yet what 
never changes and never breaks away is what makes it an 
impression; this is the essence of life….what is always already 
there before it and what remains after it, is what is necessary for 
its arrival. This is not the empty form of an “I think” or the ek-
static gaze of the future but the radical auto-affection of life in its 





Each impression (Empfindungsfarbe) from the outside comes and goes within a 
temporal flow and announces novelty with each new impact; however, according to 
Henry, the self-impression of self-affection of the living present never comes and 
goes. Self-affection is perfectly self-present in that it is immanent to itself, interior to 
itself. As the living essence of the ego, the living present is manifest as my life that I 
feel crushing up against myself as I affect myself in the nocturnal depths of invisible 
display. Henry furthermore insists that the invisibility of auto-affection (the pure 
ego) cannot intertwine with the visible display of the ego’s intentional-ray, lest the 
pure ego be tainted and rendered impure by visibility, by light.  
 To offer a concrete example of the living present, Henry frequently refers to 
the feeling of pain. Pain is customarily understood as a “physical” sensation tied to 
pressure applied to local nerve endings, such as the pain in my foot that follows from 
a kicking a tree stump. Yet Henry highlights the interior essence of pain apart from 
the cause and effect mechanism of physical sensation. Pain can be immediate in that 
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there are no gaps between the pain and the feeling of pain. If the pain is in the foot, it 
resides there only in the exterior display, as an empty representation of the pain in its 
self-disclosure. If pain is to be truly lived, then it must be experienced internal to 
itself as a relation to itself; namely, the pain I experience is not the pain in my foot 
“out there” but the pain as I immediately and invisibly experience it. Only the 
suffering of pain allows me to know the pain, and what is revealed in this fact of 
suffering is the suffering itself and nothing else. When I seek to take flight of the 
pain, I am pulled in by it and collapse under its weight. It imposes itself on me, as 
“my pain” that I feel, and I feel it without distance between the pain and my 
experience of it. I have never seen my pain, I have only lived it.
142
 
 So far we have maintained that Henry’s pure ego is manifest within the living 
present apart from the world-horizon and its temporal streaming. We now turn 
directly to the divine source from which the living present is born. Rudolf Bernet 
notes that Henry’s phenomenology of life, “affirms from the start, and in an 
‘apodictic’ fashion, that an authentic phenomenology cannot have any other object 
than the divine Life experiencing itself in its Ipseity and in this self-affection, giving 
birth to Christ and to humanity as his ‘Sons.’
143
 It is the “giving birth to Christ and to 
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When the biblical God breathes in us the Spirit of Life which makes each 








 We interrogate in this chapter, under the form of the expression “duplicitous 
self,” Henry’s theological turn.
145
 Such “duplicity” opens up an impassable abyss 
between the fullness of interiority and the desolation of exteriority. Henry’ variety of 
the self, recast in an utterly dualistic light, is prepared to deprive itself of its outward 
course into the world because it is already in sure and radical possession of an inner 
essence that appears to itself: a site where no single aspect of the self appears outside 
of its own intimate haven, which is a spiritual achievement to be understood in terms 
of mystical inwardness. Detached from all passing contents of consciousness or any 
relation to an outward object, the irreducibility of the inward pole of subjectivity is 
“mystical” precisely because it coincides with the invisible self-disclosure of God; 
that is, the ontological distance between this self-present pole and God is all but 
eliminated. Henry’s value as a theological thinker, it should be said at this juncture, 
lays not so much in his retrieval of interiority as the principle of pure self-experience 
but in the concentrated intellectual force by which he consummates this logic. Such 
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an economy of the self is communicated by Henry with the intensity and authority of 
a prophet or an apocalyptic mystic, though our contention here is not that the severity 
of his idiom befalls his readers as intellectually counterfeit but that it is, together with 
its mystical intonations, genuinely attentive to principled reason and argument 
precisely because it exercises a mode of inquiry that emanates from the 
phenomenological tradition. Hence Henry’s audacious claim that phenomenology is 
to be condemned in its classical expression, the construal of which is best persevered 
by Husserl and Heidegger. The “ontological monism” (Henry’s term, see chapter 2) 
pursued by the two Germans refers to their utter evasion of the invisible disclosure of 
interiority. The interior subjective sphere where I appear first to myself is a site that 
Henry speaks of as inescapable and irresistible, and yet, it is one that Husserl and 
Heidegger evade altogether. Even though, as an invisible sphere, it may appear as a 
mute presence that eludes the illumination of the world, it is nevertheless manifest as 
an overbearing tremor of affection that brings me before myself, an experience that 
reveals a self-embrace wherein I affect nothing but myself. 
But the inmost essence of phenomenology must be overturned if the invisible 
disclosure of life is to enjoy admittance as a primal movement of absolute subjective 
power that lurks behind every form of thought and action. This is the unique 
achievement of the ingenious and inventive structure of “life” that Henry consecrates 
with the name auto-affection—that impermeable citadel of subjectivity that 
eliminates any notion of autonomous freedom or what Nietzsche forcibly expresses 
with the concept of the “Free Spirit.” The invisibility of auto-affection is inextricably 
tied to its non-freedom, to its opposition to the freedom attached to life in the world. 
The ontological independence of the sphere of the invisible (i.e., its independence 
106 
 
from the world) is proved in the fact that it cannot attend to the possibilities opened 
up by the free spirit in the visible world, a Nietzschean “will to power” who is 
capable of negotiating within the differences of the world. By the same token, the 
continuum of classical phenomenology, the scope of which is manifestly prescribed 
by Husserl and Heidegger, consists too of a vast horizon of lived experiences 
attenuated by the play of the world’s finitude that, precisely because it is shut up 
inside the world, pretends to the freedom of visible self-legislation, which is always 
accomplished under the outward direction of either intentional consciousness or the 
existential analytic of being-in-the-world. But such a “Free Spirit” admits of no 
expansion beyond the world (and thus remains an ontological monism) if it is not 
wrenched from its gross absorption in its own self-determination in the visibility of 
the world. This is a violent but necessary step in the odyssey of the self, so argues 
Henry, if it is to achieve a critical and rigorous passage into the invisibility of 
interiority, and so be rescued from the nihilistic dissolution to which the post-
Nietzschean self succumbs as it unfolds only within the metaphysical landscape of 
the exterior world. The truth of the self is that the invisibility of the inner life 
coincides with divine life, and Henry’s work is intended to represent at once a 
spiritual and moral recuperation of the “modern self” specifically on these 
theological grounds.   
Cultivating a philosophical sensibility uncoupled from conventional 
phenomenology, Henry’s work carries out an analysis of appearing in which the 
invisible is set over against the visible in the most absolute of terms.
146
 By sharply 
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divorcing the invisible from the visible, and then, by ordering the essence of 
appearing solely in terms of the invisible, Henry redeems phenomenology from its 
unwitting and dogmatic attachment to the finitude of the world and the metaphysics 
of representation. By resituating phenomenology, too, within the narrative of 
theology and its logic of the invisible, he considers how Christ’s invisible Word of 
manifestation may not only legitimately converse with, but also spiritually vindicate, 
philosophy (vindicate it from an insufficient ontological foundation based on the 
metaphysics of representation). Even if phenomenology so expanded—to include not 
one, but two spheres, namely the visible and invisible—may not triumph over 
phenomenology’s classical expressions, and even it if shall not entirely supplant the 
ill-constituted logic of the visible, its theological dialect will nevertheless disrupt the 
ease and charm of an autonomous reason complacent with its own power to 
constitute the unity of the world. 
 Recall that the “modern self” amounts to a reduction of subjectivity to the 
visibility of the world. On the basis of the structure of representation, the ego shapes 
the world from a distance, making the world an object at its disposal, which is to say 
that the ego gives to the world its thin patina of visibility, its “light.” And such a 
subjective illumination will never abjure from its inordinate emphasis on distance 
and mediation, not least from its claims to power, sovereignty and self-sufficiency, 
all of which, for Henry, are nothing more than Enlightenment myths that celebrate an 
original and pristine state of daring self-sufficiency and power; as Nietzsche declares 
in that brief but formidable section in Beyond Good and Evil, the “Free Spirit” 
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embodies a self who is brutally totalizing, constitutive of the world in its every 
respect: “The world seen from inside, the world determined and described with 
respect to its ‘intelligible character’—would be just his ‘will to power’ and nothing 
else.”
147
 Henry shall certainly not disagree with Nietzsche’s “phenomenological 
description” of the ego’s power to open up the horizon of the world. This is because 
Henry affirms much to be found in Heidegger’s landmark reading of Nietzsche. The 
metaphysics of the will to power, as Heidegger observes, is “a metaphysics of the 
absolute subjectivity of will to power.”
148
 So understood, the Nietzschean discourse 
of the self narrates an uninhibited subjectivism that roots the world in the subject’s 
anarchic and primeval repetitions that reap no harvest of peace and joy and that fulfil 
no teleological movement. The world’s narrative of pure temporal flux is a theatre of 
cruelty and pain that eternally recurs (“The discipline of suffering, of great 
suffering—do you now know that only this discipline has created all enhancements 
of man so far?”
149
) wherein the subject’s base and primitive instinctual impulses are 
not to be tempered by a religious faith of self-sacrifice and mercy. In Henry’s 
estimation, Nietzsche’s self nevertheless offers up a powerful display of a subjective 
life moved by affects and instinctual feeling, aspects of self-effectuation that Henry 
celebrates as the universal essence of subjectivity; Henry will readily acknowledge 
the eloquent and profound glimpse into the indestructible and absolute essence of 
subjectivity (i.e., auto-affection) Nietzsche develops from the Birth of Tragedy 
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 Yet, Nietzsche’s metaphysics of the self, ultimately, expresses the 
nihilism and turbulence of an egoistic barbarism so advanced and therefore so 
entrenched in late modern conceptions of selfhood that one must understand the 
world to be the site where life and God come to die: the saint must, in Henry’s eyes, 
avoid the world at all costs, for the world is the site of the death of God, and despite 
Nietzsche’s hyperbolic claims about the “noble and happy” ones enjoying 
themselves from their own self-feeling, power and potency,
151
 the world is equally 
the site where the self is without God and therefore cast into the emptiness of 




To think of the self after Henry is to consider a self in relation to God’s self-
revelation in Christ, as co-present with my inward disposition, albeit a site of 
appearing with its own style of disclosure; this gives rise to a logic of appearing that 
may reverse and derogate from, though in no way eliminate, the repetition of the 
representational subject’s confidence in its “will to power” to constitute the world. 
Henry’s project still develops a phenomenological line of inquiry but one that 
operates on the order of what Rudolf Bernet aptly calls a “theo-phenomenology.”
153
 
As a strategy to think between philosophy and theology, such a mystical sojourn 
involves several intellectual traditions, all lying near the surface in Henry’s work, 
which taken as allied trajectories of thought are gathered together to set out a vision 
cast under the canopy of the single apparatus of auto-affection, a sphere of 
experience that seamlessly transitions between phenomenology, patristic spirituality, 
                                                 
150
 Henry, Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, trans. Douglas Brick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993), pp.205ff. 
151
 See for example, Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, book I, §§3 and 10; The Gay Science, §179. 
152
 Henry, I am the Truth,  p.265. 
153
 Rudolf Bernet, “Christianity and Philosophy,” 327. 
110 
 
medieval mysticism and biblical revelation. What emerges in Henry’s view of reality 
is nothing short of radical, if even utterly counter-intuitive: a comprehensive 
reappraisal of life on the basis of divine life’s invisible self-revelation intimated 
solely within the pure self-outpouring of God’s Trinitarian life, which is tangible 
only beyond the world; understood in this manner, God is denotable as a self-
disclosure arriving inside my soul, which lies underneath the temporal flow that 
constitutes the field of consciousness.  
Despite its refusal to appear within the horizon of the self-legislating ego who 
is at the origin of the world and the universe of objects, the inward disposition of life 
for which Henry’s enterprise advocates does in fact open up somewhere within the 
concrete experience of the self. This tempo of interiority is delivered within the 
invisible and silent cadence of a perfect self-embrace—a subjective experience of 
“myself” as I am in pure union with God. The disclosure of God within me is never 
first consigned to something else, which then may or may not appear to me only 
later, after God was held at bay for a while. No. Rather, God hands himself over to 
me and is bound at once to himself and me, and there, while continually experiencing 
himself, he is nothing but that living self-experience I also have of myself: I am what 
God is. This concrete intonation of myself within God’s internal arrangement is, 
properly speaking, an experience of will and affection, but it is held together not by a 
will to power but by a divine will to life, a coming into oneself that never stops 
coming into oneself, the eternal coming into the plenitude of the invisible life of 
God. “This plenitude of life, in which life gives itself to itself as that of which it is 





 Articulated in terms “life,” this conception of interiority propounds an 
“entirely new conception of man, his definition on the basis of Life and also as 
constituted by it—of man as living.”
155
 What does this entirely novel conception so 
premised consist in?  
 We suggest, in what follows, that this phenomenological grammar is 
translated into a theological one precisely because Henry elects to situate the pathos 
of auto-affection, as a living self-presence, inside the eternal presence of God, an 
elemental presencing that he describes as the perfect becoming of God within his 
Godhead, or simply: generation. As a primal evocation of life that occupies the arch-
forms of passivity and donation, the living-present, my essence, is born from the 
movement of divine generation and not from myself as if I were a self-positing “I 
think” or “I represent” characteristic of the post-Cartesian valorisation of the 
constituting subject. I am to subtract myself from such an appalling acceptance of the 
world and the subject’s self-regard, its egoism and autonomy. I subsist, in Henry’s 
discourse of life, only as a negative of such an egoistic empire of self-legislation and 
autonomous power; I am given to myself, invisibly, by the divine life who 
continually gives rise to all life, and who, as the original source of my particular life, 
is continuous with me. My living present “consists in the interior relation to God, and 
exists only by it, and is explicated entirely by it.”
156
 To be sure, there is good reason 
to single out the interior relation to God explicated by generation as a fundamental 
theological thesis, since it represents a most basic anthropological truth for Henry, 
and it is a view of the self that is exemplarily and supremely Christian, indeed it is a 
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“central thesis of Christianity.”
157
 A key, perhaps the key, to penetrating the richness 
and originality of his “theological turn” lies in elucidating this unique, and 
sometimes exasperatingly equivocal, theo-phenomenological thematic.  
 We shall also thematize how the discourse of generation, for all of its 
absolute divisions between light and dark, inner and outer, parousia and the world, 
necessarily leads, not only to the liberation of the self from an ontological monism 
encapsulated by Husserl and Heidegger, but leads also to the thraldom of auto-
affection; without doubt we may associate auto-affection with an imbalanced self 
that privileges the interior and invisible at the expense of the exterior and visible, 
which of course fosters a monism of its own making. This is perhaps a theological 
monism (with degrees of intensity) that, in its fullness and integrity, denies the world 
its worth bestowed on it by God at creation. The tyranny of pure self-presence is 
what Henry founds here over against the tyrannical discourse of the world. Henry’s 
monism is a subjective sphere against which Levinas, for all of his own prejudicial 
oddities and theological strangeness, collides in his very acknowledgment of a basic 
truth which is to my mind necessary to repeat here: “The return of the present to 
itself is the affirmation of the I already riveted to itself, already doubled up with a 
self...,” which “constitutes the underlying tragic element in the ego, the fact that it is 
riveted to its own being.”
158
  
 Given that Henry’s philosophical lexicon can be “jargon-laden,” this chapter 
clarifies the fertile, if “tragic,” concept of generation (the process that rivets me to 
myself) with respect to both phenomenology and theology by paying special heed to 
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the double-sided structure of the duplicitous self: its visible and invisible elements. 
Bearing this in mind, this chapter commences with an instructive but critical 
appraisal of the complex character of Henry’s theory of generation as that which 
gives rise to, and carries along, the interior self over against the world. 
 “Generation,” first of all, signifies for Henry the original movement through 
which a living self experiences itself and comes into itself. The expression 
“generation” forbids distance or the possibility of an “interval between” sameness 
and otherness, as if these two poles could be preserved within the always absolute 
experience I have of myself. Generation rivets me to myself because it constitutes a 
dynamic invariability, which ensures an endless movement toward oneself without 
separation from oneself, wherein one’s essence as this particular “self” is born. This 
self-experience I have of myself attests to the generative power of givenness and 
birth, not to the self-generating or constituting power drawn from the ego’s own 
provision. That is, generation designates, for Henry, the coming-to-be of myself in 
and through the only life that can auto-generate itself, the divine self. Generation or 
birth thereby places a caesura between my invisible self-presence in unity with God 
and my visible manifestation in the world. I come into myself only in that sphere of 
invisible self-presence, and in such a vision, I am given to myself internal to God’s 
self-donation. And this donation is set forth in a univocal and timeless event of birth: 
it runs its endless course as an utterly primitive, or aboriginal, movement through 
which I am given over to myself as a passive self without reference to the world. 
Through generation I am, therefore, thrown into myself perpetually, and without 
such continual givenness, I would cease to be. Henry describes generation as a 
perpetual birth realized in an original and absolute unity with God, comprehensible 
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 Moreover, for Henry, generation is a substitute for, and at odds with, the 
traditional theological dogma of creation. Yet defining generation as Henry 
conceives it is not as simple as this. To say, within this calculus of manifestation, the 
duplicity between invisible and visible, that my life is generated rather than created, 
and that generation (invisible interiority) is distinctly at odds with creation (visible 
world), does not necessarily clarify precisely what generation completes in its 
elaborate and ambitious genealogy of the self, what could be portrayed as Henry’s 
attempted rediscovery of an autochthonous origin from which all life is born. 
Generation remains, to be sure, an elaborate thematization of the self precisely 
because it appears to include within it layers or gradations, indicative of degrees of 
intensity, even if that sounds impossible or incoherent—which it certainly does. Thus 
generation takes on various declensions based on the fusion of human (nature) and 
divine (grace) horizons. Parsing out the declensions nature and grace as they recede 
from one another is an elusive task because to unveil the distinction between myself 
and God with perfect clarity remains ultimately unachievable for Henry: “The 
singular Self that I am comes into itself only in absolute Life’s coming-into-itself and 
carries it within itself as its never-abolished premise, as its condition.”
160
 Or better, 
“God engenders himself as me.”
161
 Even though it may appear obviously 
inconceivable, and even though it asserts that I am co-substantial and thus coeval 
with God in the divine essence we share within that divine monad, generation as a 
category in Henry’s analysis accounts for two declensions, differing it seems only in 
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intensity: first, the auto-generation of absolute divine life, and second, the generation 
of the human self as it is isolable within the fabric of divine life. We take each 
declension in order. 
 God’s self-generation: God’s self-generation, for Henry, is the everlasting 
Trinitarian evolution of God’s inner life, which is “unoriginate” in that it is borne 
forth from the eternal reciprocal relation between Father and Son, whose bond of 
holy communion is given in and through their common gift, who is the Spirit.
162
 
Father and Son come together in a purely interior and dynamic movement through 
which is disclosed the First-Living, i.e., Christ who is the “firstborn and only Son, 
which we will call the transcendental Arch-Son.”
163
 Yet Henry identifies the Father 
as primary here, because the Arch-Son is the “First Living in whose original and 
essential Ipseity the Father experiences himself.”
164
 Henry also portrays the 
Trinitarian generation of divine life as a phenomenon. Because of his 
undifferentiated simplicity, God is not a phenomenon rendered visible before the 
gaze of the Husserlian ego nor is it a phenomenon co-emergent with the luminosity 
of Heidegger’s world-horizon. Rather, God as a phenomenon, who is the fullness of 
the divine Father who begot the Word and gave to him the gift of charity and wisdom 
by begetting him, which generates the love of the Holy Spirit who is the spirit of 
them both; and as such, God’s inseparable trinity “has” no accidents but only is pure 
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presence, appears in a way peculiar to himself; for God is exactly identical to his 
own substance, revealing nothing other than himself, and hence, always appearing as 
an invisible phenomenon. God never may make an appearance under the aspect of 
the world’s light, given that the world sheds light on nothing more than a temporal 
surface made of the shifting shadows of mutability. For Henry, the intra-Trinitarian 
reciprocity of Father, Son and Spirit engenders a concentrated tonality, an invisible 
pathos, one of utter affective enjoyment in which God experiences and feels himself, 
and is therein manifest within the endless and majestic depths of his absolute self-
affection of himself. Henry argues that the Father generates himself through the Son, 
and with this movement he emits an undistorted “black light” of joy and delight—of 
self-love. Here, the nocturnal glory in which the Father feels the Logos in its 
irradiating diffusion is formative of a self-feeling of himself at every point of his 
eternally expansive depths—reflecting a perfect coming-into-himself that involves 
nothing but his own unity with his Son. Nothing here may become visible, which 
indicates that Henry contradicts the basic assumption of the visibility of the Word; 
utterly invisible because he appears fact-to-face with the Father as they together 
beget their common Spirit, Christ is never visible in the world. Henry’s principal 
leitmotif of absolute unity, one certainly reflective of the logic of the immanent 
Trinity, and one that belongs entirely to the mechanism of auto-affection, is the 
“essential kernel of Christianity.”
165
  
 It is for this reason that we shall want to understand more exactly what Henry 
means by divine auto-affection. In virtue of his very inner structure, God is manifest 
not as transcendent nor as a “beyond” whose ontological form is at a far remove from 
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the soul’s repository. Rather, God appears as abundantly present to the soul. God is 
not only immanent to his own likeness that is originally without shadow but is also 
fully present within the clandestine space in which the soul feels itself. How the soul 
and God are in union is a topic to be addressed in detail later in the chapter, but we 
hope to remind the reader here that this unity is always difficult to abstract out into 
separate entities in Henry. Presently, we explore the inner chamber of God, and with 
that, we can say divine auto-affection is to be understood as an immediate self-
embrace enacted within his intra-Trinitarian life; through an infinite series of 
moments of satiety and completion, God always subsists within himself, and by 
reason of his own upwelling source, owes nothing to the “economic” Trinity or ad 
extra visible display of the Trinitarian persons as they might be manifest in the 
temporal streaming of intentionality or the horizon of being-in-the-world. The 
grammar of unity or immanence orders the Trinity as an inward self-effulgence 
which unfurls within itself without taking leave of itself. The Trinity only sees the 
world as but an intrusion upon the expression of its unity as the Godhead. So there is 
within divine generation no reflective Logos at play, where the Father has his image 
in the Son and where the Son’s mirror is illumined by the spirating of the Spirit, for 
such a discourse of distance and traversal, for Henry, would make controvertible the 
category of unity, opening up the ill-conceived possibility of the economic relation of 
the dancing circle of divine persons in their reflection of one another. Thus such 
language of mediation and reflection is rejected by Henry on the basis of a strict 
divine “aseity:” the Father, Son and Spirit feel each other in radical immediacy, 
without oscillation and without exitus and reditus, and so without mediation and 
reflection, and finally, without visibility. Just so, the Triniatrian persons are pulled up 
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against each other with an invincible centripetal force, an exact coincidence that is 
manifest without traversing an infinite series of distances, for the life of God is 
inwardly complete already; God is “I am who I am,” a tautology that involves no 
difference or gap interposed between Father, Son and Spirit. The reciprocal 
movements of the Trinitarian persons are not so much set within an ineffable mystery 
of unity-in-difference where the immanent and economic Trinities relate, but within 
a supreme Tri-unity of simplicity and oneness. 
 But in Henry’s scheme the persons of the Trinity are nevertheless given 
marked roles—or at least it appears so. The Father, here, is primary but he is not 
primary in the sense of temporal autonomy, for “Life’s self-generation cannot come 
about without generation within itself this Son as the very mode in which this 
process takes place, the Son is as old as the Father, being, like him, present from the 
beginning.”
166
 The Father and Son experience themselves in a full and perfect 
mutuality, bringing unity to its most radical expression. They draw life from each 
other as they share life by giving and receiving each other. They are co-dependent, 
co-reliant and it is a co-belonging that is, “more powerful than any conceivable 
unity.”
167
 Henry writes further of the inextricable interrelatedness of the Father and 
the Son, as they are enclosed within sheer presence, which is undivided and thus 
articulable (or to the extent that it is) in terms of sheer identity: “To the extent that 
the revelation of the Son is the self-revelation of the Father—that the first is not 
possible without the second, or the second without the first—each appears in turn as 
the condition of the other.”
168
 Even though the Son is eternally born, and the Spirit 
ceaselessly spirates and the Father subsists as the wellspring of divine generation, we 
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must contend here that the final form of Henry’s Trinitarian discourse is that God is a 
bare and unadorned unity with no genuine distinction to be made between, and thus 
no real reciprocity to occur among, divine persons. 
 Such a Trinitarian God, Henry insists, appears as a phenomenon, and in some 
sense, as a surfeit of phenomenality that gives to all manifestation its hidden depth 
and all-embracing truth. God’s unity is complete, and so refuses an arrival at self-
consciousness of any kind. Henry’s conception of God is in no way like Hegel’s 
Absolute, whose (welt)Geist progresses through stages of self-realization and self-
consciousness, a concept of God brought into clear view in that final section of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (“Absolute Knowing”). Here Hegel says, among other 
things, that God alienates and impoverishes himself in the event of kenosis, only to 
return to himself in the world, circulating in the fashion of a metaphysical loop that 
finally retains all consciousness in its fully apprehended totality.
169
 Contrary to the 
movement of separation that consists of a steady realization of self-consciousness, 
proceeding as it does in Hegel from the infinite to the temporal indeterminacy of the 
world, Henry’s God is unconstituted, is a phenomenon of auto-experience that 
ventures nowhere but within himself. On such a view, God does not even withdraw 
from the world because such an intentional or cognitive reflex would suggest that he 
is at some point capable of knowing himself in the world. God is therefore best 
understood, in Henry’s architectonic, as that supreme principle or power which 
ascribes to all reality his divine essence, but incarnates himself in this fashion within 
himself alone. In this intra-Trinitarian manner, God is brought forth in and through 
his self-determination that goes forth into himself, making himself his own medium 
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of self-determination. A God who gives of his incarnate bounty and abundance only 
to himself evokes of necessity the duplicity of display, recalling the caesura between 
the visible and invisible that informs at every level Henry’s portrayal of the “God vs. 
world” distinction. The duplicity of all appearing imparts into Henry’s thought the 
rigor of an absolute intelligibility that makes unavoidable a break with any 
philosophy of the world or discourse of distance, and even breaks from basic 
theological conceptions of Incarnation, kenosis, ecclesiology, etc. Without difference 
or stratification, and certainly without stages of realization, divine auto-affection 
makes God appear inside himself, immanent to himself; God does not conceal within 
himself historical chaos, nor reflective acts of cognition, nor distance of any kind. 
Henry’s God is manifestly a totality of all that God finally is in the pure giving of 
himself to himself. Such immanence could be explicated in a phenomenological 
idiom as a pure subjective identity without reference to the world, what Henry also 
discusses as an utterly pure form of non-reflective self-awareness—an immediate 
and “acosmic” self-revelation that precedes, and happens outwith, any temporal 
delay or reflective “outside” of the world.
170
  
 Such an absolute distinction between God and the world, or the invisible and 
the visible, certainly invokes the philosophical taxonomy of Heidegger’s late book, 
Identity and Difference (1957). Whereas Heidegger in that book, especially the essay 
“the Principle of Identity,” opts for an economy of difference, finitude and distance, 
and the ontological difference between Being and beings, Henry elects to take 
narrative of pure identity as his point of departure. This unity links the subject to its 
divine origin apart from all perception of ontological difference. In Henry’s system, 
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then, God is manifest only within his self-embrace in his absolute subjectivity, a self-
revelation that “holds it inside itself, retains it in so close an embrace that what it 
holds and reveals is itself.”
171
 This absolute subjectivity is what one may depict as 
the “strong” sense of auto-affection that belongs to God alone.
172
 
 Human generation: We further develop here the economy of generation, 
extending it to encompass its “weak” portrayal of givenness, even if we are 
approaching here one of the more glaring moments of imprecision in his thought, a 
climax of convolution within the layered presence of divine auto-affection. Human 
generation is the second declension of generation. And Henry’s convention of 
generation proposes to explain, simply, the generation of the self; or more precisely: 
the affirmation of myself as this particular creaturely monad utterly dependent on 
God for my life even to be, for God’s Trinitarian life burgeons into the life of myself 
as a particular creature whose invisible life bears within it that very plenitude of God. 
Henry’s spirituality stands at a total remove from any kind of doctrine of the 
vestigium trinitatis.  
 Henry may tacitly affirm Barth’s condemnation of this originally Augustinian 
idea, which, as Barth notes, constitutes “An analogue of the Trinity, of the Trinitarian 
God of Christian revelation, in some creaturely reality distinct from Him, a 
creaturely reality which is not a form assumed by God in His revelation, but which 
quite apart from God’s revelation manifests in its own structure by creation a certain 
similarity to the structure of the trinitarian concept of God, so that it may be regarded 
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as an image of the Trinitarian God Himself.”
173
 Of the possibility of a trace of the 
Trinity within the self, both Henry and Barth would adjudge to be a myth.  
 The “root of the doctrine of the Trinity,” for Barth, is revelation, God’s self-
disclosure in Christ. There are not two roots but simply one, for if there is a second 
root then there is no reason why an infinite regress of roots could not forever unfold. 
We are not, on this view, a microcosm of the macrocosm, as if the human image is a 
supplementary illustration of the inner life of God. But the undeniable impression 
one may receive from reading Barth is that God’s self-revelation is communicated 
only in and through scripture, the Biblical material, since it is the “concept of 
revelation taken from the Bible” (there is certainly a “three-fold” form of the Word 
of God).
174
 Here, Henry and Barth diverge, and radically so. Whereas Barth widens 
the abyss between Creator and creature, presumably maintained to protect 
theological language from idolatry or myth-making, Henry brings the self and God 
into an unbreakable unity. Henry shall derive, admittedly, so much of his own 
thinking from scripture, but the kind of revelation he pronounces belies any kind of 
simple correlation between revelation and the biblical documents. This distinction 
highlights that while the vestigium trinitatis is too radical for Barth, it is not 
sufficiently radical for Henry. The self-revelation of God, for Henry, is generation, 
the perfect and complete upwelling of divine presence within me, which represents 
an act in which my life is gathered up into God’s Trinity so as to share fully in his 
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glory—not by participation but in essence.
175
 In such a vision of divine revelation, 
the “trace” or vestigium violates the gift of God bestows of himself upon the soul 
because it disallows the exaltation of nature fully into divine grace—so far as the 
world is interpolated between the gift and the recipient. Henry indicates that the 
God’s life communicated to me in and through generation does not leave the divine 
and human essences distinct; conversely for Barth the vestigium trinitatis does not 
leave them distinct enough. Barth concludes, of course, that a movement toward God 
such as Henry’s would appeal to a mythic imagination fully ordered to the creaturely 
realm, “In the last resort, at the same risk as all the rest, including the finders of the 
ancient vestigial trinitatis, we can only try to point to the fact that the root of the 
doctrine of the Trinity lies in revelation, and that i can lie only in this if it is not to 
become at once the doctrine of another and alien god, of one of the gods, the man-
gods, of this aeon, if it is not to be a myth.”
176
 But of course, all language of 
“creaturehood” or “finitude” or “human nature” in Henry is no longer justified, since 
human nature is already divine in its essence. 
 Even if Henry may not take into proper account the language of the Trinity 
and its utter difference from the creature, human generation does not invent a self-
identity that originates from itself, but from something other than itself. Just so, the 
radicality of paradox constitutes the heart of selfhood. This is, in point of fact, 
inaccurate, because the concept of paradox Henry employs succumbs to 
incoherence—and we shall further develop this accusation of incoherence later in the 
chapter. At least we can glimpse, and we often do, statements in Henry that say I 
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have not, “brought myself into this condition of experiencing myself. I am myself, 
but I myself have no part in this ‘being-myself.’”
177
 The self-affection I have of 
myself takes up the theme of gift and the abiding orientation of receptivity to which 
such a donation leads, evident in the feeling of primitive passivity. I receive myself 
from one whom is not me, that is, God’s donation of his Word, but in whom I 
nevertheless subsist in exactly the same way he subsists because of the life we share 
together. Henry intends to belabour the point that I am not an “active” or 
spontaneously sovereign self, tragic in my decadence, whose self-indulgence 
prepares me to represent or disclose the unity of the world—a gesture toward an 
unbridled freedom so characteristically on display in the modern subject we 
considered above. But he equally stresses that in my essence I am not separate from 
God. In order to reject the modern concept of self-assertion, Henry considers how 
auto-affection, for all of the power of self-possession and sense of selfhood it imparts 
to me and for all of the intensity of subjective presence it confines within me, does 
not include within it a self-subsisting or self-legislating ego.  
 There is no such thing, in other words, as autonomy for Henry. In 
consequence of my passivity within the depth God’s gift and plenitude, my 
generation within God is the ultimate subversion of the onto-theological, self-
positing subject. The onto-theological self teaches us, with a presumptuous conceit, 
that the religious life may take on merely an “ontic” role. Theology can only 
articulate a self that puts into play a harmless religious moment of diremption from 
what is more fundamentally a philosophical self who stands as the centre of reference 
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of the whole world (Husserl) or whose existence is always first an ontological 
question to be resolved in relation to the world (Heidegger).    
Of course, in Henry’s eyes, I receive my power to be myself not from own 
resources or rationality but from the origin of all subjective power: God. The power 
of the passivity by which I am given life draws me within myself with an invincible 
divine force. I am cast irrepressibly within myself, a divine movement which permits 
me to exercise myself as “myself” and to grasp myself inwardly. Just as God is self-
present, I too am magnetized to myself in and through a non-reflective self-
awareness, a subjective structure of undiluted self-presence that is proved void at 
every moment of the reflective capacity to distanciate me from my own essence, 
from my feeling of myself in perfect form. Reverberating under the impact of itself, 
auto-affection does not grow weary of itself; it does not finally implode on itself after 
one last exhale, but rather passes onto the inexhaustible life of God, allowing me 
thereby to share immediately in the richness of God’s fullness, which engulfs my 
difference from God altogether—or better, it precludes any difference from obtaining 
in the first place. Given to me inwardly, like an invisible residue of yeast, God 
ferments within me, thickening out inside me without exceeding the space into which 
he rises up. Communicating to me the same love the Father communicates to the 
Son, God appears to me in a dark and inward upsurge, therein offering up to 
experience the yield of a passive enjoyment of the Spirit’s living profusion held 
together with the sorrowful blessing of living ineluctably in communion with the 
eternal movement of divine life; in that underground night where I pervade myself 
thoroughly, the life of God is already there pervading me. Hence, given that my 
“self” is understood as a gift because it is received passively, I do not have the leisure 
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to refuse or assume my selfhood. I could not momentarily bracket my life and then 
re-engage it upon a time of my choosing. Henry describes this irrefragable call to life 
in pointed language that consists of the principal message of the Spirit of 
Christianity: “For in the irruption of life and in its wave, which moves in us and 
renders us both full with it and ourselves, there is no gap, nor any distance or any 
possibility of a response, of a yes or a no.”
178
  In other words, I do not decide if I 
live—my destiny as a living subject is already set, etched in stone, for I am 
relentlessly hurled into life by way of divine life’s eternal self-donation.  
 As Jeffrey Hanson notes, it is this notion of “unfreedom” with respect to 
living that leads Henry, “to recognize the unfreedom of my self’s constitution is 
tantamount to recognizing my identity with life.”
179
 And so, Henry’s conception of 
the “I” is not a nominative “I” but rather assumes a dative/accusative lived-pole, a 
“me” to whom selfhood is given immediately and in one fell swoop from God. Henry 
does not intend, on this account, to destroy the correlation between the genitive and 
dative poles altogether. The genitive understood here consists of that which is given 
to me, but is something given to me without distance between it and me; there is thus 
no distance or gap between the genitive and dative poles. The appearing of life to me 
is structurally one and the same; what appears (genitive) and that to which appearing 
appears (dative) are brought together in pure identity, structurally isomorphic, if 
“weakly” identical—the same in essence even though my self-affection varies in 
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intensity, but not in kind, from the level of purity at which the Father and Son affect 
each other. And yet, how can this be? 
 Unlike God, I do not bring myself into life, yet paradoxically, I am given to 
myself in the selfsame movement of the Father’s auto-generation accomplished 
through his reciprocity with his Son and Spirit. For Henry, the achievement of 
“myself,” or my self-experience, is identical to my singularity as this particular “me.” 
I am this unique self borne forth from an elemental self-presencing. I crush against 
myself, affect myself without distance or difference between me and myself. My 
auto-affection, however, is carried along and made possible by divine auto-affection. 
The temptation to say that I achieve myself ought to be rejected up front. And yet, 
the temptation to say that I am given to myself from something different in essence 
from me must be rejected too. Here the equivocity of Henry’s thought attains full 
maturity, exposing to view a plain incoherence. I do not receive myself, according to 
Henry, in and through hetero-affection, as if in the movement of coming-into-myself 
I am affected by something essentially different from myself. Within the space where 
nothing foreign affects me, there arises a visceral experiencing only of myself, being 
affected only by myself, prior to any possible horizon of alterity or of any world—
but at the same time, such an enclosure is shut up inside the self-coherence of God 
who is somehow different than me (though not in essence).  
 The human and divine horizons merge, or so appear to fully merge, at just 
this point. For Henry it is Christ the Arch-Son who gives to me my life. I am, in 
every occasion, what Henry names the “son within the Son” insofar as my “ipseity” 
(i.e., self-experience) is realized within, and never without, Christ’s self-realization 
of himself. To convey this point in familiar New Testament terms, Henry describes 
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this dative pole, this “me” that I am and to whom God donates life, in language 
drawn from the gospel of John’s famous sheep parable: “I cannot be myself except 
by passing through the gate of the sheepfold. I am not myself, and cannot be, except 
by way of life’s original Ipseity. The pathētik flesh of this Ipseity, in which absolute 
Life is joined to itself, is what joins me to myself such that I may be, and can be, this 
me that I am. Therefore I cannot join me to myself except through Christ, since he 
has joined eternal Life to itself, creating in it the first Self.”
180
 I am given to myself, 
simply cast into myself, as a brute and apodictic fact, which is realized under the 
form of “absolute life’s” self-donation which, in calling me to live, gives me the life 
of Christ, who is my form.  
 
 §12. TRANSCENDENTAL REDUCTION AS “RADICAL” REDUCTION 
 Henry invokes here the classically “Kantian” transcendental style of 
philosophy as the proper method for thematizing life, and so abolishes the need to 
make empirical difference a chief factor upon which rests our communion with each 
other in our respective singularities. It is only in virtue of our relation with the Father 
mediated by Christ that we are able to share at all in each other’s transcendental 
singularity. Thus the transcendental condition for all possible life: God expressed in 
the form of Christ. God’s auto-generation is henceforward the primitive source from 
which I am born together with all that lives. One may even describe generation of the 
First-Son as the “form” from which I take my own form and from which every 
singular self take its form.  
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 But how may we experience, according to Henry’s strict framework, such a 
limit phenomenon? In this section we describe the spiritual, mystical means through 
which I gain access to this the form of Christ, his living present as the eternal Son. 
Henry’s disqualification of the exterior aspect of the self in favour of the interior 
furnishes the coordinates of a “radical phenomenology”
181
 in the precise sense that it 
radicalizes Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. Central to Henry’s radicalization 
is a strategy that invests phenomenology with the resources that make possible the 
unveiling of the living present. Henry’s strategy indicates the way forward by 
demanding that phenomenology eliminate altogether the idea of bracketing or 
suspending of the world. He is especially troubled with the power of display the 
world may exercise over the invisible disclosure of life. So, rather than merely 
bracket or suspend the world (as Husserl does), Henry’s strategy seeks to undermine 
the world entirely, and such a theological or radical reduction purifies the interior 
self of all attachments to temporality, worldhood and visible structures of disclosure. 
This move away from Husserl is simultaneously a move toward Gnosticism on the 
part of Henry: undoubtedly a Gnostic impulse comes expressly into view here as the 
principal miscalculation that shall bedevil Henry’s work from beginning to end. That 
is to say, because it is freighted with a Gnostic impulse, Henry’s theological 
reduction retains within its logic a sharp refusal of the world, and conceived in this 
way, the steadfastness of the reduction necessarily intends to subdue the actual 
difference between life and the world. How? By splitting the self between a pure 
inner oasis of divinity and an outer world of illusion and death (a pertinacious breach 
within the self never to be reconciled), one may then wonder if the world matters at 
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all in Henry, and therewith, whether any actual difference between the self and world 
may finally obtain. Consequent upon the calculus of duplicity, this is the Gnostic 
arrangement of the self that besets his analysis of interiority, or at least ominously 
circles, and therefore, exasperates its invisible disclosure. Before we address the 
question of Gnosticism more fully in Henry, we dwell first on the theological 
reduction as he puts it forward.  
 We must first acknowledge that it is Husserl who articulated the reduction as 
a way to parenthesize or bracket the visible world in order, not to negate the world, 
but to come back to it with the special lens of the transcendental attitude.
182
 The 
reduction traverses, as in the motion of a circle, the ego’s movement away from, and 
then back to, the world. It is unsurprising, then, that Henry finds this Husserlian 
method, whose guiding impulse is abstraction from the world (together with its 
inverse, the return back), a step in the right direction; the meditating philosopher of 
Husserl’s reduction is nevertheless not sufficiently radical for Henry with respect to 
the complete disqualification of the visible display of the world that a radical 
reduction shall necessarily summon forth. Husserl defines the reduction as an 
especially powerful species of the many acts of consciousness that a reflective ego 
can exercise, and its function is serviceable to the extent that it allows the ego to 
“bracket” or “parenthesize” the world as a means to find out exactly how the ego is 
like a residue. In each instance, the Husserlian reduction is supposed to unveil how 
the ego counts as a pure substance that remains after the self’s recoil against the 
horizon of the world, after the ego looks at the world from afar. Husserl’s main 
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interest in such an application of the reduction is to dissociate the ego from its natural 
attitude or its dogmatic slumber about its surrounding world (Umwelt), as if the 
world were just “there” without its appearing having been originally modified and 
thereby constituted by an ego and its continuous perceptual powers, i.e., its ongoing 
“consciousness of….”
183
 The world, for Husserl, is always a correlate of 
consciousness shaped by and synthesized within the ego’s streaming temporal 
experience, the immanent happening of the mind whose cogitatio (thinking) always 
has a cogitatum (content): hence, Husserl’s three-fold Cartesian chord of Ego-cogito-
cogitatum.
184
 It is certain that Husserl did not disqualify the world’s appearing, for 
the world always impinges on the ego, giving itself to the ego as an object of 
attention and reflection: the ego, “as intentional it reaches out beyond the isolated 
subjective processes that are to be analysed.”
185
 So in Husserl’s transcendental 
reduction, the world is not annihilated but becomes “in a quite peculiar sense, a 
phenomenon.”
186
 To this end, Husserl writes that in the reduction the stream of 
cogitationes are never evacuated from the ego’s gaze, because “we have not lost 
anything but rather have gained the world of absolute being which, rightly 
understood, contains within itself, ‘constitutes’ within itself, all worldly 
transcendencies.”
187
 So, when Husserl writes that the field of absolute consciousness 
is the residuum left after the “annihilation of the world,” he is not saying that the 
world is really annihilated or somehow negated by consciousness.
188
 Rather he states 
quite clearly that the metaphor of annihilation is used to illustrate the basic truth that 
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the proper province of the phenomenological reduction is the constituting power of 
consciousness—that the world is not eliminated but constituted by consciousness.  
 Taken for granted, the empirical world in the natural attitude is simply and 
straightforwardly there and never becomes an object of inquiry. Husserl contends 
that the critical, transcendental attitude institutes a paradigm shift away from the 
natural attitude by “purifying” the ego’s naïve belief patterns and doxastic 
allegiances to the world. It is in and through the transcendental reduction that the 
ego, in its own reflective freedom, can alter its experience of the world by assuming 
another attitude altogether. The conversion from the natural attitude to the 
transcendental attitude is an “essentially changed subjective process that takes the 
place of the original one.”
189
 This subjective-reflective transcendental attitude, 
moreover, alters my experience of the world by assuming an attitude of 
disinterestedness whereby the self-legislating “phenomenological Ego establishes 
himself as a ‘disinterested onlooker,’ above the naively interested Ego.”
190
 This 
“splitting of the ego,” a consequence of the transcendental reduction, pervades my 
experience of the world so thoroughly that it throws open up the field of pure 
consciousness in which I can, without prejudice, describe the world as it is given. 
And in this new transcendental attitude, and in it alone, argues Husserl, I am enabled 
to see the world as given to me only as it is for me, that is, as a correlate of my 
meaning-endowing intentional aim.  
 What often goes unnoticed about Husserl’s theory of the transcendental 
reduction: it must be maintained, habitually and without respite, as an ongoing 
critical-philosophical attitude about the world. The transcendental reduction so 
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conceived is a way of life. In Ideas I, Husserl suggests that putting into play the 
phenomenological reduction is, initially, like deciding to convert to another 
worldview or pressing through a difficult and life-altering trial.
191
 In the Crisis of 
European Sciences he compares the performance of the transcendental reduction to a 
religious conversion, a momentous struggle that completely transforms one’s outlook 
on the world.
192
 It is difficult to execute the transcendental reduction because I am so 
tied to the way things naturally are for me in this empirical horizon of spatiotemporal 
givenness. It is naïve to live in the natural attitude, so once I undergo the conversion 
to the transcendental attitude, I must remain under its tutelage once and for all. 
Husserl writes of this purified domain and the attitude it fosters, that “it is to be noted 
also that the present, the transcendental epoché is meant, of course, as a habitual 
attitude which we resolve to take up once and for all. Thus it is by no means a 
temporary act, which remains incidental and isolated in its various repetitions.”
193
 
Husserl is consequently concerned, in spite of his turn toward philosophical idealism, 
with the ego’s status as the transcendental condition for the possibility of the 
objective world. After all, the world-horizon indicates an accomplishment, in large 
part, of the ego’s power to constitute inside its mental life that which it sees. 
 Henry welcomes Husserl’s strategy of employing the transcendental 
reduction as a means to unveil the interior transcendental field of the self.
194
 Henry 
agrees with Husserl about the basic transcendental structure of phenomenology, 
“insofar as it takes into consideration the givenness in which every experience is 
rooted. The reduction returns us to this original domain and, as Husserl notes, is 
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 Yet Henry is critical of Husserl about the degree to which the 
wish of the reduction to purify the ego of its attachment to the world can be fully 
effected. While Husserl may have sought to bracket the exterior world in order to 
come back to the world with the transcendental attitude, Henry thinks, in contrast, 
that only a reduction which reduces the self to the irreducible field of its aboriginal 
presence, to its self-narrative or soliloquy in which its own echo is heard within 
itself, is worthy of the name “transcendental.”  
 Henry’s radical reduction celebrates a “pure” transcendental sphere that 
attempts explicitly to order the self toward a higher, divine end, which is secured 
over against Husserl’s fictive and “impure” transcendental consciousness. For Henry, 
the living present from which I am endlessly born is accessed once the self is purified 
of all exteriority or conscious reflection, this is especially so with regard to the 
temporal “comet’s tail” in which consciousness is embedded. Henry’s radical 
reduction takes me back to the invisible residue left over after the disqualification of 
the world and its temporal streaming. This interior site of birth is no abstract self-
equivalence, but an element that vibrates under the impact of it timeless self-
impression, and which stems directly from the essence of life, and thus, is truly 
undergone in the immanence of divine life. Henry states, in sometimes the most 
imperious of terms, that access to the living present is given in and through the 
uncontested disqualification of the world, leaving no sedimentations of the ego’s 
vital self-presence in the world. Henry advocates a reduction that “results from a 
radical reduction of every transcendence that yields the hyletic or impressional 
component as the underlying essence of subjectivity. Naturally, the radical reduction 
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of every transcendence can only become possible and have a sense to the extent that 
it can show, at the end of its proceedings, what subsists when transcendence is no 
longer there.”
196
 If Henry’s radical reduction represents a reduction that opens up the 
truly transcendental sublayer or the theological underground of the self, then it must, 
in one visceral fell swoop, bring the self into unmitigated presence with itself, 
experiencing its divine subjective core that subsists at its limit. 
 By “disqualification” we indicate here Henry’s desire to move away from the 
world, an absolute movement that brackets it once and for all without returning to it. 
The radical reduction contains an unassailable rupture from the world, which, 
however unlikely it sounds, does not annihilate or negate the world. The world is 
always there, in Henry’s estimation, looming over against the interior self as a threat 
against the security of self-presence tied to the living present from which it 
continually flows forth. And so, we may be forgiven for a moment of speculation 
here in contending that Henry means to say that to disqualify the world one must let 
oneself passively detach from the world, such that the reduction constitutes a such a 
passive flight from the world without return. To disqualify the world in such 
uncompromising fashion, similarly, sanctions self-presence without reference to the 
cognitive, representational power of the ego to bracket the world and come back to it, 
as in a circle, with a renewed attitude. 
 Rolf Kühn’s interpretation of Henry’s radical reduction helpfully stresses that 
it counters Husserl’s valorisation of cognition and reflective freedom, and most of 
all, the power of constitution. Thinking or mental processes are powerless 
(impuissante) in their capacity to illuminate the auto-revelation of life. Kühn 
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describes Henry’s unique appropriation of the reduction as a “leap” (saut) that 
proceeds from visible display to the field of invisible display. The radical reduction 
that Henry designs as a means of access to life, it must be emphasized, does not 
perpetuate the Husserlian idea of a disinterested onlooker or freely self-legislating 
spectator, as if I could split my ego simply because I simply decide to do so. The 
Husserlian transcendental reduction would, in fact, prioritize the ego’s freedom to set 
out in the clearest terms a reduction that is soundly an accomplishment of its 
reflective-cognitive agency, its own power and daring to bend the world to its gaze. 
Henry’s radical reduction, in contrast, mutes the reflective-cognitive agency of 
mental life in the most comprehensive sense insofar as the ego Henry’s advances has, 
remarkably, no autonomy or scope within which it can make the world a variable of 
the self-legislation peculiar to the modern subject (Husserlian or otherwise). The 
absolute Life of God, manifest as a purely affective event reverberating inside me, 
gives access to life. Kühn clarifies Henry’s radical departure from Husserl in this 
respect: “The counter-reductive leap does not only abandon the position of the 
apparently sovereign phenomenological spectator. The auto-reduction as a concrete 
counter-reduction also implies the radicality of a pure experiencing event as an 
experiential trial—said otherwise: as the ‘poverty’ of life which is given as nothing 
other than an ‘intensity’, known as a pure passio itself, without intervention of time 
and space with their ontic multiplicities.”
197
 What Kühn suggests here is that the 
radical reduction sets into operation the feeling of pure receptivity both motivated by 
and set into operation by the nocturnal presence of God inside me. The “leap” into 
life circulates within itself, proving that my desire for life is already within me as it is 
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given to me by God, forming me in my pure essence as this “me” generated within 
his absolute self-affection. Without reference to consciousness or reflective 
representational thought, the radical reduction must be apprehended as a counter-
reduction. As a leap into life, it is initiated by God. Henry writes, “thinking does not 
permit access to life, rather it is life which achieves itself in the self, being nothing 
other than the original movement of life’s eternal arrival of itself.”
198
 I leap into life, 
therefore, by way of a radical detachment from the field of visible display, but one 
that is aroused by and moved according to divine life’s eternal movement.  
 Because it is a “leap,” Henry’s radical reduction does not entertain degrees of 
reduction nor does it permit any intentional fissures or ruptures to occur since such 
crevices shall let in the light of the world (opening up right away a distance or 
difference between me and myself) through mental representational thought. In the 
words of Henry, there is no difficulty in nominating the radical reduction an “original 
auto-affection in a truly radical sense…, it is a life that achieves itself simply and 
permanently, as one with itself and thus before it can be affected by anything 
different than itself.”
199
 By virtue of this mysterious power within us that may always 
lay dormant or may irrupt at any moment, the radical reduction is indeed a power 
that brings me back to the deep pathos of “myself” from which I am born within 
divine life.  
This is why Meister Eckhart’s theory of detachment commands pride of place 
in Henry’s earliest work, The Essence of Manifestation.
200
 Unmistakably reminiscent 
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of Husserl’s claim that the transcendental reduction may count as a “conversion” or 
an entirely novel attitude, Henry’s radical reduction is also a “conversion” of sorts. 
To detach from the world is to find God, and so, the radical reduction quite literally 
gives rise to a theological conversion, a second “birth” in which I passively 
remember—and am born again. The ego so conceived by Henry has no real or 
intelligible contours visible within the world’s theatre and certainly does not suffer 
the changeability of temporality. But the exterior aspect of the ego, makes the inner 
ego forget its divine origin—hence the radical reduction constitutes an affective 
movement away from the world and toward life motivated by divine life itself. 
Adamant that the reduction cannot return to the world, Henry’s unique synthesis of 
phenomenology and theology is, contrary to some of his interpreters and 
descendants, an unabashed theological turn; the radical reduction is a theological 
reduction. To this we now turn. 
 
§13. RADICAL INTERIORITY AND THE THEOLOGICAL TURN 
 Henry illuminates the original primal limit phenomenon of all living with the 
theory of generation (§11) and the bringing to light of this reality arises from a 
radicalized phenomenological reduction that pursues a purified transcendental sphere 
entirely distinct from the world, giving way to a duplicitous self (§12). We are now 
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in a position to attend to the theological articulation he gives to this 
phenomenological residuum (i.e., the product left over after the reduction). The 
radical reduction so premised by Henry is necessarily a theological reduction. Yet 
there has been some debate about Henry’s relationship to theology, to wit: has he in 
fact made a theological turn at all, and if so, to what degree? 
 
Theological Turn: How Far? 
  Chapter one defended the theological turn in phenomenology by maintaining 
that phenomenology, as a style of thinking, helps to clarify how the life of faith is 
lived before God. Inspired by Henry’s own theological turn, we sought a 
rapprochement between phenomenology and theology such that they collaborate in 
the attempt to speak rigorously about the lived aspects of faith. We avoided the right 
to claim that God is a phenomenon and that phenomenology can somehow garner the 
conceptual power to determine how God is manifest, whether invisibly or not (we 
develop this more fully in chapters five and six). Yet here we cover Henry’s 
theological turn in more detail with the net effect of showing how God is an absolute 
phenomenon and that phenomenology and theology unite together as single 
conceptual approach to elucidate the structure of the living present. But there is some 
disagreement to what extent Henry has taken a theological turn.   
 Antoine Vidalin offers a suggestive perspective that characterizes Henry’s 
work as a propaedeutic to theological reflection. The upshot of this perspective is 
that Vidalin assumes Henry’s phenomenology of divine life is couched purely in 
phenomenological terms, and in its pursuit for interiority, happens upon the divine 





 While one may appreciate a measured and careful approach that respects 
disciplinary boundaries and yet highlights how phenomenology and theology may 
overlap in Henry, Vidalin’s laudable position is ultimately inadequate with respect to 
Henry’s deep integration of the two styles of thinking. Why must Henry’s work be 
characterized as a “preliminary” or a propraedeutic practice in preparation for 
philosophically fashioned theology? In this sense, one must wonder why Henry’s 
own readings of scripture, his configuration of God as a deeply personal self-
revelation and his critical studies of the Incarnation and rejection of creation in 
favour of generation cannot also be theological data in their own right.
202
  
 For fear of losing out on his key phenomenological breakthroughs, Ruud 
Welten recommends an alternative strategy to reconciling phenomenology and 
theology in Henry. The most authentic form of pure interiority left over after the 
reduction, argues Welten, does not purport to be theological in content per se. To 
make the audacious claim that Henry’s phenomenology is intrinsically theological is 
necessarily to relegate Henry to the role of theologian or mystic. It is more prudent, 
suggests Welten, to appreciate Henry’s application of theology as secondary or 
derivative. In other words, Welten argues that theology is merely the handmaiden to 
phenomenology’s quest to iterate the basic structures of human life in their essential 
articulations. Welten recommends that we approach Henry as a phenomenologist 
who simply seizes religious texts and the Christian tradition for their 
phenomenological bounty. In such a vein, Welten writes that, “the conclusion is not 
that the Christian life is the authentic Life, as long as we do not really understand 
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why Henry reads the New Testament in its phenomenological structure. I hesitate to 
conclude overhasty that the authentic life is the life in God, because then we lose the 
phenomenological analyses of the immanency of the self.”
203
 Welten here intimates 
that phenomenology exemplifies a discrete discipline with expressly naturalistic 
boundaries (and thus cannot overlap with the domains of existence that theology may 
disclose). For Welten, then, Henry’s work is a model of phenomenology that 
ventures into the New Testament as an intellectual artifice or a thought-experiment, 
as a mere means to an end. Nothing more than a conduit that leads to the 
phenomenological structure of life, theological discourse is simply one of the many 
orders of manifestation (art, politics, culture, etc.) by which life gives itself. The 
degree to which Henry takes a theological turn is here minimized (and more so than 
Vidalin). 
 Dominique Janicaud, perhaps the most well-known commentator on the 
debate about the theological turn in French phenomenology, considers Henry to have 
taken an unambiguous and radical theological turn. But such a theological turn in 
Janicaud’s estimation effects a turn away from the well-defined boundaries of 
phenomenology and its status as a “rigorous science.”
204
 Both Janicaud and Welten 
presume the discipline of phenomenology to have adopted a sense of finality with 
protocol in place that, once violated, lead one beyond its proper bounds. Welten 
forecloses the possibility of a genuine theological turn in Henry while Janicaud 
acknowledges Henry’s theological turn may have resulted in a departure altogether 
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 (we have already overcome Janicaud’s challenge by 
evaluation whether phenomenology is open enough to dialogue with theology. See 
§2 above).  
 A more charitable reading of Henry’s theological turn is to suggest that he is 
a phenomenologist who is seeking to think theologically without at the same time 
taking leave of phenomenology. Certainly one could not claim Henry is a theologian 
or a trained scholar in ecclesiastical history or dogmatics. He is undoubtedly a 
trained phenomenologist deeply indebted to both Husserl and Heidegger as well as to 
the contemporary French scene that critically broadens the methodological bounds 
set by those two German founders. Henry’s particular contribution is evident in his 
disclosure of the field of invisible display up against the field of exterior display, a 
double-sidedness that results in the duplicitous self. And further, for Henry, it is the 
disqualification (without annihilation) of the exterior self by means of the reduction 
that leads to the pure interior living present, which in turn, elicits theological 
discourse as a most natural dialogue partner. The reason Henry’s move into 
theological terrrain transpires as it does is that the field of invisible display is home 
to God as phenomenon. Hardly an abstract philosophical principle, God as a 
phenomenon is the living present that rises within me giving me to myself as I live at 
each moment. God is manifest as visceral, affective and thus concrete presence 
inside me. And that which gives birth to me, for Henry, represents that which stands 
outside of time in a genuinely self-subsistent, self-generating manner, namely God. 
Henry’s thinking is, in its essence, greatly indebted to theology. It is only with 
recourse to the intelligibility of theological discourse, in other words, that Henry is 
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enabled to clarify the divine origin of the invisible field of disclosure that the 
phenomenology of life unveils. We may disagree, then, with Welten’s claim that 
Henry implements theological discourse as merely one example among many of 
life’s disclosures. The phenomenological substance of life is theological in its 
essence. 
 Henry therefore adopts a “theo-phenomenology” that exceeds the strict 
bounds of “visibility” in which Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology is 
enclosed. It is perhaps more accurate to describe Henry’s work as a mutual meeting-
point where phenomenology and theology collaborate, working in concert to 
elucidate the nocturnal nature of transcendental life. Without theology, 
phenomenology as Henry conceives it could well remain inarticulate about the actual 
content and origin of the transcendental sphere of life. By the same token, 
phenomenology installs within theology conceptual resources to thematize more 
exactly the experiential matrix by which divine revelation is internal to the living 
present.   
  
Phenomenology and Theology: Transcendental Pursuits 
 Henry deeply integrates phenomenological inquiry with theological discourse 
for another important reason. He thinks their teleologies are coterminous: they are 
both reflective moments of thought constructed through discursive knowledge aimed 
at articulating, after the fact, the living present as it originally appears. They are both 
“transcendental” disciplines insofar as they take “into consideration the givenness in 
which every experience is rooted.”
206
 Neither discipline can reveal the living present 
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of divine life self-generated within the interior depths of human life, for only divine 
life can achieve itself by revealing itself. Phenomenology and theology, together, are 
reflective disciplines that can only elaborate upon the structure of divine life after the 
fact (après coup);
207
 for the auto-revelation of divine life has always already been 
there from the beginning as a living present without having arrived from the future or 
been recalled from the past. Because both phenomenology and theology are temporal 
reflections on that which is non-temporal, we can say that Henry’s theological turn is 
not merely a propeadeutic to theology proper nor is it a taking leave of 
phenomenology in the sense that it no longer participates in the discursive exercise of 
thought about the transcendental conditions of life. 
 Because of their common teleology Henry is enabled to join the 
methodological genius of phenomenology with the content of Christian revelation: 
they are inscribed within the same invisible field of display because they are 
informed by the same truth, namely the “Ur-truth” of the living present as it is born 
withing God. Henry writes, “it is here that the phenomenological intuitions of Life 
and that of Christian theology are rejoined: in the recognition of a common 
presupposition which is not that of thought. Before thought, before phenomenology 
and even before theology...a Revelation is at work.”
208
 Henry describes this basic 
revelation from which I am born as “Absolute Life” (phenomenology) that is 
expressed exactly as the “Parousia of the Word” (theology).
209
  
 Henry’s theo-phenomenology certainly entails a moment of “faith.” Given its 
purpose to look for that which is not always apparent or visible, phenomenology 
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ought not reject the idea that invoking faith nourished by seeking can particularize 
that seeking by shaping it within the Christian intellectual tradition. Henry exercises 
this play between phenomenology, theology and faith by appealing to Philip’s 
question posed to Jesus in John 14.8-11. As a model for how one might integrate 
phenomenology with faith, Henry highlights how Philip asked Jesus to show the 
Father, for Philip was at pains to understand and “see” (phenomenologically) how 
Jesus and the Father were unified (theologically). In response, Jesus asks Philip to 
“believe” (have faith) that Jesus participates in the invisible essence of the Father’s 
life. Believing in the invisible is therefore, for Henry, a movement internal to the 
pragmatics of the phenomenology of invisible display. Theological discourse 
nourished by faith aids the phenomenologist’s quest to name the invisible disclosure 
of the living present. 
 Christian theology also maintains, according to Henry, that the self-revelation 
of God in the “Word made flesh” inscribes itself within the living presence from 
which I am born. This fact establishes straightaway that the theological disclosures of 
divine revelation are subject to phenomenological investigation. And according to 
Henry, the very phenomenological outworking of the Incarnation gives way to the 
basic truth that each of us appears in Christ as a “Son of God” generated within the 
“First-Son.” This is, perhaps, the point at which Henry’s theological turn come close 
to dissolving the distinction between theology and philosophy. We must recall that 
God is a phenomenon inasmuch as God appears as a phenomenological substance, a 
living present analyzable by phenomenological inquiry. Henry is quick to argue that 
one must not interpret the profession of faith to have made possible a 
phenomenological “seeing” of the living present as if it were a theoretical object to 
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be observed. Rather, as a living present already lived and experienced, both 
phenomenology and theology collaborate on the basis of faith to conceptualize and 
name the living present as God. Faith is the glue that unifies phenomenology and 
theology, giving to them the feeling of certainty, of apodicticity, that I am this “me” 
born from within the Word of God. I can hear through faith this donation as the noise 
of my birth (le bruit de ma naissance) as it irrupts in and through the living present 
and, therefore, am enabled to deploy phenomenology and theology as styles of 
thinking to reflect on and name the living present.
210
 The theological turn in Henry is 
not so much a question of how far but rather a question of whether there is a 
difference at all between phenomenology and theology. 
 
In Pursuit of Truth 
 There is one final conceptual link by which Henry joins phenomenology and 
theology. Guiding his book I am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity is 
the explicit invitation to rethink the idea of “truth” after Heidegger’s innovative 
interpretation of truth in §44 of Being and Time.
211
 Heidegger there depicts truth as 
an act of unconcealing/uncovering (Aufdeckung) or of disclosing (Erschlossenheit). 
Henry, like Heidegger, seeks for an original, primordial disclosure of truth, defined 
as pure unconcealedness, or “Aletheia.” The Greek word Heidegger famously 
deploys means both truth and un-concealing, or truth as un-concealing (a-letheia is 
literally “not-forgetting” or “not-concealing”). Further, “Aletheia” signifies that the 
proper conceptualization of truth is a matter of showing, manifesting or uncovering 
that which is hidden, lost or covered over. When something is false it is because its 
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truth is covered over, hidden from the light of day: “It is the ontological condition of 
the possibility that assertions can be either true or false—that they may uncover or 
cover things up.”
212
 While Heidegger’s interpretation of truth is complex, and it is 
not our purpose to evaluate it here, it is important to note that Henry’s theological 
turn is, in large part, a commentary upon, and critical development of, Heidegger’s 
recognition that truth reflects a pursuit of that which is hidden. 
 While Henry agrees with Heidegger that the principal purpose of 
phenomenology is to unveil truth (i.e., truth as unveiling), Henry disagrees with what 
the actual content of that truth is. Henry thinks that §44 of Being and Time makes 
intelligible the advent of the appearing of the world according to three false “truths:” 
first, unconcealing is different from what is unconcealed to the point that the 
unconcealment consists in this difference. It seems, according to Henry, that such a 
difference is posited only when the unconcealment is understood as the ‘outside’ of 
the world. Second, because the appearing of the world differs also from what is 
unveiled there, the result is that the horizon of the world dispenses its light on 
everything regardless of its nature, which means that the world, in Heidegger’s 
thought, is totally indifferent to what it illumines. And third, the indifference of the 
appearing of the world to all that it shows refers to a still more decisive situation, to 
the incapacity of the world-horizon to uncover effectively that which it seeks to 
uncover. The appearing of the world, in other words, does not create the reality of 
that which it unconceals; it simply limits its power to that of a pointer by uncovering 
that which is already there.
213
 Henry’s proffering of the radical reduction that 
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unconceals the transcendental sphere of divine life opposes point for point each of 
these three Heideggerian characteristics.  
 The truth of life designates the living present whereby the appearing and what 
appears are exactly the same, so that for Henry, there is no exteriority whatsoever 
and thus no world-horizon or visibility involved (opposition to number one). The 
invisible living present opened up by the truth of life is that it is also the site where I 
am touched at very point of my being without difference or distance. The field of 
invisible display where life displays itself in its full glory is not indifferent to “me” as 
this particular living being as Heidegger’s world-horizon is indifferent to what it 
shows. Henry writes in this vein: “What is true in the world’s truth in no way 
depends on this truth: it is supported by it, guarded by it, loved by it, saved by it. The 
world’s truth—that it is to say, the world itself—never contains the justification for 
or the reason behind what it allows to show itself in that truth and thus allows ‘to 
be’—inasmuch as to be is to be shown” (opposition to number two).
214
 And third, the 
site of radical interiority is tantamount to the site of divine life precisely because it 
auto-generates itself in its eternal coming-into-itself. Henry’s discovery of the “truth 
of life” is an absolute and irrefutable fact of existence because it self-verifies itself by 
way of self-revelation. What is revealed and the revelation is exactly the same so that 
the truth of life provides its own content and thus its own structure of appearing. 
Divine life is a sphere of truth that has a reality that cannot be governed, verified or 
adjudicated outside of its own domain of experience (opposition to number three). 
 Taken together, these three oppositions to Heidegger are reason enough to 
conclude that Henry takes an unequivocal theological turn without also taking leave 
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of phenomenology as a method that seeks for truth. Henry states the “truth as 
revelation” with respect to divine life this way: “With this idea of a pure 
Revelation—of a revelation whose phenomenality is the phenomenalization of 
phenomenality itself, of an absolute self-revelation that dispenses with whatever is 
other than its own phenomenological substance—we are in the presence of the 
essence that Christianity posits as the principle of everything. God is that pure 
Revelation that reveals nothing other than itself. God reveals Himself. The 
Revelation of God is his self-revelation.”
215
 And it is in just such a self-revelation 
that God appears through affectivity, that immediate feeling of myself in which I 
crush against myself prior to the temporal streaming of visible display. The primitive 
and original type of self-awareness that is verified according to its own revelatory 
power through Christ constitutes the basis upon which the “truth” or certainty of my 
ipseity is built. Phenomenology makes intelligible the interior structure of appearing 
and theological discourse develops this structure in view of God’s self-appearing in 
Christ. Rolf Kühn writes that the self verifies itself within itself from both a 
phenomenological and theological point of view. I feel myself in pure auto-affection 
as this “me” and yet this is the living present from which I born as Son of God within 
the “First-Son.” The living present is a concrete Christ-affection. Kühn writes that 
for Henry, “the ‘nomination’ of Christ for this work is not an ideal, moral or 
ideological assurance, it is a work of unification, which never proceeds outside the 
self, as life affects itself absolutely, without leaving its own sphere.... it is the 
realization of my “true” life in its objectification as it is anchored in this lived 
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 We see here that Henry’s strategy is to secure truth in its purest 
apodictic form, that is, my self-appearing through auto-affection within the arch-
revelation of Christ.  
 And where does God’s self-revelation appear? In its absolute disqualification 
of the world (without annihilating the world), the radical reduction uncovers or 
unconceals an arch-truth, a ground-level self-experience of the ego wherein God’s 
presence appears. So while Henry will admit, for obvious reasons, that world 
discloses things in their visibility, he claims, nevertheless, that the world cannot 
disclose what is “true” about human reality. Understood on the basis of the 
duplicitous self, only God’s self-revelation within the acosmic sphere of divine auto-
affection in its ongoing donation of life inside me can secure what is true about, or 
essential to, my life. God’s appearing as a theological truth is therefore incontestable 
because God is self-verifying in and through the phenomenological structure of auto-
affection. It is the seeking after this arch-intelligibility in faith that unifies 
phenomenology and theology. 
 But because the power of the visible display of the exterior world conceals 
the truth of interiority, the absolute generation of the living present inside me can be, 
and usually is, forgotten by me. My “second birth” in which I remember my original 
state as a Son of God eternally born of Christ is put into play by the radical reduction 
and takes on what Jad Hatem calls a “mystical tonality.”
217
 As such, the interior 
shape given to the living present unveiled by the reduction yields a mystical 
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spirituality that, despite the particular spiritual exercise, founds the truth of myself 
upon the sure foundation of the unbreakable union continually secured and generated 
between my living present and God’s living present. 
 This leads to a third and related point: the reduction is a theological turn is 
because the radical reduction precipitates a detachment from the world, which can be 
interpreted as a form of Christian mystical practice or even ascetical detachment.
218
 
Such a theological reduction participates in a style of spirituality akin to the “dark 
night of the soul” (and there certainly have been comparisons between Henry and St. 
John of the Cross).
219
 Henry will formulate this inward turn in his own language: 
“God engenders himself as me, and also, God engenders me as himself, so in effect, 
because this is his life which is becoming mine, my life is nothing more than his: I 
am deified, according to the Christian concept of salvation.”
220
 Henry similarly 
deploys, as we have noted above, Eckhart, too, in this sense: “It is the absolute who, 
in the accomplishment of his task, constitutes the essence of the soul, the essence 
which as such is not different from this work, or as Eckhart says, from the operation 
                                                 
218
 In fact, Henry argues it is the extreme humility (i.e. Eckhart’s detachment) that the self must 
practice in the hope of provoking a disclosure of that original self-revelation of Life within the 
inner-self. Christ models the pragmatics of detachment through his extreme humility as a Son who 
displays perfect obedience to the Father. Henry quotes John 7.17, which declares that, “If anyone’s 
will is to do God’s will, he will know whether the teaching is from God or whether I am speaking o 
my own authority.”  Henry notes that this statement illustrates, “the phenomenon of religious 
experience, experience indisputably had by all humans to whom it is given. And this experience 
arrives each time that one hears the Word and abandons himself to it, and does the will of God.”  
Henry, Paroles du Christ, 153. 
219
 For secondary sources which elucidate the “night” of auto-affection with an eye to the dark night of 
the soul, see Alain Cugno, “Jean de la Croix avec Michel Henry.” In Michel Henry, l'épreuve de la 
vie: actes du colloque de Cerisy 1996, eds. Alain David and Jean Greisch (Paris: Cerf, 2001), 439-
52; Ruud, Welten, “The night in John of the Cross and Michel Henry,” Studies in Spirituality 13 
(2003): 213-33. 
220
 Given the programmatic nature of the text, we replicate it here in French: “Parce que ‘Dieu 
s’engendre comme moi-même’ et que, alors, ‘Dieu m’engendre comme lui-même,’ alors, en effet, 
parce que c’est sa vie qui est devenue la mienne, ma vie n’est plus rien d’autre que la sienne: je sui 





 It is the “soul” or the interior life understood in this way that orients one 
away from the luminosity of the world to the nocturnal of pure invisibility, the 
nightime when phenomenology and theology meet. 
 
§14. HENRY’S ABANDONMENT OF THE CREĀTA IMAGO DEI  
 We have described Henry’s notion of “generation” as the non-temporal 
source-point of life, the living present from which I am endlessly born in God 
(naissance intemporelle) without reference to the exterior world (§11-12).
222
 We also 
mentioned, in passing, that generation is a reconstitution of human life’s origin 
insofar as it rejects the doctrine of creation and thus the imago Dei. In §45 of his 
book, Incarnation: une philosophie de la chair, Henry takes a foray into the creation 
story of Genesis in order to confront and overcome the challenge it presents to his 
theo-phenomenology. In doing so, he attempts to demonstrate why humans are not 
created in God’s image. For Henry, life is always already generated, eternally, within 
divine life ad intra. I receive my essence as a living being from my unity with God, 
not from being created in the image of God. Creation, in principle, ruptures my 
primal union with God. Instead of coming into life continually prior to all temporal 
movement, creation throws me outside of my non-temporal birth into the temporal 
horizon of the world. Because creation presents to us the picture of “rupture,” 
precisely in its casting me out from the living present into the temporal play of the 
world, Henry contends that creation alienates me from divine life, and despite its 
theological weight as a dogma, it must be rejected: 
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To come into life as a transcendental self, living and 
experiencing oneself in one’s flesh in the manner in which all 
flesh experiences itself, is to be born. To be born, therefore, 
does not signify, as sometimes one naively imagines, coming 
into the world under the form of a body-object, because in 
such a case there would never be any living individuals. 
Nothing more than the appearing of a thing, a mundane body 
subject to the laws of the world, defining its phenomenological 
properties—its spatiality, its temporality, its relations of 





 How does Henry overcome the problem creation poses to his theory of 
generation? Henry renders creation obsolete by displacing it with the idea of 
generation. This is why Henry writes that once human life is “cleared of all ideas of 
exteriority, exteriorization, of objectivation—of the world—the concept of creation 
signifies now generation, generation in the auto-generation of absolute Life which 
happens to the self in its coming into life as it continually comes into itself.”
224
 Yet 
Henry’s negative evaluation of the doctrine of creation necessarily gives way to a 
sustained reappraisal of the doctrine of the imago Dei as well. For him, the imago 
Dei is a configuration maintained by a structural gap (l’ecart), for the image must be 
at a distance from that which it is imaging. The chief movement of “imaging” is 
indeed defined by, and ordered to, the power of visible display (and is thus 
isomorphic with “outside” of creation). Visible display attests to the privileging of 
opposition, distance, exteriority, transcendence and temporality, all of which alienate 
me from my ongoing non-temporal living present. In Henry’s estimation, the imago 
Dei is complicit in the destructive work of visible display in that it conceals the field 
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of invisible display. Henry’s critical engagement with the biblical text, as we shall 
see, highlights his theological commitment to a doctrine of generation that 
overcomes such alienation.  
 Generation thus provides a forceful counterpoint to the imago Dei. 
Articulated from a theological point of view, Henry states that the Incarnation of the 
Arch-Son mobilizes all human life together in an invisible spiritual union between 
the interior auto-affection and the inner-life of the Trinity. By situating the living 
present within the interior reciprocity between Father, Son and Spirit and its auto-
donation, Henry can refigure human auto-affection as coincident with divine auto-
affection in order to close any gaps, and in so doing, re-read Genesis afresh: “When 
the biblical God breathes in us the Spirit of Life which makes each one of us a living 
being, it is generation which is accomplished.”
225
 
 Henry states it is naïve to believe that the Genesis narrative addresses the 
question of the historical origin of the world and humans. The historical authenticity 
of the creation narrative remains suspect given what Henry perceives to be its bizarre 
situational details: Adam was created as a twenty year old man; Cain, the son of the 
first humans Adam and Eve, roamed the earth only to encounter a hostile group of 
other people that have clearly existed for some time; the stars, the water, animals, 
vegetation, living species and human beings were created all in successive stages; to 
conclude the narrative God sits down to rest as if God were enfeebled by finitude.
226
 
Even more important, however, Henry emphasizes that this creation narrative does 
not point to anything “outside” of God, especially the visible disclosure of the world. 
Despite the temptation to think that the Genesis creation story outlines the creation of 
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the world, Henry argues that it cannot. He reminds us that the world is subject to an 
illusion, a lie. For Henry, the world extends itself as a shell-like structure (i.e. 
cadaver), one that breaks upon me as nothing more than a copy of reality, a 
doppelganger of what is otherwise the thing itself. Scripture as the revelation of 
divine life therefore does not describe the origin of the world any more than it can 
give license to break the ninth commandment.  
Henry’s appeal to generation over against creation explicitly accommodates a 
transcendental method of reading Scripture. He insists that the Genesis text does not 
concern itself with historical artifacts, narrative history or objective events but rather 
pure, archetypal “forms” of trans-historical, transcendental import. Highlighting this 
idiosyncratic approach to scripture, Henry writes that, “if we want to understand the 
Bible as a transcendental text indifferent to the historical factuality of men, we have 
to compare it to other transcendental books we have at our disposal.”
227
  For Henry, 
Adam is not the first historical person but rather the archetype of all humans, like 
Kant’s transcendental ego. Yet Adam is different from Kant’s transcendental ego 
insofar as Adam represents all those who are involved in and made subject to God’s 
self-revelation through the work of generation (not creation).
228
 Thus, for Henry, 
humans are certainly not created in any worldly, exterior sense: “Man was never 
created, he never came into the world.”
229
 The negation of the doctrine of creation 
leads, without delay, to the negation of the imago Dei: “Man is not an image, 
because in fact images exist only in the world, against the background of this original 
putting into-image that is the horizon of the world in its ek-static 
                                                 
227
 Henry, Incarnation, 325. 
228
 Henry, Incarnation, 324. 
229





 To combat the doctrines of creation and the imago Dei, 
Henry holds to the truth of the prologue of John that declares “Word made flesh” is 
in union with which it is joined in the Incarnation. This is, Henry substitutes 
Johannine generation for Pentateuchal creation as the phenomenological-theological 
paradigm of the origin of human life. 
To accomplish this hermeneutical move, Henry filters Genesis through the 
grid of the prologue of the gospel of John. The gospel of John, “allows us,” he 
claims, “to understand the unity of the transcendental vision of the Scriptures.”
231
 
Because of its ultimate transcendental rank, “the Prologue constitutes the revelation 
of the essential truth buried in Genesis.”
232
 This essential truth is that the Word 
became flesh and lived among us in order to remind us that we are and always have 
been born of God. Humans are “not born of blood or man but of God” (John 1.13), 
so observes Henry. God generates the human self as a Son of God in and through the 
Incarnation, or, as Henry highlights it in his typically Johannine voice: 
 
The generation of man in the Word replicates the generation of 
the Word in God as his auto-revelation. This homogeneity 
between the generation of the Word and of man explains why 
when the Word became incarnated to become man, it was not 
in the world to which he came, it was in flesh, ‘his own 
flesh’—among those who were generated in Him and who 





As a human being whose essence inhabits divine life itself, the pure living ego as 
Henry conceives it is acosmically occupied in the inner-working of God’s auto-
generation. Divine life eternally self-generates itself within its own interior reciprocal 
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movements between Father, Son and Spirit.
234
 Nothing here is created, after all, 
God’s life has always been there, and Christ’s Incarnation is acosmic (“Before 
Abraham was, I am” John 8.58, a favourite New Testament text for Henry). Christ 
signifies the Arch-Son co-engendered within the very self-movement of God’s 
coming-into-itself.
235
 So integrated is human generation with Christ’s self-generation 
that Henry adopts the theological factum of deification whereby, to quote from 
Eckhart again, God “engenders (i.e. generates) me as himself.”
236
 On the basis of 
God’s eternal donation of life and by virtue of my birth through this donation, I 
participate immediately in the Triune life of God. 
 Henry draws a sharp distinction, then, between two modes of explaining 
human origins, and hence, two “truths” that correspond to the two spheres of the 
duplicitous self: the world’s truth (exteriority) and Christianity’s truth (interiority). 
The world appears as exteriority, illuminating all which is made visible by the power 
of distance, outside-ness, transcendence, alienation, temporality—in short, hetero-
affection. The world explains the origin of humanity in terms of creation, which 
indicates the very structural opening to that which is outside of divine life. To be 
created in the image of God leads to a separation between God and the creature, an 
ontological and temporal distance lodged at the very base of the creature’s imaging 
of God. For an image, maintains Henry, is only a representation of the thing it 
images; by its very structure it presupposes a distance and alienation from that which 
it images. This distance between the creature and its divine source thereby strips the 
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creature of its own subjectivity and its living substance thereby stripping “me” of my 
living present. According to Henry’s interpretation of Christianity, God does not 
create the human creature because to be created is to be posed outside of God as an 
image of God. The true ego, the pure living ego born in the living present, in 
contrast, finds itself generated within the very Life of God without distance or gaps 
between the two.
237
   
 While we appreciate here the unity between the ego and God that Henry 
underlines, we are not uncritical. For all of Henry’s brilliance, his theory of the 
duplicitous self leads to a monism, an absolute absorption of myself within God. We 
shall insist in the remainder of this chapter that Henry’s repudiation of creation and 
exteriority implicates him in a disasterous theological monism that neglects to 
account for the individuality of my “me-pole” as well as the possibility to realize 
myself in the world. We shall rehabilitate creation and the imago Dei from 
constructive point of view both in chapters five and six as a way to overcome 
Henry’s duplicitous self. 
 
§15. THE PARADOX OF INDIVIDUATION  
 We have seen that Henry suggests that my singularity as one who feels 
myself crush against myself in pure immediacy without recourse to anything outside 
myself is nothing other than a relative moment in Life’s absolute auto-affection 
generated through Christ (§11). The truth of generation is revealed as an ineluctable 
arch-truth of my life, a revelation brought to light by way of a radical reduction or 
disqualification of the world-horizon (§12). Portrayed as a theological turn toward 
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interiority (§13), the truth of generation is also the disqualification of the doctrine of 
creation because creation interposes a gap between human life and God (i.e., imago 
Dei) (§14). The radicality of Henry’s critique lies in his interest to construct 
positively “an entirely new conception of man.”
238
 And this entirely new conception 
of human life yields an entirely new conception of human origins—generation 
structured in accord with the duplicity of display. Because generation is 
transcendental and non-temporal, the doctrine of generation contends that each 
human ego is both uniquely a “me” and a relative “moment” internal to Christ’s 
auto-generative coming into Life apart from the visible temporal streaming of the 
world-horizon. My auto-affection, as an acosmic living present (outside the 
streaming from future to past), is singularized according to the selfsame process that 
singularizes every other living ego.  
 Yet, how is it that I am uniquely “myself” (up against all of “you”), as Henry 
claims, if we all acquire our individuation from the selfsame acosmic birth? Does 
this not pose an obvious philosophical problem about individuation?
239
 Given that 
the structure of auto-affection is that it is a feeling of nothing but my own feeling in 
radical immediacy without reference to anything foreign—how can I be my own 
singular self when Christ is the universal inner possibility of any singularity 
whatsoever? How does Henry address this tension?  
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 Henry resolves this tension by recourse to the notion of paradox.
240
 For 
Henry, Christ is my transcendental life, that is, the absolute condition for the 
possibility of my living. A central thesis of Henry’s interpretation of Christianity is 
that Christ embodies the universal, non-temporal substance from which each ego, in 
its capacity to live as a singular ego, draws that capacity to live—from its ongoing 
filiality as a Son within the First-Living Son. Christ is the shepherd whose absolute 
transcendental ego is figured in the shape of a universal gate under which the 
sheepfold passes and acquires identities, their respective ipseities. Henry writes in a 
stunning passage drawn from the sheepfold parable of John 10:  
 
But the gate of the sheepfold, which according to this strange 
parable provides access to the place where the sheep graze—
thus founding the transcendental Ipseity from which each me, 
being connected to itself and growing in itself, draws the 
possibility of being a me—this gate provides access to all 
transcendental me’s, not to only one of them, to the one I am 
myself. Christ is not within me solely as the force that, 
crushing me against myself, ceaselessly makes me a me. Each 
me comes into itself only in this way, in the formidable power 
of this embrace in which it continually self-affects itself. This 
is why the gate opens onto all living things: access to each of 





 Each transcendental self is co-substantial, immediately unified with each other on 
the basis of their common substance, namely Christ living inside each of us giving to 
us the selfsame life. It is the word of God, Christ, in whom all things live, that gives 
to each of us life (dative/accusative pole in Henry). Christ is manifest as the all-
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unifying Word. Each ipseity is derived from a common source from which it 
originates in its particularity. The Trinitarian God, Henry frequently notes, is the real 
living God who lives in each living self, and without whom, each self would not live 
and to which each living self testifies to in its living.
242
  
 Henry argues that this theory of the duplicitous self renders possible my 
living present as this unique “me.” He suggests that I am manifest in my self-aware 
selfness through my ongoing self-experiencing of myself without reference to 
anything outside myself. But again, I am not self-positing in that I do not bring 
myself into life thereby self-individualizing or self-positing myself as this “me.” To 
this end, Henry writes clearly, “ultimately there is only one self-affection, that of 
absolute Life, because the self-affection in which the ego is given to itself is only 
absolute Life’s self-affection, which gives the ego to itself by giving life to itself.”
243
 
I experience myself as this particular “me” but only as passively given to myself 
from that absolute origin of life itself, God. 
 Henry recognizes this paradox, namely that I am a singular “me” experienced 
without reference to any outside, and yet, I am given to myself by that which is not 
me, and from which all life is born. Henry affirms this truth as a central thesis of 
Christianity, “expressed in the great Christian paradoxes.”
244
 In quoting the popular 
proposition in the gospels that whoever wants to save his life will lose it and whoever 
loses his life will save it (Matt 10.39; Luke 9.24; John 12.25), Henry underwrites his 
own theory of the paradox of individuation with this theological truth. This paradox, 
that I am myself only by way of something that is not myself, is a critique of the 
sovereign and autonomous ego that has persisted as a hallmark of modernity at least 
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since Kant. Only once we recognize, asserts Henry, the reality of generation do we 
realize we cannot escape our identity as “sons of God.” So when I feel myself in 
suffering myself as this particular, singular self, “the self-givenness of these 
sentiments, of this ego, of this Self, and of this Ipseity that is their basis, is that of 
absolute Life giving itself to itself in the original Ipseity of the Arch-Son.”
245
 This 
paradox is an explicit result of Henry’s substitution of generation for creation; for in 
generation, no gap or separation is interposed between myself and God, which 
means, of course, that generation must make room for distinct ipseities by way of a 
sequence of paradoxes. 
  In an illuminating essay, “Phénoménologie de la naissance,” Henry develops 
this paradox in relation to Husserl’s theory of the transcendental ego.
246
 Henry cites 
§44 of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations in which the transcendental reduction 
enables access to my primordial “sphere of ownness” (Eigenheitsphäre). In this 
sphere the ego lives, argues Husserl, in its concrete “I myself” as a monad. Husserl’s 
transcendental ego employs the “I-Can” in which the ego goes outside of its 
Eigenheitsphäre toward the world in order to constitute that which is the non-ego 
(for more on the “I-Can,” see chapter six, §24 in this dissertation). Husserl writes, 
“what is specifically peculiar to me as an ego, my concrete being as a monad, purely 
in myself and for myself with an exclusive ownness, includes my every intentionality 
and therefore, in particular, the intentionality directed to what is other.”
247
 The sphere 
of ownness that Husserl discloses through the transcendental attitude designates a 
sphere in which the luminosity of the world is brought about thanks to the work of 
intentionality (§6 above). The sphere of ownness so premised by Husserl is, 
                                                 
245
 Henry, I am the Truth, 212. 
246
 Henry, “Phénoménologie de la naissance,” in Phénoménologie de la vie, tome I, 123-42. 
247
 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 94. 
163 
 
however, what Henry’s phenomenology of generation does not reject outright, but 
rather, radicalizes inasmuch as generation presents a picture of a pure, and hence, a 
nocturnal sphere of ownness. Generation moves me from the intentional sphere of 
ownness to a pure site of acosmic birth within the First-Living Son. Henry describes 
the ego’s pure self-suffering of itself within itself in absolute immediacy (i.e., the “I 
myself” monad) without recourse to intentionality or the world-horizon. Thus Henry 
observes that out of the two fields of display constitutive of the duplicitous self, the 
interior or “‘I myself…’ marks the achievement of the process of my transcendental 
birth.”
248
 This means that I draw myself from my birth prior to my ejection onto the 
world whereas the Husserlian ego is self-reflexive and presupposes that the terminus 
of the ego or the ego-punctum lies in the ego’s constitution of that which is outside 
its monadic sphere, namely the world.  
 One reason why Henry departs from the Husserlian ego is that the Husserlian 
ego develops that which has been present in European philosophy since Descartes: 
the sovereign “subject” or the self-positing, self-confident ego.
249
 The only way to 
overcome Husserl’s self-positing representational subject (in which the ego’s 
constitution of the world is its own ego-punctum) is to put into play a radical 
reduction. Returning to the living present apart from the intentional life of the ego, 
Henry’s radical reduction unveils the truth of radical passivity. The living present is 
home to the “I myself” in its pure self-presence prior to the outside of the world-
horizon. The condition for the possibility of the Husserlian transcendental ego, to put 
it differently, is my passive reception of divine life’s ongoing donation inside me. I 
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do not constitute that which is outside me (as in Husserl), rather I am constituted by 
that which is inside me. 
 I am therefore not a “Son of humanity” but a “Son of God” born from within 
the ipseity of God with no distance between myself and God; and, moreover, every 
other self is also born of God in its singularity in and through the selfsame 
movement. But does this not give rise to a kind of interiorized monism that 
forecloses the possibility of singularity, and therefore, of any individuality 
whatsoever? Is my life in its singularity nothing other than one of many lives blended 
together with God’s life in an absolute monism that appears in contradistinction to 
the exterior field of visible display? Or is the duplicitous self complicit in a radical 
dualism, a splitting of the self between, on the one hand, its interior domain in which 
it is continually born, and, on the other, its exterior domain in which it is nothing 
more than a duplicate of the thing itself?  
 
 
 §16. MONISM (OR GNOSTIC DUALISM?)  
 
Undoubtedly, one may raise questions about whether Henry’s duplicitous self 
evokes the spectres of monism (reality is pure interior life with no individuality) or 
radical dualism, what some may call a variant of Gnostic dualism (the self split 
between pure life and an exterior illusory world). Determining the precise relation in 
Henry’s thought between interiority and exteriority or between the invisible and 
visible accedes to difficulties and ambiguities. While my essence is incorporated 
within divine life, Henry nevertheless links the interior essence to its visible, exterior 
display in its bodily and temporal manifestations. Henry does not deny the existence 
of the world, its temporal horizon and the ego’s bodily place in that luminous space. 
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A serious problem nevertheless persists at just this juncture, namely: how is it 
possible to attend positively to the bodily and temporal dwelling in the visible world? 
This problem exposes to view, above all, Henry’s tendency to overcompensate in his 
effort to critique the long-standing philosophical predisposition toward the visible 
display of the world-horizon, a predisposition diffuse in post-Cartesian philosophy 
and post-Husserlian phenomenology. The doctrine of generation brings Henry to the 
brink of a kind of monism that delimits reality to one absolute sphere in isolation 
from the visible world. 
Henry’s tendentious account of pure interiority also evokes, simultaneously, 
the spectre of dualism: interior life contains the truth alone and the exterior display of 
the world is merely a copy of that reality. Life is pure non-temporal auto-affection in 
which I feel myself perfectly and without deviation in the depths of that feeling and 
the world is a temporal field of display that throws me outside of my immediate 
embrace into the flow of time, fragmenting me in the illusory flux of world 
engagements. The two fields of display—the interior and the exterior—are, as Henry 
frequently instructs his readers, absolutely heterogeneous to each other. Henry states 
it starkly: “Life designates pure manifestation, always irreducible to that of the 
world, an original revelation that is not the revelation of another thing and does not 
depend on anything other, but is rather a revelation of self, that absolute self-
revelation that is Life itself.”
250
 Henry argues that interiority, to be truly interior, 
must exclude exteriority.
251
 In point of fact, we recall that they are quite literally two 
types of appearing (e.g., see the “duplicity of display” above in §8). Henry advances 
a theo-phenomenology that, without hesitation and with all rigour, splits me into two 
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spheres: a duplicitous self constitutive of a pure, real self over against an exterior 
irreal copy of the self in the world.  
We out not forget that Henry’s position is deeply troubled with the 
“ontological monism” he attributes to Heidegger and Husserl, both of whom focus 
exclusively on the visible display of the world. To overcome such an injurious 
monism, Henry reconstitutes the field of display to account for two fields of display. 
In so doing, however, does Henry not overcompensate and subscribe to an 
ontological monism of his own making? Certainly the duplicity of display forms a 
duality between interior life and exterior world, however, in this section we shall 
claim that Henry’s theory of invisible display promotes a monism to the extent that it 
disqualifies the world entirely, leaving the final word about the nature of “reality” 
and “life” to be explicated the interior field of display alone. 
But what kind of monism does Henry advance? It is necessary to 
acknowledge that the “radical reduction” Henry deploys to disqualify the world is 
not tantamount to the annihilation of the world. Henry is clear that the radical 
reduction simply exposes the world for what it is. The radical reduction, we recall, 
highlights that the world is the field of visible display that conjures away the 
invisible. Henry regards the radical reduction, in other words, as a “leading back to” 
(reconduction) or an unveiling of that invisible presence of life hidden behind every 
modality of visible display. And in order to gain access to that interior sphere, I must 
radically disqualify the world by purifying my illusion that that the world is a site of 
life, i.e., the illusion that I am able to realize my life apart from life, as if life could 
be realized outside of life, that is, in the world. As such, Henry’s duplicitous self 
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yields to a radical monism, but one that neither annihilates nor denies the existence 
of the world. 
Henry’s duplicitous self is susceptible, therefore, to a qualified monism in the 
sense that it prioritizes the interior non-temporal at the expense of the exterior 
temporal field of the world. When Henry says that the exterior world is “irreal” he is 
not claiming that it does not exist or that it is something like a figment of one’s 
imagination. Henry utilizes the term “irreal” (iréel) simply to convey that the world 
does not possess the capacity to illuminate that which is living.
252
 And so when 
Henry compares the world to an “optical illusion” he is not implying that the world 
does not exist as an actual horizon of display. Falling prey to an optical illusion does 
not mean the same as undergoing a hallucination or being fooled by a hologram. For 
example, just because there is a scenario in which two lines seem to be different in 
size (but in reality are the exact same length), does not thereby entail the conclusion 
that the two lines are non-existent. So, by calling the “man in the world an optical 
illusion,”
253
 Henry is suggesting that the exterior world dissimulates the ego’s gaze 
away from what is essential about its own life as well as the life of other egos (not 
that the world is a hologram or a product of a hallucination). The ego as Henry 
conceives it is a duplicity: bifurcated between the pure presence of myself (reality) 
and the exterior copy of myself in the world (irreality). Only the non-temporal sphere 
of generation is real while my objective body and my temporal streaming in the 
world is irreal inasmuch as it is a copy of the thing itself.  
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Furthermore, the temporal horizon of the world is not merely irreal; it is also 
destructive in that it de-realizes my life. Henry, to return once again to Husserl, 
associates the ego’s temporal streaming of consciousness and its intentional regard 
with this very destructive power: “That which produces intentionality is not the 
immediate donation of the thing: it is rather the signification to which is given 
immediately to the thing. But all signification is an irreality, an object-of-thought—a 
‘noematic irreality.’”
254
 In even starker terms, Henry writes, “This is phenomenality, 
that of the world, as we have seen, makes unreal apriori everything it makes visible, 
making it visible only in the act by which, posing it outside itself [via 
consciousness], it empties it of reality.”
255
 And, “the world comes to exist by 
appearing as such—the temporality of this world…”
256
 By effectually throwing me 
outside myself, the temporal streaming of consciousness opens up the field of visible 
display of the world, which in turn, alienates me from my reality.  
Even Henry’s distinctions between weak and strong senses of auto-affection 
(§11) fail to distinguish between temporal and non-temporal orders of manifestation. 
The identity between the human life and divine life is structurally identical in that 
they share the same non-temporal essence: “This is the meaning of the thesis that 
‘God created man in his image:’ that he gave man his own essence.”
257
 Henry claims 
that generation poses no gap or temporal distance between the ego and God and that 
the ego’s relation to God is therefore immediate, pure and effectual. While Christ is 
the “First Son” or “Arch-Son” and the ego is a “Son of God,” there is, once more, no 
temporal separation, and in this sense, nothing in that distinction that undermines my 
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argument that Henry is a non-temporal monist. It is in this qualified sense that we 
claim Henry’s duplicitous self presupposes monism. Despite the fact that there has 
been some debate as to what extent Henry may be identified as a Gnostic dualist, it is 
plausible to connect the monism we have suggested here with a kind of Gnostic 
dualism. 
Jad Hatem is perhaps the most well-known critic to have isolated in Henry’s 
theological turn a tendency toward Gnostic dualism. Hatem has published a book that 
outlines Valentinian Gnostic dualism as a framework by which to interrogate 
Henry’s duplicitous self. While it is not the purpose here to outline Gnosticism(s) as 
a point of comparison with Henry, Hatem’s work is nevertheless analogous to the 
conclusion we have drawn about Henry’s monism. Hatem is quick to highlight 
Henry’s proximity to Gnosticism as well as pantheism when he writes that Henry 
structures the human ego by divine life, as two ipseities that “are irreducible in 
Henry, a fact that does not save him from pantheism which maintains the identity of 
the nature of human life with divine life, homoousia, a fact for which Clement of 
Alexandria reproached the Gnostics.”
258
 Hatem’s impulse to compare Henry to 
Gnosticism is well-founded, and the kind of Gnostic dualism to which Hatem limits 
himself (i.e. Valentinian) is, as far as we can discern, similar to the kind of non-
temporal monism with we which have associated Henry’s duplicitous self.
259
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Kevin Hart also comments on Henry’s Gnostic tendencies from a theological 
point of view. The emphasis on the parousia of life, argues Hart, tends toward a 
Gnostic dualism insofar as Henry adopts an eschatology that is at once over-realized 
(full presence of divine life inside the ego) and under-realized (complete absence of 
divine life in the world). In such an over-realized eschatology, whereby God’s 
parousia appears internal to Godself, God appears also within the interior field of 
myself. This leads Henry to reduce the Cross, Resurrection, the Sacraments and the 
Kingdom to secondary status, or worse, to events with no decisive relation to divine 
life at all. As such, they remain conspicuously unimportant to Henry’s non-temporal 
monism.
260
Yet fundamental to the economy of Henry’s duplicitous self is that there 
is only one auto-affection and therefore one life, a circumscription of reality within 
one non-temporal field of display that promotes an ontological monism.
261
 
While Hatem and Hart may often resort to a polemical tone, they are 
nonetheless right to confront what is, if not explicit, at least a latent, monism that 
attributes, on the one hand, reality to interiority, and, on the other, irreality to the 
world on the other. As such, it is not unfair to argue that Henry has reduced the self 
in its living ipseity, in its individuation, to an invisible, acosmic substance that fails 
to incorporate the field of visible display constitutive of the temporal world-horizon. 
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The field of visible display, i.e., the temporal horizon of the world and the objective 
body’s spatial polarity, affirms the radically embodied way each of us identifies 
ourselves as spatially and temporally distinct from one another. Henry himself even 
indicates, and is in consequence forced to indicate, that upon encountering the other 
we do so only by way of mediation through the exterior body. So while Henry may 
say that the world de-realizes me or that the visible, objective body appears as an 
“optical illusion” he, nonetheless, says that “the most ordinary experience shows the 
contrary. Consider the objective bodies of other people. If, in our eyes, their bodies 
contrast with the inert bodies of the material universe, it is because we perceive them 
as inhabited by a flesh [an interior life].”
262
 Henry states that the world has the power 
to manifest things but not the power to manifest what is essential or real about their 
appearing as they appear to a perceiving subject.
263
 This does not mean that the 
world does not exist on its own, but rather that its power of manifestation can never 
arrive at the thing-itself, only life can give itself (i.e., or auto-donation), giving the 
thing itself therein. 
 
 §17. TOWARD A POROUS SELF   
 In this final section we point toward part three’s proposal of the porosity of 
the eschatological self over against Henry’s duplicitous self. We set out here the 
contours of the porous self who is at once temporal, bodily and worldly and yet 
porous to that which is non-temporal and not of this world, a God who is to come. To 
reaffirm the temporal nature of the ego is to return, of necessity, to the doctrines of 
creation and the imago Dei, and moreover, to a self that surmounts a non-temporal 
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monism. While Henry’s duplicitous self is theologically fecund and takes seriously 
the unity between human life and divine life, it nevertheless proceeds to posit an 
unreserved monism, furnishing the coordinates of an absolute duplicity that sets up a 
strict distinction between God and world but unduly blurrs the distinction between 
creature and Creator. 
 Our proposal therefore introduces what we call here the “porosity of display” 
in contradistinction to Henry’s principle of the “duplicity of display.” Whereas 
Henry splits the self into two irreconcilable fields of display, cleaving it between a 
non-temporal and temporal domain, we propose a site that negotiates between them 
without cleaving them in two. While the porous self is certainly temporal and able to 
open up the light of the world through the temporal streaming of reflective 
consciousness (retention and protention), the porous self is not merely temporal. The 
porous self so understood is porous to the pure presence of the present, the divine 
aseity that does not recede into the past or anticipate the impact of the future. The 
living present to which Henry devotes his project may be accessible only through a 
theological turn inward after the performance of the radical reduction. In our 
proposal, however, the living present is never attainable, even if it embodies divine 
presence and is thus my object of love. The living present is that which the temporal 
creature lacks because it is a temporal creature, not born of, but created by God.
264
 
 The porous self also affirms the impossibility of the theory of auto-affection 
as a pure, non-temporal transcendental sphere in absolute union with divine life, 
entirely invisible to, and isolated from, the appearing of the temporal streaming of 
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the world-horizon. While we work out this paradigm shift with the help of 
theological and philosophical resources drawn from St. Augustine’s reflections on 
the nature of time, our proposal figures the self in such a way that its contemplative 
desire for God assumes an interior shape but does not abide absolutely in an interior 
sphere heterogeneous to the exterior. We thereby repudiate Henry’s strict division 
between interior and exterior, between invisible and visible and the duplicity of 
display that sustains that rift. We suggest that neither interior nor exterior fields are 
accessible in isolation, as if there was a sphere of the “world” standing alone without 
already implying that the world points beyond itself, eschatologically. And likewise, 
there is no pure self-presence of the ego entirely within itself and without relation to 
the exterior field “out there,” as if the interiority of the ego were a pure site of divine 
life in sole possession of itself.  
The corollary to this chapter is chapter five in which we discuss the 
eschatological temporality of faith enjoyed by the porous self. For we need faith only 
now, prior to the moment we see God in the parousia. I need faith now to sustain 
belief in that which I cannot see until the parousia. Thus faith, according to St. 
Augustine, “will not always exist, because it will certainly no longer exist when this 
sojourn abroad comes to an end in which we are living away from the Lord so that 
we have to walk by faith, and when the sight by we shall see face to face takes its 
place.”
265
 Our proposal of a porous self will be put into action in chapters five and 
six whereby the life of faith is analyzable by phenomenological tools not in the hope 
that God should be proved or verified as a phenomenon but that God should be found 
as that which I seek after in my pilgrimage in the world from an eschatological point 
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of view. It is chapters five and six, then, that we commence with a phenomenological 
description of the life of pilgrimage, both in its temporal (chapter five) and bodily 
manifestations (chapter six). Before we proceed to the porosity of display, we must 



































Chapter 4:  
 




We are robustly there in our bodies, yet vulnerably there, because the body 
reveals and conceals, communicates and betrays, what we are in the 











 §18. CONCRETE EXISTENCE 
 In the previous chapter we outlined the theological architecture of Henry’s 
proposal of the duplicitous self. We showed that he contends that my ipseity as this 
particular “me” is eternally generated and is thereby manifest in and through God’s 
auto-generation as it appears prior to the visible display of the world. Split 
irrevocably between two fields of display, the self is figured in its essence on the 
basis of an interior union with God: as such, the interior self is not self-constituted, 
self-positing or temporally contingent (§11). We also learned that access to the sphere 
of generation is opened up by Henry’s application of the “radical” reduction (§12). 
Because the radical reduction constitutes a complete disqualification of the exterior 
world-horizon without return (and thus signals a departure from the Husserlian 
reduction which seeks to come back to the world after bracketing it), it gives way to a 
transcendental-theological turn inward (§13). We next highlighted that the doctrine of 
creation and the imago Dei in Genesis chapter 1 affirms the necessity of the visible 
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display of the world-horizon by positing a gap between the ego and God, which is 
reason enough for both the doctrines of creation and the imago Dei to come under the 
blow of Henry’s radical reduction. This underlines, once again, that his theory of 
generation induces a complete disqualification of the world (§14). We then showed 
how Henry’s theory of generation evokes the problem of individuation (§15) and how 
his proposal of the duplicitous self necessarily evokes the spectre of a non-temporal 
monism (§16). And finally, we charted a few suggestions about how to overcome 
Henry’s duplicitous self by sketching the “porous self” on eschatological pilgrimage 
(§17). 
 In the previous chapter we also highlighted that the ego’s acosmic, i.e., non-
temporal, origin is ordered by a pure form of appearing, that of invisible display. 
Conforming to itself, the interior self’s living essence is realized internal to itself and 
it thereby appears without relation to any “outside” or exterior world-horizon. 
Appearing in the way in which it gives itself, and in the accomplishment of its self-
manifestation, my being-generated within the First-Living (Christ) is immediate and 
therefore opposed to the luminosity of the world put into play by temporal exteriority 
and the gap between the genitive and dative poles of appearing. This invisible site of 
display in which I am born, in which I feel nothing foreign to myself, designates the 
venue of concrete affectivity in its radical passivity (where genitive and dative poles 
unite in a primal displaying inside God). For I am given to myself as this “me” thanks 
to the work of generation in which I arrive at myself in the same movement by which 
God arrives at Godself. 
 One is immediately struck by the seemingly disembodied character of 
Henry’s duplicitous self as we have described it thus far: how does generation 
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actually take effect or embody itself, if ever? Does Henry ever broach the question of 
embodiment, flesh and the element of concrete experience? Does not Henry entitle 
his own phenomenology a “material” phenomenology? And yet, it would seem that 
his theory of generation and the invisible monism to which it gives rise would defy, 
or at least, minimize concrete embodiment.  
 It is at this juncture that one may be tempted to level the charge of 
“worldlessness” against Henry’s notion of the duplicitous self as some have done—
as if the transcendental articulation of interiority is tantamount to a disembodied 
abstraction.
267
 Certainly Hegel’s well-known portrait of the “beautiful soul” comes to 
mind as ostensibly disclosive of Henry’s unyielding démarche toward invisible 
interiority. The “beautiful soul,” as Hegel describes it, hides itself from the world of 
visible display and delves inward, abstracting its self-consciousness from the 
concrete reality and dialectical tensions of world events, for “it flees from contact 
with the actual world...”
268
 Hegel emphatically condemns this type of self-
consciousness as vapid and worldless inasmuch as the purity of its self-enclosure 
folds in upon itself: “Its light dies away within it, and it vanished like a shapeless 
vapour that dissolves into thin air.”
269
 Unable to self-externalize itself into the 
ceaselessly moving horizon of the world, the soul becomes an “unhappy 
consciousness,” collapsing upon itself, falling prey to the illusion that it possess 
concrete self-presence. We only use Hegel’s metaphor of the “beautiful soul” as a 
device here to illustrate how Henry’s theory of the duplicitous self could be 
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misunderstood. This chapter contends
270
 that Henry’s duplicitous self is not complicit 
with an escapism of the sort that disassociates the ego from its concrete existence 
only to lose itself in the “vapour that dissolves into thin air.” Certainly Henry 
endeavours to escape the appearing of the world but he does not also desire to escape 
the element of the concrete. As we shall presently see, Henry thematizes the 
duplicitous self explicitly in view of its duplicitous body, a body split between flesh 
(la chair) and body (la corps). Henry intends flesh to fit a particular setting of 
concrete interiority, a subjective style of givenesss from which I receive myself by 
feeling myself immediately. My flesh is my ipseity, this “me” that I am and from 
which I take hold of myself as a zero-point of bodily orientation. Concretely 
experienced and intransitively given, my flesh grips me as I feel myself rise within 
me and reverberate under the impact of its self-experience independent of my body 
on visible display within the world-horizon.  
 But what kind of corporeality does this transcendental flesh specify? This 
subjective disclosure, while we shall explicate it in greater detail below, is manifest 
in what is known in phenomenology as the subjective or lived-body—which is 
situated in tension with its corollary, the objective body on visible display. The 
subjective body’s problems notwithstanding, Henry’s theory of the subjective body is 
therefore not a “beautiful soul” insofar as it reflects just the opposite: a self-suffering, 
self-enjoying flesh that concretely bears its own burden of being this unique “me.”  
 With this prelude, we enter into constructive dialogue with Henry’s 
distinction between flesh (la chair) and body (la corps) for the remainder of this 
chapter. We shall see Henry claims that while the source-point of the ego lies in the 
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invisible site of eternal generation, that source-point is not located beyond or outside 
me. The eternal arrival of God engenders my flesh. This distinctly religious sphere of 
experience is a lived-experience qualified by its dynamic interiority whereby the 
divine presence is felt or lived inside the intimate space of the subjective flesh, or the 
heart.
271
 Hence, the order of manifestation by which flesh displays itself is not 
cognitive/thinking/mind/consciousness. Nor is it a matter of physical 
embodiment/kinaesthetics. The flesh/heart, for Henry, appears as a feeling of pure 
self-affectivity grounded in the ego’s immediate disclosure of itself to itself. As a 
domain of lived carnality, flesh flashes forth in its living fulguration by way of  an 
interior deployment and is thus regulated according to its own movement and 
without interference from the exterior body on visible display. We name Henry’s 
proposal of concrete existence the “duplicitous body” in that the ego is split between 
an interior flesh and an exterior body. 
.  In what follows we shall also see just how flesh is intrinsically theological in 
composition. In a recent interview Henry describes his work on the Incarnation as 
tantamount to a phenomenological archaeology, a leading back to the transcendental 
venue where flesh appears in its essence (eidos). Once unearthed, flesh flashes forth 
as a pure incandescent matter (matière incandescente),
272
 appearing as an inner 
substance given as self-given. As a pathos manifest in an original self-impression 
immersed in its self-possession, flesh is holy in that its lustre is pristinely divine, 
without distance from its divine source and therefore within flesh appears “not 
merely traces of life but absolute life.”
273
 The phenomenological archaeology of 
flesh necessarily puts into play a theological articulation in which human flesh and 
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divine flesh co-appear. Christ, who is the “Word made flesh,” transcends the 
appearing of objects in the world and even the world-horizon itself, but this does not 
mean that Christ’s pathētik flesh is distinct from or of a different order of display 
than human flesh: “In the depths of its night, our flesh is God.”
274
 Henry’s 
Christology suggests that while it may not be obvious from the body’s exterior 
display in the world, the inner possibility of all bodily acts or appearings in the world 
is based upon an interior union with Christ’s flesh, so that “there is a single and 
selfsame life... and it has the same meaning for God, for Christ and for man.”
275
 
Henry’s phenomenology of flesh therefore maintains that all flesh is divine in that it 
enjoys immediate union with the living power of Christ incarnate. That is, the 
phenomenological study of the flesh, for Henry, is not merely phenomenological but 
also opens up access to the original theological unity between “my flesh” and the 
“Word made flesh.” We shall expand on such theological aspects of the duplicitous 
body in §§21-3 below.  
 We proceed presently to Henry’s debt both to Main de Biran’s notion of 
interior movement/effort and Edmund Husserl’s theory of kinaesthetic embodiment 
(§§19-20). Following upon these engagements, and by virtue of the theological turn 
we outlined in chapter three, we describe Henry’s phenomenological theology of the 
“Word made flesh” as it functions to incarnate the interior aspect of the duplicitous 
body (§21). Even though Henry’s proposal entails a duplicitous body, it is not a 
dualism, but a monism, that underpins his thinking. To substantiate further our claim 
that Henry’s theological conception of the duplicitous body is susceptible to a 
monism, we examine his peculiar interpretation of language in his final, if brief, 
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work, Paroles du Christ (2002). We pay heed here to how he analyzes the manner by 
which the divine “Word” self-communicates itself by imposing itself within the my 
living present, engendering a space within me in which the Word is heard as an 
incarnate presence entirely apart from my linguistic utterances heard in the visible 
world-horizon (§22). We then highlight, as we did in chapter three, how Henry 
advances a radicalized transcendental reduction; yet here we introduce the way in 
which it disqualifies the exterior body in order to open up access to the interior flesh 
(§23). Finally, we sketch a way to surmount the pitfalls of Henry’s duplicitous body. 
We name this alternative the “porous body” in which flesh and body are co-
constitutive and porous to each other so that both invisible and visible fields of 
display contribute to concrete existence before God (§24). The porous body will be 
worked out more fully in chapter six in light of the social, sacramental and 
resurrection bodies. 
 
 §20. I AM MY BODY: FEELING MY MOVEMENT 
 Henry wrote his first book on the purely philosophical nature of incarnation. 
Pursuing these lines of inquiry in the late 1940s and early 50s, he published it in a 
book-length study entitled Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body in 1965.
276
 In 
that work he adopts important facets of the work of Main de Biran (an early 
nineteenth-century French critic of empiricism) to show that the subjective nature of 
the body reflects the essence of concrete existence as a distinct field of experience up 
against the objective body-thing on display in the world. Already in 1965, Henry 
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notes, we see two bodies, la chair and la corps, which gives rise to the fact that the 
“’duplicity of appearing’ is at work insofar that the body as a phenomenon is given in 
two different ways.”
277
 There is, on the one hand, the interior, subjective body to 
which Henry lays claim absolutely, and, on the other, the objective, exterior body to 
which the empiricists lay claim absolutely.  
 The interior essence of the duplicitous body so understood by Henry is 
shaped by the immediacy of movement, effort and feeling within the interiority of 
the ego itself—what Henry calls after de Biran the sphere of “absolute immanence.” 
The Biranian breakthrough of the identification of the body with the ego’s inner 
effort was, in Henry’s estimation, the crucial conceptual key to recovering a thickly 
subjective and transcendental theory of the body.
278
 He also insists that the Biranian 
philosophy of the body, while often neglected, represents an unrivalled contribution 
to philosophical reflection on the topic. Contending that modern philosophy 
stretching from Descartes to Merleau-Ponty has failed to account for the subjective 
nature of the body, Henry is especially critical of Kant on this score.
279
 Kant himself, 
the transcendental thinker par excellence, whose work personifies for many the high 
point of modern subjectivity, failed to substantiate how the ego intrinsically 
comports itself with the body. To be sure, we read Kant here for a moment in light of 
Henry, not because Henry is a reliable guide to Kant but because his treatment of 
Kant sheds light on Henry’s duplicitous body. 
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 Turning for a brief moment to Kant, then, we recognize that Henry argues 
against Kant by claiming that the bodily sphere always already encroaches upon and 
modifies the life of ego. In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason the impact of the body 
upon the transcendental reality of the ego is minimized. The Kantian ego reflects a 
disembodied “form” or “receptacle” fitted to objectify sensible intuition. “The 
subjectivity of the subject,” writes Henry, “in the philosophy of the subject is the 
objectivity of the object. The proof is that Kant’s analysis of the structure of this 
subject is nothing other than the analysis of the structure of objectivity (space, time, 
causality, etc.).”
280
 The Kantian ego so described here is highly abstract and 
subjectively impoverished in that it simulates itself as nothing more than a 
formalized receptacle for sensible, empirical data. Kant himself expressed the 
structure of the transcendental aesthetic in such starkly disembodied language when 
he wrote, “but if one considers that this nature is nothing in itself but a sum of 
appearances, hence not a thing in itself but merely a multitude of representations of 
the mind, then one will not be astonished to see that unity on account of which alone 
it can be called the object of all possible experience, i.e., nature, solely in the radical 
faculty of all our cognition, namely transcendental apperception.”
281
 All objects of 
experience for Kant are representations in the mind, and the “sum of appearances,” 
are ordered to and synthesized by the mind’s apriori apperceptive ground as a 
subjective, cognitive faculty, which is analogous to a universal (transcendental) 
setting or law to which sense date must conform. The “standing and lasting I of pure 
apperception,”
282
 writes Kant, is a “pure, original, unchanging consciousness.”
283
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This unchanging Kantian “I” provides an absolute ground, a set of pure concepts 
which operate in accord with universal laws and determine apperception without due 
recognition of the body. With the exception of Main de Biran’s work, Henry 
postulates that there remains in the history of philosophy no clearly articulated 
discourse on the ego, Kant or otherwise, that answers head-on its relation to the 
body.   
 What, then, is the “body” for Henry and how does it render intelligible the 
subjectivity of the subject in its concrete disclosure? The structure of the body, in 
Henry’s view, is tied radically to the ego. I do not possess a body nor is my body the 
vehicle through which my ego is mediated to the world, as if my “I” were an 
abstraction, a disembodied set of apperceptive concepts. Rather, for Henry, “I am my 
body.”
284
 This conception of the body highlights the ego’s internal and immediate 
feeling of its own movement. Clearly indebted to de Biran’s theory of the body, 
Henry writes “my body is not a mountain which I see...I never see my body from the 
outside because I am never outside my body...”
285
 To be an ego is to be a body. And 
to be a body is to be an ego who feels, suffers, enjoys, needs, desires and moves in 
immediate relation with itself.   
 According to Henry, the way the body appears to me is by way of my own 
perspective. If a body appears in the third-person perspective it may appear as a 
cadaver or a destitute “it,”  “thing” or “object”—no different than a stone or any 
other empirical object in the world of visible display, no different than a mountain I 
see. However, from the first-person perspective, my body is manifest as immediate 
inasmuch as my body is my ego and my ego is my body. My body, in Henry’s 
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estimation, is “mine” in that it is constitutive of my primordial sphere of “ownness,” 
a zero-point of bodily orientation. That Henry invokes a Biranian style of non-
empiricism could hardly be more clear at this juncture. Just as de Biran opposed 
empiricism, Henry rejects the thesis that ascribes to the body an instrumental 
function and an empirical status as a “thing.” Empiricist may argue that the body 
appears as a thing whose parts are circumscribed by the displacement of its members, 
say my hand as it passes over a book; this hand-movement exhibits an exterior 
movement, an empiricist may suggest, that permits me to delimit my physical 
contours and establish my localized sensations as a finite object. For Henry, this 
position, codified in thinkers such as Locke, Hume and Condillac, designates the 
barbarous turn toward a “medicalized” scientific body nourished by a reductive 
materialism that tends to relegate the body to a mosaic of sense impressions mediated 
by nerves and muscular stimuli. The body so premised is reduced to a cadaver or 
“thing” in the world, lifeless and without subjectivity. The pure living ego Henry 
opposes to biological, empirical, scientific and natural elaborations of the body, all of 
which are complicit in the field of visible display (§5 above) at the expense of the 
invisible. 
 For Henry, and in contrast to the empiricist school, “my” body arises from the 
generative power within my ego as it is given to me by the very invisible carnality of 
an interior flesh. Installed inside my ego, flesh bears within it the pressure of self-
affection. I feel myself riveted to myself and drawn within myself by way of an 
interior undertow stronger and more original than the wave that seems to result, but 
which, in fact, forces itself on me, sucking me in by it and within itself—within the 
186 
 
sphere of absolute auto-affection.
286
 Henry’s duplicitous body therefore does not 
deny the objective, empirical body; rather it repositions the subjective nature of the 
body, i.e., “I am my body,” entirely within its own sphere, internal to itself. 
 Henry therefore follows de Biran in the quest for the “subjective body.”
287
 
This subjective body by which I feel myself in my own effort brings to light the 
sphere of absolute immanence. This is, more particularly, a sphere of pure life that 
ascribes to the ego-body a mode of givenness distinct from the sphere of the 
objective, physical body of motor sensation. The subjective aspect of the duplicitous 
body, consequently, possess a style of verification all its own, one that supplies its 
own sphere of manifestation, a self-having or self-manifesting grounded in its 
relation to itself. It is a sphere so interior to itself, for Henry, that it is even distinct 
from the intimate pre-reflective feeling of my own local movement commonly 
identified as kinaesthetic locomotion. Henry is careful to acknowledge the 
importance of kinaesthetics as a field of study that illuminates the nature of the 
objective, empirical body, especially with regard to the sense of touch/tactility. Yet 
the study of kinaesthetics can only highlight the shape and nature of the empirical 
body (i.e., the exterior domain of the duplicitous body). The subjective body, because 
it is entirely interior to itself and thus subsisting within itself in the sphere of absolute 
immanence, owes nothing to the visible display of the world or physical sensation. 
The subjective body, Henry insists, is the “original” or “real” body, the pure and 
primordial feeling of myself in the primitive field of invisible display sealed off from 
the display of the world, including kinaesthetic locomotion.   
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 But this original body ostensibly constitutes the ontological basement upon 
which the empirical, constituted body is enabled to move in the world. Auto-
affection is the condition for the possibility of hetero-affection. Henry describes this 
transcendental structure of the duplicitous body: “The movement of the hand is 
known without being apprehended in the world, it presents itself to us immediately in 
the internal transcendental experience which is one with the very being of this 
movement. Because it is not constituted, because it is a transcendental experience, the 
movement of the hand has nothing to do with a displacement in objective space... the 
original and real movement is a subjective movement.”
288
 Even though I sense 
objects in the world and I move throughout space and time, my “sensations are only 
abstractions because in fact they are always constituted by a power to which 
subjective movement is immanent.”
289
 In light of this transcendental relation, we 
pose the following question: how does the subjective body serve as the 
transcendental or living condition for the objective body? If the subjective body 
belongs to a sphere of pure immanence (i.e., interiority) absolutely heterogeneous to 
the objective body of the world (i.e. exteriority), how do the two “bodies” meet, if 
ever (we address this problematic in the next section)?  Here, we acknowledge how 
close Henry is to the spectre of Cartesian dualism, or worse, Gnostic dualism, which 
endows the subjective body with reality and the objective body with “irreality” 
(reminiscent of the monism we attributed to Henry in chapter 3). The obvious 
difficulty Henry finds himself in here has to do with the problem of relating the 
subjective and objective bodies. We shall appeal below to this tension as a central 
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problem, perhaps as an aspect of his phenomenology not fully refined, and thus 
highlight how the subjective and objective bodies call for integration.  
 For our purpose here, it is important to clarify that the subjective body as 
Henry conceives it represents the site of pure, concrete interiority, a self-referencing 
in which the ego is the centre of reference for all movement, feeling, communicating 
and perceiving. Because of this, the subjective body is manifest neither as a stagnant 
or impassable body nor as a body that remains in one place, like a rock at the bottom 
of a river. Though non-temporal, the ego’s self-referencing as it moves within the 
subjective body is dynamically immersed within its own pathos of auto-affection as 
it feels itself crushing up against itself, increasing in its ongoing effort to feel and 
move. “I am my body” as I increase, grow and expand in and through the nocturnal 
depths of my lived-body itself, subjectively experienced in the living present. And 
while Henry has yet to deploy the terminology of “flesh” we shall see that he learns 
to discuss the body in terms of the flesh vs. body distinction after giving greater 
attention both to Husserl’s hyletic phenomenology and the Christian doctrine of the 




 §20. RADICALIZING HUSSERL’S LEIB 
 Henry’s use of the word “flesh” is derived, in part, from his direct encounter 
with Husserl in the 1980 and 90s.
290
 Even though we have already touched on his 
confrontation with Husserl in previous chapters, we introduce here Henry’s departure 
from Husserl with particular reference to the study of the flesh/body, or what Husserl 
nominates as the Leibkörper.
291
 And, even though it remains to be iterated in a 
theological style of phenomenology, Henry shall employ a Husserlian variation of 
flesh that will persist until the end of his career. Beginning with Material 
Phenomenology (1990) and proceeding up through his theological turn, Henry 
follows Husserl because Henry maintains that flesh designates the interior site of 
intimate contact with oneself, i.e., a phenomenological field of display internal to the 
ego. In years subsequent to Material Phenomenology, Henry shall turn to theology to 
analyze how human flesh is joined to the “Word made flesh.” Understood in a 
theological idiom, the ego’s flesh originates within the revelation of God in Christ’s 
taking flesh. But before we interrogate Henry’s theological approach, we elucidate in 
this section his rearticulation of the Husserlian flesh-body or lived-body, or in 
German, Leibkörper.   
 Husserl’s systematic exposition of the complex correlation between Leib and 
Körper appears in his lesser-known work, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution (or 
Ideas II). It is here that Husserl accentuates the role of the body in the ego’s 
                                                 
290
 The whole of Henry’s book, Material Phenomenology (1990) is devoted to a close but critical 
reading of Husserl’s “hyletic” phenomenology. 
291
 As far as I can glean, the use of the term “flesh” first begin with Henry’s confrontation with 
Nietzsche in his 1983 work, Genealogy of Psychoanalysis. Henry deploys the term with greater 
regularity after his critical reading of Husserl in Material Phenomenology and his appropriation of 
the gospel of John in the late 1990s. 
190 
 
constitution of the world-horizon. Curiously, while not as widely read as many of 
Husserl’s other works, Ideas II has exercised enormous influence within the 
phenomenological tradition and was cited as key resource for Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s now classic Phenomenology of Perception (1945). As one commentator has 
put it, “there is almost an inverse proportion between the influence that Husserl’s 
Ideas II exercised on important philosophical developments in this century and the 
attention it has received in secondary literature.”
292
 Ideas II has certainly been 
instrumental in Henry’s own study of the body, and we now turn to sketch its major 
features. 
 A basic question emerges early on in Ideas II that informs the book’s 
explication of the body throughout: namely, how does the ego constitute material 
objects, for example, that arm-chair in front of me, as it is given to my subjective 
sphere of consciousness? Husserl limits the appearance of objective things within the 
ego’s streaming lived experience or flesh, or Leib. For Husserl, “flesh is the medium 
of all perception; it is the organ of perception and is necessarily involved in all 
perception” [zunächst ist der Leib das Mittel aller Wahrnehmung, er ist das 
Wahrnehmungsorgan, er ist bei aller Wahrnehmung notwendig dabei].
293
 This means 
that the Leib, as the subjective body, shapes the immediate context by which the ego 
perceives all objects so that the arm-chair “out there” can become meaningful for the 
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“ego-pole” in its absolute here.
294
 Husserl’s Leib imposes itself upon the ego as an 
absolute venue of perception, united together, the ego-Leib is therefore where things 
out there are “incarnated” within my subjective sphere, as I live through them. 
Husserl calls the Leib the “zero point” of orientation (Nullpunkt), the zone from of 
which the ego proximately grasps and thus objectifies things “out there.”
295
   
 Modified within the intention-intuition unity, all objects appear as subjective-
relative in Husserl’s theory of incarnation. Objects and even other subjective egos are 
“there” relative to my “absolute here.” Husserl devotes considerable space in Ideas II 
to highlighting how the Leib is related via the exterior body (Körper) to that which is 
“over there.”
296
 I can never be anything other than “here,” that is, my absolute and 
abiding place as this ego-body which is localized in this particular region of objective 
time and space by virtue of the spatial components of the Körper. If the horizon of 
empirical objects and other egos is relative to my “absolute here,” then how am I to 
experience the non-ego “over there”? Put differently: how does Husserl unify into a 
single experience my enduring sense of “flesh” (Leib) as this ego-pole lived through 
its exterior “body” (Körper) as it comes into contact with objects “over there”?  
 It is clear that Husserl disallows any unified experience or pure self-presence 
whatsoever to occur within the Leib. Because it is structurally discontinuous with 
itself, the Leib relates to its exterior body. Affected by the “outside,” and thus, 
affected by its Körper, the Leib is structurally open to, and thereby integrated with, 
its exterior body in its ongoing contact with objects “over there.” We may say that 
Husserl structures the body according to two distinct, though integrated, fields of 
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display, (1) a subjective body and an (2) objective body, or Leib and Körper. There 
is, to be sure, one body in Husserl, a Leibkörper, and yet one body with two distinct 
modes of givenness. The Leib is how the body is self-given, how I am non-
reflectively self-aware that this body that is moving is my body and not just another 
spatial thing or object, whereas the Körper is the objective or “thingly” body on 
visible display in the world.  
 The difficult task of elucidating the sometimes obscure phenomenological 
investigations of Leibkörper in Husserl’s texts is only exacerbated by the contentious 
state of post-Husserl scholarship on the topic. Perhaps the best exegetical work to 
which one can turn for interpretive help on this particular issue is Didier Franck’s 
widely-read monograph, Chair et corps: sur la phénoménologie de Husserl 
(1981).
297
 Franck’s valuable book conveys the essential contours and problems in 
Husserl’s phenomenology of Leibkörper, looking to not only the standard Husserlian 
texts but to many sources in the Husserl archives as well. His close study of the 
Husserlian Leibkörper yields two overall points worth mentioning here.  
 First, the Leib interlaces with its Körper in order to open up the Leib to the 
world-horizon, making Leib the primary place of incarnation. For Franck, flesh 
signifies that original site that receives (dative) that which is given (genitive). Flesh 
is the “medium of the intentional regard” and the original sphere of all experience.
298
 
Interpreting Husserlian phenomenology as essentially a “hyletic” (i.e., matter) 
phenomenology concerned with how matter is constituted by the “morphe” (i.e., 
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form) of the intentional regard, Franck raises the important issue of the structural 
accomplishment of incarnation itself: how is the “hyle” rendered incarnate within 
consciousness by the cognitive power of the “morphe”? Franck maintains Husserl’s 
theory of incarnation, structurally speaking, represents an ongoing and complexly 
synthetic act of “crossing” or “interlacing” (what Franck denotes with the French 
terms transverse or entrelacs). Understood in this manner, flesh and body cross 
against one another giving rise to an experiential tapestry, a single Leibkörper, but a 
Leibkörper that also maintains the distinct properties of Leib and Körper.
299
 Husserl 
thematizes this act of crossing when he writes that concrete experience “depends on 
the Body [Leib] and on what is proper to the psyche, what it is that, as world, stands 
over and against the subject.”
300
 So while the flesh is distinct from the body, the flesh 
nevertheless comes into contact with objects “over there” by way of crossing with 
the body in the body’s ongoing immersion in the world.  Husserl shall frequently 
describe the crossing as the ego-Leib’s position “over and against” (gegenüber) the 
world: “It is now evident and beyond discussion that what is most proper to the Ego 
is something experienced in or at the Body [das eigentlich Ichliche im oder am Leibe 
Erfahrenes sei...] in the manner of a constituted stratum within a constituted 
Objectivity. Each such Objectivity and stratum indeed belongs on the side of the not-
Ego, the over-and-against, which has sense only as the over-and-against of an 
Ego.”
301
 So the Leib as the subjective body is unified with the Körper, as a single 
Leibkörper, and yet the Leib is distinct from the Körper in that the Leib crosses with 
the Körper in the latter’s contact with the exterior objects and other subjects in the 
world. 
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 Even as the “world stands over and against the subject,” Husserl’s Leibkörper 
illustrates the basic principle of constitution: “transcendence in immanence.” As the 
ego-pole stands over against the Körper in the world, the ego-pole constitutes the 
world in that very act within its sphere of immanence. This is a universal law, argues 
Franck, that demonstrates that the flesh/body distinction is founded ultimately upon 




 We have observed that the interior subjective layer of “flesh” incorporates the 
“body,” in Franck’s estimation, by way of continual crossing or interlacing with the 
body in its immersion in the objective, spatio-temporal world—giving rise to a single 
Leibkörper. Flesh and body, for Husserl, are therefore never separate or autonomous 
species, absolutely heterogeneous to each other (as they are in Henry, see §21 
below). Despite the fact that tensive nature of the interlacing may give way to 
friction, flesh and body in Husserl are in absolute solidarity, in a symbiotic tension 
whereby each induces the other giving rise to a psychosomatic unity, a kinaesthetic 
Leibkӧrper. Franck puts this unity succinctly: “The first thing to clarify is that the 
sphere of ownness, centred on my flesh, crossed by the flesh/body difference, is not 
homogeneous. We have shown that no synthesis given to a body is possible without 
the correlative system of dispositions of my flesh (tactile movements, eye 
movements, etc.)....”
303
 In other words, the Leib is always emplaced in a Körper and 
a Körper is always distinguished from but nonetheless subjectively moved by the 
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power of an interior Leib, and together they constitute a crossed phenomenon, a 
Leibkörper
304
.   
 We are now in position to bring to light the second important characteristic of 
Husserl’s Leibkörper that Franck highlights: the temporal constitution of the 
Leibkörper. Franck insists that it is by virtue of the flesh’s temporality that the 
Leibkörper can have an experience of anything at all.
305
 Franck contends that 
Husserlian Leib unifies the temporal flux in which both Leib and Körper exist as 
single Leibkörper. But this unifying power presupposes a structural openness, a gap 
which opens the flesh to the temporal streaming of objects arriving from “out 
there.”
306
 Franck insists that while Husserl rejects empirical sensualism characteristic 
of objective scientific discourse, Franck does not think, however, that Husserl rejects 
sensualism in general. Qualified thusly, Husserlian Leib assumes a unique kind of 
sensualism, an interior temporal form reinforced up against itself as it is affected by 
that which stands against it through the Körper. Though the flesh is not empirical, it 
is nevertheless temporal and subject to the visible display of the world mediated by 
the Körper. As Franck notes, flesh “is always being given in the temporal flux, for 
without it the hyle could never be ‘incarnated.’”
307
 This is why Franck states directly 
that, “my flesh crosses continually and integrally with time... flesh constitutes 
time....”
308
 But, the way in which the flesh temporalizes time is through its bodily 
relation with otherness, especially the other ego (what Husserl names the alter-ego). 
In this respect, Franck writes of Husserlian Leib: “my flesh—the milieu of all 
                                                 
304
 In fact, Franck shall insist that it is the flesh that is responsible for unifying the movements and 
impressions received by way of the empirical body. See Franck, Chair et corps, 45. 
305
 Franck, Chair et corps, 154, 177, 188, 193 
306
 This is also the basic thesis lucidly articulated in Dan Zahavi’s excellent book, Self-Awareness and 
Alterity, especially chapters 6-7. 
307
 Franck, Chair et corps, 190. 
308
 Franck, Chair et corps, 190. 
196 
 
givenness, is not thinkable in isolation, outside of its interlacing with the other, its 
relating to other fleshes.”
309
 My Leib, as this absolute here or zero-point, is unified 
with my Körper, because Leib at its core is fractured by temporal difference and thus 
affected by other bodies “over there.” Never self-present and self-enclosed, the 
Husserlian Leibkörper experiences itself together with that which is different than 
itself in one fell swoop, for as Franck writes that for the Leibkörper, “auto-affection 
is immediately a hetero-affection.”
310
 Franck shall argue that the Husserlian 
Leibkörper is not purely self-impressional (i.e., auto-affection) but is always already 
fractured by that which is other thanks to the work of temporality. 
 The Husserlian body is therefore open to otherness because it is pervaded by 
the presence of the other through the bodily medium of temporal difference. And it is 
by way of this crossing or “interlacing” that time emerges in the first place. Franck’s 
thesis is that “the interlacing here is a form of association and, more specifically, a 
form of association between the present and the non-present, without which the other 
would not be able to appear in my [temporal] flux of lived-experiences.”
311
 The very 
origin of temporality and the streaming of exterior objects is manifest in and through 
the Leib’s exposure to the world-horizon mediated by the Körper. Husserlian Leib, 
vulnerable to the flow of sensations accommodated by the Körper, is ineluctably 
drawn toward alterity, or the non-ego. The Leibkӧrper as “absolute here” is a 
subjective point of orientation fractured by temporality and thus open to other egos 
and objects in the exterior world “over there.”   
 Henry’s radicalization of Husserlian Leib proceeds to eliminate the 
phenomenological utility of the Körper. Henry’s particular adaption of Leib is born 
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of the conviction that auto-affection clarifies the transcendental essence and therefore 
the living vitality of Leib. To proceed to the “essence” or “pure form” of flesh, Henry 
departs from Husserlian Leib by directing it further into the depths of interiority, 
toward the living present, a sphere stabilized by its self-presence, where there is no 
fracture opened by temporality and hetero-affection. By penetrating into the 
nocturnal depths of pure interiority, Henry resituates the Leib’s essence upon a lived 
substructure situated beneath consciousness and thus beneath the genitive and dative 
poles made possible by the Husserlian Leibkörper’s structural interlacing with 
objects and other egos in the world. 
 For Henry, the interiority of Leib necessarily evokes that which is prior to 
temporality, namely the pure living present without reference to the temporal 
streaming of the world (future to past). Further, such a living present proceeds 
straightaway to a theological articulation. Henry’s critical departure of Husserl’s 
language of Leib is thus informed by a phenomenology of invisible display that 
establishes absolute auto-affection as the ego’s primal self-experience of itself. And 
so while critics of Husserl usually seek to rectify what they perceive to be an overly 
interior egology, Henry presses Husserlian interiority further into the inner 
“underground” of the living present from which Leib is born in and through God. 
 For Henry, this substance or matter is a self-impression, a literal feeling of 
my own impression of myself. The self-impressional flesh actualizes the materiality 
of myself as I feel myself in absolute immediacy, the “impressional now” whose 
impact lands before the streaming retentional and protentional acts take over. 
Because Husserl reduces flesh to a temporal interlacing with otherness, Henry thinks 
that Husserl necessarily aborts Leib it to a sphere outside itself, casting Leib into the 
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multiplicities of world-engagements and thus breaking Leib apart into endless 
fragmentation and flux. To adopt Husserl’s Leib, as it is conceived within the 
temporal flow retention and protention, would inescapably lead, in Henry’s 
estimation, to the exterior movement of self-alienation. Henry’s theory of the self-
impression corrects this alienation by turning Leib back upon itself. 
 But do Leib and Körper relate at all in Henry’s schematic? Henry 
acknowledges that both flesh and body exist and constitute the dual manner by which 
concrete existence appears; and while he insists that the pure ego-flesh (radicalized 
Leib) is the pure essence of my life in its concrete living present, Henry cannot deny 
the importance of the objective body (Körper) as the exterior reality that draws me 
outside myself into the world. How, then, do they relate in Henry’s scheme? 
 Flesh appears as the very self-suffering of being alive, a self-impression not 
subject to the change, movement and temporal streaming of the exterior Körper. But 
the exterior Körper, Henry indicates clearly, is the site by which I see the other body, 
the other perceiving subject who is in possession of interior flesh. Thus, “consider 
the objective body of the other. If it differs from other inert bodies in the material 
universe, it is because we perceive it as inhabited by a flesh.... The body of the other, 
despite its objectivity, offers itself to me as a living body.”
312
 Like Husserl, Henry 
claims that the flesh and body form a kind of unity with two manners of givenness, a 
Leibkörper.
313
 And Henry acknowledges that we observe this Leibkörper 
phenomenologically by looking to the exterior body, to the eyes by which we see, 
hears by which hear, bodily members by which we are mobile and move about 
freely. Henry does not deny such a body’s practical possibilities are realized and thus 
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seen in the world. But, in diverging from Husserl, Henry states “the reality of such a 
body is returned to our living flesh whereby all of its real operations—of seeing, of 
moving, etc.—belong to the sphere of absolute immanence of transcendental life; as 
such, this flesh is invisible.”
314
 To phrase it another way, the body appears, for 
Henry, as both a unity and a duplicity. How?  
 The principle of the duplicity of display informs how the body is a 
duplicitous body, how it est à double face. This is to say that it appears in Henry’s 
schematic as an exterior body with empirical properties and an ensemble of sense 
impressions which are visibly localized within its bodily continuum (Körper). It also 
appears as an interior self-impression impermeable to the impressions that arrive 
from the “outside,” a flesh (Leib).
315
 The two fields of display, as it should be 
obvious by now, are situated in an absolute tension. The former is visible, the latter 
invisible, the former constituted, the latter unconstituted, the former irreal and the 
latter real. Yet if Henry claims that the former (exterior body) carries within it the 
latter (interior flesh), then how do these irreconcilable spheres meet? How can the 
invisible animate the visible without bypassing the absolute barrier that separates 
them?  
 Henry explains the mysterious relation, not by way of interlacing, but by way 
of “paradox.” The paradoxical synthesis of flesh and body is tantamount to the 
synthesis of soul and body through the spirit, a spirit which Henry also calls our 
original, primal transcendental life: “the synthesis between the “spirit” 
(transcendental life) and our objective body is paradoxical.”
316
 Yet it is only the flesh 
(spiritual reality of transcendental life) that is real, living and the ground for my 
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bodily movements in the world. Thus, Henry shall say, “the eye never sees. Only our 
flesh, or our “soul” as Descartes says, sees.”
317
 Why does only the flesh/soul/spirit 
see? Why does the interior life see and not the objective body on visible display see? 
It is because “a real and living flesh which is only revealed in the auto-
impressionality of life, and thus never in the outside of the world.”
318
 Even though 
the flesh and body come together to form a single Leibkörper, Henry relegates the 
body to an irreal or non-living venue. The body cannot see because Henry refuses the 
body participation in the interior life. Henry describes this paradox with 
representational imagery as well: the body is nothing other than a “double” or 
“exterior representation” of my invisible flesh.
319
  
 Henry’s eccentric proposal of a single Leibkörper translates fluidly into a 
theological grammar. The advantage of Henry’s theological rearticulation of 
Husserlian Leib is that it renders intelligible how immediate contact with the divine 
is possible as an internal movement of God’s self-disclosure in Christ, who is a flesh, 
the “Word made flesh.” 
 
  §21.  THEOLOGICAL FLESH WITHOUT BODY? 
 In a 2001 colloquium at the l’Institute catholique de Paris, an event organized 
as un hommage à Henry’s last works on Christianity, Emmanuel Falque delivered a 
paper on Henry’s theory of incarnation with a laconic but pithy title, “Y a-t-il une 
chair sans corps?”
320
 Even though we shall engage briefly with Falque’s 
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interrogation of Henry below, it is important to note here the utility of Falque’s title 
as a powerfully concise question, that once posed, brings into focus a central problem 
internal to Henry’s thinking. Such a question is perfectly appropriate with regard to 
Henry’s privileging of the subjective body over against the objective body. Is there a 
Leib without a Körper? Can Henry truly account for the dignity and importance of 
the exterior body (Körper) on visible display in the world-horizon without at the 
same time contradicting his claim that the flesh of absolute interiority (Leib) is the 
univocal site of reality? Consistent with our argument in chapter three, we find that 
Henry’s proposal of incarnation reduces human flesh to a non-temporal monism or 
what Falque describes as a “carnal monism.” Here, the interior flesh bears within it 
the parousia of (divine) life whereas the exterior, visible body remains without life 
and remains irreal.  
 Given the deeply theological, even mystical character (see §33 for more on 
the mystical body of Christ in Henry) of Henry’s interpretation of flesh, an obvious 
question ensues: what exactly does Henry mean by the term “flesh” (Leib) from a 
theological point of view? More specifically, how is Christ’s flesh the transcendental 
condition for human flesh?
321
 These questions strike at the heart of Henry’s 
theological project that feeds into his radical separation between invisible and visible 
display, between flesh and body. In elucidating the theological setting of Leib, Henry 
isolates what he perceives to be an inescapable fact: that phenomenology and 
theology share a common vocabulary about l’être-chair or l’existence dans la chair. 
Phenomenology studies appearing itself, or “in its substantive form: donation, 
monstration, phenomenalization, unveiling, disclosure, apparition, manifestation, 
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revelation. It cannot go unnoticed that these key words of the discipline of 
phenomenology are, in large measure, those of religion—or theology.”
322
 It is thus 
no surprise that Henry’s “theological turn” focuses on the Christian explication of 
God’s self-revelation (manifestation, disclosure, etc.) in Christ. What then naturally 
follows is that Henry determines, and in fact, delimits the phenomenological study of 
the Incarnation as it relates to human flesh by asking: how does the “Word made 
flesh” appear to us in flesh? If the Incarnate manifestation of Christ is God’s self-
manifestation par excellence, then it is crucial that one clarify the style of givenness 
by which the “Word made flesh” appears as flesh.  
 Christ assumes flesh, for Henry, and appears as an appearing of divine flesh 
to human flesh, yet these genitives (appearings of) and the dative poles (that to which 
the appearings appear) are not to be taken as structurally dissimilar but as one and the 
same. The genitive and dative poles of appearing, as we made clear in chapter one, 
presuppose a gap or distance between the appearing and the dative to which the 
appearing is rendered manifest. As will become instructive for us momentarily, 
Christ’s incarnation (taking flesh) and our incarnation (taking flesh) are one and the 
same revelation of flesh in Henry’s scheme. The genitive and dative come together in 
an original unity whereby the appearing of Christ to human existence is a singular 
manifestation without gap or difference. 
   To elucidate the l’être-chair Henry invokes the principle of the “duplicity of 
display/appearing” as the point of departure. This principle highlights the 
phenomenological duality Henry imposes on all appearing, a principle discussed at 
length already in chapter one (§8). Given its programmatic status, the principle of the 
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duplicity of appearing orders the manifestation of all phenomena in such a way that 
they conform to one of two spheres of display: either an invisible appearance of pure 
auto-affection (i.e. no fracture between genitive and dative) or a visible display of 
hetero-affection (i.e., gap between genitive and dative). This duplicity of 
displaying/appearing adjudicates the basic contrast between the pure ego and the 
world, or between living present and the temporal horizon, or between subjective 
flesh and objective body. Henry addresses the question of the appearing of “Word 
made flesh” according to the strict duplicity between flesh and body or chair and 
corps, or Leib and Körper.   
 It is not insignificant to note that in order to bring to light the nature of flesh 
(Leib) Henry commences with the prologue to the gospel of John, a powerfully 
poetic text which ascribes to Christ an incarnation of “taking-flesh,” not of “taking-
body.” For the gospel of John, “does not say that the Word had taken a body....”, 
rather, “it says that the Word was made flesh and thus it is a question of flesh and not 
body.”
323
 Henry continues, “for it is not a question thus of ‘form,’ of ‘aspect,’ or of 
‘guise,’ but of reality. In itself, in its essence and reality it is the Word, and as the 
Word, it is that of the Word made flesh.”
324
 Turning our attention away from the 
objective, historical body of Jesus of Nazareth manifest within the world-horizon, 
Henry maintains that the Incarnation is acosmic, that is, invisible and without world. 
As such, Henry insists that the visible body (Körper) of Jesus of Nazareth does not 
tell us anything about the essence of the “Word made flesh.” If the historical body on 
visible display were the site of the real Incarnation, Henry asks, why did so many not 
recognize him as a divine manifestation? Did not many in first-century Palestine 
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mistake his identity, claiming he was nothing more than an ordinary human being, a 
bandit, a prophet, a revolutionary? Henry states it this way: “If the Word of God 
comes to dwell with humanity under the guise of the objective body, the Word’s 
journey would take place in such a way that Christ would remain entirely incognito 
(and insurmountably so).”
325
 In other words, what is essential about the “Word made 
flesh” is not the body on visible display in the temporality of the world (founded on 
the distance between genitive and dative of appearing) but rather his flesh, or his 
concrete self-display which assumes a manner of givenness with a unique style of 
verification all its own and thus one that cannot be mistaken—one in which what 
appears and the appearance are co-original and thus identical, a self-impressional 
appearing (Leib). Understood, then, on the basis of the duplicity of display, Henry 
disrobes Christ’s body, peeling it back so as to discover its pure interior essence. 
Christ’s Incarnate reality appears in the field of invisible display cut off from visible 
display, physical embodiment and temporality. 
 Henry does not deny that Christ, as a historical personage, assumed a 
physical, objective body disclosed within time and space. But, the luminous display 
of the world under which the visible body appears is simply disqualified by Henry. 
That is, the body as fractured by the genitive and dative of appearing in the flow of 
time does not count as a form of divine revelation. It cannot. The “Word made flesh” 
generates its flesh through feeling itself in radical immediacy (i.e., auto-affection), as 
it crushes against itself within its own interior reciprocity among Father, Son and 
Spirit. Christ’s flesh, as pure Leib, thus dwells within its own space, sealed within the 
Trinity given that the “relation of life to living occurs inside God himself.”
326
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Christ’s incarnate reality appears in the field of invisible display cut off from visible 
display, physical embodiment and temporality—certainly a theological radicalization 
of the Husserlian Leibkörper, an integrated unity which Henry bifurcates into two 
irreconcilable fields incapable of harmony (and thus giving rise to a duplicitous 
body). 
 Might such a phenomenology of flesh cast the dark cloud of heresy over 
Henry, invoking the spectres of Docetism or Apollinarianism whose teachings 
ascribe to Christ’s earthly body the status of illusion while privileging the interior 
spiritual core? It seems difficult to deny that Henry’s duplicitous body gravitates 
toward the grievous imbalance of these early church Christological heresies.
327
 
Henry’s preoccupation with the essence (eidos) of Christ’s flesh at the expense of its 
appearing as appearings of a body to other bodies in the visible display of the world 
is symptomatic of the kind of absolute dualism/duplicity upon which these heresies 
trade. Adopting a monism of the kind we outlined in chapter three (§16), Henry 
advances a non-temporal monism that reduces reality to the acosmic flesh of Christ. 
 Despite that on Henry’s view it is incapable of conforming to the alien 
structures of the world, the Incarnation does not exclude human flesh. We recall that 
even though Henry’s theory of flesh signifies the lived domain of immediate self-
awareness, my concrete feeling of my own effort, movement and suffering/joy of 
being this me that I am, it is nevertheless the same venue in which Christ’s flesh 
appears. Henry writes:  
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I am not myself, and cannot be, except by way of Life’s original 
ipseity. The pathetic flesh of this ipseity, in which Life is joined to 
itself, is what joins me to myself such that I may be, and can be, this 
me that I am. Therefore, I cannot join me to myself except through 
Christ, since he has joined eternal Life to itself, creating in it the 
first Self. The relation to self that makes any me a me is what makes 
that me possible; in philosophical language, it is its transcendental 






To phrase it differently, in the pure embrace of my auto-affection I am given to 
myself by Christ’s incarnate auto-affection. Christ’s flesh replicates itself in my 
flesh, generating and carrying along my own self-suffering of feeling myself as I 
crush against myself; Christ’s Incarnation, in short, makes possible my own taking 
flesh.   
 But does this not pose an obvious theological problem? Given that the very 
structure of auto-affection is that it is a feeling of nothing but my own feeling in 
radical immediacy without reference to anything foreign, how can Christ be the inner 
possibility of this feeling? How is it that when I feel myself, and nothing but my own 
flesh, that I am also in contact with Christ’s flesh? Is not inserting Christ’s flesh 
within my own self-affective flesh a violation of the nature of self-affection as a self-
enclosed event of feeling in which I feel nothing but my own singularity? Does not 
feeling Christ’s flesh within my own flesh introduce an element of hetero-affection 
within the impenetrable sphere of auto-affection?  How does Henry address this 
profound problem from a theological point of view?  
 The unity between Christ and each human self forms an interior unity 
wherein the living present is carried along by Christ’s generative donation of life. 
Henry writes, “no living is living, that is, self-affecting, other than in the process of 
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the self-affection of absolute Life.”
329
 God’s essence manifested in the first-living 
self of Christ and my own essence of being this “self” are not foreign to each other. 
There is only one life and thus one absolute auto-affection that actuates all living. 
Henry’s conception of divine life necessarily leads to the conclusion that my own 
self-affection is a relative moment of divine life’s own absolute self-affection. So, 
when I feel myself in radical immediacy I am at the same time, whether I 
acknowledge it or not, feeling Christ’s own flesh—Henry claims, “my flesh, my 
living flesh, is Christ’s.”
330
 May we also conclude that Henry’s theological 
reflections on Leibkörper gives way to an irreparable rift between Leib and Körper? 
 Perhaps the most involved appraisal of Henry’s study of the flesh-body 
distinction is Emannuel Falque’s lengthy essay mentioned in the opening of this 
section. Falque advances, in the main, what we perceive here to be an appropriate 
critique of Henry. Labelling Henry a “carnal monist,”
331
 Falque raises two points 
worth mentioning here. First, Falque rightly argues that Henry is confronted with the 
problem of physical incorporation or visible embodiment. Falque notes that Henry’s 
theory of flesh is disembodied (la chair désincorporée) in that Henry does not think, 
phenomenologically, how my interior ipseity is truly lived in concert with my spatial 
body manifest in the ordinary spatio-temporal horizon of the world. Falque notes that 
Henry even affirms the unity of flesh and body by appropriating the expression 
Leibkörper on four occasions.
332
 Falque also notes that Henry highlights the need to 
resolve this tension between the two modes of givenness when Henry says “the 
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relation of the flesh to the body is thus an inescapable question.”
333
 Falque observes 
that Henry, nevertheless, fails to address clearly how flesh and body relate. 
 The second point Falque brings to the fore is a theological one. He suggests 
that Henry’s carnal monism renders problematic the bodily nature of the Christian 
doctrine of the Incarnation. For, “the duplicity of the thingly body and of the 
intentional flesh (Körper-Leib),” writes Falque, “is in effect entirely absorbed in the 
impressional flesh.”
334
 Thus the reason Falque argues that Henry does not address the 
question of how flesh and body relate is that flesh and body do not relate at all in 
Henry. The Körper is absorbed into the Leib, or so argues Falque. The impressional 
flesh, acosmic and non-temporal, is the flesh of Christ and the point of unity between 
human flesh (Leib) and divine flesh (Christ-Leib). Describing Henry’s tendency to 
absorb human flesh within divine flesh as a “theological corporeality” 
(l’incorporation théologique), Falque proclaims that such a theological interpretation 
of Leib is more Gnostic in tone than Christian. In contrast to Henry’s emphasis on 
interior flesh, Falque seeks to connect the Incarnation to the affirmation of ordinary 
human life in the world. Christ’s self-disclosure happens, Falque reminds us, in 
simple ordinary life. Christ appeared with blood running through his veins, and sweat 
on his brow. By highlighting the humble state of Christ’s incarnate body, Falque 
complicates Henry’s theological interpretation of the Incarnation. Does Henry 
dismiss the Pauline doctrine of kenosis? Does not the Pauline hymn of Philippians 2 
presuppose the radical difference between God and humanity thereby affirming the 
humility explicit in the act of God taking flesh?
335
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 While we affirm Falque’s thesis that Henry is a carnal monist, we must 
qualify Falque’s thesis slightly. Falque is perhaps overstating his claim when he 
asserts that Henry absorbs the exterior Körper into the ego’s invisible Leib. The 
carnal monism that Falque accuses Henry of having adopted calls for qualification in 
light of Henry’s theory of the duplicitous body, a body split between Leib and 
Körper. To be sure, Henry does not reject the existence of the exterior body on 
visible display as Falque would have us believe. Much of Incarnation: une 
philosophie de la chair focuses on the particular failures of the visible body to 
display that which is most real about concrete life. So we agree with Falque that it is 
correct to suspect Henry’s flesh appears on its own and is independent of the body’s 
appearing. If flesh is without a body in this sense, it is not certain that the body is 
absorbed within the flesh as Falque maintains. Henry claims that the flesh is simply 
the ratio cognoscendi, or the reason for the body’s movement and living 
expressions.
336
 So, despite the body’s incapacity to reveal the interior life of divine 
flesh in its full glory, the body as an object of visible display is always there, leading 
me in my existence in the temporal world-horizon. Henry affirms as much: “My 
flesh is not simply the principle of the constitution of my proper objective body, it is 
concealed in it as its invisible substance. Such is the strange condition of this object 
that we call our body: it is not simply reduced to its visible species; rather it is its 
invisible disclosure that is its reality.”
337
  
 Henry shall also insist throughout Incarnation: une philosophie de la chair 
that the body on visible display imposes itself on the flesh, exercising the power of 
de-realization over flesh. The objective, visible body throws the real, living 
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impression of flesh into the temporal flux of the world (Henry writes, “the 
derealisation of the flesh happens in and by the appearing of the world”).
338
 But 
again, this supposes that the existence of the exterior body is always there, if even as 
threat. If the exterior, objective body were absorbed into the impressional flesh of 
Christ, as Falque would have us believe, then Henry’s Leibkörper would not pay 
heed at all to the de-realizing power of the Körper. The fact remains that the exterior, 
objective body figures in Henry’s vocabulary as a powerful reality by which we exist 
in the world (it is not merely an empty shell, coquille vide)
339
 but also by which the 
visible appearing of the world can conceal or de-realize the invisible life. And 
finally, it is necessary to affirm that both Leib and Körper are components of the 
body in Henry, for it is only with the friction between them that Henry is forced to 
conclude that they relate paradoxically. If there were no body (or if it were absorbed 
within the flesh), then there would be no need to describe the relation of flesh and 
body as a paradox.
340
 It is therefore in this qualified sense that we affirm Falque in 
ascribing the title of “carnal monist” to Henry. 
 By now it may be obvious that we are suggesting that Henry’s unique 
appropriation of Leib advances a theological truth about the ego’s unity with Christ. 
Flesh is manifest as a lived-experience, arriving as a pure feeling of Christ touching 
my ipseity at every point of my being. For Henry, my auto-affection is a Christ-
affection. Yet, does this not violate the pure, singularity of auto-affection as indicated 
above?  For Henry, inserting Christ as the source and ongoing possibility of my own 
auto-affection is not introducing an element of hetero-affection. Rather, Christ’s 
flesh and my own flesh are isomorphic, structurally enclosed, and hence, within the 
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selfsame absolute auto-affection. To feel myself in radical immediacy without 
reference to anything outside myself is therefore not to exclude Christ’s flesh: “In my 
flesh I am given to myself, but I am not my own flesh. My flesh, my living flesh, is 
Christ’s.”
341
 Henry’s carnal monism is therefore monistic in that it isolates all of 
reality within the flesh of Christ, including my flesh. 
 Henyrian Leib, as Christ-affection, as a theological flesh, in principle, 
excludes the temporality of consciousness, ecstatic physical embodiment or spatial 
movement. Divine Life as embodied in my invisible “flesh” displays a mode of 
givenness and a form of evidence all its own. It manifests itself in the style of auto-
reference, giving itself according to itself as a phenomenon heterogeneous to the 
luminous display of the exterior “world.” The appearance of the Incarnation 
therefore determines ipseity as a flesh without a body, a theological Leib without a 
Körper.     
 
  §22. PAROLES DU CHRIST: THE LANGUAGE OF LIFE 
 We have seen that Henry radicalizes Husserl’s Leib so that the interior Leib 
(subjective body) is distinct from and purified of the exterior Körper (objective 
body) (§20). Leib is subsequently framed by Henry within a theological context so 
that my Leib and the “Word made flesh” are co-incarnated. My Leib is the venue of 
divine life and my Körper the exterior site incapable of accommodating the 
disclosure of divine life—rendering it a duplicitous body split between two 
irreconcilable fields of display (§21). Christ’s Incarnation so understood here 
conforms to Henry’s theological monism in which God’s self-revelation in the flesh 
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is acosmic and without world, a peculiar monism we described as a “carnal monism.” 
We now turn to his last work, Paroles du Christ (2002),
342
 a text which designates 
the “Word of God” as a mode of divine self-communication that incarnates itself 
within human flesh. 
 The over-arching theme of Paroles du Christ is that the divine word manifest 
in Christ speaks as a universal word inside us thereby bringing to light the voice of 
God as an audible voice. Yet this voice we hear is of an entirely different language. 
As a divine language, the “language of life” is incarnate prior to the words we speak 
in the world. Accomplished as a concrete donation, I cannot but help hear the voice 
of God within me, and yet it is a word that refuses to be heard in the visible display 
of the world (i.e., by empirical ears). The language of life therefore stands in 
opposition to the language of the world. In this section we establish that, while 
Henry’s theory of language accounts for both fields of display, it, too, is susceptible 
to a “carnal monism” that captures the central misgiving of the duplicitous body. 
 Henry unearths the language of life within the New Testament scriptures, and 
Paroles du Christ cites the gospels in abundance, especially the sayings of Christ 
himself (ipsissima verba) recorded both in the gospel of John and the synoptics. 
Characterized by Jean Greisch as a philosophical lectio divina,
343
 Henry’s final work 
resembles more of a meditation on the New Testament than a philosophical treatise. 
So, rather than attending to implicit semiotic tropes or rhetorical devices embedded 
in the New Testament, Henry seeks to read these documents as a transcendental 
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Word or as a set of texts which communicate the unshakeable and immediate 
presence of divine revelation, as it is lived in its concrete intensity. Refraining, too, 
from the historical-critical method and the self-referential narrative and symbolic 
character of the New Testament documents, he appeals to the unique capacity of the 
phenomenological-transcendental method to proceed straight “to the things 
themselves,” as they are given to “me” in propria persona, i.e., with no distance 
between the genitive and dative or no difference between the word and its referent 
(Husserl of course does not mean in propria persona in this way). Henry indeed 
states that the phenomenology of invisible display removes the need for literary-
critical or hermeneutical, reflective methods altogether. Especially grounded in the 
Johannine voice of theological discourse in which, “there are no metaphors,” Henry’s 
transcendental approach purifies the text of historical and linguistic distinctions, lest 
phenomenology should “give way to hermeneutics and commentaries, or rather, to 
endless hypotheses.”
344
 Critical of the literary-critical, hermeneutical and narrative 
methods that preoccupy so much contemporary philosophy and theology,
345
 Henry 
nevertheless proposes an approach (a hermeneutic?) that opens up access to the 
concrete word of life.  
 The language of life is laid bare in its stark essence by a carefully articulated 
phenomenology of the invisible that reads off the scripture as sacred word, “which 
turns away from itself and indicates the site where another word speaks. It is only the 
Word of Life in me.”
346
 Unique in content and style, Henry’s theory of language 
therefore privileges the interior sphere of the living present which effectively grows 
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out of his phenomenology of Leib in its Christological disclosure (and once again 
confirms the radicality of his theory of the duplicitous body). 
 The “Word made flesh” of the prologue of John appears as an actual word, a 
divine speech disclosive of its own language entirely at odds with the language of the 
world. In Henry’s estimation, Christ’s word calls me so that I hear it speak in me 
without distance between my experience of the word and the call of the word itself. 
Hearing the voice of Christ is regulated not by my empirical ears, in other words, but 
by Christ’s auto-revelation inside my living present. I am enabled to hear the word of 
God because I am incarnated by that very word. The word of God is “inscribed in my 
non-temporal birth, in this venue each is a revelation to itself in the auto-revelation of 
life. That which is born of life hears the Word of life.”
347
 Since I am born of God, my 
original condition lies in my status as a Son of God.  
 The structure of language, recast here in view of the duplicitous body, is 
redefined altogether. Because of the ego’s denomination as a son of God, the ego 
expresses itself in two languages: on the one hand, the “language of the world” 
contaminated by imagination, reflective display and temporal flux that interposes a 
gap between the sign and the signified (Körper), and, on the other, the “language of 
life” carried along in its concrete immediacy by the interior auto-donation of absolute 
divine life (Leib). As Jean-Nicolas Revas reminds us, Henry’s “material 
phenomenology is not first another phenomenology of language, but rather a 
phenomenology of another language.”
348
 And it is that “other language” to which we 
now turn. 
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 In an illuminating essay, “Material Phenomenology and Language,” Henry 
maintains that we can best glimpse the structure of the “language of the world” by 
pitting against the structure of language in Heidegger’s work On the Way to 
Language. Spoken at a distance, the empirical language by which I communicate 
outside myself through physical phonemes functions to throw me outside myself by 
alienating me from the referent the phoneme signifies. Ordered by the field of visible 
display and its temporal distanciation of genitive and dative poles of appearing 
(appearings of words to others), the language of the world as Heidegger understands 
it is such that it opens the world itself, endowing the perceiving subject with the 
capacity to put his ego at distance from the world and illuminate the “outside” of the 
world itself. Correlatively, Heidegger writes, “the essential being of language is 
Saying as Showing;”
349
 or to “‘Say’ means to show, to let appear, to let be seen and 
heard.”
350
 Heidegger thereby links language to the opening of the world itself: “To 
say means to show, to make appear, the lighting-concealing-releasing offer of 
world.”
351
 And further acknowledging the primal power of language to cast the ego 
into the exterior field of visible display, Heidegger writes that, “the word ... is no 
longer just a name-giving grasp reaching for what is present and already portrayed, it 
is not only a means of portraying what lies before us. On the contrary, the word first 
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bestows presence, that is, Being in which things appears a beings.”
352
 It is well-
known that Heidegger ennobled language as the “house of Being”
353
 as that 
mechanism through which the world flashes forth in its luminous presence.  
 It is no surprise that Henry critiques Heidegger for portraying language as 
that speech act which supposes a distance between the sign and referent. Thus “it 
seems to us,” writes Henry, “that such a difference is posited only when the originary 
truth is understood as the ‘outside of itself’ of the world.”
354
 The disastrous effect of 
distance, with particular reference to the structure of language, lies in the fact that it 
leads to a hermeneutical “play,” or language’s original incapacity to communicate 
with absolute certainty that of which it speaks. Henry maintains that language of the 
world can, and often does, qualify the same reality with opposing signs rendering the 
language of the world ambiguous, deceitful, and even frequently counterfeit. Do not 
all of us speak out of both sides of our mouth? Henry notes that the impotence of 
language is captured best in the expression that states we use the tongue deceitfully, 
for “with it we bless the Lord and the Father and with it we curse men who are made 
in the image of God. From the same mouth come blessings and curses” (James 3, 9-
10). For Henry, the impotence of the language of the world is that it cannot 
discriminate between the “play” of two words which are able to count for the same 
reality. It is possible that one can at the same time bless and curse that which is the 
same (i.e., God) because language cannot penetrate and predicate absolutely the 
reality of which it speaks. Cast in the flow of temporal distanciation, the language of 
the world names that which recedes from its presence, and in doing so, opens up a 
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field of distance between sign and reference (différance?).
355
 This distance puts into 
action the hermeneutic “play” of the language of the world,
356
 which in turn, 
prohibits the word from securing absolutely the meaning of its referent.
357
  
 In contrast, then, the language of life Henry advances bursts forth in the 
secret of the human heart, in an interior word of pure presence (no distanciation, no 
gap between the genitive and dative of appearing). By way of an interior divine self-
revelation, the Incarnation of the word and its referent coincide inside me, with no 
difference. Such an overlap enables the Word of life to speak immediately and 
without distance between its call and that which it is calling—thus securing its 
meaning with absolute certainty. Henry writes of the peculiar power of the language 
of life: “The other call, the call of life, lies beyond any call, for it does not put forth 
the proposition of whether to live or not live. Rather life already throws us into life 
itself, crushing us against it and ourselves, in the suffering and enjoyment of this 
invincible pathos. The call has already been living in us the moment we hear it, its 
listening is nothing other than the noise of life, or its rustling in us, the embrace in 
which it gives itself to itself and give us to ourselves in the self-same donation.”
358
 
Truly concrete inasmuch as it is immediately lived and experienced, the language of 
life is nothing other than the Word of Life or the “Word made flesh” incarnating its 
divine speech within me (with no distance between sign and reference and thus no 
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hermeneutic “play”). Yet Henry’s re-ordering of language implies the re-ordering of 
the human condition itself. 
 Set into operation by divine Incarnation in Christ as he is generated within 
absolute divine life, human nature’s original condition is divine, for Henry writes, 
“the appellation of the Son of God awarded to us by the gospels is not a metaphor, 
rather it is our real condition.... It is an original condition that has been denatured, 
forgotten but never abolished.”
359
 In Paroles du Christ, Henry delineates the unique 
genealogy of divine life in which all of us participate. Substituting a divine 
genealogy for a natural genealogy, he advances the thesis that it is “natural” for me 
to hear the word of God within me precisely because my genealogy is divine and not 
worldly or biological. Henry insists that even though we have a biological mother, 
father and siblings, our real genealogy leads back to a divine origin, to the living 
present in which I am born. My life “is accomplished in the substitution of the divine 
genealogy of humanity for its natural genealogy. Such is the content of the words of 
Christ inasmuch as it indicates to humanity the reality of their true condition.”
360
 
Christ’s word is lived within me, heard as a silent call only because it is lived in the 
depths of my heart, on the basis of my identity as a Son of God, my true condition. 
The language of life speaks a more original word, one prior to the speech-acts of the 
language of the world and the hermeneutical play they presuppose. 
 Henry contends, furthermore, that the arch-intelligibility of divine life 
manifest in the “Word made flesh” is the decisive theme of the prologue to the 
gospel of John. Understanding the famous prologue as the locus of the language of 
life in which the Logos is the revelation of God to humanity, Henry maintains that 
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the Word of God is a distinct language accomplished by way of its unique action. 
There is no difference between sign and signified, and hence, no difference between 
word and action either. For the Word of God accomplishes that which it speaks, 
incarnating itself without delay, showing itself immediately in its truth as the 
absolute auto-donation of life unaware of the difference presupposed by the language 
of the world.
361
 Henry will couch this truth often in Johannine terms: “In the 
beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God. In Him 
was life, and the life was the light of men” (John 1. 1, 4.).
362
 It is human nature to 
hear the word of Christ because in him is the life constitutive of our life. On this 
ground Henry concludes that “hearing the word is thus co-substantial with human 
nature.”
363
 Henry writes, moreover, that, “there is no longer an abyss separating the 
word of Christ and the word which speaks in us. They are one and the same life. It is 
this by way of this native predestination that each of us can hear this Word. We see 
this in the founding text of St. Paul in Romans 8.29 whereby he says we are ‘called.’ 
Called by a word...”
364
 I hear both myself and the Word as I suffer myself and I am 
revealed to myself as I experience myself, an accomplishment of the auto-revelation 
of absolute life in its Word, in its irresistible “call” to live. 
  Henry grounds the capacity to hear the voice of God in our identity as Sons 
of God. He writes that the scriptures “say that we are Sons, that we have been given 
to ourselves, in this Self that we are forever, in the process through which absolute 
life is given to itself in its Word. They say the truth of what the meanings foreign to 
reality would not be able to establish. But there in what they say is what we are. Thus 
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we hear it, so to speak, twice and we can understand it. We hear the speech of the 
Scriptures inasmuch as what the words which institutes us in Life self-hears itself in 
us.”
365
 There is, simply put, no hermeneutical space in Henry’s theory of language, 
for he word of life supplies its own language, self-verifying and self-interpreting—
for the Word of God hears itself through us! 
We return to Henry’s claim that the reality of Christ is an incarnate reality 
which splits the body into a duplicitous body. It is crucial to note here that hearing 
the voice of God inside reflects an achievement of the subjective body alone, the 
theological Leib. The ego hears it within its self-presencing self-affection prior to the 
reflective temporal display of consciousness or the exterior tactility of the objective 
body. The language of life communicates itself secretly to the heart, for it is there in 
the mystical presence of the Leib that, Henry observes, the eye by which I see myself 
and the eye by which God sees the secrets of my heart are the selfsame eye.
366
  
Hearing the voice of God, however, is not tantamount to a divine epiphany 
like we see in Mary and the angel, Moses and the burning bush or Abraham and the 
hand of God. Christina Gschwandtner mistakes Henry’s insistence that we can hear 
the voice of God as a claim that we can undergo a mystical vision or intense feeling 
of ecstasy confirmed by a distinctive, yet audible voice. The word of God I hear as 
co-emergent with my birth as a Son of God is not, as Gschwandtner argues, an 
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Gschwandtner rightly notes that an excess of affective satisfaction not only 
can lead to haughty eyes, placing one squarely in the jaws of (self)deception and 
(self)deceit. Appearances that appear in the luminosity of the world can be deceiving. 
Perhaps it is an idol that one feels, and she writes, for “emotions maybe more than 
anything require interpretation.”
368
 Perhaps the fascination tied to an experience of a 
mysterium tremendum is due to the subterfuge of Satan or to my own erratic 
psychological state and not to an authentic encounter with God like Job or Isaiah had 
or like Paul had on the road to Damascus. The vague, unreliable character of sensible 
emotions requires the application of “hermeneutics of suspicion” with respect to the 
nature of the religious experience. It seems to us that Gschwandtner is counselling 
the Christian beholden to Henry’s emphasis on affection to test the spirits, to practice 
spiritual discernment, to separate the wheat from the chaff. Yet Henry does not 
propose that interior life is subject to hermeneutics at all because the purity of the 
Leib, where the Word incarnate speaks, is distinct from my Körper. The type of 
mystical experience of which Gschwandtner speaks is sensible, bodily and thus 
complicit with the field of visible display, the Körper.  
The radicality of Henry’s thinking is thrown into sharp relief here. It is 
because he designates the field of invisible display as isomorphic with the Word of 
God that hearing that primal locution is not a sensible, audible word. As a primal 
domain of invisible disclosure, the language of life is not subject to hermeneutics 
precisely because hermeneutics can only interpret that which becomes visible, 
luminous and thus subject to the play of the language of the world. Unable to appear 
in the world and thus unable to be verified by the language of the world, Henry 
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writes of the primal appearing of the “Word made flesh” up against the appearing of 
the world: “Unfortunately, there is no possible evidence of transcendental 
subjectivity because in the divergence of an Outside, in the language of the world, all 
life vanishes. Material phenomenology comes après coup, after the fact, to meditate 
on life.”
369
 In other words, the language of life is a reality all its own that defies all 
visible display. 
Henry’s conception of the “language of life” therefore avoids the danger of 
domesticating God within consciousness, a danger Gschwandtner mistakenly 
attributes to him. Henry does not conceive of God as if God were a numinous object 
of my intentional aim or the direct cause of sensible, exterior ecstasies (like a flutter 
of the heart or a creaturely feeling).
370
 Hearing the voice of God in Henry’s theory of 
the language plays by the rule of invisible display where the appearing of divine 
speech is co-emergent with the immediate feeling of my own subjectivity apart from 
the visible field of appearing opened up by the language of the world. Even though 
auto-affection displays a concrete sphere of feeling, it is radically distinct from the 
field of “visible” empirical sensation, or physical emotional stimulation/response.
371
 
Simply put, the “Word made flesh” appears in the Leib to which it gives birth. It is 
the site of auto-affection, the place of self-suffering of being a self, this unique, 
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singular self from which I cannot escape nor experience as “out there.” An interior, 
invisible mode of manifestation, auto-affective feeling, incarnated as the language of 
life, is concrete precisely because it is the most intimate experience I can have of 
myself as this “me.” Because my appearing in the world, according to Henry, throws 
me outside myself by alienating me from myself in this difference, we can conclude 
sensible affections, given their visible, bodily character, are not identical with the 
language of life. The phenomenon of the inner word whereby I hear the voice of God 
inside me, for Henry, is a structural soliloquy, that is, purely self-present. It appears 
in the invisible field of display prior to visible modalities of display such as 
intentional reflection, being-in-the-world or sensible affections or visions of any sort. 
This duplicitous body split between two languages is confirmed by recourse to 
Henry’s radical reduction, to which now turn. 
 
  §23. BRACKETING THE AUTONOMOUS “I-CAN”: ACCESSING MY FLESH 
 Is it not obvious that when I lift a weight that I am, in fact, the one lifting the 
weight? Is it not also obvious that when I seize an object or reel in a fish that it is not 
my own strength doing the seizing and reeling, and that I am usually pre-reflectively 
self-aware of those bodily actions without necessarily reflecting on them as my own? 
When I spontaneously reach for the cigar on the table “without any further ado” (as 
Husserl is wont to say), is it not self-evident that I am the one who freely moves to 
take hold of it despite the fact that this movement recedes from thematic display and 
initially eludes representational consciousness? Husserl’s theory of the “I-Can” 
describes these bodily scenarios as practical possibilities (Möglichkeiten) or 
actions/movements and thus as original willings of my subjective lived-body (Leib) 
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in functional tandem with my exterior, physical body (Körper). In this section we 
interrogate the way in which Henry at once adopts and modifies (modifies via the 
blow of the radical reduction) Husserl’s phenomenological description of the bodily 
aspects of the “I-Can.”  
 This section, moreover, completes what we have argued thus far both in 
chapter three and in this chapter. We have seen in the preceding section that Henry’s 
theory of language leads to a pure presencing of the divine Word inside my self-
presencing, pitting the peculiar incarnation of the invisible language of life against 
the language of the world (§22). We have also seen that because my (theological) 
flesh is born from the selfsame flesh of divine Incarnation, i.e., the First-Son Christ, 
my flesh is not my own but born of Christ’s. I am therefore joined to myself, not 
through myself as I am displayed in the world, but through Christ’s acosmic 
incarnation (§21). Both of these points portray Henry’s conception of flesh/language 
in its pure self-impressional ipseity, an interior mode of invisible display without 
reference to the “outside” of the language of the world or the temporal streaming of 
the exterior Körper. In light of this observation we have concluded that Henry’s 
descriptions of both flesh and language accommodate a duplicitous body that gives 
way to a carnal monism. In this section we extend this thesis by highlighting how 
Henry disqualifies the ego’s practical bodily achievements in the field of visible 
display. In particular, Henry highlights that the radical reduction disqualifies the 
autonomous, visible “I-Can” in order to open up access to the invisible, interior site 
of flesh. It is here that we consider what means of access to that interior sphere 
Henry proposes his readers deploy and thus how it is that, as a body in the world, I 
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can actually experience my original living present born in and through the “coming 
of Life into itself in the Self of the Arch-Son.”
372
  
 Henry takes his point of departure from Husserl’s rich descriptions in Ideas II 
of the Leibkörper’s “I-Can.” Husserl thematizes the I-Can in order to make 
intelligible how the body puts into action its own practical movement in the world 
and realizes its possibilities there. To render intelligible the body’s practical 
capacities, Husserl isolates a basic subjective unity that ties together that primal 
capacity, the “ego’s unity as a system” or the “I-Can” (Ich Kann).
373
 A unique 
faculty which gathers together my bodily experiences into a rule-governed, though 
spontaneously lived pattern, the I-Can is continually realized “not as an empty ability 
but [as] a positive potentiality, which may now happen to be actualized but which is 
always in readiness to pass into activity.”
374
 While this unified system to which 
Husserl refers is a practical, spontaneously lived system played out in the ego’s 
wakeful stream of consciousness, it is also highly regulated by exterior stimuli. In 
other words, the ego is free to choose, often spontaneously, to go for a walk, to reach 
for the TV remote, to eat everyday at noon, to speak loudly or softly, etc., but it is 
only so as it develops tendencies or habits over time in connection to its surrounding 
cultural/temporal milieu.  
 Certainly Husserl claims that the embodied ego is an expression of the I-Can 
because the I-Can is most fundamentally the seat of free movement in possession of 
its liberties/capacities to move and act (Der Leib als Träger freier Bewegung).
375
 
And certainly the “I-Can” therefore represents for Husserl a distinctive feature that 
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sets the Leibkörper apart from all other material things. But, the I-Can is also a 
product of its surroundings. Thus the body as organ, as an agent of touching, is 
always aware of itself in its awareness of the world, the touched. The body on visible 
display together with its stratum of localized sensations is an organ of the will, and is 
thus moveable immediately and spontaneously by the ego, by the Ich Kann, with the 




 Because it is actualized up against the backdrop of the world, the I-Can is 
spontaneous only by virtue of a particular habit of doing. Habit indicates a mode of 
regular living or what Husserl calls a typical character (typischen Charakter).
377
 The 
I-Can functions not in abstracto but is pronounced in multiple corporeal experiences 
played out in the field of everyday life. Formative of the ego’s moral and aesthetic 
character, the I-Can moves pre-reflectively according to this typicality, so that “one 
can to a certain extent expect how a man will behave in a given case if one has 
correctly apperceived him in his person, in his style.”
378
 Built up over a lifetime, the 
ego’s I-Can singularizes itself, takes positions, engages and influences, as well as 
comes under the influence of, other egos, and most of all, learns a specific 
disposition shaped and acquired by those confrontations in the world. Such habits 
accrue as the ego develops a character of style, and one day, without further ado, it 
engages in (for example) “the habit of drinking a glass of wine in the evening.”
379
 
Husserl names this kind of bodily comportment deployed by the power of the I-Can a 
“position-taking” act, a bodily act that is distinct from the mode of intentionality by 
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which we become conscious of objects: “Therefore we distinguish between 
consciousness of objects and position-taking, comportment toward the objects.”
380
 
The result of this distinction is that the I-Can is set against a complex nexus of 
backgrounds (upon backgrounds) that forms the ego’s habits, which in turn, regulate 
its spontaneous and free I-Can. So while I may reflect, with focused attention on a 
particular object, I also freely comport myself to the world by way of a process of 
“position-taking” as my subjective Leib coordinates the movement of the Körper in 
the context of cultural and kinaesthetic rules learned over time.  
 The I-Can, furthermore, provides its own point of unity, its own terminus quo 
in that its self-moving autonomy is focused upon the ego’s primal capacity as an I-
Can. As a system that develops over time, Husserl articulates a bodily self grounded 
in the ego’s power to accumulate experiences that shape its bodily disposition into an 
identifiable “style,” so that I know “the nexus of lived experiences of a person is not 
a mere bundle of lived experiences or a mere ‘stream’ of consciousness in which the 
lived experiences flow away. Instead, every lived experience is a lived experience of 
an Ego, of an Ego that does not itself flow away in a stream as its lived experiences 
do.”
381
 The ego, as I-Can, is the “centre of a surrounding world,”
382
 and relates to its 
world by the variations of acting, moving, evaluating, grasping, striving; in the 
process relating to the world through various embodied acts, the world becomes “on 
hand” for the ego-as-focal-point.  
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 Following upon these analyses in Husserl’s Ideas II, Henry indeed identifies 
the subjective body, i.e., flesh, as co-original with the I-Can. The I-Can so 
understood by Henry discloses an original power through which the ego as “myself” 
emerges. It is a primitive entering into possession of my ispeity, and thus, for Henry, 
“‘I’ means ‘I Can.’ The proposition ‘I Can’ does not bring any particular property to 
the essence of ’I’ but simply defines it.”
383
 What precisely defines one’s flesh is the 
fact of being in possession of such powers and having them at one’s disposal. Henry 
describes and elucidates the original primal self-presence of the I-Can in terms of 
“affection,” “feeling,” “suffering,” “undergoing”—a semantic range similar to 
Husserl’s deployment of the term “will” or practical possibilities.  
 Thus far Henry and Husserl are in concord about the nature of the I-Can. Yet, 
in Henry’s schematic, there is no distance between the pain and the experience of it, 
no distance between the primal feeling/sensing and the felt/sensed. James G. Hart 
describes Henry’s portrayal of how the ego and the powers it can exercise coincide 
within my living present, thus becoming the point at which Henry and Husserl 
diverge: “The theme of affection and self-affectings is perhaps dramatically 
emphasized when Henry insists on self-affecting as flesh. Feeling, touching, etc., is 
always a feeling oneself feeling, always a fleeing of this capacity, the I-can”
384
 What 
Hart brings out here is that Henry’s conception of the I-Can is “dramatically 
emphasized” insofar as it combines the ego’s self-affecting as a practical self-
referencing point without the world, without the habit or “style” to which Husserl 
refers nor to the autonomy which Husserl valorises as central to the I-Can (the ego is 
its own terminus quo).   
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 Consequently, Henry disqualifies Husserl’s autonomous, stylized I-Can. 
Henry does so because his understanding of the I-Can is that the I-Can is not learned 
over time (i.e., style or character) nor is it autonomous. Rather Henry understands the 
I-Can as entirely submissive, derived and at the disposal of divine life.
385
 James G. 
Hart, again, describes it aptly: “But I, as the I of capacities, the I of “I can,” and 
eventually the I of acts and responsibilities, have not brought myself into this 
condition of experiencing or undergoing myself. I witness or suffer pre-preflexively 
myself’s ongoing emergent self-manifestation through self-affections without being 
the source of this manifestation. I am given to myself without this donation 
depending on me in any way. Thus my self-affecting is only through the absolute 
Life effecting a self-affecting in me.”
386
 Henry’s phenomenological study of the 
body is an unequivocal condemnation of the self-positing Husserlian ego manifest in 
its self-luminosity of the I-Can’s capacity to dictate the movements of the 
Leibkörper. While Henry appropriates the primal capacity of the I-Can to put into 
play ipseity, he also calls into question the way Husserl grounds the ego in itself, in 
its autonomy as an I-Can, which is both the centre, and the product, of its 
surrounding world. This is exactly why Henry shall write that, “the effectiveness of 
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this I-can/I-am overrides the fact that this living I can, this living I am, has come 
about only thanks to the endless work of Life in it.”
387
  
 In order to overcome the obstacle to achieving the living present posed by the 
Husserlian I-Can, Henry expands the meaning of the I-Can to signify a duplicity of 
functions, one illusory and one real. In §35 of Incarnation: une philosophie de la 
chair, Henry outlines this ambiguity latent in the I-Can and its bodily acts and 
practical movements. He maintains that the primitive duality of the I-Can can lead us 
to think that Husserl’s I-Can is the only modality able to describe and comprehend 
the subjective “will” at the base of our bodily presencings in the world-horizon. Yet, 
Henry insists, it is precisely the “illusory” operation of Husserl’s I-Can that always 
lurks just around the corner of every bodily act, thereby rendering me captive to my 
world-engagements and habits. In fact, Husserl’s I-Can, if not modified, shall give 
way to a “transcendental illusion” inasmuch as it conceals the ongoing givenness of 
the I-Can within the auto-donation of divine life. The Husserlian I-Can frequently 
disengages us from divine life by delusion or casuistry, argues Henry. The 
Husserlian I-Can, because it is accrued over time in the luminosity of the world, puts 
into play a deception that may dupe the ego into thinking that it (and it alone) is the 
source and foundation of its bodily powers and capacities realized in the world. The 
“real” (i.e., not illusory) I-Can Henry proposes is a pure I-Can of Christ, the I-Can as 
a practical possibility co-substantial with absolute Life’s achievements. A lengthy 
description of this union elucidates the dual character of the I-Can: 
 
The liberty [of the I-Can] is the feeling of the power of the Self to put 
itself to work through each of its powers that belong to its flesh. Now 
this original power which inhabits and renders possible all concrete 
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power is not adventitious, an ideal separation of the Self from itself: it 
is the way in which the Self arrives in its own flesh, it is generated in 
this venue at same time it arrives here, it and this Self are 
consubstantial. An “I can” consubstantial with this carnal and living 
Self, installed in its own power, free to deploy itself—also 
incontestable in its power and it is liberty to which this Self and this 
particular flesh belong. ‘If you knew the gift of God’ (John 4.10): the 
donation of Life each living self is a donation of its Self, of its flesh 




Henry is claiming, in no uncertain terms, that the ego’s I-Can and the self-revelation 
of divine life in the ego’s flesh are consubstantial. Divine life as it effects my I-Can 
is absolutely real and concrete it its donation (not a pseudo-donation). My I-Can is 
derived, given to me and thus generated within the absolute power of divine life’s 
auto-Incarnation through the First-Living Son (i.e., Christ). 
 Yet I often forget, insists Henry, that my I-Can and the liberty, autonomy, 
movement, capacity, singularity, and practical power which attends the I-Can is 
given to me in the immanence of absolute Life. Anthony Steinbock has observed 
how important the doctrine of “forgetting” is to Henry’s proposal of a duplicitous 
body. Steinbock observes that it is the pervasive pull of the Husserlian I-Can and its 
idolatrous end to which it leads (I-Can as autonomous and worldly) that causes 
Henry to render problematic the Husserlian I-Can in the first place. Henry argues, to 
be sure, that the Husserlian I-Can is so problematic that it causes the I-Can to 
“forget” its origin in divine life, leading the I-Can to attribute its powers to itself, as 
if it were autonomous. To overcome this forgetting, the ego must remember that its I-
Can is an accomplishment of divine life. To remember that the reality of the I-Can 
lies in its consubstantiality with divine life is not to move the I-Can into a novel state, 
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but to remember its original state and to recognize what has always been the truth 
about the source of its powers. How does this remembering come about?  
 To submit the Husserlian I-Can to the blow of the radical reduction is to 
remember that divine life is the place in which I am born as myself and thus to 
reverse the idolatry of substituting my I-Can for God. What is interesting about 
Henry’s design to disqualify the autonomous I-Can is that it amounts to nothing more 
than a direct reversal of it. In other words, Henry proposes that we forget the 
autonomous I-Can as a concrete means of remembering that the I-Can is actually a 
product of my being a Son of God. Forgetting the autonomous I-Can reflects a 
concrete and practical spiritual practice. As Steinbock notes, once again, through this 
forgetting of the Husserlian I-Can, “one forgets oneself, loses one’s self as mundane 
human being and through this forgetfulness gains myself as the Son of God in the 
Son.”
389
 But how does one forget the autonomous, Husserlian I-Can in pursuit of the 
authentic disclosure of invisible life within? 
 Henry suggests that it is only by practicing (praxis) an ascetic lifestyle that 
one disqualifies the autonomous, Husserlian I-Can. In particular, the radical 
reduction is undertaken by doing acts of mercy, engendering peace and repudiating 
natural or “worldly” relations aroused by rivalry, violence, envy, hate, deception and 
falsehood. By breaking, absolutely, with these products the autonomous I-Can 
inevitable yields, Henry brings to light the I-Can’s original condition as born in 
absolute Life’s perfect and eternal capacities. “Voilà,” writes Henry, “that which 
stems from these relations lose their power in the paradoxical word of Christ that 
demands that you love those who do you evil. Only this can break the cycle of 
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 The cycle of the Husserlian I-Can is therefore broken only 
by way of doing acts of mercy—of moving away from autonomy and habits accrued 
in the world toward complete dependence on God.  
 Stressing that the disqualification of the Husserlian I-Can is necessarily the 
same as forgetting it, Henry is at the same stressing that acts of mercy are the essence 
of any I-Can. He writes: “Only the work of mercy practices the forgetting of the self 
in which, all interest or the Self (right down to the idea of what we call a self or a 
me), now removed, no obstacle is now pose to the unfurling of life in this Self 
extended to its original essence.”
391
 So while Henry brackets the autonomous I-Can 
by disqualifying it (i.e., by forgetting it), he nevertheless modifies rather than 
eradicates Husserl’s I-Can. In other words, the ego possesses its bodily 
powers/capacities and wields them freely and spontaneously through a primal I-Can. 
However, the ego must always realize, in Henry’s estimation, its I-Can is a gift, for 
there “is no ‘I Can’ except in life.”
392
 The power proper to the I-Can as Henry 
conceives it materializes within the power of Christ’s life manifest in the acosmic 
“Word made flesh.” Henry can thus conclude that, “in the works of mercy a decisive 
transmutation takes place by which the ego’s power is extended to the hyper-power 
of absolute Life in which it is given to itself.”
393
 While Henry shall call this the 
“Christian ethic”
394
 it is nonetheless an invisible ethic, an invisible doing whereby 
God acts through us to bring about the self-revelation of the original I-Can in and 
through the interior self. Never to appear as an act of mercy done to another, i.e., the 
genitive and dative structure, the mercy to which Henry refers is an invisible mercy 
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that abides in all acts as their source and power but is such that it can never be 
manifest in the world.  
 It is important to emphasize here that the I-Can as Henry elucidates it is not 
solipsistic. It is inter-subjective, immersed in the original common birth through 
which all life comes into itself as a living I-Can. While I can never know the other’s 
life by traversing across the visible display of the world (no life in Körper), I can co-
live with the other ego by virtue of our common power and capacity to live, our 
common terminus quo by which each of us have been endowed with an I-Can (life in 
Leib alone). Jean Leclerq writes of Henry’s I-Can as Leib, “our flesh is not 
autonomous, for it is in the arch-passivity of absolute Life that each flesh finds its 
potentialities, all of its ‘phenomenological properties’, but also its ‘capacities to be 
joined with the flesh of the other.’ It is thus in life that the elaboration of an original 
communion with the other is possible....”
395
 Henry’s theory of flesh advances a 
theological variant of the Husserlian I-Can, one which follows upon the radical 
reduction Henry deployed over against Husserl (§12). Yet this radical reduction or 
absolute disqualification of Husserl’s I-Can simply confirms Henry’s tendency to 
adopt, whether wittingly or not, a carnal monism that privileges interior Leib at the 
expense of the exterior Körper. While one can appreciate Henry’s return to the 
interior origin of bodily powers and movement and its subjective “feel,” we affirm 
what James G. Hart has noted about Henry’s I-Can—that it cannot render intelligible 
how the I-Can can come into contact with the It-Can, or the objective, empirical 
horizon in which the Körper activates its bodily powers and potentialities.
396
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 §24. TOWARD A POROUS BODY  
 We are now in a position to introduce briefly a proposal that overcomes 
Henry’s carnal monism without taking leave of Henry’s return to the interior flesh 
characteristic of the subjective body. We have argued that Henry’s Leibkörper 
accedes to a duplicitous body. Articulated in contrast to Henry’s duplicitous body, 
we propose a modality of embodiment that does not pit the Leib against Körper in 
antithetical relation, as if there were an abyss between the interior and exterior 
spheres of bodily display. Rather, a genuine Leibkörper, a genuine unity of the two 
spheres that respects there difference is in order. The Leibkörper that we shall 
elucidate in chapter six is neither a psycho-somatic unity as in Husserl nor a 
duplicitous body as in Henry. In contrast to both of these phenomenological bodies, 
our proposal of a porous body illuminates an interior spiritual body interiorly in 
relation to the exterior body and thus does justice to the inherent dignity and power 
of that exterior body as created by God. Hence we describe this porous body as a 
theological Leibkörper. We elaborate this concept in greater detail in chapter six in 
conversation with both Henry and St. Augustine. 
 The ambiguity of the porous body lies in the fact that it is not pure. On the 
one hand, it is not purely self-present to itself. It is not in perfect unity with the 
“Word made flesh.” It cannot claim a secure, invincible self-revelation such that 
Henry’s Leib calls for. On the other hand, the porous body is also not purely exterior, 
a mere objective body-thing present in the visible display of the world. Thus, 
irreducible to reductive materialism or empiricism, the porous body is not less than 
motor movements, kinaesthetic configurations and physiological brain synapses, but 
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is much more. Situated within an eschatological destiny, the porous body is porous to 
God. In this way we go against both Husserl’s reductive materialism and Henry’s 
monism. While Henry will claim the right to say “in the depths of the night my flesh 
is God,” our proposal shall echo St. Augustine in declaring that, in my inner-depths, I 
am close to, but ultimately distinct from God, and it is only on that final day that my 





































































The first person who sensed profoundly the enormous difficulties inherent in 
this analysis, and who struggled with it almost to despair, was Augustine.  












 §25.  PHENOMENOLOGY AND AUGUSTINE   
 With this chapter we embark upon part three, the final part of the thesis that 
extends and develops in a constructive direction the critical, descriptive work of 
Michel Henry’s phenomenology undertaken in parts one and two.
398
  Part one 
highlighted the Husserlian and Heideggerian context out of which Henry’s 
phenomenology of divine life emerges and takes shape. Part 2 introduced Henry’s 
later work on Christianity, tracing out many of the theological themes he takes up in 
order to elucidate the duplicitous self and duplicitous body. Part 3 now turns toward 
the constructive component of the project that elicits St. Augustine as a theological 
resource both to engage key breakthroughs and address conceptual problems in 
Henry.
399
 To this end, we propose the figure of the “porous self” as a temporal 
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structure that integrates interior and exterior fields of display in an explicit bid to 
overcome Henry’s duplicitous self and the non-temporal monism it engenders. But 
why use Augustine in particular as a resource to reveal the porous self over against 
Henry’s duplicitous self? We can outline four principal reasons. 
 Augustine is, first of all, that patristic thinker labelled by some as the genius 
responsible for bequeathing to the Western intellectual tradition the very idea of an 
“interior self.”
400
 Augustine’s articulation of an “interior self” therefore renders him 
an ideal interlocutor in our critical dialogue with Henry’s espousal of radical 
interiority. A second reason we elect to engage Augustine as a resource up against 
Henry is that much of Augustine’s mature work is occupied with the contours of the 
interior dimension of the self and its concrete relation to the eternal substance of 
divine life—a relation to which he attributes passion, desire, affection and a sense of 
urgency manifest in the deep layers of self-awareness. Reminiscent of Henry’s 
insistence that the invisible disclosure of the self forms an aspect of God’s self-
presence, Augustine writes that God is not only beyond all things but is mysteriously 
internal to all things: “This is because by his immutable and surpassing power, not in 
any local or spatial sense, he is both interior to everything, because in him are all 
things (Rom 11.36), and exterior to every single thing because he is above all 
things.”
401
 For both Henry and Augustine, the self is inwardly sustained by divine 
life, once again establishing that Augustine represents an ideal candidate to use a 
theological resource in this project.   
                                                                                                                                          
ego between a real interior life and an irreal copy in the exterior world. While Henry’s articulation 
of interiority is to be appreciated, its conceptual imbalance needs to be addressed. 
400
 Some scholars claim he invented the inner self. For example, see Philip Cary, Augustine’s 
Invention of the Inner Self (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002) and Bertand Vergely, Saint 
Augustin ou La découverte de l’homme intérieur (Toulouse: Les essentiels Milan, 2005). 
401
 Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, 8.26.48. We consult the Edmund Hill translation of all 
three works Augustine wrote on Genesis, which are combined into one book. See Augustine, On 
Genesis, trans., Edmund Hill and Matthew O’Connell (New York: New City Press, 2002). 
240 
 
 Third, one can certainly read Augustine as a theologian whose interests are 
also philosophical, or even, proto-phenomenological. Augustine is perhaps what 
John Caputo calls a saint who evokes a “passionate phenomenology avant la lettre of 
the temporality of the heart’s restless love of God.”
402
 Devoted to the pastoral and 
experiential dimension of the believer’s divine calling to sanctification and 
discipleship, Augustine does not view theology and philosophy as mutually 
exclusive. Modulated in a Neo-Platonic accent, Augustine’s philosophical theology 
attends to both the interior and exterior sites of heartfelt faith, a faith in God who is 
immanent to, but ultimately distinct from, the essence of the temporal experience of 
creaturhood. Reminiscent of Henry, a characteristic feature of Augustine’s work is 
that it is both philosophical and theological in tone, and perhaps in the words of Jean-
Luc Marion, “l’aporia de Saint Augustin” lies in how one is to approach him.
403
 As a 
philosopher? As a theologian? Marion notes that it is highly reductive to split the 
conceptual tie that joins philosophy and theology in Augustine’s oeuvre.
404
 The apt 
words of Etienne Gilson underline this aporia: “We are never quite certain whether 
Augustine is speaking as a theologian or a philosopher.”
405
 Augustine’s work is 
philosophically and theologically fertile without insisting on breach of their 
communion, which renders him an ideal interlocutor to dialogue with Henry’s “theo-
phenomenology.”  
 A final reason why we highlight Augustine up against Henry is that Henry 
deploys insights about the self’s relation to God gleaned from Augustine himself. 
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Henry’s theory of the self adopts aspects of Augustine’s work and thus offers us an 
entry point into Augustine. We owe our interpretation of Augustine to Henry’s 
peculiar, though problematic, appropriation of him. Henry renders Augustine in a 
contemporary idiom, inflecting the Bishop’s voice through the current debates 
regarding the “theological turn” in phenomenology. Utilizing, then, the vocabulary of 
the phenomenological tradition, especially as Henry conceives it, we, too, take 
Augustine as a conversation partner for pursuing the elemental structures of 
theological self on pilgrimage. 
 We are not without precedent in granting Augustine a privileged voice when 
speaking to the phenomenological aspects of the self. As the only theologian noted in 
Husserl’s Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time, Husserl also takes 
Augustine’s search for the interior self as paradigmatic for his own mature Cartesian 
quest for pure consciousness in his now classic text, Cartesian Meditations: An 
Introduction to Phenomenology (1929).
406
 It is well-known that Heidegger derived 
not only his emphatic turn toward existential temporality from Augustine but also 
key philosophical concepts such as “care” (Sorge) “anxiety” (Angst) and “mood” 
(Befindlichkeit) from book X in the Confessions.
407
 Also, in recent years, not only 
has Jacques Derrida’s confrontation with Augustine in the 1990s been well-
documented but also Jean-Louis Chrétien (2002) and Jean-Luc Marion (2008) have 
                                                 
406
 Husserl writes in the last page of the book: “I must lose the world by epoché, in order to regain it 
by a universal self-examination. “Noli foras ire,” says Augustine, “in te redi, in interiore homine 
habitat veritas.” See Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 157. 
407
 See Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 115 ff. Also see the following 
secondary sources: The Influence of Augustine on Heidegger: The Emergence of an Augustinian 
Phenomenology, ed., Craig J. De Paulo (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellon Press, 2006); Heidegger et la 
question de la Dieu, eds., Richard Kearney and Joseph O’Leary, 2
nd
 edition (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2009). 
242 
 
published monographs on Augustine’s thought.
408
 Certainly Augustine is a 
prominent figure in the phenomenological tradition, and this is doubtlessly due to the 
thickly textured discussions of the particularities of self-awareness, temporality and 
desire that saturate his oeuvre, and especially, his Confessions and De Trinitate.  
 By incorporating Augustinian insights within the contemporary theological 
turn in phenomenology, we are not overly occupied with the “historical” Augustine 
or the early Augustine in relation to the mature Augustine. Nor are we concerned 
with peeling back the layers of the history of Augustine reception in order to 
discover the “authentic” Augustine (whoever that may be) or to discover what he 
“really said.” While these remain important scholarly explorations in their own right 
and perhaps define the task of the historian or historical theologian, we situate 
Augustine in the borderland between phenomenology and theology. If one desires to 
work in that contemporary interdisciplinary site between phenomenology and 
theology, one could do no better than solicit Augustine in this academic pursuit—for 
the two styles of thinking can be forged into the closest possible unity once 
converged on his sensitive analyses of the self. And because my entry point into 
Augustine is Henry, the Augustine we invoke is a phenomenological-theological 
Augustine elucidates the life of faith lived toward God without ever making God a 
phenomenon present to my interior life (§3).  
 Our constructive application of Augustine, while not always consistent with 
the regnant Augustinianisms, testifies to the malleable nature of Augustine’s thought 
and thus the fecundity of his legacy to resist domestication by any one discipline or 
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trend. Eric Gregory judiciously observes, “Augustine’s texts, in all of their 
unsystematic glory, can be pressed into service by all sorts of projects...part of 
Augustine’s genius lies in the fact that by reading him we often come to read 
ourselves and wish for another Augustine.”
409
 Central to Augustine’s enduring 
popularity and thus, in part, to his interdisciplinary plasticity, is the fact that his work 




 The porous self inspired by Augustine intends to correct an imbalance in 
Henry. This chapter contends that while Augustine’s doctrine of the imago Dei 
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presents a variant of an “interior self” it is nevertheless a more balanced structure of 
selfhood than Henry’s duplicitous self. The porous self accounts for both the interior 
and exterior fields of display, affirming them both as meaningful realities for human 
life, a structure that overcomes Henry’s absolute bifurcation of the self into “real” 
and “irreal” spheres. Our proposal, furthermore, insists that the interior field of 
display does make God a phenomenon involved in my interior coming-to-be, which 
necessarily leads to a non-temporal monism of the sort we ascribed to Henry in part 
two. This chapter affirms Augustine’s basic Creator-creature distinction that follows 
from his doctrine of the imago Dei: “that image of God was not made in any sense 
equal, being created by him, not born of him; so to make the point he is image in 
such a way as to be ‘to the image;’ that is, he is not equated in perfect parity with 
God, but approaches him in a certain similarity.”
411
 Consistent with its creaturehood, 
the self is manifest most basically as an imago Dei and thereby distinct from the God 
in whose image it is made. 
 The gap between God and that which images God is a temporal gap. I 
therefore seek God without making God a phenomenon, present to myself in a non-
temporal union. The gap between God and the imago Dei is consistent with the 
doctrine of creation, which maintains that creatures are created in the temporal 
horizon of the world, extrinsic to God. Yet, cast into the temporal horizon of the 
world, the imago Dei is not abandoned there, as if alienated from God. Precisely 
because it is created in the image of God, the imago Dei is fractured to its Creator. 
How else could I image God if I were utterly separate from God? As a creāta imago 
Dei, I am created in the world and yet porous to God who is not of this world. But 
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how is the site of porosity to be located and how is it to be lived? How is porosity of 
the self practically realized as a form of spirituality without making God a 
phenomenon, freezing God as present to me inwardly (as in Henry)?  
 The site of porosity, we argue, is interior in that it appears internal to my 
“non-reflective self-awareness.” Non-reflective self-awareness appears as an interior 
“space” wherein I am aware of myself as this “me” while remaining integrated with 
my reflective capacities realized in the temporal flow of the world-horizon. If Henry 
splits the self between interior and exterior fields, we highlight the possibility of a 
unified self with two modes of givenness, one non-reflective and the other reflective. 
So understood, the porous self is not split between two irreparable fields of display 
but is structured by a double-entry that holds them together without confusing them: 
the temporal streaming of the world-horizon in which I realize my possibilities 
through intentional acts and world-engagements (exterior entry) unified with a non-
reflective inner space that is fractured to the eternal presence of God (interior 
entry).
412
 The porosity of display understood in this way maintains that the self’s 
temporal streaming is fractured, and thus, in and through that fracture, is porous to 
that which transcends time. It also contends that reflective intentional acts and bodily 
world-engagements can be deployed theologically to unclog my interior pores to 
God, engendering a style of spirituality aimed at professing faith in and through the 
body of Christ in the world-horizon (avoiding escapism and solipsism) while never 
rendering God a phenomenon present to me. Before the phenomenological and 
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theological structure of the porous self is elucidated with the help of Augustine, we 
confront Henry’s problematic reading of Augustine as an entree into Augustine 
himself.  
  
 §26. HENRY’S PROBLEMATIC READING OF AUGUSTINE  
 The phenomenological tradition has developed a precise grammar with which 
to articulate the characteristic features of consciousness, perception, worldhood, 
temporality, etc. Henry has orchestrated an array of phenomenological breakthroughs 
regarding the interior unity with God in particular, a connection we detailed in 
chapters three and four; and Henry enlists Augustine as a resource to sharpen and 
reinforce the theological intelligibility of such a phenomenological site of unity. 
Henry’s principle of the “duplicity of display” thus gives to Augustine’s theological 
reflections on the self a sharp philosophical point of clarity about its structure. Yet it 
is this unity between the interior self and God couched in terms of the duplicity of 
display that Henry sees in Augustine that this chapter intends to challenge.  
 With the principle of the duplicity of display Henry sets into operation a strict 
division between interior and exterior. We recall, the duplicity of display highlights 
the two distinct styles of givenness by which phenomena appear: the invisible self-
revelation of divine life inside me (auto-affection) and the visible phenomena 
objectified in the temporal streaming of the world (hetero-affection). As we have 
seen, for Henry there is no intertwining or combining of the spheres, nor is there an 
interval between—for a phenomenon cannot maintain a relation to interior and 
exterior fields without also splitting itself into two irreconcilable fields of display. 
And further, Henry insists that only the invisible field of auto-affection can 
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characterize the way in which God’s self-revelation in Christ actualizes itself to the 
explicit exclusion of the exterior structures of visibility. The temporal streaming of 
the world-horizon (as the exterior sphere) cannot accommodate that which is non-
temporal and non-worldly, which by necessity, excludes the phenomenon of God. 
The principle of the duplicity of display notwithstanding, Henry is not a dualist but 
rather a monist, a thesis we outlined in part two. Only one mode of appearing 
contains “divine revelation” in which divine life gives itself, and in the selfsame 
donation gives “me” to myself, without recourse to anything outside that sphere of 
givenness. To go out into the world exposes the non-temporal to the temporal—a 
patent impossibility for Henry.  
 We also highlighted in part two that, for Henry, my interior life is not foreign 
to God but of the selfsame eternal essence. Thus access to divine life comes by way 
of a radical reduction whereby I leave my involvement in the world, consciousness 
and the physical body in a quest without return to the pure interiority of auto-
affection—my concrete “flesh” in which I feel (pathos) myself in immediate relation 
to divine life without distance or difference. In chapter four, we showed how Henry 
insists that the essence of the body owes nothing whatsoever to the visible display of 
the exterior body in the world and its kinaesthetic “I-Can.” Henry disqualifies that 
bodily aspect and opts to reposition the essence of the body within the self’s interior 
self-display, a “flesh” continually born within the eternal “Word made flesh.”    
 This section brings to light Henry’s problematic reading of Augustine with 
respect to the non-temporal monism in which he implicates Augustine (we address 
the issue of the body in chapter six). Henry devotes a portion of Incarnation: une a 





 In this section, Henry distributes the self across the two spheres of 
appearing without at the same time rendering the conditions for the possibility of 
salvation in both of them. Predictably, Henry argues that salvation is wrought 
entirely within the interior life of the ego, its non-temporal union with Christ, and it 
is precisely on this point of unity between the self and God that Henry enlists 
Augustine’s Christology as an exemplar. 
 To do so he adduces number 108 of Augustine’s tractates on the Gospel of 
John (John 17.14-19) to clarify how Augustine’s theory of the self accords with the 
non-temporal monism Henry advances. In this biblical passage, Christ tells the 
disciples that he sanctifies himself for them, that he “sanctifies them in truth... and 
for their sake I sanctify myself, that they also may be sanctified in truth” (John 17.17 
and 17.19). In his commentary on this passage in tractate 108, Augustine draws out a 
rich mystical connection between Christ and his disciples: “they themselves too are 
myself, as it benefited me in myself, because I am man apart from them, ‘and do I 
sanctify myself,’ that is, I sanctify them in myself as though I am sanctifying myself, 
because in me they themselves, too, are myself.”
414
 Again, Augustine strikes a 
mystical note when he observes that I undergo the event of redemption from sinner 
to saint through my intimate identification with Christ, for Christ, “sanctifies himself 
in himself, that is, himself as man in himself as Word, because the one Christ is 
Word and man, sanctifying the man in the Word.”
415
 Certainly in consequence of 
Augustine’s reading of John 17, one can understand how Henry appropriates 
Augustine’s unification of Christ’s “myself” with the disciple’s “myself” as an 
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exemplar of the duplicitous self. By rigorously applying the principle of the duplicity 
of display, Henry interprets Augustine to adopt a radical phenomenological position: 
that the ego’s integrity as a living ego is manifest by virtue of its unity with Christ’s 
pure ego made possible through auto-affection. For Henry, the ego Augustine 
describes here trades on theological claims made about the disciples sharing 
immediately in Christ’s sanctifying power.
416
  
 Even though Henry’s principle of the duplicity of display adds philosophical 
precision to how one may frame Augustine’s theological interpretation of the self, 
Henry exacts great conceptual violence upon Augustine’s thinking on the matter. By 
imposing the duplicitous self on Augustine, Henry fails to account for the fact that 
Augustine’s notion of the self is realized in the context of his discussions of (1) the 
temporality of the world and (2) the gap between God and creature that the imago 
Dei presupposes; each of which enables the porous self to repudiate the idiosyncratic 
notion of deification that Henry attributes to the duplicitous self.
417
  
 We argue below that the porous self is a temporal imago Dei by virtue of the 
gap creation interposes between the self and God. The porous self is therefore 
created (not generated) and extrinsic to God who “is the Creator of all time.”
418
 
Indeed, the temporality of the porous self constitutes its structural dissimilarity to 
God, for “time itself is something created and thus itself also has a beginning, and is 
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not co-eternal with the creator.”
419
 Henry’s duplicitous self eradicates the Creator-
creature distinction that demarcates an essential temporal boundary, and it is the 
temporal boundary we are reincorporating that liberates selfhood from the chains of 
non-temporal monism. As the source of all life, God is, we admit, intimately 
involved with all of creation: “all things were made through him in such a way that 
whatever has been made in this world was in him life.”
420
 Our proposal 
acknowledges that God can even be described as “my life,”
421
 “life of my life” (vita 
vitae)
422
 and “life of my soul.”
423
 Yet God is also always self-present in God’s 
eternal self-repose and is thus distinct from the temporal creatures and temporal 
world he fashioned: God “whose repose is outside time”
424
 is the creator et ordinator 
temporum, the creator and ordainer of time in which we dwell.
425
 
 Our proposal of a porous self illuminates how God’s life is the ongoing source-
point of the porous self while maintaining that God is never a phenomenon present to 
me because God is always temporally distinct from me. Augustine, in a well-known 
critical move against the Manicheans, states emphatically that the temporal distinction 
necessarily gives way to an ontological distinction that makes the human soul 
ontologically distinct from God, a distinction that follows from the doctrine of 
creation.
426
 Oliver O’Donovan highlights that the Creator-creature distinction remains a 
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basic principle by which Augustine pits himself against paganism(s) such as 
Manicheanism, but also the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus: “In the phrase, transcenden et te 
ipsum [transcend even yourself], we see what the unambiguous theism of Christianity 
has made of the Plotinian ecstasies. Any suggestion that the soul is itself an extension of 
the divinity has to be undercut.”
427
 In light of this basic Creator-creature distinction, one 
cannot but point to the stark difference between Henry’s (perhaps Manichaean?) 
interpretation of Augustine and the porous self this chapter shall bring to light with help 
of Augustine. To the porosity of the imago Dei we now turn. 
 
 §27. THE IMAGO DEI 
  God, whose repose is outside of time, is nevertheless the creator et ordinator 
temporum and therefore intimately involved in the temporal horizon of creation, 
especially the crowning achievement of creation, the living imago Dei (§26). But 
how is the imago Dei’s relation to God conceptualized in view of such a temporal 
distinction? How does a temporal creature image that which is outside of time? 
Augustine’s discussion of temporality in books 10 and 11 of the Confessions remain 
landmark philosophical explorations of the nature and function of time and have 
decidedly shaped the Western notions of “self.” While we shall attend to those 
important insights throughout, a fuller portrait of the temporality of the porous self as 
imago Dei shall emerge if that account is complemented by another landmark text, 
De Trinitate. In this work he defines the self’s natural affinity for the eternal in 
context of its identity as the crowning achievement of creation, its status as imago 
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Dei: the self, “cannot achieve so great a good except by being his image.”
428
 And 
there, “is such potency in this image of God that it is capable of cleaving to him 
whose image it is.”
429
 It is especially in De Trinitate that Augustine highlights the 
peculiar structure of the imago Dei as both interior and exterior. We shall describe 
the two-sided structure as the “double entry” of the porosity of display. Situated 
between the entries to time and eternity, the imago Dei does not merely represent a 
position I take up but is my zero-point of orientation. In other words, the imago Dei 
in its porosity is essentially who I am as this “me,” this dative pole given to myself 
through creation. It is here that our own interpretation of the self as “porous” 
complicates Henry’s duplicitous self.   
 We have said that the porous self reflects God, and in that reflecting, assumes 
the status as the imago Dei. Henry critiques the very logic of “imaging,” however. He 
contends that it is, not a living, but a “dead” activity precisely because it “reflects.” If 
one were to look through Henry’s finely-ground lens of the principle of the duplicity 
of display, one shall conclude that the temporal streaming of the world-horizon sets 
into operation this artificial power of imaging. In other words, for Henry, nothing in 
the world appears as it really is. The temporal flux of the world throws phenomena 
outside of themselves into a sphere different from themselves, opening up a gap 
between phenomena as they appear in themselves and as they appear in the world. 
Thus the so-called truth of the world is such that phenomena are “being given outside 
themselves, being deprived of themselves, being emptied of themselves in their very 
appearing, never giving their own reality but only the image of that reality that 
annihilates itself in the moment they are given. They are given in such a way that 
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their appearance is also their disappearance, the incessant annihilation of their reality 
in the image of it.”
430
 Henry argues that the “self in the world” appears as an 
objective correlate which “images” or “mirrors” the self’s real interior presence. 
Consequently, the self on visible display in the world is an optical reflection or 
exterior image and thus “dead” insofar as it is not the thing itself. The living kernel of 
the duplicitous self lies in its immediate feeling of itself with no gap between that 
feeling and itself. 
 Henry also contends that the lifeless affair of imaging resembles the 
formidable but deplorable philosophical structure of consciousness known as 
“representation.” Made popular in German, the term is vorstellen, quite literally 
“standing before,” a posture that defines the ontological status of the “I” with respect 
to that of which it is conscious. I “represent” objects to myself by putting them at a 
distance from myself. Cognitive reflection accords to representation pride of place 
when it comes to not only awareness of objects but also to self-awareness. The logic 
of the notion that “I am only insofar as I represent” is therefore a lifeless logic 
according to Henry precisely because it reflects the destructive logic of imaging: “It 
would be the same for the ‘I’ of the ‘I represent’ as it is for the tree that is said to 
reflect itself in the river and the reflection that the river returns. As if the fact of the 
image being posed before the tree and of its returning to the tree were enough to 
make the tree an ego; as if a reflexive pronoun were sufficient to cause the 
emergence of that ego’s ipseity whenever it was required.”
431
 For Henry, his critique 
of the self-reflexive power of the ego applies equally to the imago Dei. The distance 
or gap between God and the image of God alienates the two parties involved. But is 
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Henry right to claim that the imago Dei is nothing other than a mirror reflection of 
God, as if the human ego is the “representation” of God that God receives back after 
looking into a lake?  
 As we saw in part two, Henry’s duplicitous is susceptible to a kind of 
qualified monism in which the reality of the self is interior and non-temporal to the 
exclusion of the exterior self in the temporal and bodily horizon of the world. 
Further, it is, as we argued, a theological monism in that this interior reality of the 
ego is unified without temporal distance with Christ’s flesh. To interpose a gap 
between my flesh and the “Word made flesh,” as the imago Dei accomplishes, is to 
throw me outside of life altogether, according to Henry. To “image” God is 
insufficient, Henry insists, and this is because life must receive its capacity to live 
immediately from God. Henry condemns the imago Dei explicitly on these grounds. 
He writes: “is not an image, because in fact images exist only in the world, against 
the background of this original putting-into-image [doneé-en-image] that is the 
horizon of the world in its ek-static phenomenalization. If man were an image, if he 
were created in the way that the world was created, he would no longer be the 
‘image’ of God and carry in him the same essence, the essence of Life: he would no 
longer be, and could no longer be, a living.”
432
 Again we ask: does Henry here not 
display a facile understanding of the imago Dei? Is the imago Dei nothing other than 
a putting-into-image or reflection of God as if God were looking into a mirror or a 
calm lake?  
 Our proposal is not constructed on the premise that the imago Dei is complicit 
in a type of mirroring power. I am not simply a faint image of the divine. Nor do we 
                                                 
432
 Henry, I am the Truth, 103.  Also see Henry, Incarnation, 115-20. 
255 
 
argue that the imago Dei is tantamount to the God’s conscious representational power 
to throw phenomena before God’s gaze so as to reflect on them at a distance. The 
imago Dei is tantamount to the porosity that exceeds the mere reflecting capacity of a 
mirror inasmuch as the porosity is a non-reflective interior word, a self-proximity 
held together by its interior fracture or fissure to God. This is to say that without a 
fracture within temporality to the non-temporal presence of God, the porous self is 
subject to Henry’s critique that the imago Dei is forever alienated from God. Without 
the structural porosity we are advancing, the ceaseless streaming of temporality leads 
to an egregious destination, the abyss of nothingness: “Indeed we cannot truly say 
that time exists except in the sense that it tends towards non-existence.”
433
 So while 
the porous self is a homo temporalis oscillating between past and future, it is also 
porous to that which is present to itself in the presence of the present: namely, God. 
Remaining temporally distinct from God and thereby never able to make God a 
phenomenon present to me, the porous self is nevertheless porous to God because it 
images God, which unveils how it is possible that I contain the mysterious capacity 
“by which even the eternal and unchanging nature can be recalled, beheld and 
desired—it is recalled by memory, beheld by intelligence, embraced by love—[it] has 
thereby found the image of that supreme trinity.”
434
 Yet how do we describe the 
double entry of the porosity of display as between time and eternity? If the imago Dei 
is not separated by an impenetrable gap and is not simply a reflection of the divine, 
then how is it structured? 
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 §29.  THE HOMO TEMPORALIS AND THE ETERNAL: THE DOUBLE ENTRY 
 We describe the imago Dei on the basis of a “double entry:” its temporal 
appearings in the world-horizon (exterior entry) joined to its interior, non-reflective 
self-awareness fractured to that which is outside of time (interior entry). Couched in 
these terms, the imago Dei is porous rather than duplicitous because the porous self 
realizes its identity before God (without making God a phenomenon present inside 
me) by making use of temporal world-engagements, bodily acts and intentional 
displays. But before we phenomenologically analyze the nature of such temporal 
world-engagements, bodily acts and intentional displays from an eschatological point 
of view, we must outline how the structure of the porous self avoids up front the 
temptation to be reduced to the world-horizon alone. Because the porous self is an 
imago Dei it puts into play a deeply spiritual way of life that appreciates the inward 
journey to a God who transcends the world-horizon. The possibility of such a 
spiritual quest, however, is based on a peculiar structure, a porosity of display ordered 
by a double-entry, one exterior in which I am amid others in a temporal world, and 
one interior that fractures me to God. We take the exterior entry first. 
 We associate the exterior entry with the temporal streaming of the self, i.e., 
the distentio animi. This capacity highlights the human animus’ distention through 
the past (memoria) as it anticipates or leans into the future (expectatio), a double 
movement which marks with precision a basic feature of the porous self: its 
inescapable immersion in temporal streaming of the exterior world.
435
 That the 
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porous self experiences itself in a state of distentio is not a metaphor, but rather 
figures in our vocabulary as a name for life itself, as the imposition of a concrete 
awareness of being this “me” burdened with constant change in a horizon of objects, 
other subjects and linguistic meaning-schemes caught in the interplay between future 
and past.
436
 The porous self cannot help but remain subject to the variation, change 
and multiplicity of the temporal flow of the world, and this ongoing flow can be 
painful, burdensome and heavy.
437
 Temporality, “my life,” i.e., ecce distentio est vita 
mea,
438
 constitutes me all the way down, penetrating and pervading all of my 
intentional acts and world-engagements. It is an aspect of the porous self that, in an 




 Its temporal dispersal, moreover, orients it away from itself. That is, as this 
me given as a dative pole in and through creation, I dwell in the world-horizon 
always already “outside” myself, exterior to pure self-presence. I cannot escape the 
temporal streaming from future to past as it sinks into the depths of memory on 
toward nothingness. Defined as distentio animi the porous self therefore remains 
always at a basic distance from itself, harbouring an internal temporal gap.  
 The reason the exterior entry appears in the temporal streaming of the world-
horizon is that temporality is dispossessed of the “present moment.” Temporality 
appears as a strenuous flow to me because I cannot achieve presence, the living self-
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impression that is outside of time. The present eludes me in that temporality is 
temporalized because it does not incorporate the present, for the present impression 
is uniquely non-temporal, i.e., self-present. Temporality “flies so quickly from future 
into past that the present is an interval with no duration.”
440
 This “present has no 
extension.”
441
 Without the present, the self is carried along by time in either the 
backward direction of memory or the forward motion of expectation. The porous self 
temporalizes itself in and through movement. It temporalizes itself, in other words, 
not in spite of, but by virtue of the absence of the present: “If the present were 
always present, it would not pass into the past: it would not be time but eternity.”
442
 
Thanks to the absence of the present, I am not self-present reposing upon myself 
without difference or distance. Unlike Henry’s self-present interior self, the porous 
self is delayed by time, always too late to arrive at itself in the present. Before I can 
embrace myself in pure immediacy and set within myself, like concrete sets and 
stiffens by binding its aggregate parts together, I am taken away from myself by the 
(strenuous) flow of time. The temporal flow in which I am immersed determines me 
in my creaturehood. Temporality imposes itself on me prior to judgment or 
reflection, for temporality is a brute fact and thus, “I know myself to be conditioned 
by time...”
443
  I am always already thrown into time without delay, already found 
there in that exterior field of display, as an apodictic fact of creation itself—a fait 
accompli. 
 The porous self is irrepressibly temporal, a factum, thanks to creation. The 
creation of time is co-emergent with the creation of the world and myself within it. 
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To be in the world is to be in time and vice versa: “Beyond doubt, then, the world 
was made not in time, but simultaneously with time.”
444
 As a consequence God, 
“made time itself. Time could not elapse before you made time. But if time did not 
exist before heaven and earth, why do people ask what you were then doing? There 
was no ‘then’ when there was no time.”
445
 Indeed, “Time itself is something created 
and thus itself also has a beginning, and is not co-eternal with the creator.”
446
 In the 
apt words of Jean-Luc Marion, “The double event of creation sets me within the 
emergence [advenir] of time itself. The event which takes itself from the mens and 
on which imposes the distentio consists in the event of time, of tempus creatum. This 
event is absolute and without condition is named not only an event, but a coming of 
an event—the coming of time itself.”
447
 As created and thereby intrinsically 
ensconced in time, the porous self remains at a distance from itself within the 
exterior horizon of temporality, in the ceaseless arrival of time.  
 But the porous self remains at a distance, too, not just from itself but from 
God, a distance made, a fortiori, more radical by God’s eternality. Because the 
porous self is given to itself as a finite creature whose existence is primordially tied 
to the temporal streaming of the world-horizon as a fait accompli, to escape the 
world is never an option. To be outside pure self-presence and thus “outside myself” 
(i.e., ek-stasis, or standing out from) in the world is my state, which means I am 
immersed in time and distinct from God. Moreover, the reason I cannot achieve self-
presence in the present is that only God is purely present: an eternal and unchanging 
self-presence without past or future. God is God’s eternity: “Eternity is the very 
                                                 
444
 Augustine, City of God, 11, 6. 
445
 Augustine, Confessions, 11, 13, 15. 
446
 Augustine, Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis, 1, 8. Also see Confessions 11, 14, 17; City 
of God, 12.15. 
447
 Marion, Au lieu de soi: L’approche de Saint Augustin, 304. 
260 
 
substance of God, which has nothing changeable; there nothing is past, as if it were 
no longer: nothing is future, as if it existed not as yet. There is nothing there but, 
Is.”
448
 In praising God, the porous self has no right to domesticate God within the 
temporality of creation, and so, exempt of time, God dwells “in the sublimity of an 
eternity which is always in the present, you are before all things past and transcend 
all things future, because they are still to come, and when they have come they are 
past.”
449
 God is manifest as self-present, with no internal gap and no fracture 
between genitive and dative poles. Always present, in “constant eternity,”
450
 God is 
timeless, unchanging and thus “cannot be measured by the standard of things visible, 
changeable, mortal and deficient.”
451
 If the porous self could achieve self-presence in 
the present (i.e., close its temporal gap), then it would surely, like Henry’s 
duplicitous self, accomplish a duplicity, a pure interior self wherein God is present as 
a phenomenon cleaved from its outward “representation.” We insist once again here 
that the factum of temporality guarantees the temporal distinction between myself 
and my proximity to myself as well as between me and my proximity to God—a fact 
that guarantees God is never a phenomenon present to me but always just beyond 
me. 
 This yields to the second entry: the interior fracture to the eternal. The 
porosity of display maintains that, while I appear in the exterior horizon of the 
temporal streaming of the world, I am inwardly self-aware, and through this entry to 
myself I am fractured to the eternal presence of God. Yet, this interior entry is not 
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purely “interior” as if it were independent of the interplay between past and future. 
Rather, my interior entry is “interior” in the sense that I appear to myself there prior 
to language and intentionality as well as the objective aspect of my visible body. So, 
while the porous self is interior, it remains nonetheless within the temporal streaming 
of exteriority. This is tantamount to saying that the porous self is porous to that with 
which it does not share an essence. As this “me” given to myself by God, I image 
God but I do so from a temporal gulf lodged between us: “This image made to the 
image of God is not equal and co-eternal with him whose image it is.”
452
 We shall 
devote the next section (§29) to developing this uniquely interior self-awareness 
wherein I am fractured to God. 
 We may first offer a précis of the double-entry at this juncture. Created and 
given to myself within the temporal streaming of the world-horizon, I appear in the 
exterior entry always at a distance from myself as this dative pole and, too, at 
distance from God. I cannot leave the world, because as created there, my 
temporality pervades me entirely, it is a fait accompli. But as the imago Dei, I am 
inwardly porous to God through an interior entry, since I am not isolated from that 
which I image. In spite of my exterior state situated within the temporal streaming of 
the world, my proper object of love and worship is God: “To put it in a word, let it 
worship the uncreated God by whom it was created with a capacity for him and able 
to share in him.”
453
 But the capacity to contemplate the eternal raises the obvious 
question: how can the porous self, created in time and subject to the distentio of the 
past and future, image a God who is outside of time and who is perfectly full in 
God’s self-presence?  Does the temporal distinction the imago Dei presupposes pose 
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an impossible abyss between the pure actuality of God and my temporal 
contingency? And if so, does this abyss not frustrate the very ground of possibility 
for the imago Dei to image that which it has been created to image? How can the 
imago Dei become incandescent, shining as a created icon illuminated by God’s 
glorious eternal light if the imago Dei dwells in a temporal streaming absolutely 
incommensurable with the invisible eternal glory of God?  
 Our proposal of the double-entry overcomes this problematic by 
acknowledging that God endows me with an interior porosity that undercuts up front 
the notion that there is an absolute temporal gulf between myself and God. Through 
this interior entry, God’s self-presence remains at once inviolable, and yet, proximate 
to me. The porous self achieves its ipseity in the tension between the temporality of 
the world-horizon and the opening to the timeless essence of God, a double-entry 
that orders the two fields of display not in “either/or” terms. Time and eternity are 
not opposed to one another, as if they are absolutely heterogeneous to one other in an 
interminable war of absolute grammars (and therefore giving way to a duplicitous 
self). Understood to be between the two fields, the porous self arrives at itself in a 
temporal world-horizon created by God, which because it is created as gift and called 
good by God, is a temporal streaming that harbours within its temporal economy an 
opening to God whose timeless self-donation is “more intimate to me than I am to 
myself.”
454
 Our proposal so articulated here acknowledges my creaturehood but 
simultaneously refuses to reduce me to the field of temporal display alone. I am more 
than my appearance in the world (though certainly not less).    
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 Indeed, the porosity of display as we propose it here unequivocally 
deconstructs any attempt to reduce selfhood to the temporal world-horizon alone. 
Subject to the temporal streaming of the world-horizon and its luminous appearings 
of things to me (genitive and dative), the porous self can draw near inwardly to the 
constancy of God. But I draw near to God not in manner that God’s plenitude is 
manifest inside my temporal streaming, whether as a divine object of display in 
consciousness or as an object of bodily arousal—God is never a phenomenon present 
to me. Rather, the porous self is porous to the eternal by virtue of the distance or gap 
between time and eternity. But it is through its seeking after God across this fractured 
gap without at the same time being able to bridge it that constitutes the power of the 
interior entry to be lived as a spiritual seeking, or “pilgrimage.” So while the interior 
entry to the eternal can be clogged, I am nevertheless this me because I am given to 
myself by a God in whose image I was made. The temporal display of the world is a 
field of display created by a God who finally is not disentangled from creation (as if 
God were a Deist or a causa sui) but who is “both interior to everything, because in 




 It remains for us to clarify with greater phenomenological care how this 
interior entry, as a non-reflective site of manifestation, is describable. How is the 
interior intimacy with God to be, after all, a phenomenologically observable field of 
experience? To refine the structure of the double entry, we must proceed to show 
how the inner entry is manifest, how it is a site in which I appear most intimately to 
myself and open myself to the eternal Verbum.   
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 §29. VERBUM INTIMUM AND THE ABSENCE OF THE PRESENT 
 How can a temporal creature image that which transcends time? The 
resolution to this ostensible problem lies in what we described as the double-entry 
(§28), a structure made possible in virtue of its status as creāta imago Dei (§27). The 
particular structure of the double-entry accommodates both interior and exterior 
fields, and in this section we probe the prospective interior field of display. The 
porous self in its interior display also mounts here a strong critique of pure interiority 
by vanquishing the strict either/or paradigm that defines Henry’s duplicitous self. 
Alternatively, the interior field of display we are proposing, inhabited by the verbum 
intimum, an inner word by which the porous self opens onto God, instantiates itself 
in the temporal streaming of the visible world. Inescapably temporal, and thereby 
quarantined from the presence of pure interiority, the verbum intimum functions 
nevertheless as a non-reflective “inner” word by which I know and love myself in the 
temporal streaming of the world-horizon. To show just how this non-reflective word 
is “inner” without collapsing into a domain of pure interiority is the task of this 
section.  
 The verbum intimum is, hence, much more than an interior non-reflective 
self-awareness. It designates the site of porosity to God inasmuch as it is not 
abandoned to temporal streaming alone. As the imago Dei itself, the non-reflective 
word is porous to the Word of God. As will be instructive for us momentarily, it is 
important to note here that it is in and through this inner word that the porous self 
unclogs its entry to the eternal, putting into play a spirituality of seeking. To pursue 
that which transcends time, I receive myself inwardly by grace only to unclog my 
pores not by lurching further outward into the temporal horizon of the world willy 
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nilly but rather by setting firmly within myself. But this setting firmly within myself 
lays the proper groundwork for an outward movement to be set into motion, a 
purposeful temporal movement impelled by faith in both the past (memoria) and 
future (epektasis) directions that proceed upward, curving toward the present (§§30-1 
below). In this section we take one step behind the spirituality of seeking and its 
attendant temporal movements to show that they originate first in an inner word. 
 
Non-reflective Self-Awareness 
 When discussing the non-reflective articulation of the “inner” word by which 
I am self-aware, the correlation between genitive and dative poles of appearing we 
introduced in chapter one remains intact. But the genitive and dative aspects are 
resituated together within the self. Normally the genitive is an object, like a chair, 
that appears to me as the dative. With regard to the structure of the inner word, the 
appearing of something (genitive) for me (dative) come together in the closest 
possible unity within me, converging upon me without coinciding (as they do in 
Henry). I appear to myself intimately, so that the genitive (appearing of something) 
and the dative (appearing to) together are a unity within me prior to reflective 
display, whereas in reflective display there is a sharp separation between the object 
given and the lived-experience of that object. The non-reflective word inside me is 
structured by the genitive and dative, yet their integration is maximal to the point 
before dissolving into each other. I appear (genitive) to myself (dative) without 
collapsing the genitive and dative together into an original self-presence.  
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 The porosity of display is set thus held together by an interior word, a verbum 
intimum (verbum verum nostrum intimum).
456
 This inner word, to re-emphasize, is 
the site in which my pores are opened to the presence of God without making God 
present to me as a phenomenon. Yet this verbum intimum is also that ongoing word 
constitutive of the porous self’s self-awareness as a singular “me.” The porous self 
approximates itself in its self-aware self-displaying most intimately by way of the 
same interior word through which its porosity to God is opened. Yet how do we 
describe this interior field of display as a non-reflective “interior” site? The verbum 
intimum joins me to myself in and through self-knowledge and self-love: 
 
The mind loving is in love, and the love is in the knowledge of the 
lover, and the knowledge is in the mind knowing. They are each in 
the other two, because the mind which knows and loves itself is in 
its love and knowledge, and the love of the mind loving and 
knowing itself is in the mind and its knowledge, and the 
knowledge of the mind knowing and the loving itself is in the 
mind and its love, because it loves itself knowing and knows itself 






The verbum intimum conceived in this way speaks to me intimately inasmuch as I 
find myself there, in that self-revelation of myself expressed as a word, “and since it 
loves knowledge and knows love, the word is in the love and the love in the word 
and both in the lover and the utterer.”
458
 And, “the kind of word then that we are now 
wishing to distinguish and propose is ‘knowledge with love’ [cum amore notitia].”
459
 
But what kind of word is this verbum intimum uttered in the heart as “knowledge 
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with love” that brings the porous self proximate to itself? Is this verbum intimum a 
word spoken to others formed with syllables and sounds? Is it a mental word seen by 
the mind’s eye before I speak? Is it something altogether different? We are given a 
clue in what follows:  
And so we must come to that word of man, the word of a rational 
animal, the word of the image of God, which is not born of God 
but made by God, the word which is neither uttered in sound no 
thought of in the likeness of sound, which necessarily belongs to 
some language, but which precedes all the signs that signify it and 
is begotten of the knowledge abiding in the consciousness, when 
this knowledge is uttered inwardly just exactly as it is. When it is 
uttered vocally or by some bodily sign, it is not uttered just exactly 





The verbum intimum is a primal word spoken to myself from within myself, my self-
identifying word, “before any sound, before any thought of sound [verbum ante 
omnem sonum, ante omnem cogitationem soni].”
461
 Quite literally, the verbum 
intimum delivers me to myself by way of an interior self-awareness, a self-proximity 
realized through a pre-linguistic, non-reflective word. This non-reflective word 
carries within it both the self-awareness of myself and my presence in the world as 
this particular “me” whose actions are mine and whose thoughts are mine. It is non-
reflective in the sense that I know and love myself as a “me” who is alive as this 
particular self prior to consciously reflecting on it, even before all thinking of the 
sound of the word (ante omnem cogitationem soni).  
 The verbum intimum is manifest, moreover, as a self-awareness that is 
distinct from introspection or searching for myself, for “it is one thing not to know 
oneself, another not to think about oneself.”
462
 This certainly highlights that the 
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verbum intimum is manifest as a streaming self-awareness, not as a phenomenon 
unveiled by reflective searching or an act of introspection. I cannot find the verbum 
intimum by playing the role of a spectator looking inward (à la Husserl’s 
phenomenological reduction). The inner word functions not as a style of inner 
perception or introspection in which I speak to myself or interrogate myself by (as 
one contemporary philosopher describes it), “taking a (non-optical) ‘look’ at what is 
passing his mind... He can reflectively or introspectively watch, without any bodily 
organ of sense, the current episodes of his inner life.”
463
 The inner word is intimate 
not because it is a “Ghost in the machine” subject to the power of reflective self-
observation but because it is non-reflective. That is, it is prior to linguistic phonemes 
or the reflective power of an ego to observe itself through introspection. The porous 
self through its inner word, “does not have to look for itself as if it were not available 
to itself.”
464
 To be sure, the verbum intimum appears as an ongoing streaming self-
awareness that never leaves the temporal streaming of the porous self created and 
given to itself by God. Internal and personal to itself, this word is given inwardly in 
the sense that it reflects a self-proximity, one that “is quite interior to itself [interior 
est enim ipsa].”
465
 As such, the porous self does not intermittently know itself but is 
always already aware of itself given that “there was never a time when the mind did 
not love itself, when it did not know itself.”
466
 Even when it is looking for itself, it is 
always already self-aware, it “knows itself even when it is looking for itself.”
467
 
 Yet in the block excerpt immediately above, the self-proximate verbum 
intimum appears as a word “which precedes all the signs that signify it and is 
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begotten of the knowledge abiding in the consciousness, when this knowledge is 
uttered inwardly just exactly as it is.” The porous self knows itself in its streaming 
non-reflective self-awareness through a self-knowledge/self-love “utter inwardly just 
exactly as it is.” Does this not raise the spectre of pure self-presence? So, when the 
porous self is told to “know thyself,” is it able to know itself for “no other reason 
than that it is present to itself”?
468
 Is its self-presence no different than Henry’s 
theory of pure auto-affection in which the ego coincides exactly with itself in pure 
interiority?  
 We recall here Henry’s theory of auto-affection is a pure self-awareness 
manifest without reference to anything outside itself (and thus vulnerable to a non-
temporal monism). Yet the porous self we have articulated thus far displays an inner 
word “uttered just exactly as it is” in the sense that it describes a streaming 
displaying of the self in its interior domain, intimate and proximate to itself—not 
self-present. The interior domain of the porous self therefore resides always in the 
exterior temporal field of the world, the streaming distentio. The porous self, even in 
its non-reflective verbum, cannot escape its temporal condition and thus cannot 
coincide with itself without also appearing as a creature in submission to the 
temporal fragmentation of the world (i.e., strenuous play between future and past). 
When the verbum intimum, “knows itself and loves itself, it does not know and love 
something unchangeable.”
469
 If it is not self-present, then how does the verbum 
intimum surmount self-presence without succumbing to a pernicious temporal 
fragmentation?  
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 The verbum intimum arrives at itself continually with reference to itself, and 
so, overcomes the absolute fragmentation of temporality—but it does not escape the 
“changeability” of temporality. So unlike Henry’s theory of self-presence realized in 
and through a living present (that is non-temporal), the porous self is proximate to 
itself through a temporal non-reflective self-awareness fractured to the living present. 
As both self-proximate and temporal, the verbum intimum avoids both spectres of 
self-presence and fragmentation. am not self-present, however, I am not therefore 
resigned to being a “bundle of temporal impressions” or an optical illusion forever 
alienated from myself through the temporal streaming of the world. Held together by 
an inner word, I enjoy a non-reflective self-knowledge and self-love of myself that 
nevertheless remains in the flow of time. In light of the title of this section, we are 
maintaining that the verbum intimum is without the living present inasmuch as it is 
not self-present, a phenomenological fact we already established by portraying 
temporality as a fait accompli. 
 We thus come upon the triadic disclosure of the interior shape of the verbum 
intimum: memory-knowledge-love that brings to light how I am both temporal and 
intimate to myself. It is in the temporal streaming of memory that self-knowledge 
and self-love appear, for “I find my understanding and my love in my memory, 
where it is I who understand, I who love.”
470
 While I am a singular “me,” I 
incorporate three actions in a unity so that when I am loving I am also knowing and 
remembering. Similarly, when I am knowing, I am also loving and remembering, and 
etc. Accordingly, the porous self puts into play a temporal self-awareness anchored 
in the memory, as if the it reaches for itself in a constant backwards motion, seeking 
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to catch up to the present (while never grasping the present). Certainly, the temporal 
ecstasy of expectation, the leaning forward into the future, is constitutive of the 
porous self. Ineluctably conditioned by memory, the future is, however, a modality 
of the memory—“it is not foresight that instructs us how to foresee, but memory.”
471
 
Even though the porous self is a distentio dispersed into future and past ecstasies, it 
is only thanks to memory that the self-proximity of the verbum intimum can be 
materialized (yet, the future, and especially the expectation rooted in the parousia, 
can be deployed as a means of unclogging the ego’s pores, see §30 below). It is this 
peculiar triad of knowing-loving-remembering that constitutes the non-reflective 
self-proximity of myself to myself that is neither purely present nor injuriously and 
ceaselessly fractured by the flux of time. 
 
An (In)visible Word 
 Given that it submits to the temporal streaming of the world-horizon, is the 
verbum intimum necessarily in plain sight, visible in the world? We have suggested 
that the temporal streaming of the verbum intimum disallows it from collapsing in on 
itself, falling prey to the pure interiority of the living present. As such, the porous 
self’s temporal streaming is of a piece with the opening of the visible world. But this 
seems inconsistent with the non-reflective character of the verbum intimum. If its 
self-proximity and self-intimacy is temporal but undetectable on the body and 
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inexpressible by linguistic speech acts, how can it also appear as a phenomenon 
within the luminous space of the world? 
 The verbum intimum assumes an “interior” shape. As a self-awareness prior 
to language, the physical body and the complete visibility of the world, the verbum 
intimum is given with a style of verification unique to its (in)visibility. In 
phenomenological terms, the verbum intimum is situated between auto-affection and 
hetero-affection, an impure site where neither the pure presence of auto-affection 
(invisible) nor the pure difference of hetero-affection (visible) predominates. Though 
I cannot escape the temporal order of the world, and thus always remain “myself” 
within the backdrop of hetero-affection and temporal difference (“I know myself to 
be conditioned by time”), my verbum intimum is not entirely visible in the world. 
This is to say that the verbum intimum displays a temporality that implies the eternal. 
Indeed, the porous self’s distentio through the past and future implies it is missing 
that which it cannot experience, the living present of eternity, a simultaneity with no 
reference to past or future. In this sense, and even if shrouded in ambiguity, the 
verbum intimum by which I am self-aware and thus proximate to myself appears as 
an (in)visible phenomenon.  
 One way to clarify the peculiar nature of the (in)visible phenomenon of non-
reflective self-awareness is to discuss the interrelation of the reflective and non-
reflective modalities of awareness. The verbum intimum appears non-reflectively and 
resists appearing within the reflective “lighthouse” of consciousness that purports to 
render visible all that may come into its purview (see Husserl chapter two). Yet 
because the porous self “knows itself even when it is looking for itself,”
472
 its 
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reflective power as a “lighthouse” is always accompanied by a non-reflective 
knowledge, love and memory of itself. For the porous self, reflective consciousness 
is accompanied by a primal verbum intimum that is manifest beneath reflective 
consciousness and linguistic performance. How exactly the non-reflective and 
reflective states relate to one another is not necessarily important for our purposes 
here. What is important is that the non-reflective inner word is not visible in the same 
way a visible word is in its display of the reflective “lighthouse.” And correlatively, 
the non-reflective inner word is not enclosed upon itself within the pure domain of 
invisible display as in Henry’s duplicitous self. Rather, the porous self, always 
visible in the world and its temporal streaming, finds itself intimately self-aware 
through an inner word that, because it does not appear in the field of reflective 
display, is (in)visible. 
 
Interior Porosity 
 The theological property of the verbum intimum is its porosity to the eternal. 
Its interiority is not distinct from the field of visible display yet it nevertheless points 
to that which is invisible and not of this world: it displays a likeness to the invisible 
Word, and it is the “Word of God we are now seeking to see, however imperfectly, 
through this likeness.”
473
 It has been established that the verbum intimum indicates a 
phenomenon lived interior to the self while not bifurcating the self between 
irreparable “interior” and “exterior” domains. Yet, as we shall see in the subsequent 
sections of this chapter (§§ 30-1), the verbum intimum is distinct from the reflective 
“lighthouse” in that the verbum intimum is porous to the living present of God. Like 
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an aperture to the eternal, the verbum intimum pulls the ego toward the divine Word, 
toward a vision of the divine Word in whose image it is made. Thus, “if you wish to 
arrive at some kind of likeness of the Word of God, however unlike it may be in 
many ways, do not look at that word of ours which sounds in the ears, neither when it 
is uttered vocally nor when it is thought of silently... we must go beyond all these and 
come to that word of man through whose likeness of a sort the Word of God may 
somehow or other be seen in an enigma.”
474
 This is to say that my selfhood as this 
particular “me” appears in that (in)visible word that, as a temporal phenomenon, is 
uniquely porous to the eternal (and is thus a word between the temporal world and 
the living present).  
 And so while the peculiar property of the verbum intimum is that it is porous 
to the living present, we insist once again that it is not born from within the living 
present. To express it another way, I share in temporality (homo temporalis), and as a 
created self with perceptible temporal qualities, I am phenomenologically 
observable. The enigma of the double entry emerges at this juncture insofar as the 
interior porosity to the present cannot be brought fully to light but neither can it be 
divorced from the reflective lighthouse. There is no abyss separating the non-
reflective (interior) and reflective (exterior) fields of display. The porosity of display 
therefore opens up a space in which the interior word, as a non-reflective 
phenomenon fractured to the present, is also immersed in the temporal flow of the 
world. As such, the verbum intimum is able to be rendered visible in the world 
through reflective intentional acts (we intend to show how this is so in the next two 
sections).  
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 In summary, the verbum intimum is a word that is made in the likeness of the 
Word of God, the “Word made flesh” whose self-presence is purely self-present, 
perfect, simple and unchanging. This divine Word, because it is “neither formless nor 
formed in its eternal and unchangeable substance,”
475
 transcends the human word. 
The divine Word, because it is co-eternal with the Father and of the same substance 
in its pure simplicity, transcends all of creation. The two words, one human and one 
divine, are indeed alike, “such a word of ours then we have found to be somehow or 
other like that one,”
476
 but we should insist on “how great the dissimilarity is in 
whatever similarity there may be.”
477
 It is as if, through this verbum intimum, the 
porous self looks at God through a glass darkly in an enigma. I cannot overcome my 
temporal distance, as if I could leap into the presence of divine co-substantiality: 
“Our true and innermost word is only uttered by our thinking, only God can be 
understood to have an everlasting Word co-eternal with himself.”
478
 Whereas 
Henry’s proposal of the language of life internal to my pure  living present is co-
substantial with Christ thereby making God a phenomenon present to me in isolation 
from the language of the world (§22), our proposal does not bifurcate the self 
between two languages. I have one language with two styles of givenness, one non-
reflective and the other reflective. So, the imago Dei, this “me” as porous to God, is 
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§30. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AND EPEKTASIS  
 So far we have seen that the imago Dei is distinct from God because God 
created me (creāta imago Dei) within the temporal streaming as a fait accompli 
(§27); that despite my temporal streaming, I am endowed with an entry to the eternal 
in virtue of the self’s two-sided structure, the double-entry: one exterior in the world-
horizon, the other interior fractured to the eternal (§28); that my interior entry 
appears a non-reflective word fractured to the eternal and thus not subject to the 
same protocol of appearing of visible phenomena (i.e., without reference to linguistic 
utterance, the body, and reflective thought) (§29). Yet because the porous self is 
thrown into the field of visible display through the work of creation, the verbum 
intimum is not purely interior, as if divorced from the reflective intentional acts, 
linguistic utterances and bodily presences that appear in the temporal horizon of the 
world. In this section we elucidate how the linguistic-reflective performance of faith, 
as a profession of faith in God, brings to light the non-reflective word. With this in 
view, we examine faith’s futurity, the implementation of an eschatological desire, or 
epektasis. Whereas Henry seeks to disqualify the temporal field of visible display 
altogether, we are interested in a theological reorientation of temporality. 
 Before we elucidate epektasis, a brief word is in order about how the 
temporality of faith affects the temporal streaming of the porous self. It is only in 
virtue of the purging power of faith that the interior pores can be “unclogged,” 
opening onto the eternal. The temporality of faith is not simply added onto our 
original temporal condition. The temporality of faith is not like an elastic element 
stretched over the surface of what is originally a closed system of finite time. If that 
were the case, then we could simply disqualify or escape the temporal order, leaving 
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it to its finitude (like Henry does). Our proposal maintains that faith penetrates the 
fabric of time itself, transforming its character by distending it, by re-opening its 
porosity to a God who created time as originally good. For the porous self, then, faith 
carries its own living form of temporality, both past and future tenses. Leading 
toward that which is not in this world, faith is situated in the interval of 
“incommensurability” posed between the temporal and the eternal. Situated just so, 
faith is regulated by an immeasurable difference (without positing a gulf) between 
our temporal fragmentation and God’s pure simplicity and eternal presence. But it is 
not an absolute incommensurability. Faith, calibrated by its temporal economy, 
professes a God who is to come, and a God before whom we shall, at the final day, 
sit face to face. Before that eternal Sabbath, faith is given as gift of grace, as a 
contingent reality to sustain our seeking and, in fact, expresses itself as radically 
finite in its groping amid the horizon of the world wherein its utility as a temporal 
mode is evident. By seeking God through the contingent word of faith, the non-
reflective word becomes visible as an image of that eternal Word. Faith, then, is an 
unveiling of the self before God lead by the Spirit toward its terminus point where 
the porous self shall be unveiled completely before God, a self who shall proceed to 
“rest in you for the Sabbath of eternal life.”
479
 Faith carries me forward (extensio) 
while I am a pilgrim on this earth but expires when the aim of its gaze is fulfilled, 
when the eye of faith sees God face-to-face: “there will no longer be any faith by 
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 Always linked to the temporal horizon of the world while on pilgrimage, faith 
does not lead to escapism or disqualify the temporal horizon. Rather, faith radicalizes 
the Heideggerian future temporal ecstasy (“being-toward-death”) by stretching that 
temporal ecstasy toward the final destination of the saints. Epektasis, the Greek term 
that Paul used in Philippians 3.13-14 (“Forgetting what lies behind and straining 
forward [epekteinomenos] to what lies ahead, I press on toward the goal for the prize 
of the upward call of God in Christ Jesus”) is a an act of seeking for a God who is to 
come. Faith in a “Sabbath to come” is a Christian temporal act which temporalizes 
the self in view of an absolute future to come. It is appropriate that we identify the 
future ecstasy as a “seeking,” for epektasis signifies that the temporality of faith is a 
straining forward to what lies ahead, to what shall appear in that final day.
481
 It is 
described here eloquently:  
 
The Son of man who is mediator between you the One and us the 
many, who live in a multiplicity of distractions by many things; so 
‘I might apprehend him in whom also I am apprehended’ (Phil. 
3.12-14), and leaving behind the old days I might be gathered to 
follow the One, ‘forgetting the past’ and moving not towards those 
future things which are transitory but to ‘things which are before’ 
me, not stretched out in distraction but extended in reach, not by 
being pulled apart but by concentration. So, I ‘pursue the prize of 
the high calling’ where I ‘may hear the voice of praise’ and 






 Our proposal that faith incorporates futurity within a theological setting is an 
explicit critique of the finitude of Heidegger’s being-toward-death. Charles Taylor 
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has recently suggested that one crucial facet of human life which explains the 
secularity of our contemporary age lies in the gradual transformation of how we 
understand time. Secular time constitutes an interpretive grid that constrains us to 
experience time as radically finite and levelled, that is: purely horizontal in the 
world. Taylor suggests that secular time necessarily leads to the homogenization of 
the temporal movements. All time is the same and all time conforms to and is 
ordered by the finitude of the world. Industrialization, technology, science and the 
steady detaching of the self from God gave way over the last few centuries to a 
temporal framework in which “my” singular temporal flow finds its meaning only 
within the wider, mundane flow of objective world time; each “moment” is regulated 
to repeat itself by the mechanized consistency and perfect continuity of a finely tuned 
clock. A generic or “vulgar” world time sets the boundaries of life itself, secularizing 
the temporal dynamics of faith in a God who transcends time.
483
 Taylor rightly 
acknowledges that Heidegger’s analytic of being-in-the-world is profoundly original 




 Heideggerian time consists not of a successive trail of punctual moments 
regulated by a clock (chronos) but of a dynamic set of projections in light of one’s 
future death, an experience of time that “possibilizes” one’s existence anew each 
moment (kairos).
485
 We recall from chapter one (§7) that Heidegger reverses the self-
world temporal relationship of secular time: my individual temporal existence 
governs and, in fact, regulates my experience of the world (i.e., Dasein is world-
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forming). No longer does a generic world time determine my existence and my 
selfhood (homogenizing me). But Heidegger’s conception of being-in-the-world 
reworks temporality without reference to the theological roots it utilizes. Even 
though Heidegger’s being-toward-death may illustrate a helpful corrective to the 
monotony of chronos, being-toward-death does not avoid its emphatically secular 
tenor. At that very least, Heideggerian time appears buffered to and disengaged from 
(or clogged to) the eternal.
486
 Certainly, by privileging the future plane, Heidegger 
opens up a valuable space of expectation, possibility and “destiny.” Yet his notion of 
being-toward-death is radically finite, theologically inauthentic and thus “secular” in 
that it is grounded in the finitude of temporality and the coming termination of death. 
How does a theological critique of being-in-the-world shape, and in fact, transform 
the plane of time from secular expectation of a future inscribed in the world (death) 
to a theological expectation (epektasis) of an absolute future outside of death? While 
Henry’s solution was to escape temporality altogether, bifurcating the self between 
non-temporal and temporal fields of display, our proposal reincorporates time within 
an eschatological framework.  
 Through faith I do not escape this world but dwell within it hopefully.
487
 
Because it is a subjective temporality (“faith itself is temporal and finds a temporal 
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dwelling in the hearts of believers”)
488
 we seek for God by reference to the mood of 
hope (not angst), a hopeful posture, or distentio toward the City of God to come. As 
John Cavadini states, “Faith is thus revealed not merely as a propaedeutic to vision, 
but as a redirection of the noetic regard to a decidedly un-noetic realm, and 
‘understanding’ becomes the position of the self constituted by a growth wholly 
defined in that realm—it becomes that is a ‘seeking.’”
489
 And it is this seeking in 
hope through faith that culminates in the “perpetual Sabbath” of the City of God.
490
 
 A distentio without reference to the temporality of faith is secular, nothing 
more than being-toward-death. However, to radicalize the distentio beyond the limits 
of being-in-the-world is not to eradicate distentio altogether. To radicalize my 
distentio does not eradicate such a temporal movement but stretches it to its maximal 
degree, “distending” the distentio toward its eternal “terminus.” Faith, which 
engenders the existential mood of hope, redeems secular time by breaking open 
temporality itself to that which transcends time. To sanctify and redeem the distentio 
does not eliminate temporality; for a profession of faith stretches the porous self’s 
future possibilities to-be toward a future beyond death and angst
491
 to that absolute 
parousia where it shall see God face-to-face. This theological radicalization of the 
distentio framed by the parousia accords with Marion’s helpful judgment that 
distentio is transformed by faith into extensio toward God—my distracted state 
(distentio) translates into an existential attraction to God as I extend my temporal 
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destiny toward the eschaton (extensio).
492
 The theological radicalization of time 
extends temporal existence forward, unclogging its temporal esctasy to the absolute 
destiny to come. 
 The porous self so understood harbours a theological critique of Heidegger’s 
preoccupation with the future temporal plane, i.e., being-toward-death, in a way that 
does not simply disqualify it or invert it as Henry’s position tends to do.
493
 While 
Heidegger founds existential authenticity on the “possibility of impossibility” by 
which I (anxiously) create myself through my possibilities (do not rest on your 
laurels, but push forward!),
494
 the imago Dei repaired through faith both remembers 
the divine who can make it happy and strains impatiently (in hope) toward that 
absolute future in which faith is consummated and made happy in the full presence 
of God (parousia).
495
 While we wait in hope, we dwell in the future tense, in 
epektasis. It is though the porous self is looking at God while in this world through a 
glass darkly and in an enigma.
496
 My existential impatience, even restlessness, for the 
parousia is beaten back as I try to glimpse through faith the divine plenitude of 
Father and Son bonded by the love of the Spirit in their co-eternal aseity. Even the 
perfected imago Dei consists of a feeling of “absolute inadequacy.”
497
 This side of 
the eschaton, I remain temporal if even aware of myself as a “self” only because it is 
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seeking that which it cannot fully grasp: the eternal Verbum.
498
 To complete the 
temporality of faith we must explicate its backward directionality, its memoria. It is 
here that a fuller theological treatment of temporality can be realized and here, by 
engaging with Husserl, that pilgrimage can be understood in both its past and future 
directionalities.  
 
  §31. MEMORIA:  A CONTEMPLATIVE INTENTIONALITY 
 We sketch the final stage in the temporal pilgrimage to the eternal. We turn to 
a theological radicalization of Husserlian consciousness of internal-time, a mode of 
temporality which emphasizes the power of memory, i.e., retentional consciousness. 
To do so, we proceed from several facts already established: that my ek-static, 
temporal constitution is inescapable, a fait accompli (§27); that despite this temporal 
existence, I have been created with a double entry (§28); and that my entry to the 
eternal is a non-reflective word interior to me (§29). And finally, in the previous 
section we noted that the temporality of faith renders visible this inner word by 
distending my future beyond (without escaping) the temporal limit of being-toward-
death (§30). We highlight here the temporal limits of Husserlian retentional 
consciousness as a boundary through which the porous self’s memoria travels on its 
way toward the eternal. We recall once again that our proposal constitutes a counter-
move against Henry’s insistence that the self’s relation to God is non-temporal. 
Henry’s duplicitous self, moreover, is especially critical of memory. He writes that 
life in its pure self-presence, “is always present to itself, its memory without 
diversion, without thought, without a past, without memory—in its immemorial 
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memory. It is my flesh that is indivisible... it lies in the parousia of my flesh.”
499
 Our 
proposal of a contemplative intentionality takes aim against this kind of “living 
present” in which memory is disqualified altogether. 
 A redeemed memoria we are advocating in this section enacts a looking 
inward which gives way to an ascent, an inward pilgrimage inscribed within my non-
reflective word. We have seen that memory is of profound importance to not only the 
porous self’s non-reflective self-awareness but also to the interior awareness of God 
(without making God a phenomenon present to me).
500
 The temporal streaming of 
memory forms that special place wherein God draws near but whose presence as a 
living present is never grasped within that temporal flow. Hence, the verbum intimum 
contains an irrepressible memory of the immemorial. I am a fractured through 
memoria to the eternal call to desire the God in whose image I was made: “Where in 
my consciousness, Lord, do you dwell? What kind of sanctuary have you built for 
yourself? You conferred this honour on my memory that you should dwell in it...But 
you remain immutable above all things, and yet have deigned to dwell in my memory 
since the time I learnt about you.”
501
 My memory is porous to that which is not of 
this world, which is to say that I cannot, in principle, completely forget God (though 
I may repress that memory). Robert O’Connell observes that the imago Dei cannot 
have, “forgotten God completely. For if that were the case... No ‘reminder’ could 
ever succeed in awakening that lost memory.”
502
 This primordial memory of the 
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immemorial supervenes on the reawakening or remembering of this origin, a 
contemplative style of intentionality ordered by the temporality of faith.  
 To enjoy the memory of creation, a particular type of intentionality is to be 
performed with “every ounce and particle of one’s life.”
 503
 Just as my pores remain 
clogged when I am limited to the future horizon of being-in-the-world, similarly, 
they are clogged when fully matched to the strict phenomenological design of the 
temporal streaming of Husserl’s retentional consciousness. We must, to be sure, set 
our theological proposal of memoria within the horizon of Husserl’s consciousness 
of internal time, only to rupture its formalism by reworking temporality from an 
eschatological point of view. Though we have touched on retention in Husserl 
already, especially in light of how Henry critically appropriates the “living present” 
predicated on the duplicity of display (§9), we shall propose here the way in which 
the temporal streaming of retention can be submitted to theological modification 
without at the same time taking flight from temporality and our creaturehood. 
 Husserl claims the ego desires and craves fulfilment of objects so that it can 
manifest them as phenomena to consciousness.
504
 When it does fulfil that craving, 
the Husserlian ego phenomenalizes objects into phenomenality by way of retentional 
modification. In other words, the ego moves outward into the temporal horizon of the 
world in order to synthesis (or constitute) temporal objects into a unity of experience, 
what we called an intentional constitution (§6). This intentional constitution 
necessarily occurs, moreover, within the flow of the consciousness of internal time. 
The Husserlian ego experiences the impact of the objects in a temporal flow that 
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moves like a “comet’s tail”
505
 receding into the depths of the memory. One 
impression after another makes it impact that creates an ongoing temporal 
continuum, a continuum that is rooted in the ego itself because the ego is always the 
“referential centre of the whole surrounding world.”
506
 While Husserl does account 
for the future (protention) the present (the primal impression) and the past (retention) 
ecstasies, he confers the special privilege of holding consciousness together on the 
longitudinal expanse of retention. Consequently, he calls retentional consciousness a 
“unique kind of intentionality.”
507
 Take a melody for example. The melody gives 
itself point by point as the notes impact the ego. From the “perceived” note (not the 
note itself in the present), the tone is held in the memory and “holds onto” the 
elapsed tones themselves. In so doing, the retentional consciousness “progressively 
brings about the unity of the consciousness that is related to the unitary temporal 
object, to the melody.”
508
 In virtue of its longitudinal expanse and maximal unifying 
power, Husserl gives to retention the perceptual integrity required for constitution at 
all, for “retention constitutes the living horizon of the now.”
509
 Calling retention a 
“horizontal intentionality,” he claims that it unifies, by holding together in the closest 
possible unity, the conscious experience of time so that the flow of temporality is 
stretched, gradually and linearly, without rupture, from the primal impression to the 
retention, to the retention of the retention backward until it fades.
510
 On such an 
account, the temporal flow proceeds from the present toward nothingness in a 
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sustained, prefixed and compact horizontal flow, for the present “continually dies” 
away as it recedes carefully within the strict and stable boundaries of the subject’s 
memory, as if such boundaries represent banks enclosing and guiding the flow of a 
steady continuum (stetiges Kontinuum).
511
 Held together ultimately by this 
retentional form, Husserlian intentionality limits phenomena to their objectification 
in retention as they pass from the present into retentional modification onward as 
they sink into the depths of nothingness. 
 A contemplative intentionality theologically radicalizes the Husserlian 
retentional acts by referring them back to that which cannot die away or fade from 
memory, and thus, to that which spills over the strict boundaries of the retentional 
form. The contemplative memoria reaches back to the origin, to creation itself, but 
also to the beginning of faith, the in-breaking of God into history that complicates the 
linear and horizontal structure of the temporal flow: Christ’s death and resurrection. 
The memoria par excellence of the Christ event is the eucharist, a ritual that 
celebrates Christ’s body and blood by continually memorializing them (through 
bread and wine) in expectation for what is to come: “For whenever you eat this bread 
and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord’s death until he comes” (1 Cor. 11. 27). 
Insofar as Husserl requires that retentional consciousness to “phenomenalize” the 
datum in question by rendering the intentional aim fulfilled by a temporal object, the 
contemplative style of intentionality violates this principle of phenomenality. My 
memoria remains empty in that I cannot retrieve my creation or the body and blood 
of Christ through retention and thus fit God inside my retentional continuum, 
enclosing God within my temporal flow as a phenomenon present to me. We must 
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continue to be mindful that God is not a phenomenon (§3). The porous self who 
contemplates God cannot achieve intentional fulfilment precisely because God’s 
repose exceeds the temporal horizon, the integrity of which is only maintained within 
the prefixed and stable boundaries that unifies all temporal experience, boundaries 
that set up in advance the condition for the possibility of intentional fulfilment. To 
profess faith in God is to therefore to suffer (to suffer here is linked to the impatience 
of waiting for and hastening that which will someday arrive) an empty intention (not 
merely poorly filled but entirely empty) that disrupts the continuous monotony of an 
endless temporal continuum operating strictly from its own resources. As empty, the 
contemplative retention requires faith (the “evidence of things not seen”). But this 
emptiness is nourished by a faith that elicits the eternal, drawing near to God by 
curving upward transfiguring retention from an eschatological vantage point, moving 
no longer in the backward direction but toward the present—without making God 
present to me. 
 
The Curvature of Memory 
 The first thing to say about the curvature of memoria is that, in decisive 
contrast to Husserlian rentionality, it does not allow the memory of God to recede 
into nothingness, continually dying away “like a comet’s tail.” Always there, in the 
pure presencing of the present, God is nevertheless active in that God extends grace 
to those who profess faith, drawing them to the present. Disrupting the horizontal and 
chronological temporal flow, God’s presence evokes a contemplative desire enabling 
me to modify temporality itself, unclogging it, breaking open its apparent uniform 
state as a “closed system.” By way of an inward descent that takes a turn upward to 
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God’s eternality, the contemplative retention manipulates the temporal flow as it 
moves backward, in one fell swoop, and by grace, moving from stable finitude to a 
transcendent rupture upward. Just so, contemplative intentionality verifies itself by 
providing its own theological fulfilment, a fulfilment which is outside the world and 
beyond time. Moving backward to that immemorial, and thus modified by 
contemplation, the retention does not stream in continuity with the sinking away of 
other temporal objects into the depths of memory but bends upward, sharply, by way 
of a curvature. Bending upward, the memoria curves forward because the memoria is 
ineluctably drawn forward to the consummation of time itself, the future parousia.  
 The eucharist, we recall, declares both memoria and epektasis in one breath: 
“For whenever you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord’s death 
until he comes” (1 Cor. 11. 27). We affirm what Michael Purcell describes as the  
double temporality of the Eucharist: “The structure of the eucharist which is an 
essentially temporal event undertaken in the present as an attempt to memorialise an 
immemorial past, and which attempt at memorialising gives a future yet to come.”
512
 
The temporal levity of eucharistic memoria is such, therefore, that it rises upward, 
breaking from the linear flow, only to curve toward the expectation of parousia. 
Gathering together both backward and forward ecstasies into an interlocking 
mutuality, and made concrete and effective through contemplation, the porous self 
opens onto both memoria and epektasis at once as the self “seeks” in and through 
time, and yet over against the horizontal flow of time, the God who transcends time. 
 Certainly we can highlight the corporate and embodied aspects of the 
eucharist that Purcell highlights in his proposal of a “Eucharistic subjectivity”
513
 and 
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that David Ford maintains in the analysis of a “Eucharistic self.”
514
 The eucharistic 
event is not a solipsistic event, certainly. We present the phenomenological 
intelligibility of the bodily/corporate aspects of the eucharist in chapter six (§34). We 
intend here merely to align the self as a dative pole along the temporal axis peculiar 
to the eucharistic memoria, which is given in view of a double movement. For, “to 
proclaim the Lord’s death until he comes,” implies both memory and expectation, 
and thus an empty retention is met with an empty protention. These two temporal 
movements join together in a collateral drama that forms a single curvature upward 
without making God present as a phenomenon. How may we describe this temporal 
curvature phenomenologically?  
 To contemplate the eternal through memoria is to uncover a double 
intentional movement that converges on God without domesticating God as a 
phenomenon, without making God an idolatrous correlate designed to fit within the 
horizontal integrity of prefixed retentional and protentional acts. Even though the 
contemplative intentionality remains empty in both past and future directions, its 
emptiness is not without theological import here: by faith the memoria seeks its 
origin in creation (past) and epektasis desires its destiny in the new creation (future), 
both of which spill over and thus elude the stable horizon of the temporal form. The 
empty intentional aim deploys faith in order, not to fulfil the aim, but to lead it 
toward the present where its origin and destiny become interchangeable. In so doing, 
a contemplative intentionality distends the intentional regard backwards and 
forwards, simultaneously, lifting me upward beyond the interplay between past and 
future as I look inward toward the eternal. Past and future streams converge in 
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contemplation so that the retention bends upward and proceeds upstream toward the 
present and the protention bends upward and accelerates downstream toward the 
present, where they complement one another in their respective gazes, unfulfilled and 
yet remembering and expecting in a single eschatological curvature. The retentional 
streaming looks to the origin and the future streaming searches in anticipation for the 
redemption of that lost origin, and they culminate in the selfsame quest for 
redemption, so that beginning (retention) and the destiny of life (protention) become 
a single collateral telos moved toward the end goal of creation, interlocking as they 
bend toward the eternal presence of God. The original Sabbath present in Genesis 1 
shall become, and already is, the eternal Sabbath of the parousia proleptically 
maninfest as a rupture within the relentless flow of time. 
 Understood by way of this single curvature, the two streaming ecstasies open 
onto the porosity of the present without collapsing into the present and without 
confusing their respective temporal directionalities. Access to the “living present” in 
its pure timelessness is not enjoyed or made present (as in Henry). The curvature 
orders life, in its temporal intervals of flow and rupture, of mundane continuity and 
eschatological elevation, as a “seeking” anchored in the memoria. Propelled upward, 
thereby lifting the temporal streaming of epektasis upward, contemplation does not 
escape temporality but breaks open its enclosure of contingency. Contemplation 
orients temporality away from the apparent nullity to which it leads and resets its 
course toward its proper telos, the coming renewal of creation to be inaugurated by 
Christ. Retentional consciousness so understood bends forward as it arches toward 
the protention which likewise bends backward, a double movement lifting me as I 
ascend to the present. To the extent that I seek the present I affirm a supremely rich 
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finality for time in claiming for it the Sabbath to come. Even though Husserl insists 
that intentional fulfilment is the essential feature of retentional perception,
515
 it is not 
so with regard to spiritual perception nourished by contemplation and sustained by 
grace. Spiritual perception exhausts intentionality in that it moves away from the 
temporal movements of retention and protention toward their convergence in the 
present. 
 Yet because faith is a temporal movement employed by perceptual acts, and 
however close I may come to glimpsing the present, I never experience what could 
be considered an over-realized unity within the interior space of the living present. 
For this would be to submit to an over-realized escapism of the sort decisively on 
display in Henry, where the self inhabits the enduring fullness of the eternal, a self-
repose independent of past and future. We ought not forget that the curvature of 
memoria cannot escape the temporal streaming, both chronological continuity and 
liturgical/eucharistic discontinuity. This is perhaps why the body and blood of Christ 
is recreated in its eucharistic form, over and again until Christ comes. The call to 
repetition is an explicit acknowledgement that the eucharist must be repeated in time 
because it cannot accomplish fully what it seeks; it cannot claim for itself the glory 
of the present (parousia, literally translated as “presence”). The most we can do now 
is yield to God through contemplation, which in no way denies our irrefutable 
temporal condition, and which deploys memoria as a theological means of 
delaying/hastening time. And while the eucharist is the “time of God” par excellence, 
the contemplative style of intentionality is not merely a ritual or an act of prayer but 
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rather a way of habitually rendering the imago Dei porous to its Creator who 
transcends time—it is pilgrimage.  
 A contemplative intentionality puts into play an ongoing remembering that is 
more but not less than prayer, liturgical praxis or vigil. In the words of Kevin Hart, 
“contemplation may bring me closer to God if I understand how I am living but it is 
not structured as a living relation with God. It is an attitude, not prayer.”
516
 Stretched 
in both directions without fulfilment and drawn together into a single curvature, the 
porous self inhabits a contemplative attitude of wisdom, which yields to the fracture 
of time itself. Why? Contemplation breaks from the stability and monotony of the 
temporal flow (contra Husserl), unclogging time, making manifest its originally 
permeable structure. But in such a theological departure from Husserl, contemplation 
does not lead the self to become absorbed into the living present (contra Henry). On 
the basis of the porosity of display, a contemplative word of faith makes visible the 
non-reflective word inside me, opening that interior aperture to the joy of intimacy 
with God’s presence whose presence is present in the pure co-substantiality of 
Father, Son and Spirit, a simple aseity pure in its co-presence and thus always 
beyond my contemplative gaze. As an expression of wisdom, contemplation is a gaze 
directed toward the supreme Trinity “on which you are not yet capable of fixing your 
eyes.”
517
 Without fulfilment, then, we intend to characterize contemplation as an 
intentionality of “seeking” or pilgrimage undertaken in faith and sacrament for a God 
before whom I shall sit “face to face” in the parousia to come.  
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In rendering itself visible, the body does not render itself alone visible, but 
allows to come into the light of the world the invisible soul that, in vivifying 
the body, is its perpetual origin, without which it would show nothing. 
  
        –Jean-Louis Chrétien
518







 §32. THE PHENOMENON OF THE BODY  
 In this final chapter we sketch a phenomenology of the porous body that 
invokes the Husserlian grammar of Leibkörper. This configures the body with two 
styles of givenness that Henry radicalizes into an absolute duality, interior (Leib) 
over against exterior (Körper) (see chapter four). To overcome Henry’s privileging 
of Leib at the expense of Körper that trades on the dangerous monism to which the 
duplicitous body inevitably leads, this chapter develops the porosity of display as a 
line of inquiry that positively evaluates both interior and exterior fields of display, 
both Leib and Körper, by figuring them together as two modes of givenness manifest 
in a single body. Given that phenomenology and theology intertwine, the porous 
body is brought to light with resources drawn from both disciplines. To that end, this 
chapter intends to describe the phenomenological relation between Leib and Körper 
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explicitly from an eschatological point of view, i.e., the temporality of the 
resurrection body. 
 It would seem impossible to describe a porous body tied to the resurrection 
body as a phenomenon situated between the phenomena of flesh (Leib) and body 
(Körper) as Henry conceives them. For Henry, flesh and body are not only radically 
separate but are also antipodal, in absolute opposition, and are kept apart by a non-
temporal monism and over-realized eschatology. Yet, as we discussed in chapter 
four, Henry resolves the dilemma of how to interrelate the invisible flesh with the 
visible body with recourse to the notion of “paradox.” He concedes that a 
paradoxical synthesis is the only means by which subjective flesh (already realized in 
the parousia) can come into contact with the objective body in the world (that has 
already passed away).
519
 In order to avoid adopting a duplicitous body that privileges 
interiority at the expense of exteriority, a position that untenable for the reasons 
outlined above, this chapter proposes a porous body whose temporal and bodily 
display in the world-horizon is in eschatological tension with that which is outside of 
the world, namely the resurrection body sitting face to face before God’s parousiaic 
presence. Adopting the porous body is a counter-move against Henry in that it allows 
for both (1) a deeper integration of flesh (interior Leib) and body (exterior Körper) 
and (2) a temporal articulation of the body, i.e., its unfinished nature. The porous 
body therefore accords to both flesh and body the dignity and value of all creation 
and the eschatological destiny for which all creation groans. 
   To determine the complex phenomenological shape of the porous body we 
continue to focus on Augustine. Interestingly, not unlike Henry, Augustine framed 
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his reflections on the body by distinguishing between “outer” and “inner” as spatial 
metaphors able to bring to light key features of the double givenness of the single 
body (unum exterius alterum interius). He certainly viewed the “flesh” (i.e., the soul 
or the subjective animating principle) and the “body” as distinct spheres of 
givenness. At the same time, Augustine’s distinction is not an absolute or 
impenetrable demarcation, splitting the body, cleaving it in two.
520
 While distinct but 
not autonomous spheres, flesh and body are porous to each other in their differential 
unity as two modes of givenness exhibited in and through a single temporal body, the 
destiny of which lies in its eschatological perfection. Flesh and body, in that final 
day, shall appear harmoniously as not only a single body harmoniously integrated 
within itself, but more radically, as a single mode of givenness. As such, in that final 
day, my body shall appear spiritually and my spirit shall appear bodily, brought 
together in an absolute givenness: singular, unique, fully integrated and “at home” 
with itself, and, given to itself, from within the selfsame horizon, simultaneously as 
spiritual body or bodily spirit.  
 This side of death, we can, therefore, place the accent on the future “tense” of 
the porous body, captured in summary form by the expression “I will be my body,” 
which is a theological materialism aimed at overcoming Henry’s thesis that “I am my 
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body,” which succumbs to a “tense-less” living present (see §20 above).
521
 This is no 
way denies that I am my body, and yet, in my bodily acts and presences, I am not 
fully present, nor do I subsist in perfect simultaneity inwardly—for corporeality 
theologically understood is communicated through a becoming, an arrival and thus a 
longing for a completion of what is now incomplete. “I am my body” is founded on 
an prior theological truth, “I will be my body.”
522
 
 We define some basic terms here in preparation for the constructive analysis 
of the porous body. The porous body, first of all, is situated neither in the pure form 
of flesh (interior lived-experience) nor in the pure spatial locality of the body 
(exterior empirical object), but in an impure “between.” As such, the porous body 
displays two bodily modes of givenness: (1) an interior state qualified by a living 
singularity, as this subjective “me” (Leib), and (2) an exterior state demonstrably 
subject to empirical laws such as temporality, spatiality, weakness of constitution, 
etc. (Körper). Such a Leibkörper consists of two modes of givenness that are distinct 
but complementary. From an eschatological vantage point, this chapter intends to 
consider a “single body with a two modes of givenness” as it may become unified 
with other bodies in the community of the mystical body of Christ. 
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 Bringing to light such a body proceeds down a particular path. On our way, 
then, to making positive statements about the resurrection body and perpetual 
Sabbath of the social body of Christ, we proceed with a strategy that, in brief, 
consists of five moves: first we summarize Henry’s problematic phenomenology of 
body as it relates not only to the duplicitous body but also to the social body of Christ 
(§33); the phenomenological structure of the Leibkörper is elucidated in a manner 
that overcomes the problems outlined in Henry (§34). The temporality of the body, 
i.e., is its unfinished nature, is clarified by its telos, the resurrection body (§35). In 
order to make the resurrection body the key object of hope for the Christian life, it 
must be professed within and sacramentally nourished by the social space of the 
body of Christ (§36). And, finally, professing hope in the resurrection body involves 
a climactic bodily blessing that shall enable the saints together to “see” God face to 
face on that final day, a blessing Christians yearn for with eschatological impatience 
(§37).  
 
 §33.  MYSTICAL BODY OF CHRIST IN HENRY 
 In order to discuss with phenomenological precision the unveiling of the 
bodily self before God framed in its eschatological tense, we must first pass through 
how Henry thematizes the “mystical body of Christ” in Incarnation: une philosophie 
de la chair.
523
 Entitling the penultimate section of the book “La relation à autrui 
selon le christianisme: le corps mystique du Christ,” Henry accords great organizing 
power to the doctrine of the mystical body of Christ as a theological category that 
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draws together the essential aspects of human flesh as it arises in and through the 
“Word made flesh.” 
 We have introduced Henry’s strict bifurcation of the duplicitous body (see 
chapter 4 for a fuller account); yet this radical duplicity of display is struck in a new 
Christological key in his exposition of the mystical body of Christ. It is a theological 
category that ties together not only how my individual flesh relates to Christ’s flesh 
but how all flesh relates together in the eternal Word. We have been careful to note 
that for Henry the “flesh” gives itself as a sphere of pure interiority with an order of 
display radically distinct from and opposed to the display of the world; we have 
called this subjective pole a pure Leib (§21-22). The mystical body of Christ 
therefore unites, not all bodies, but all “flesh” within Christ’s singular acosmic flesh. 
How, then, does Henry incorporate a theory of intersubjectivity (i.e., la relation à 
autrui) if it is only by way of an interior pathway that we can relate to the other? 
How does my interior site of flesh enter into the other’s interior site of flesh without 
first traversing across the exterior dimension of the world-horizon (outside myself) 
where the other’s body appears?  
 Henry indeed sidesteps the need to address the question of traversing across 
temporal and spatial distance to the other body by unifying my experience with the 
other within a universal sphere of acosmic flesh. This acosmic sphere accommodates 
not only my ongoing eternal birth or arrival of myself to myself, but it also contains 
every other self’s eternal arrival, as we are all generated/birthed within the “Word 
made flesh.” A social body of all humans within Christ’s flesh appears in the fullness 
of God’s interior reciprocity among Father and Son and Spirit prior to the appearings 
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of the body in the world, i.e., prior to my ejection onto the temporal horizon of the 
world with the appearings of my body (genitive) to other bodies (dative).   
 This theological articulation of the relation to the other is for Henry 
Christological in substance. Christ represents as the absolute transcendental principle 
for all being-with (être-avec), or what Henry also calls the original essence of all 
community; the condition for the possibility of relating to the other is founded on the 
basis of Christ’s donation of life to all who are living. This original donation 
designates what we have described as an invisible “transcendental birth” or “non-
temporal generation” from which I am continually born (see §11). This is a birth in 
which I am gathered together in unity with myself and every other self, and by virtue 
of this in-gathering, converge with the other as we co-emerge within God’s ongoing 
emergence in the “Word made flesh.” All community in consequence of the acosmic 
essence of community takes place in a transhistorical, eternal birth that is common to 
all because all enjoy a birth in Christ in order to live at all.
524
 Hence, for Henry, as 
this “me” who is eternally thrown into life (dative/accusative), I relate to the other 
inside the selfsame eternal arrival into life. Before my ejection into the temporal 
world, before conscious reflection and before any ethnic, economic, social or even 
sexual difference is manifest, I experience the other.
525
 In spite of basic sexual 
difference, Henry maintains we find a common point unity in our common source of 
life from which we are all continually “being given to ourselves in the auto-donation 
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of absolute Life [i.e., Christ].”
526
 The singularity of each self, we argued in chapter 
four, is problematic for Henry in that the essence of “me” and the essence of “you” 
coincide in the selfsame eternal arrival, a monism which does not attend to the 
temporal and spatial distinctions between “me” in my ipseity and “you” in your 
ipseity (§15). 
 For Henry, then, the relation to the other in her singularity is entirely acosmic 
and invisible. That is, the being-in-common of duplicitous bodies is wholly 
transcendentalized within Christ’s pure Leib without reference to his historical 
Körper. The theological consequence of such a monistic relation to the other is 
radical: each transcendental self, each embodied “me,” is co-substantial, immediately 
unified and drawn together with one another in their interior flesh on the basis of 
their common substance, namely Christ’s flesh:  
 
Thus each transcendental living self is in the Word before being with 
itself, and in this Word it is with the other before the other is given to 
itself. And the other is in this same situation of being in the Word 
before being with itself or with me – because it is in the Word in which 
it is both with itself and with me—in which I am myself with the other 
and myself with the Word. It is notable that each transcendental self is 
being-with the other in the place where it is given to itself, and it is 





Each “me” in its unique singularity is born from not just a common source but in and 
through the selfsame movement of life, a principal reason why we insisted that 
Henry’s duplicitous body reduces to a non-temporal monism in which all singularity 
dissolves into the singularity of absolute life (see §16 above).    
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 Another theological consequence of Henry’s variant of the mystical body is 
that it excludes the possibility of the resurrection body to come. Because our 
common birth is without world it is also without time, in an absolute “living 
present.” That we always remain in the eternal present of Christ’s flesh as it arrives 
within itself is, for Henry, proof that we do not exist within an eschatological 
horizon. Henry puts it starkly: “In its ‘now’ and its ‘reality’.... we do not want nor 
will we ever want or take hold of any future.”
528
 For the essence of life is other-than-
the-world (Autre-que-le-monde), a radical-elsewhere (Ailleurs radical) wherein the 
“glory” of absolute flesh emerges in and through my living present.
529
 The 
immemorial structure of all flesh, divine and human, is retained in such a close self-
embrace that no gap, distance, temporal delays, and thus memory or expectation is 
possible: “Thus my flesh is indestructible and impenetrable [indéchirable]... and it is 
in the parousia of my flesh where it is achieved.”
530
 By grounding the self-revelation 
of Christ’s presence as the parousia in the interior and invisible display of my living 
present, Henry hazards a fully realized eschatology. If this is the case, then it follows 
that I am always already in the full presence of Christ together with all the saints in 
the living present that presses on me at each and every moment, underneath the 
interplay between past and future. Such is the over-realized eschatology that is at the 
foundation of the duplicitous body. As Kevin Hart observes, if the arrival and full 
impact of the parousia gives rise to all flesh, then it “means that the world has 
already passed. So [Henry’s] eschatology is at once over-realized (it has always and 
already happened) and under-realized (it has no decisive relation to Christ’s 
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Resurrection and to Pentecost).”
531
 To speak of Henry’s eschatology is therefore to 
speak of Christ’s presence in the flesh as “already” realized, precisely, as a living 
present. And this renders explicit the over-realized eschatology that maintains the 
duplicity of appearing between the flesh (parousia) manifest in contradistinction to 
the temporal body (already passed away). 
 Naturally, Henry’s interpretation of the mystical body of Christ does not lend 
itself to the traditional or standard interpretation as a communal body of church life 
(which also includes the sacramental body received together in liturgical rights).
532
 
Rather, for Henry, the mystical body of Christ, because it subsists outside of, and 
does not intertwine with, the temporal streaming of the world-horizon, is given 
within the invisible sphere of my living present as a concrete flesh. There is no Christ 
revealing himself (genitive) to me in the flesh (dative) in a manner that splits the 
genitive and dative. The appearing of something to someone appears as an original 
unity for Henry: my appearing in the flesh is co-given with the self-revelation of the 
“Word made flesh.” Christ irrupts within me giving “me” to myself in one and the 
same movement—a movement brought about by an impression in which I feel 
myself feeling, a lived immediacy manifest inside me before my body-object can 
take its various positions within the temporal streaming of the world. The mystical 
body of Christ is therefore manifest as a primitive pathos (a primitive Word) in the 
secret and nocturnal depths of my self-feeling without mediation in and through the 
temporality of the world-horizon; and it is there, in the nocturnal pathos, that I am in 
an original union with the other and the other with me. 
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 The eternal Word, for Henry, is neither communicated in a linguistic form 
nor in a conscious representational thought. Rather it appears as a primal revelation 
expressed in self-feeling that rivets me to myself before I can even reflect, speak or 
engage the world with my bodily senses. Such a primitive word does not correlate to 
a concept or appear in the linguistic exchange between perceiving subjects in the 
world. Such a primitive word appears as an eternal call that I cannot help but hear, 
and “its listening is nothing other than the noise of life, or its rustling in us as the 
embrace in which it gives itself to itself and gives us to ourselves in the self-same 
donation.”
533
 Joined together with the other members of the mystical body in and 
through this primitive donation, the feeling of “myself” that I continually undergo as 
myself and that you continually undergo as yourself, whether we realize it or not, 
constitutes a mystical experience within an acosmic sphere given according to its 
own acosmic deployment. This mystical body of Christ is therefore a concrete flesh 
manifest as an ongoing impressional affection among living flesh undulating internal 
to each other as they form the collective “tissue” of Christ’s body. An extended quote 
from Henry highlights this imaginative, if strange, interpretation of the divine 
community: 
 
And so the mystical body of Christ grows and increases itself 
indefinitely through each of its members who are sanctified in the 
flesh of Christ. In this potentially indefinite extension, the mystical 
body of Christ is construed as the “common person of humanity” 
and “this is why he is called the New Adam.”  This edification does 
not proceed by an accumulation of elements, as “stones” added 
together like an edifice constructed by hands of humans, but rather 
they are in Christ. It is because each is in the Word that the erection 
of each transcendental self, given to itself in the Word, is one with 
the Word. It discovers itself there, in the same moment given to 
itself in the same unique Life of the same unique Self in which all 
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other Selves are given to themselves. And so each is one with all 
other others in Christ and, because Christ is not divisible—being 
the unique Life in which the power of life dwells—they are not 
separated, but rather the inverse: one in Him and with Him, they are 





 It is helpful to re-inscribe this extended statement of the acosmic mystical 
body of Christ within the structure of Henry’s duplicitous body. This radical unity 
that each of us possesses with one another on the basis of Christ’s “taking flesh” 
cannot realized through bodily acts in the visible display of the world. Simply put, 
the mystical body of Christ is not a process of the coming together of bodies in a 
visible, social gathering; rather it reflects that which has “already” taken place in 
Christ’s in the living present, within the acosmic universal flesh. This is why Henry 
writes, “Before thought, before the opening of the world and the deployment of its 
intelligibility, there fulgurates the arch-intelligibility of absolute Life, the Parousia of 
the Word through whom it achieves itself.”
535
 
 The principle of the duplicity of display and the duplicitous body to which it 
gives rise introduces three problems we must overcome in the following reflections: 
(1) the bifurcation of the body into two irreconcilable halves, between, on the one 
hand, an auto-affective flesh (pure Leib), and, on the other, an irreal, objective body 
in the world (impure Körper). (2) The non-temporal monism that privileges the 
interior flesh at the expense of the body in the world sustained by an over-realized 
eschatology (flesh is the realization of the parousia). (3) And the interior entryway to 
the other, an eccentric view of “la relation à autrui” that furnishes the coordinates of 
an “acosmic” social body not of this world (Autre-que-le-monde).  
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 To overcome these three problems, we highlight a phenomenology of the 
body that integrates flesh and body within a single body (Leibkörper) that is shaped 
by the both the social institution/sacrament of the body of Christ now and the 
resurrection body to come. I am between flesh and body, which means I am a both 
interior and exterior, a double givenness arising in and through a single body. The 
absolute disclosure of God’s presence in its concrete givenness is deferred to the 
future resurrection where the gap between flesh and body is closed and where am I 
given to myself as a wholly integrated. In that final day, I will still be a body, see 
with eyes and have “hair and nails,” be in possession of a “healthy silhouette in the 
prime of life,”
536
 and maintain my sexuality;
537
 even the martyrs will “display their 
scars;”
538
 yet all the saints shall assume an incorruptible and eternal flesh that enables 
them to see God face to face. Until that day, we dwell between flesh and body, in a 
frail and mortal state configured by the porosity of display, with two modes of 
givenness in a single body, and to that bodily state we now turn. 
 
 §34. THE POROUS BODY  
 This section makes explicit what is typically implicit in the body’s most basic 
movements: the inmost phenomenological structure operative at both the subjective 
and objective levels experience. How does my flesh take on a body in the world, 
cohering with it as a unit? How do flesh and body appear together in the field of 
visible display as single body without pitting interior against exterior (that cultivates 
a radical duplicity)?   
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 We have seen that Henry’s duplicitous body displays a strict duality so far as 
it maintains an absolute line of division between flesh (Leib) and body (Körper). 
This section attends to the manner in which flesh and body interrelate, as co-given 
aspects of experience, always realized together within a single body. Framed in this 
way, the flesh appears as an interior dynamic movement (Leib), while the body 
appears as a visible spatio-temporal body-pole susceptible to resistance, and is thus 
always placed “over against” other body-poles and object-poles in the world-horizon 
(Körper). Describable on the basis of porosity, the distinction between flesh and 
body is not absolute. Whatever the nature of the porous distinction between flesh and 
body, the two modes of givenness are inextricably bound within a single body. 
 How is the porous body brought to light phenomenologically? The porous 
body makes itself felt within a space between flesh and body, where I receive myself 
as this interior subjective “me” (Leib) in and through a body-pole visibly manifest in 
the world (Körper). A porous body dwells in the play between the two modes of 
givenness, the distinction between Leib and Körper. The porous body in consequence 
of the space between does not draw a clean mark between flesh and body. In fact, the 
subjective flesh and the objective body frequently confront one another, and in their 
co-givenness within a single body, yield to conflict and tension resulting in sin, 
frailty, fatigue and mortality. Existing in this precarious space between, it follows 
that I am flesh but not pure flesh. I am porous to the body in the world. It also 
follows that I am a body but not pure body. I am porous to the interior flesh. I am 
between them, in that porous gap that separates them, a gap which exposes me in my 
subjective body to the dangers and forces of sin and death which the objective body 
undergoes in the world-horizon. 
308 
 
 This side of the eschaton the flesh and body exhibit distinct, if integrated, 
manners of givenness. As an embodied pilgrim in the world, my flesh is interior, 
subjective and living. It is “more excellent than the nature of the body: it surpasses it 
by far, it is a thing spiritual, incorporeal, akin to the substance of God. It is somewhat 
invisible, it rules the body, moves the limbs, guides the sense, prepares thoughts, puts 
forth actions, takes in images of countless things.”
539
 But in what way is the 
subjective “interior” flesh given in a manner different from the objective “exterior” 
body? We must pursue this question in greater detail if our argument is to achieve 
any level of rigour.  
 If the porous body is not the duplicitous body, then how does the porous body 
maintain an interior/exterior distinction within a single body? Because the distinction 
is neither a juxtaposition nor a strict duplicity, the interior flesh is fractured to the 
exterior body thereby opening up communication between them. Indeed, the flesh is 
given to itself not in pure auto-affection, as if it could arrive at its own materiality 
purely by feeling itself crush against itself. Rather the interior flesh arrives at itself 
by virtue of its temporal displacement, that is, by virtue of its disjointed arrangement 
with the body. Flesh materializes itself in and through dislocation from itself, 
transmitting itself outward, into the polarity of the exterior body. The temporal 
fracture, as we saw in chapter five, dislocates the flesh from “self-presence” or “self-
impressionality” or “immediacy.” Simply put, flesh arrives at itself by way of 
mediation. Dynamically extended in and through the exterior body, the flesh is 
typically situated in continuity with the temporal movements of the exterior body. 
Flesh is thereby fractured to the temporality of the body, which in turn, creates a 
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dynamic space of mutual communication. One the one hand, flesh reveals itself to 
itself in and through the body, and, on the other, the body discloses itself as living 
body endowed with abiding subjective powers and personal identity: two modes of 
givenness deeply integrated within a single body, a single Leibkörper.  
 Because the flesh is given as an “impure” interiority, flesh is not locked 
within itself and thus isolated from the body’s exposure to the world-horizon. Flesh 
is ineluctably given as a temporal phenomenon. As such, it moves dynamically 
through the body as a whole. Flesh is therefore not manifest as a timeless “inner 
spark” imprisoned within the body. Nor is it located in the mind as an immovable 
inner intellectual “theatre.” Rather, the flesh, “is whole in the whole and whole also 
in any part of the body. Thus when something happens even in some tiny little part of 
the body that the soul is aware of, the whole soul is aware of it because it does not 
escape the whole soul even though it does not happen in the whole body.”
540
 That is, 
interior flesh, as a subjective mode of givenness, exercises a temporality attuned to 
the exterior body’s temporality enabling interior flesh to incorporate itself within the 
exterior body’s perceptual wholeness—the flesh is the body’s living self-expression 
manifest in acts of grasping, communicating, perceiving, touching, even feeling and 
suffering, etc. The flesh pulls the exterior body within itself, a complete 
incorporation that gives to the body-pole in its entirety a capacity for life, an ability 
to live through phenomena and experience them in their concrete givenness. Never 
isolated within a specific bodily cavity or cognitive capability, flesh is present to my 
bodily appendages as a living subjectivity (Leib) in precisely the same depth and 
texture to my eyes or waist or index finger. Opening onto my body as a whole, flesh 
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renders the entire volume of this particular body-pole suffuse with subjective power. 
The subjective properties of the flesh are expressed in and through the body all at 
once in a temporal unity.  
 Yet the link between flesh and body becomes difficult to articulate when 
flesh is characterized as temporal but not properly spatial. If flesh cannot be localized 
neither can it be objectively measured or quantified. My flesh is not five feet seven 
inches tall with a particular weight and volume of an amateur wrestler. To express it 
differently, we could suggest that the flesh, from the point of view of the porous 
body, is given in an immaterial “space” that cannot be spatialized—and thus displays 
a sphere of givenness incongruous with the spatial polarity of the body. On this view, 
one could claim that flesh cannot be measured, weighed or circumscribed within 
geometrical dimensions, the manners of givenness associated with the exterior body. 
The benefit of describing the flesh in this way is that it refrains from reducing flesh 
to a psychological faculty, or to an ego-seat embodied through brain synapses, 
intentional acts and motor movements, i.e., a psychosomatic unity (a 
phenomenological variant is Husserl’s Leibkörper). So, if we eradicate the prefixed 
spatial givenness of the flesh altogether, then we avoid psychosomatic materialism—
we avoid reducing flesh to the software that attends to the body’s hardware.  
 But could we describe the flesh as a non-geometric phenomenon without 
relation to spatiality at all? One could claim that flesh is “subject to movement only 
through time and not through place, while moving the body through both time and 
place.”
541
 Or, “There is a nature mutable in space and time, namely body. And there 
is a nature which is not at all mutable in space, but only in time in which it is also 
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 But statements like these convey the misguided notion that 
flesh, as an invisible, non-geometic phenomenon, appears in the temporal streaming 
of the world-horizon without also appearing within the spatial continuum and bodily 
localizations/polarizations put into play by the manners of givenness of the objective 
body. Advancing a thesis like this is a move in the direction of an either/or paradigm, 
splitting the properties of the flesh and body that gives way to a pernicious dualism 
that plagues the duplicitous body. The porous body for which we are advocating, in 
contrast, underlines the possibility of greater continuity between flesh and body. Yet 
this does not mean that flesh and body are given in exactly the same way with 
respect to temporality and spatiality. The flesh, insofar as it is localized and thus 
present to the body throughout, displays a “spatial plasticity.”  
 Such spatial plasticity is especially evident in the act of introspection 
whereby the flesh, as the centre of the body’s living capacities, can enact a reflexive 
curvature or bending-back in which it “is drawn back to itself not through an interval 
of space, but by a kind of non-bodily turning round.”
543
 Thus not limited by the rigid 
spatial givenness of the exterior body, the flesh, in its temporal capacities of 
memory, presencing and expectation, assumes a spatial plasticity which pervades the 
localized body in its rigid and monadic polarity as an objective body-pole in the 
world. In this manner, flesh holds the body within itself, unifying the self-as-body 
just as the body changes positions in space, utters linguistic speech acts or 
enjoys/suffers bodily contact with other objects in the world.
544
 Understood on the 
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basis of this dynamic interior/exterior unity, I do not have a porous body or deploy it 
as an organ of my will, rather “I am my body” incarnated as this body-pole in the 
temporal streaming of the world-horizon. One must remain apprehensive of the 
temptation to reduce the textured phrase “I am my body” to a self-presencing 
subjective pole, living in relation to nothing but itself, as an absolute self-affection 
dramatically realized in Henry’s explication of la chair. 
 But how exactly is the flesh incorporated within the body if each maintains a 
distinct form of givenness? How are flesh and body joined together as a single 
porous body? We have described the unity so far in this way: flesh is temporal and 
spatial but not spatial in the same way the body is spatial. Can we 
phenomenologically analyze with greater precision how such a unity between flesh 
and body can occur? Flesh is manifest by way of an interior living subjectivity that 
gathers together the objective body-pole around itself. On our view, the flesh, in its 
temporal streaming and spatial plasticity, inhabits the body while maintaining a 
distance from the body’s rigid objective localization and geometric composition as 
an immovable absolute zero point of orientation. We shall, in §36 below, expose to 
view in sharper terms and theologically reflect on the distinction between, on the one 
hand, the living dynamism of the flesh, and, on the other, the body’s formal 
objectivity as a body-pole. But perhaps the first thing to observe, and make 
phenomenologically tenable, is the unity of flesh and body: both forms of givenness 
joined in one body gives way to a unique corporeality whereby the flesh feels the 
impact of the body while the body is subject to, and an expression of, the vital 
capacities of the flesh.  
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 To shed further light on the porosity of display that elucidates the elemental 
unity of flesh and body in one Leibkörper, we turn to what is perhaps a universal 
example of such a unity: pain. The phenomenon of pain illuminates with great clarity 
the porosity between flesh and body (without making overly rigid distinctions). 
While contemporary science or empiricism may inform us that pain originates from, 
and resides in, the exterior body-pole, the sensation of pain, “really pertains to the 
soul.”
545
 More particularly, “for it is the soul, not the body, which feels pain, even 
when the pain arises in the body; for the soul feels pain at the place where the body is 
injured.”
546
 That is, while it may be extreme to say that only the living flesh feels the 
pain and the not the body, it is plausible to maintain that the flesh is the principal 
sufferer of pain. The body occupies the proximate site of the impact, and so the body 
is where pain makes its definitive landing, for just as “the feeling and life of the body 
comes from the soul, so also do we speak of bodies suffering pain, though no pain 
can exist in the body apart from the soul.”
547
 Our proposal of a phenomenology of a 
single body with two forms of givenness therefore suggests that the body cannot 
suffer without the lived-experience of the flesh feeling the pain itself, for the flesh is 
the “body’s life.”
548
 And just as pain, say the hammer slipping and pounding my 
finger, designates an effectual bodily sensation that evokes feeling in the finger, so 
also does this pain establish the most primal fact of all, that the flesh is given as the 
living principle that pervades the body at every point, for “everything which suffers a 
pain is alive, and that pain can be present only in a living creature.”
549
 Such an 
account of pain may help show how the distinction between the two forms of 
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givenness is minimized. On the account we are defending, a strict duality is 
minimized once we realize the interior flesh is the living capacity that is mediated in 
and through the exterior body. The flesh is immediately provoked by impact the 
body suffers when, for example, climbing a steep hill or the burning my tongue on 
hot coffee. I do not burn my tongue, and then, seconds later, feel the pain. When I 
burn my tongue I suffer immediately. The burning sensation evokes my life, 
overcomes me and pulls me within myself under the impact of its landing. My 
tongue itself does not suffer the pain, rather it is me who suffers even if the site of 
impact can be isolated on my tongue (or in my legs from a steep hill, in my finger 
from being pounded by a hammer, etc.). 
 Certainly the body-pole, a geometric entity and objective thing, is 
unmistakably alive when it takes positions in the world, bumps up against other 
objects and is scolded by hot coffee. But this primal capacity for life displayed in the 
exterior body ineluctably attends to the interior flesh whether I am conscious of it or 
not, whether I want it or not, and despite any hallucinations to the opposite. I am a 
living body as long as I am my body: “It is quite certain that even a man who is being 
deceived is alive. The knowledge by which we know that we are alive is most 
intimately inward.... Let a thousand kinds of illusion be objected against the man 
who says ‘I know I am alive’; none of them will worry him, since even the man who 
suffers from an illusion is alive.”
 550
 I cannot escape my flesh because I cannot 
escape my life. The interior temporal streaming and spatial plasticity of the flesh is 
manifest as a non-reflective subjective power (see §29 above on verbum intimum) 
embodied within the objective body-body. Because of its spatial plasticity, flesh 
                                                 
550
 Augustine, De trin, 15, 21 
315 
 
appears not so much as localized within the chest cavity or inside the cranium but 
rather as a living content materialized within the forms, patterns and objective 
displacements of bodily acts in the world-horizon. 
 We pursue further the unity of the porous body by adopting here the 
metaphorical image of “mud.” As a single Leibkörper with two modes of givenness, 
the body (Körper) consists of the material element of earth that is soaked in the 
living water of flesh (Leib). The flesh pervades wholly each of the body’s multiple 
movements unifying them within a polarity in conjunction with other objects and 
body-poles: “Just as water, you see, collects earth and sticks and holds it together 
when mud is made by mixing it in, so too the soul by animating the material of the 
body shapes it into a harmonious unity, and does not permit it to fall apart into its 
constituent elements.”
551
 In light of this metaphor, flesh assumes an order of display 
akin to water. Its temporal streaming and spatial plasticity is manifest in and through 
richly textured speeds and densities of flowing circulations, displacements and 
ruptures, like water. The malleable fluidity of flesh renders it structurally capable of 
pervading the exterior body wholly without also merging with the exterior body’s 
rigid polarity and empirical dimensions. By pervading in every respect my bodily 
presences in the world-horizon, my flesh orients the body in view of sense data, 
unifying the living body into a single body-pole, a Leibkörper. Lest a monism 
emerge, the unity of which we speak does not presuppose self-presence, for the 
structure of porosity is dislocated from itself on the basis of its temporal streaming 
and spatial movement. So, while not fully unified or self-enclosed, the porous body 
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consists of a flesh and body, an “interior” Leib manifest in and through mediation of 
the “exterior” Körper.  
 The phenomenological consequence of the structure of the porous body, i.e., 
two modes of givenness in a single body, is that I cannot see the other interior flesh 
as if it were visible like an objective thing, like a red chair stationed before my eyes. 
Because of the gap separating flesh and body, I strain to see the other’s flesh. The 
other’s flesh is not a secret presence hidden in the nocturnal depths of the living 
present. But flesh is nonetheless elusive, mysterious and absent from being given in 
full-view of the world-horizon. If I can “see” with my bodily eyes the other’s flesh, it 
follows that I can only see its capacity as a living flesh mediated through its body. 
We can declare, after all, “in this life, as soon as we become aware of the men among 
whom we live, we do not merely believe that they are alive and displaying vital 
motions: we see it, beyond any doubt, by means of our bodies, though we are not 
able to see their life without their bodies.”
552
 And furthermore, our proposal 
maintains that the elemental unity by which the porous body joins together flesh and 
body surmounts the rigid distinction typical of the duplicitous body. We can situate 
the unity in this way: 
 
The life which he now lives in the body and which causes his 
earthly members to grow and be alive; but he is aware of it, not by 
means of the body’s eyes, but through an interior sense. The life 
of others, however, though it is invisible, he sees with a bodily 
eye. For how do we distinguish between living bodies and non-
living objects, except by seeing simultaneously both the body and 
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 Flesh is given as an interior living capacity, a primal temporal self-awareness 
capable of spatial expansion and plasticity, a living principle pervading wholly the 
exterior body’s acts and world-engagements. So even though it is interior, a verbum 
intimum, flesh is seen by the other “with a bodily eye.” We distinguish the living 
body from the object-thing because we see “simultaneously both the body and the 
life, which [I] cannot see other than with the bodily eye.” However, the flesh 
assumes a unique mode of givenness inasmuch as it is interior. By virtue of both its 
temporal continuity with, and spatial plasticity over against, the body-pole, the 
appearing of flesh is (in)visible because it is mediated by the exterior body to other 
living bodies situated in the visible display of the world-horizon.   
 The account we are defending so far highlights the structural possibility of a 
porous body which integrates flesh and body even while maintaining their distinct 
modes of givenness. The porous body inhabits neither a site of pure flesh concealed 
within a body-shell (Henry) nor a psychosomatic unity consisting chiefly of 
kinaesthetic movements (Husserl) but rather a site framed in a space somewhere 
between these two phenomenological positions. On our view, the flesh is thereupon 
made visible in and through the exterior body exposed to the other bodies in the 
world. Yet, by emphasizing the flesh as the vital principle that gathers the body 
together, unifying the body with itself as a living “pole,” we come close to a dualism 
of the sort that suggests our proposal privileges the flesh over the body so much so 
that there is a temptation to say that flesh can exist without the body. Does our 
proposal not resemble Henry’s emphasis on pure Leib in its living reality in 




 Our proposal of a porous body necessarily entails an “exterior” body and its 
bodily presences realized in the temporal streaming of the world-horizon for three 
reasons. (1) Without the body, the flesh reduces to a vapour, a life-giving power with 
no outlet through which to give itself. Absent of the body, the flesh amounts to 
nothing more than a living capacity locked within itself, a self-givenness released 
into itself with no greater purpose than feeling itself. If it does not emerge in and 
through the “exterior” body-pole and its temporal streaming, then it follows that the 
flesh shall implode on itself, become static and without movement, and therefore, 
become unable to “animate” or mobilize and synthesize data gathered by the exterior 
body’s exposure to the world. (2) Only because the interior flesh discovers itself in 
and through mediation of the body, can the memory remember itself as a “self” in 
continuity with itself. Because it is exposed to the world through the exterior body, 
memory is not a closed-system but a fractured, disjointed movement tied to the flow 
of exterior data. Memory orders self-awareness by virtue of its immersion in the 
world-horizon and its temporal streaming, if even passively and non-reflectively. 
Without the temporality of memory I cannot remember, love and know myself as 
“myself” (i.e., triad of verbum intimum, §29 above). As an interior trinity of loving, 
knowing and remembering, the flesh lives in and through exposure to difference, 
and, in fact, flesh “gulps” down sensory data received by the exterior body’s 
involvement in the world. Understood on the basis of its temporal streaming and 
spatial plasticity, flesh maintains its ongoing self-awareness as this particular body-
pole relative to other body-poles.
554
 (3) And finally, because of its temporal 
dislocation, flesh is released from itself, goes outside itself, and is naturally joined to, 
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and fitted for, the body: “The soul possesses a kind of natural appetite for managing 
the body. By reason of this appetite it is somehow hindered from going on with all its 
force to the highest heaven so long as it is not joined with the body, for it is in 
managing the body that this appetite is satisfied.”
555
 Indeed, in and through its body, 
the flesh exercises its temporal and spatial life in the world.  
 This chapter is now in a position to turn to the eschatological tension explicit 
in our proposal. We saw in chapter five that the eschatological desire is fostered by a 
contemplative distentio. There we argued that my desire to see God is put into play 
by a contemplative faith anchored in memoria (§31) that is ineluctably qualified by a 
future movement, an epektasis (§30). The interplay between memoria and epektasis 
sustained in contemplative desire unclogs the non-reflective interior entry (the 
verbum intimum given as Leib) to God, in whose image I am made (§§27-29). We 
now elucidate the specifically embodied manifestation of the temporal distentio. 
  
 §35. THE HOPE OF THE RESURRECTIO CARNIS 
 Our proposal of the porous body is cast in an unequivocal eschatological 
tense.
556
 The porous body displays a tension between flesh and body in the present 
only to be made manifest in one mode of givenness in the resurrection body to come. 
The body now is elusive and sequentially extended in its spatio-temporality only to 
be subsumed in the resurrection as a perfectly self-present body, in its eschatological 
luminosity and fullness. In this resurrection body, my bodily presences will be 
eternal in that I will dwell in the “heavenly city,” and no longer be a citizen of the 
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 It is in this final resting place of eternal felicity where the flesh and 
body distinction dissolves and where the porous body is made whole. Flesh and body 
fuse into a perfect spiritual body that “can no longer take delight in sin.”
558
 In the 
heavenly city God “will be seen without end, loved without stint, praised without 
weariness.”
559
 Yet what does a porous body presume to describe by figuring the 
resurrection body as a harmonious integration of flesh and body? And equally 
important, what is the function of the resurrection body for me now on 
pilgrimage?
560
 It is crucial that we understand how the expression “I am my body” is 
founded on the future-tensed “I will be my body.” Brian Robinette notes this well, 
when he writes: 
 
The phrase “I will be my body” also intends to emphasize that 
human identity is relational and eschatological. I cannot simply 
associate my identity with who I presently am. Nor can I be an 
authentic human person by securing my identity in a polarized 
relationship to the many bodies from which I subsist. As a being-
unto-resurrection, I am a being unto-the-Other, a being from- and 





 Our proposal that the porous body is to become whole on that final day 
invests the porous body on pilgrimage now with profound theological import: “I 
cannot simply associate my identity with who I presently am.” We interpret the body 
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now, in its presently disjointed and precarious state, to be inexorably bound to the 
eschatological destiny of Christ’s body—we are an unfinished “being-unto-
resurrection,” as Robinette rightly insists. And further, our future resurrection is 
intelligible only because it is proleptically grounded in Christ’s bodily resurrection 
that has already taken place. Our bodies are promised to rise on the final day because 
we base that promise on Christ’s resurrection and ascension: “Christ’s resurrection 
showed the immortality of flesh that he promised should be ours.”
562
 This Christ 
event attested to in the gospels vouchsafes the promise of our own future 
resurrection, in which flesh and body shall come together perfectly, giving way to a 
sinless spiritual body.
563
 In proceeding to sketch this spiritual body, or resurrection 
Leibkörper that will rise on the final day, we are proposing a theological, not 
hypothetical, interpretation of the porous body. But this being-unto-resurrection is a 
theological reality put into play by faith and hope. For we, “truly believe and surely 
and firmly hope that we are going to be immortal after the manner of Christ. For at 
the moment we can bear the same image, not yet in vision but in faith, not yet in fact, 
but in hope. The apostle Paul was of course speaking about the resurrection of the 
body when he said this.”
564
 In other words, hoping in Christ’s resurrection and final 
return secures our being-unto-resurrection now. 
 When we describe the resurrection body, we throw into contrast what our 
porous bodies are like now while on pilgrimage. As highlighted above, the porous 
body accommodates a gap, a distinction in the manner of givenness between the 
interior Leib and the exterior Körper. While we can underline a multitude of 
maladies that shapes the various profiles of the porous body, it could not be more 
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clear what it suffers from now when compared to the glorious state of the 
resurrection body on that final day. What we hope for in that final day exposes what 
we are in danger of today. The porous body hopes for a body which Christ promised 
us and authenticated in his own resurrection: a resurrection body in which flesh and 
body are in absolute harmony, unified without fracture or gap, without temporal and 
spatial distinctions and without the precariousness to which those distinctions gives 
rise.
565
 This resurrection body is what is to come, when “the flesh will then be 
spiritual, and subject to the spirit; but it will still be flesh and not spirit, just as the 
spirit, even when carnal and subject to the flesh, is still spirit and not flesh.”
566
 
 There are four main characteristics we can adduce regarding the nature of the 
resurrection body: (1) incorruptibility, (2) immortality, (3) lightness/beauty and (4) 
perfect vision/rest.
567
 It is crucial to note that these characteristics change the body 
qualitatively, not, as we might presume, substantively. Remaining in continuity with 
our porous body now, the resurrection dictates a body in which the present body-
pole, “will remain the same, but with no fleshly corruption and heaviness 
remaining.”
568
 The body will be made fit to dwell in heaven, “not by losing its 
nature, but by changing its quality.”
569
 While we have to caution against wild 
conjecture and irresponsible extrapolation from our present state, we can claim the 
right to insist that flesh and body will not collapse into an invisible “ghost-like” 
apparition. As Paula Frediksen has put it, in rather dramatic epigrammatic form: 
“The body you gave breakfast to this morning, the body that helped you navigate 
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your automobile, the body with which you at this moment occupy your chair is... the 
very same body that will dwell in the heavens and see God.”
570
 If this is a rather 
dramatic assessment of the resurrection body, it uses hyperbole well to convey the 
fact that even though we shall continue to live-out bodily acts, those concrete profiles 
and exterior manifestations shall be transfigured and perfected in the resurrection—
not eradicated. Our porous body now will not change into another entity altogether, 
but rather transfigured into a perfectly integrated form of what it already is. This may 
mean many things, but is crucial to highlight that it at least means, according to the 
patristic tradition forward: incorruptibility, immortality, beauty, luminosity.  
 First of all we can say in no particular order that the body-to-come is to be (1) 
incorruptible, that is: perfect, without temptation and without imperfection. The 
resurrection body shall also be (2) immortal. Christ “while holding fast to His own 
divinity, became a partaker in our infirmity, that we, being changed for the better, 
might, by participating in His immorality and righteousness, lose our condition of sin 
and mortality....”
571
 We thus become immortal in an act of divine transformation 
when Christ returns, “we shall then have everlasting bodies, and so we shall be with 
Him everywhere....”
572
; or those who those who are caught up to meet Christ, “will 
leave their mortal bodies when they are caught up, and will straightway return into 
immortal bodies.”
573
 The discourse on the resurrection body also brings forth a body 
with a (3) beauty so majestic that its parts will be arranged perfectly, its stature 
strong and without blemish or deformity, so that “we need fear no bodily loss in the 
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resurrection of the body.”
574
 The resurrection body’s beauty shall also yield a 
sublime and aesthetic lightness such that “the body will go immediately to wherever 
the spirit wills; and the spirit will never will anything which is not seemly either to 
the spirit or to the body.”
575
 And finally, (4) the five senses of the porous body 
expand, taking into account the spiritual sense, especially the sense of sight, which is 
restored to “20-20” vision so that it can “see” God face to face. I know longer see 
God in an enigma or through a glass darkly but face to face.  
 The unity of flesh and body set into operation by the final resurrection 
signifies a complete, fully realized and perfected corpus spirituale. The resurrection 
body so understood is couched in terms of absolute harmony: the “elements of the 
body’s harmony... which are now hidden, will then be hidden no longer.”
576
 We also 
couch it in terms of perfect agreement: “For there will then be such a concord 
between flesh and spirit—the spirit quickening the servant flesh without any need of 
sustenance therefrom—that there will be no further conflict within ourselves.”
577
 
Described thusly, the bodily eyes are not limited by their finitude and weakness but 
are reconstituted by a spiritual quickening that enables their gaze to beholden, delight 
in and “see” the invisible God. For the resurrection body is in such perfect command 
of its body that its “facility will be as complete as their felicity. This is why their 
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 Yet the resurrection body recalls that our present porous Leibkörper 
maintains an internal gap, two distinct modes of givenness that tend to give way to 
internal conflict. As such, on the way to mortality in this world, the porous body is in 
danger of sin and the self-consuming power of thinking that it is an autonomous, 
self-empowered body-pole. An autonomous porous body is in danger of leaving 
behind its Leib in favour of its Körper, self-possessed and solipsistic in its idolatrous 
groping for the temporal and passing goods of the world (though it is impossible to 
leave behind one’s Leib, we can only forget about it). In the earthly city, self-
satisfaction anchored in pride leads to abuse of temporal goods for my own end. I 
worship myself in satisfying myself, usually in satisfying my bodily lusts. The 
danger remains that we think we shall become gods today only to perish in God’s 
wrath tomorrow.
579
 This bodily pride happens by way of a bodily lurch into the 
world, a distentio not toward the resurrection body but toward the exterior body-pole 
in the world, toward the naturalism and physicalism increasing apace in the modern 
world where medical and cognitive science, technology and secularism advance with 
no sign of waning. In a secular age, the porous body becomes all too easily clogged 
and reduced to a body-pole that, “refers all its business to one or other of the 
following ends: curiosity, searching for bodily and temporal experience through the 
senses; swollen conceit, affecting to be above other souls which are given over to 
their senses; or carnal pleasure, plunging itself in this muddy whirlpool.”
580
 The 
porous body, because it is given as an exterior body-pole in the world-horizon, is 
fragile. It must be on guard against forgetting that its possession of a body in the 
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created order is, in fact, a “part-ownership.”
581
 I forget I am between flesh and body 
when I lurch outward entirely into the zone of bodily senses, dwelling their alone, 
loving sensual gratification and privileging the atomized body; given over to bodily 
senses entirely, the porous body forgets its subjective Leib and its being-unto-
resurrection given to it by God. Such forgetfulness clogs its theological pores and 
thereby gives the impression that it is nothing more than a body-object of which I 
have full ownership, a corpse, a Körper to be commodifed like any other object.  
 Given the dangerous world in which the porous body lives, it is no wonder 
that, without being-unto-resurrection, it is allied with mortality. Indeed, the moment 
we enter the world we are “endlessly dying”
582
 and on our way to our mortal end. 
Our present state gravitates toward corruption and death—on a precarious and 
dangerous path toward death. Our spiritual vision is clogged and thus obscured by 
the weakness and corruptibility of the porous body. Jean-Yves Lacoste helpfully 
highlights that our spiritual life of hope in the coming eschaton is in continual 
“danger” as long as we dwell (and we always do) in the world. Created in the world, 
the porous body, “runs the risk constantly of being enfolded within being-in-the-
world... The world urges us to conform to its measure of, i.e., to its mode of 
existence.”
583
 In other words, the porous body occupies a fragile state, tarrying amid 
the danger of the world where, if not careful, it can limit its destiny to the objective 
body-pole in the finite horizon of the world. The world can be a perilous place.
584
 
                                                 
581
 Augustine, De trin, 12, 14. 
582
 Augustine, City of God, 13, 11. 
583
 Jean-Yves Lacoste, “Plus qu’existence et être-en-danger,” in Presence et Parousie, 145-68, 
reference on 164. 
584
 Augustine writes that the earth is full of a great mass of evils: “If therefore, there is no security 
even in the home from the common evils which befall the human race, what of the city? The larger 
the city, the more is its forum filled with civil law-suits and criminal trials. Even when the city is at 
peace and free from actual sedition and civil war, it is never free from the danger of such 
disturbance or, more often, bloodshed.” Augustine, City of God, 19, 5. See also 19, 10-11. 
327 
 
 It is only by professing hope in the resurrection to come that we protect (and 
remember) the two manners of givenness unified in a single body. As an unfinished 
body waiting in faith for the wholeness of the resurrection body, we must not forget 
the unity of flesh and body, and this despite their distinction. It is, “not yet in vision 
but in faith, not yet in fact but in hope,” that we seek the resurrection body in the 
heavenly city where the presence of God is on full display. During the pilgrimage 
now, the porous Leibkörper fights against the modern “forgetfulness” so pervasive in 
the West in which Leib is relegated to the margins. By expressing a word of hope 
Leib is memorialized and reincorporated in and through the eucharist. This 
eucharistic word professes hope in the heavenly city to come in which, “Christ 
perfects the great abundance of His sweetness for those who hope in Him.”
585
 It is in 
this City, or this social gathering of saints, that all come together to constitute the 
body of Christ, the site of intersubjective harmony and peace: “such is the salvation 
which, in the world to come, will also itself be our final happiness.”
 586
 To the social 
and sacramental bodies we now turn. 
 
 §36. THE SOCIAL AND SACRAMENTAL BODY OF CHRIST 
 We have sought to overcome two problems that render untenable Henry’s 
“duplicitous body:” first, Henry’s splitting of the body into two irreconcilable halves, 
between a pure flesh (pure non-temporal auto-affection), and impure body in the 
world (pure temporal hetero-affection). And second, his Gnostic-like aversion to the 
body in the world, an aversion sustained by an over-realized eschatology that 
suggests the presence (parousia) of God is fully manifest within my flesh. Up against 
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both of these points, we highlighted how two modes of givenness are unified 
imperfectly in a single body (Leibkörper) (§34), which in consequence fosters the 
hope for a perfect integration of flesh and body in the resurrection to come (§35). 
Building off of those two theological truths, this section retrieves the intrinsically 
social and sacramental character of the present porous body where the hope for the 
resurrection body is confessed, together as a corporate confession. As a co-
Leibkörper, all the saints labour together alongside the wicked (the tares and the 
wheat) in imperfect community—until that final day.
587
 By emphasizing the 
institutional and sacramental aspects of the body of Christ, we overcome a third 
problematic in Henry: the relation to the other. 
 Recall that Henry’s theory of the “la relation à autrui” outlines a communal 
site that is non-temporal, non-worldly, fully within Christ’s acosmic flesh (§33). The 
entryway to the other on this account is interior because the “Word made flesh” is 
always already present as a living present internal to each ego. Accordingly, we turn 
inward, disqualify the body in the world so as to accomplish the return back to the 
living present. In order to provide a corrective to such a monistic and non-worldly 
consideration of the body of Christ inasmuch as it is detached from the institutional 
and sacramental bodies, we re-emphasize the visible display of the institutional 
church and sacrament of the eucharist (Körper) as principal sites where I relate to the 
other. And yet this relation to the other we put forward does not deny the knitting 
together of the saints in the body of Christ as a concrete invisible unity (Leib).
588
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 The locution “body of Christ,” eventually denominated as the “Mystical body 
of Christ,” takes on a social manifestation; but it is a social in-gathering of the saints 
in Christ whereby the porous body does not lose, but maintains, its singularity as a 
body-pole given in an objective spatio-temporal horizon. Interior and exterior modes 
of givenness are thus preserved, but it is their distinction, not juxtaposition, to which 
we attend here. In the words of Goulven Madec, “Interiority and community are not 
juxtaposed but profoundly unified in the person of Christ who is in the plain sense of 
the scriptures, the interior teacher and the Head of the Body of which is the 
church.”
589
 We prioritize here the exterior relation to the other that touches off an 
interior communion of flesh in the body of Christ. Understood in this way, “my 
body” is my absolute “here” as this particular living body-pole distinct from other 
body-poles. My body-pole as an objective “here” is given together with bodies over 
“there,” and together we constitute the visible social body of Christ, namely the 
institutional church. Nevertheless I am able to enter into a communion of flesh with 
the other body over there who confesses with me the hope in the Resurrection body. 
As pilgrims on the way to the Heavenly City, how do we experience each other if I 
am a body-pole distinct from every other body-pole? 
 Perhaps the first point to observe about the experience of the other is that the 
institutional body of Christ, as the site of communion of flesh, is on pilgrimage in the 
world, making communion of flesh a difficult task to realize.
590
 As a result of 
pilgrimage, the porous body remains troubled by many trials, clashing wills, 
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misshapen desires and sin, “for not even holy and faithful worshippers of the one true 
and supreme God are secure from the deceits and manifold temptations of the 
demons.”
591
 Most of all the church on pilgrimage consists of a mixing or 
intermingling of good and evil, the saints mixing with the wicked. Such is the 
perilous state of the institutional body of Christ: “At this time, therefore, many 
reprobate are mingled in the church with the good. Both are as it were collected in 
the net of the gospel; and in this world, as in a sea, both swim together without 
separation, enclosed in the net until brought ashore.”
592
 Our account of the body 
explains not only the “mixing” but also the internal conflict of the body of Christ. 
The fact that my particular Leibkörper is a distinct body-pole and at a distance from 
the other body-poles over there constitutes a fact not neutral in itself. Such distance 
engenders conflict. Giving way to sin and conflict, the distance between “my body” 
and the “body over there” characterizes a feature through which the church on 
pilgrimage must negotiate. In what way? 
 The upshot of this distance between body-poles is that, as discrete, visible 
bodies who gather together in the exteriority of the church, body-poles are incapable 
of entering into full union: I am a leg, you are an arm and yet another is a finger. We 
all appear contiguously and separate as body-poles in the world, standing at an 
objective distance from each other. I cannot, as this member of the body occupying 
my own space, somehow “merge” with or become one with another member of the 
body. My “here” as this particular limb is here by virtue of its relation to the other’s 
“there” as a different limb. A thumb, as spatially relative to other components, does 
not appear as a leg, but as a thumb only. The bodily distance between porous bodies 
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places not just distance buy also resistance at the centre of our relation. We are 
exterior to each other. The resistance this exteriority discloses the basic individuation 
of the objective body as a polarity, as this “me” who is here and not over there. As 
Husserl put it succinctly, “As reflexively related to itself, my animate bodily 
organism (in my primordial sphere) has the central “Here” as its mode of givenness; 
every other body, and accordingly the ‘other’s’ body, has the mode “There.”
593
 But 
this is no mere neutral description of embodied life, as Husserl may presuppose. The 
distance between body-poles can, and usually does, lead to resistance that assumes 
subjective states such as anxiety, insecurity, and the temptation to inflict bodily harm 
on one another. In this state of hardship, “we often believe that someone who is an 
enemy is a friend, or that someone who is a friend is an enemy.”
594
 Given that “social 
life is surrounded by such darkness”
595
 each body-pole is weak and frail and 
succumbs to resisting, rather than communing with, the other body. As such, 
alienation, anxiety and insecurity are not uncommon to those members of the 
institutional body of Christ. Saints and the reprobate intertwine together as body 
parts constitutive of the body of Christ, but their integration is hampered by an ever 
greater distanciation, giving way to resistance that is manifest as conflict.
596
 
 Yet there is hope for pre-eschatological communion of flesh with the other. 
Even though I am not less than an exterior body-pole, I exceed that geometric 
limitation. I am not merely a monad whose body is shut up within itself in a closed 
system incapable of sharing bodily with other bodies other than through resistance, 
or its obverse, the intentional act of empathy, as Husserl thinks. From a theological 
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point view, we can examine how the body of Christ provides the common point 
where bodies meet, where bodies commune together in spirit, hope and love—a 
communion of flesh. Such a communion is given in both time and space: temporality 
as memoria and epektasis and spatiality as a spatial plasticity, both time and space 
are conditions for the possibility of a communion of flesh in Christ.   
 Husserl is, however, correct in one respect in regard to the body. He rightly 
depicts the relationship among bodies, no matter communing in and through empathy 
or in and through the body of Christ, as an intersubjective system of “monads.” 
Certainly I cannot, as Husserl observes, place myself inside the other’s body. My 
Körper cannot coincide with the other’s Körper, for that is both temporally and 
spatially impossible.
597
 But in contrast to the inter-monadic system famously 
elaborated in Husserl’s fifth chapter of the Cartesian Meditations, the body of Christ 
enables each porous body to be unified together on the basis of the porosity of flesh. 
The interior Leib is given not only inside me but also outside of me, spilling over the 
edges of the psychosomatic monadic sphere elaborated by Husserl. If this is true, it 
follows that, despite the conflict and the tension resulting from the bodily distinction 
between my “here” and your “there,” the church is a single co-Leibkörper, a single 
communion of flesh brought about by the headship of Christ—who is both invisible 
Leib and visible institutional/sacramental Körper. And while the separation of the 
wheat from the tares will take place by winnowing as on a threshing floor in that 
final day, the porous body’s pre-eschatological state is nevertheless both fleshly 
(Leib) and bodily (Körper), and is thereupon enabled to commune in love and hope 
with others on the basis of Leib mediated through the Körper.  
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 Which leads us to our final point in this section: in the institutional and 
sacramental body of Christ our bodies gather together so as to open up a space in 
which communion of flesh can occur. A “cosmic Christ” (not an acosmic Christ) 
disclosive of the institutional and sacramental reality of the body of Christ in the 
world-horizon joins the saints together in communion of flesh. But it is critical to 
observe once again, that phenomenologically speaking, no absolute unity is possible. 
The actuality of “my” communion with “you” in the ecclesial horizon of the body of 
Christ is not constituted within the auto-generation of an acosmic “Word made flesh” 
that transcends, altogether, the body polarity situated in the world. Though my flesh 
may come into communion with your flesh in and through hope and love in Christ, 
my flesh remains tied to my body just as your flesh remains tied to your body. I am a 
single body with two modes of givenness whereby the interior flesh assumes a mode 
of dynamic givenness that is in surplus to the strict monadic sphere of the Husserlian 
Leibkörper. Such a surplus is precisely what enables me to enter into abiding and 
deep spiritual communion with you; we are thus porous to each other on the basis of 
the surplus of flesh each of us inhabits (surplus as spatial plasticity and eucharistic 
temporality). But my flesh cannot merge with your flesh. I cannot enjoy the presence 
of your flesh inside my flesh nor can I enter your flesh, hollowing out a home there 
and reincorporating myself there. The reason why this is impossible is because flesh 
and body are given together within one body, which in turn, presupposes that my 
flesh may never disentangle itself from its incorporation within a body-pole, the 
geometric givenness of the polarity of Körper and its temporal continuity. 
 Correspondingly, communion of flesh also means that our body-poles are in a 
similar over-arching scheme, within the same institutional and sacramental body. 
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When my flesh enters into such a communion with your flesh on the basis of love 
and hope in Christ and the resurrection body to come, our bodies are necessarily 
brought together as well. I must rise out of the chair, walk out the door and situate 
myself within the walls of the church, just as you shall. When my flesh is in 
communion with your flesh it implies that we are occupying the same space bodily 
within the institutional body of Christ (though not literally the same church building. 
I can be in Edinburgh and you in London, for the body of Christ is spread out over 
the world-horizon).  
 But we give a more rigorous account of the possibility of communion of 
flesh: if I cannot disentangle my flesh from my body, how can I commune with your 
flesh at all? We recall that flesh appears with a peculiar mode of givenness with 
regard both to spatiality and temporality. (1) All flesh puts into play a spatial 
plasticity, a dynamic extension in and through the body inasmuch as the suppleness 
of flesh is not imprisoned within the strict, pre-fixed silhouette of the bodily limbs, 
their movements and monadic enclosure. Flesh is, in fact, a living subjectivity 
fractured to, and able to enter into communion with, other flesh on the basis of the 
“Word made flesh” because all flesh images the Word. (2) In addition to spatial 
plasticity, another characteristic of flesh is that it is typically in temporal continuity 
with the body. Triggered by a contemplative intentionality (memoria and epektasis), 
however, flesh becomes fractured temporally to the pure presence of the eternal 
Word. My flesh and your flesh therefore ascend together to the present, through the 
curvature of memoria and epektasis (§31). However, the flesh’s temporal porosity to 
the present does not allow for flesh to ascend beyond the temporal sequencing of the 
body, as if the flesh could literally rise outside of the steady temporal continuity of 
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the body. Retention and protention cannot be left behind in a bid for an “out of body” 
experience, but retention and protention are nevertheless modified from a theological 
point of view. The temporal curvature of retentional and protentional acts does not 
result in a break from temporality, rather curvature modifies temporality without 
escaping it. As such, the temporal curvature put into play by a contemplative 
intentionality also assumes something like a plasticity because the temporality and 
the spatiality of the flesh are not neatly distinct. Recall that the temporality of flesh 
and the spatiality of flesh are co-given within the same Leib itself. And so, because 
my flesh is temporally and spatially plastic and your flesh is temporally and spatially 
plastic, we are able to enter into an abiding communion outside ourselves precisely 
because flesh is not restricted to our bodily monadic spheres. 
 When I gather together, therefore, with your flesh in the body of Christ, our 
inter-flesh communion is a “transcorporeal” experience incapable of being brought to 
light fully by a hermeneutical-narrative structure. I am not merely a “metaphorical 
body” among other metaphorical bodies whose narrative-discourse is “received and 
understood only in and through language,” as Graham Ward puts it.
598
 In the body of 
Christ we are not joined together only as characters in a plot, nor are we only 
imaginatively inscribed within a narrative-linguistic/metaphorical body of Christ. 
Rather, I am primarily received and understood in relation to the other in and through 
flesh, and on the basis of our mutual porosity to the “Word made flesh.” But this 
concrete relation to the other is never conceived of apart from the objective body-
pole. For the body-pole, too, is alive because it is joined with the flesh. The objective 
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body-pole perceived in the world cannot, in principle, appear as a mechanistic res 
extensa or, worse, an illusion that de-realizes my flesh (Henry).  
 My relation to the other is thus realized on the basis of a mutual temporal and 
spatial porosity, evoked in and through the objective body-pole—and thus a relation 
necessarily prior to, but not separate from, narrative, language and metaphor. We 
thus ask again: if I cannot disentangle my flesh from my body, how can I commune 
with your flesh at all? This intersubjective communion of flesh may be clarified by 
the eucharistic body. As Jean-Luc Marion helpfully points out, the eucharist as the 
liturgical right par excellence, is a central site of theological discourse itself. In the 
eucharist, saints are incorporated within the body of Christ. This is not achieved by 
way of real presence (enclosed in res literally within bread and wine, i.e., 
transubstantiation) nor is it accomplished in and through the conscious attention 
conferred on the offering by the congregants gathered. Instead, Marion elucidates the 
eucharist explicitly over against immediacy or reification, whether reified in the host 
itself or in the community’s consciousness of the host. The eucharist appears as 
eschatological, for it is mediated through time, both memoria and epektasis. 
Mediated and visible, the sacramental body of Christ communicated through the 
bread and wine constitutes a living icon of the body of Christ. Mediated visibly, the 
consecrated bread and the wine give to the saints the invisible unity of love and 
spirit. But such a unity is linguistic and symbolic insofar as it touches off an invisible 
communion of flesh unable to be thematized by language or symbol. Along these 
lines, Marion writes, “the spiritual body of Christ constituted by the Church. A 
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spiritual body, in other words a body infinitely more united, more coherent, more 
consistent—in a word, more real—than any physical body.”
599
  
 The proposal we are advancing here elaborates a relation to the other on the 
basis of flesh as a mode of givenness distinct from, but not juxtaposed to, the 
givenness of the objective body-pole. Hence, (and this is where we may diverge from 
Marion), the mutuality of flesh in communion is always mediated by the body. Each 
Leib is therefore fused together in love and hope on the basis of their common 
porosity to the eternal Christic Leib, but this is always mediated by Christ’s cosmic 
body (Körper) that joins all other bodies into visible ecclesial and sacramental 
bodies. In and through the church and its sacramental rites, we are “fused somehow 
into one spirit in the furnace of charity:” 
 
“He did not say ‘that I and they may be one,’ though as he is the 
church’s head and the church is his body he could have said that ‘I 
and they’ may be not one ‘thing’ but ‘one person’ since head and 
body make the one Christ.... so they are cleansed by the mediator 
that they may be one in him, not only by virtue of the same nature 
whereby all of them from the ranks of mortal men are made equal 
to the angels, but even more by virtue of one and the same wholly 
harmonious will reaching out  in concert to the same ultimate 






It is thus here in the ecclesial exteriority of the body of Christ that saints enter into a 
concrete inter-flesh communion that is put into play by, but not fully analyzable by, 
eucharistic language and symbol. The communion of flesh, while not overcoming the 
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basic distance separating my body from your body, is actualized on the basis of the 
porosity of display whereby each flesh’s surplus enables it to exceed its geometrical 
body-pole. My flesh is spatially fluid, vulnerable and a living capacity and is porous 
to other flesh but is only joined to your flesh once it is understood from the vantage 
point of the eucharist, which modifies the flesh by opening it to the “Word made 
flesh” outside of the temporal succession of the world-horizon. By unclogging those 
temporal and spatial pores each of us has by virtue of being an imago Dei, inter-flesh 
communion is brought to fruition, however imperfect, by participation in the 
sacramental body of Christ. My flesh and your flesh are “fused somehow into one 
spirit in the furnace of charity” when our bodies receive the eucharist mediated 
through bread and wine; and when received in hope and love, the bread and wine 
evokes a communion of flesh because we “eat within, not without; he who eats with 
his heart, not he who crushes with his teeth.”
601
  
 Like the institutional church, the theological intelligibility of the eucharist is 
twofold, both Leib and Körper. It is a visible word, spoken by the clergy in linguistic 
speech-acts, expressed in and through the sacramental Körper. Yet the eucharist is 
also an invisible “Word made flesh,” an eternal Leib through which my Leib and 
your Leib are fused together in hope and love. Graham Ward’s explication of the 
“transcorporeality” of the eucharist body proves exemplary here as a decisive 
antidote against the modernity’s temptation to reduce bodies to atoms or inert 
commodities, or to conceive of the eucharistic body as a reification enclosed within 
and extended through the bread and wine. So when Christ says “this is my body, take 
and eat,” Christ is referring to what Ward articulates philosophically as an 
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“ontological scandal.” The body of Christ, as eucharist, is broken and dispersed 
across the body of Christ as church. Leagued irremediably together, the eucharist and 
church intertwine, so that the visible corporate disclosure of my body (Körper) and 
your body (Körper) are gathered together in the corporeality of the church to receive 
the sacramental bread and wine in the unity of our flesh (Leib). The objective bread 
and wine (Körper) is also the spiritual body of Christ communicated in grace to the 
flesh of the saints (Leib). Christ does not “cut himself up” and disburse his body to 
be consumed in bite-sized pieces in exterior form. Rather the “Word made flesh” 
nourishes his body spiritually, animating the church to be a living, invisible 
phenomenon of love and hope. Stretching my flesh (plasciticy of both temporality 
and spatiality) beyond the rigid boundaries of the body-pole, the eucharist enables 
my flesh and your flesh to commune without taking leave of our bodies. Though we 
may relate as distinct bodies, our communion is such “that we may be his members, 
unity joins us together. That unity may join together, what causes it except love?”
602
  
 We are now in a position to say a brief word about how the body of Christ 
shall appear in perfect unity on that final day—that day when the sorting of wheat 
and tares shall happen and when God appears in full splendour (no longer in an 
enigma). How might the perfected co-Leibkörper appear in the fullness of God’s 
presence? Might we, together as the perfected body, see God “face to face?” 
 
 §37. SEEING GOD 
 We have been arguing that to unveil the porous self we must investigate the 
body as a focal-point. As a site for theological reflection, the body can be 
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reconfigured by the resurrection body, the institutional body and the sacramental 
body. To accomplish this, we proceeded from a porous body whose characteristic 
feature is that it contains two modes of givenness joined within a single body, a 
Leibkörper (§34). And because our proposal, to be clear, is a discourse aimed at 
unifying the Leibkörper in a manner that explicitly overcomes Henry’s duplicitous 
body and the over-realized eschatology on which it rests, we inscribed the porous 
body within an eschatological framework (§35). The institutional body in which the 
porous body confesses faith in the resurrection body to come is the body of Christ, 
the church/sacrament—the institutional community where the wheat and the tares 
live precariously by the logic of love, the definitive expression of which is the 
eucharistic or sacramental body (§36). The resurrection body, we argued, shall be 
perfect, fulfilling the porous body’s hope for fullness, so that “when the complete 
comes, the incomplete will pass away... for now we see in a mirror dimly, but then 
face to face” (1 Corinthians 13.10-12). It is the eschatological consummation of the 
resurrection body that we approach here, cautiously, in this final section.  
 Once the porous body is raised on the last day, it is transfigured by the Spirit, 
made whole and perfected in its imaging of the “Word made flesh.” Our proposal of 
a porous body, holding together Leib and Körper in unity (however precarious and 
incomplete), insists that the resurrection body is not disembodied, detached from its 
Körper, as if shed like old skin. Rather the Leibkörper is transfigured, becoming 
whole and immortal in its eschatological presence. In such a transfiguration, Leib and 
Körper interpenetrate, so that I see God with my bodily eyes as if I see that table in 




It may well be, then—indeed, this is entirely credible—that, in the 
world to come, we shall see the bodily forms of the new heaven and 
the new earth in such a way as to perceive God with total clarity and 
distinctness, everywhere present and governing all things, both 
material and spiritual. In this life, we understand the invisible things 
of God by the things which are made, and we see Him darkly and in 
part, as in a glass, and by faith rather than by perceiving corporeal 
appearances with our bodily eyes. In the life to come, however, it 
may be that we shall see Him by means of the bodies which we shall 
then ear, and wherever we shall turn our eyes. In the world to come, 
wherever we shall look with the spiritual eyes of our bodies, we shall 






 The phenomenological truth embedded in this extended quote is that the 
porosity of display, in its temporal fulfilment to come, gives way to full presence, 
parousia. The body no longer conforms to the porosity of its mortal and frail body 
but rather appears whole, standing within the presence of God in which all is made 
luminous by the light of glory. Of the porous body, God’s glory perfects it bringing it 
into plain site so that the interior is made exterior and the exterior is made interior, 
the two modes of givenness becoming one. The kind of vision with which the saints 
will see God enjoys perfect clarity, no longer obscured by the distinction between 
Leib and Körper (and no longer in need of the eye of faith). Neither the duplicity nor 
the porosity of display will suffice, for it is the glory of divine display itself that is 
manifest, rendering every appearance luminous and perceptible: “When He shall 
appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is” (1 John 3.2). The porous 
Leibkörper attains its destiny as the eschatological Leibkörper, which is still a 
Leibkörper but one which consists of one mode of givenness, both spiritual and 
physical given in and through the same gift.  
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 In the new heaven and new earth, even if I shut my eyes, I shall not block the 
display of God’s glory from my gaze, for we must forbid “that we should say that the 
saint in the life to come will not see God when they close their eyes; for they will 
always see Him in the Spirit.”
604
 We have attained in the eschatological Leibkörper 
the pure display of creation itself, for it has longed to be perfect and complete 
without temporal flow, corruption, frailty or seeking in faith/hope. The temporality 
of confessing faith as the unclogging of pores is rewarded by the opening of all 
pores, without delay and to abandon. There is no memoria  and no epektasis, both 
temporal ecstasies are used only to unveil what is hidden. In the new heaven and new 
earth, all is on display, nothing hidden and thus everything present in the presence of 
eternity. There is no distance between Leib and Körper, for their relation, too, is laid 
bare in its perfect unity. The distance between distinct Leibkörperen severally 
ordered in the body of Christ as a single co- Leibkörper are in such perfect in 
harmony and peace that there is no discord, anxiety or sin (and yet each is perfectly 
singular in her own lived-pole as this particular Leibkörper). It is therefore in this 
enduring bodily presencing before the glory of God in which we “shall see him as he 
is” (1 John 3.2). It through this perfect and full vision “that the image of god will 
achieve its full likeness of him when it attains to the full vision of him—thought this 
text from the apostle John might also appear to be referring to the immortality of the 
body.”
605
 It is in the eternal body, what St. Paul calls the incorruptible body in 1 
Corinthians 15, that the full vision of God is received by grace, and lived and 
enjoyed forever in the delight and felicity. And here, in the mystical body of Christ, 
we are all ordered but also joined in spirit and body within Christ’s body, so that we 
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appear in the bright noonday sun together with the “perfect man, that is, Christ, and 
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 This dissertation has sought to achieve two goals: (1) to critically introduce 
and contextualize Michel Henry’s duplicitous self with particular reference to his 
theological turn and to isolate the phenomenological and theological problems to 
which it gives rise; and (2) to construct over against Henry (while appreciating his 
theological turn) an eschatological self whose temporal and bodily modes of 
appearing are firmly situated within the world but also directed to a God who 
transcends the world. 
 To that end we have arranged the chapters of the dissertation within three 
interlocking parts, proceeding from context, to exegesis, and finally, to constructive 
reflection. The first chapter locates Henry’s work in the contemporary scene, setting 
him within phenomenology’s theological turn. Chapter two highlights Henry’s 
critical readings of Husserl and Heidegger, and it is in this chapter that we begin to 
glimpse the subjective mode of display—auto-affection as the living present—that 
shall animate his theological turn.  
 The second part consists of a critical introduction to Henry’s theological turn 
in light of two principal themes tied to the living present: temporality and the body. 
Chapter three discusses the non-temporal origin of the self Henry unveils. By giving 
me a non-temporal origin it follows that I am born within God and endlessly given to 
myself within the life of Christ. Without reference to past or future and thus without 
reference to my appearing in the world-horizon, I appear in my apodictic essence as 
this dative/accusative “me” born from within the eternal life of Christ—I am a Son of 
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God in my essence. This “tense-less” living present, we argued, necessarily entails a 
misguided movement toward monism. Here monism is a qualified non-temporal 
monism defined as a transcendental origin that assures that I must share immediately 
in God’s essence if I am to appear as a self at all. Moreover, because it is the 
parousia in which I share and from which my nocturnal living present subsists as a 
self, there can be no temporality involved in my brith. Without hesitation this leads 
to another theological blunder, one that correlates my passive embrace within God’s 
presence with an over-realized eschatology. Nestled within the nocturnal site of my 
subjectivity, in my pure self-affection, is the parousiaic glory of God’s self-giving 
manifestation. The disclosure of the living present brings into full light the manner in 
which God is ineluctably present to me as a phenomenon. Chapter four continues in 
this vein. The body so conceived by Henry is split, irreparably, between an interior 
Leib and an exterior Körper. The “Word made flesh” appears in its incarnate 
presence inside me giving flesh to me, giving rise to my Leib without relation to my 
Körper, once again leading to an absolute monism that privileges the interior mode 
of display at the expense of the exterior. 
 Part three indicates a way forward. Henry’s imaginative elucidation of the 
interior self remains fruitful precisely because it situates the self between the poles of 
temporality and the body and links my origin, not to the sovereign self-positing 
subject, but to God. Chapter five incorporates resources from St. Augustine (both 
phenomenological and theological) in order to bring to light the temporal modes of 
the self, and in particular, the temporality of pilgrimage that fosters the 
contemplation of a God who transcends time. Pilgrimage assumes a theological self 
whose status as an imago Dei is constitutive of an interior non-reflective self-
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awareness we all have as unique subjects created by God. While I do not feel myself 
in a pure and elemental auto-affection as Henry may think, I nevertheless appear to 
myself in a subjective site that is not communicable by language or thematizable by 
the standard subject-object opposition. My interior non-reflective self-awareness is 
not pure because it remains temporal and of a piece with the world-horizon God 
created. And yet I am not alienated from God while on pilgrimage in the world—as 
if I were abandoned to the world by a God whose creative presence is fully removed. 
As the Creator who brought forth heaven and earth and all that is within, temporality 
is not self-enclosed or horizontal but is fractured to God’s eternal repose. I am porous 
to God by virture of my involvement in a created order God made and saw as good. 
Two temporal movements realized in and through the world-horizon are invoked as 
means of grace that God deploys to unclog my inner porosity to God: memoria and 
epektasis. Backward and forward directionalities are given to the self who enjoys 
God through the eucharist, the site par excellence of contemplation. While never 
escaping from the world I am enabled through a eucharistic play of temporality to 
move toward the presence of God outside of time. Memoria and epektasis interlock 
in the eucharist, “For whenever you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim 
the Lord’s death until he comes” (1 Cor. 11. 27). When I remember God I also lean 
forward in eschatological expectation for the parousia to come. 
 The final chapter integrates the temporal pole with the bodily pole of the self. 
Here the Leib and Körper are reunified into a single Leibkörper, which is then 
discussed as a unique body-pole with a living flesh that can enter into abiding 
communion with other body-poles in the body of Christ. Here not only is the 
eucharistic body once again adduced as a leitmotif characteristic of the 
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escathological self but so are the ecclesial and resurrection bodies. Understood in this 
way, the eschatological body that I am together with others in the institutional body 
surmounts Henry’s non-worldly monism and the over-realized eschatology that 
maintains my flesh is already in perfect union with the flesh of Christ. The 
eschatological body does not, and cannot, make God present to me as a phenomenon. 
The glory of God is to be longed for in the resurrection body to come, where I shall 
see God face to face and where no phenomenality but God’s luminous holiness may 
appear. In the eternal Sabbath of life I shall see God; until then, I am set the task of 
seeking the “Sunday of Life” and remaining under its eschatological conditions while 
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